The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

There is also a thing where yes on the one hand attrition, population size, industrial capacity has a certain inevitable logic. But if you aren't winning battles the strain can become unbearable and armies can break down.

1941 and the first three months of 1942 were bad times for the Allies. Millions of troops, thousands of aircraft, tanks, guns and other materiel were lost. The news was full of defeat after defeat. German and Japanese triumphs. New atrocities and endless slaughter. The Allies were hemorrhaging trained soldiers and equipment. Losing ground. If you are a soldier in one of those losing armies in the Philippines or Malaysia or Ukraine or Egypt, the notion that attrition and production logistics are inevitably on your side is cold comfort.

That surging Axis momentum needed to be checked, and as soon as possible. The Soviets started to stiffen up in the mid year but didn't really start turning it around until the fall of 1942. The British began turning things around in the middle of the year, also peaking around November. For the Allies in the Pacific Theater, Midway was huge. The loss of those Japanese carriers and all those flight crews meant that the avalanche was quite checked, literally over night. The armed forces suddenly, in one day, shifted rapidly toward parity, and in a more even fight, the attrition and production advantages begin to seem a lot more real for the soldier, sailor and airman.


That is also why I think the Spitfire was really necessary in the BoB. The Hurricane could shoot down the bombers quite efficiently and cause a certain amount of damage to the fighters, losing 10 to shoot down 3 Bf 109s say. But the Spitfire was even, or a little better than even. Maybe 5 for 5 or even 5 for 6. The Spitfire was where the British could say, we can best them. Not just endure them or whittle them down, but we can win.

Schweik said:

I think that is about when it started, but it took a while. Stalingrad went on until February of 43, same for Guadalcanal, serious heavy fighting in North Africa continued until March of 43 (Kasserine Pass, a substantial Axis victory, was in Feb of 43).

Second El Alamein was also set up by the first El Alamein in July 42 (a draw, technically but a rare example of stopping a major push by the Afrika Korps) and during the battle of Alam el Halfa, which was really the first important British victory by their new commander Bernard Montgomery, in August of 42. Simultaneously in the MTO was the series of engagements some call collectively "the siege of Malta" - Malta holding out, kind of by the skin of their teeth, amounted to another major Allied victory. That campaign went on through the year (and well before) but ended around your tipping point of Nov 42. Having Malta as an air base meant Axis logistics were choked off - definitely contributing to victory in the Med. Here you can give credit to the Hurricane and the Spit (and before that, the Gladiator).

Coral Sea (May 42) and Midway (June 42) were earlier, but in combination amounted to a serious punch in the face that knocked out some of the IJN's teeth. The real effects of it weren't entirely apparent really until Guadalcanal heated up, with those four or five carriers the Japanese would probably have won there.

So while you could reasonably say Nov 42 was the fulcrum, it was kind of more of a range from mid 1942- spring 1943, IMO.

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True Stalingrad, El Alamein, Guadalcanal lasted past Nov 42. But after Nov 42, the Axis never launched a successful Strategic Offensive for the rest of the War. Perhaps Kursk was an attempt but it was not successful. Japan continued offenses in Mainland China, but they were not Strategic in the sense that it was altering the War. The Naval battles and land battles at Guadalcanal in Nov 42 determined the US was win, it took more time for the Japanese to evacuate the island. Nov 42 was the high water mark.

To clarify, I'm not saying the war became easy after this tipping point, I'm just saying the existential dread was somewhat lessened, the possibility of victory became more real. For the individual fighting man though, death was still very real and very likely, whether at Corregidor or Bastogne, Malaya or Arnhem.

Schweik said:

There is also a thing where yes on the one hand attrition, population size, industrial capacity has a certain inevitable logic. But if you aren't winning battles the strain can become unbearable and armies can break down.

1941 and the first three months of 1942 were bad times for the Allies. Millions of troops, thousands of aircraft, tanks, guns and other materiel were lost. The news was full of defeat after defeat. German and Japanese triumphs. New atrocities and endless slaughter. The Allies were hemorrhaging trained soldiers and equipment. Losing ground. If you are a soldier in one of those losing armies in the Philippines or Malaysia or Ukraine or Egypt, the notion that attrition and production logistics are inevitably on your side is cold comfort.

That surging Axis momentum needed to be checked, and as soon as possible. The Soviets started to stiffen up in the mid year but didn't really start turning it around until the fall of 1942. The British began turning things around in the middle of the year, also peaking around November. For the Allies in the Pacific Theater, Midway was huge. The loss of those Japanese carriers and all those flight crews meant that the avalanche was quite checked, literally over night. The armed forces suddenly, in one day, shifted rapidly toward parity, and in a more even fight, the attrition and production advantages begin to seem a lot more real for the soldier, sailor and airman.


That is also why I think the Spitfire was really necessary in the BoB. The Hurricane could shoot down the bombers quite efficiently and cause a certain amount of damage to the fighters, losing 10 to shoot down 3 Bf 109s say. But the Spitfire was even, or a little better than even. Maybe 5 for 5 or even 5 for 6. The Spitfire was where the British could say, we can best them. Not just endure them or whittle them down, but we can win.

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Schweik,

When did the big wing, welded wingmen give way to the pairs and finger fours? Those two types of formations, and ensuing tactics were the proverbial recipe for disaster when fighting a combat experienced adversary.

Cheers,
Biff

BiffF15 said:

Schweik,

When did the big wing, welded wingmen give way to the pairs and finger fours? Those two types of formations, and ensuing tactics were the proverbial recipe for disaster when fighting a combat experienced adversary.

Cheers,
Biff

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In a comedy only the British could produce the big wing actually came after some squadrons were using finger fours.

Schweik said:

That is also why I think the Spitfire was really necessary in the BoB. The Hurricane could shoot down the bombers quite efficiently and cause a certain amount of damage to the fighters, losing 10 to shoot down 3 Bf 109s say. But the Spitfire was even, or a little better than even. Maybe 5 for 5 or even 5 for 6. The Spitfire was where the British could say, we can best them. Not just endure them or whittle them down, but we can win.

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The Hurricane shot down more aircraft than the Spitfire because there were more Hurricanes. how many were shot down depended almost entirely on the situation, and who bounced whom. The Spitfire was marginally better overall, better at keeping new pilots alive and marginally to be shot down in, statistically fewer pilots got burned.

BiffF15 said:

Schweik,

When did the big wing, welded wingmen give way to the pairs and finger fours? Those two types of formations, and ensuing tactics were the proverbial recipe for disaster when fighting a combat experienced adversary.

Cheers,
Biff

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From what I gather this happened gradually and at different rates in different Theaters. I have read (though it could be wrong) the finger four was developed originally by the Finns in the early 30's, and the Germans adapted it from them. Another version says the Germans of the Condor Legion developed it independently during the Spanish Civil War.

The Finns had this standard tactic when faced with Russian fighters as they came toward a merge: one pair goes left and up, the other pair goes right and up. Whichever pair is chased by the Russians becomes the bait, the other pair hunts the chasers and shoots them down. They said it worked over and over and over again.

I believe the British adopted the Rotte (from the Germans) in the aftermath of the BoB, but this didn't seem to have filtered out to the Med or Burma where they were still using vics, line astern, weaving "fluid pairs" and so on through 1941 and until May or June of 1942. They adopted two pairs of wingmen as a finger-four in the Med at some point in mid 1942.

They also changed from more defensive to more offensive tactics at that time. Prior to June of 42 it was common for Allied fighters to form a lufbery circle when attacked, each plane chasing the other, theoretically covering each other but in practice handing over all initiative to the enemy. This was a reaction to the superior performance of the Bf 109 and especially it's attacks from above. Later it was the same problem with the MC.202, with the same reaction. Some Axis pilots excelled at defeating these - it was Hans Joachim Marseilles favorite target. It allowed a pair or a Rotte of 4 German fighters to take turns attacking 12 Allied fighters or more.

After mid 42 though, they changed to instead do a wheeling turn of the whole squadron into an attack, guns blazing. Then after the enemy passed, they would split into 3 or 4 formations of two pairs each, one turning right, one left, and one split-Sing into a 180 degree turn. From there they fought in pairs, basically. This tactic worked much better and so long as they saw the attack coming, the bounce lost a lot of it's bite. They also actively sought out Axis fighters and attacked their bases, forcing a fight.

The Russians seem to have gradually adopted the finger four from the Germans starting some time in late 1942. By mid 1943 it seems to have become standard.

The Japanese were using Vics in the early days of the war, and didn't start switching to pairs until some time in 1943. Like the Russians they also initially had a serious shortage of radios, in early Japanese fighter units sometimes only the squadron leader had a radio. I think having the radio makes group tactics much more effective.

US Navy was training finger four ("Fighting Pair" or "Pair or pairs" as they called it) since 1940, possibly learning about it from German Spanish Civil War exploits. They also famously adopted the Thach weave which was a standard tactic also used by the Germans. The USAAF seems to have picked this up from the Navy before the war. In the Med and Pacific they were using pairs from the early days.

Schweik said:

I am not confident a Sea Hurricane could handle a Zero. Martlet as we know is fairly comparable but I'm not sure how many they had in 1942, none seem to be involved in the Ceylon debacle.

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Per Bloody Shambles the few RAF Hurricanes delivered to Singapore by HMS Indomitable in Jan 1942 did well against the Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa. The A6M has similar performance to the K-43, so the Sea Hurricane should be competitive. The trick as always when dealing with the Zero is to avoid a turning match and to fight to your advantage, like the Thatch Weave.

I've just discovered that the Sea Hurricane was also produced in Fort William, Canada. This means fighters can be easily flown to RN carriers in Norfolk, VA or even at CFB Esquimalt. Below in Sept 1941 these Sea Hurricanes are in final assembly, during which three RN carriers are soon to be in Norfolk, VA for repairs.

Schweik said:

I don't consider the Swordfish "one of the greats of WW2".

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Well, universal opinion is that it is, Shweik, just because you don't doesn't mean it isn't.

Regarding the Skua, yes, you have provided accurate figures, but that doesn't mean it couldn't have done the job, none of it does and again, regardless of whether the SBD shot down 120 or 1200 enemy fighters, it makes no difference to the situation, circumstances were different in the combat arenas that both aircraft operated in. All you are doing is quoting figures that can't really justify why the Skua could not have carried out the same job. Had the British been in the same environment then the Skua would have had to do, so again, your judgement is moot - it certainly shows that operationally the Dauntless enjoyed a longer and fuller career but it doesn't explain why the Skua could'nt have done the same. Sorry, not convinced.

Admiral Beez said:

Per Bloody Shambles the few RAF Hurricanes delivered to Singapore by HMS Indomitable in Jan 1942 did well against the Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa. The A6M has similar performance to the K-43, so the Sea Hurricane should be competitive. The trick as always when dealing with the Zero is to avoid a turning match and to fight to your advantage, like the Thatch Weave.

I've just discovered that the Sea Hurricane was also produced in Fort William, Canada. This means fighters can be easily flown to RN carriers in Norfolk, VA or even at CFB Esquimalt. Below in Sept 1941 these Sea Hurricanes are in final assembly, during which three RN carriers are soon to be in Norfolk, VA for repairs.

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Great photo but my info says that the Hurricane did abyssmally against the Ki 43 through the end of the war. Do you have specific examples?

nuuumannn said:

Well, universal opinion is that it is, Shweik, just because you don't doesn't mean it isn't.

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I don't think that is true, I wouldn't think most people outside of UK or Commonwealth countries feel that way, I don't think anyone I know does. Maybe we should run a poll?

Regarding the Skua, yes, you have provided accurate figures, but that doesn't mean it couldn't have done the job, none of it does and again, regardless of whether the SBD shot down 120 or 1200 enemy fighters, it makes no difference to the situation, circumstances were different in the combat arenas that both aircraft operated in. All you are doing is quoting figures that can't really justify why the Skua could not have carried out the same job. Had the British been in the same environment then the Skua would have had to do, so again, your judgement is moot - it certainly shows that operationally the Dauntless enjoyed a longer and fuller career but it doesn't explain why the Skua could'nt have done the same. Sorry, not convinced.

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I think the key factors would be range, bomb load and the exaggerated vulnerability of the Skua.

Midway was a very close-run battle. If the Allies had been forced to use bombers with 2/3 of the range, and if they had suffered substantially higher losses, and only been able to carry half the size bombs that they actually used, I don't think they would have won it. Admittedly just my opinion, but I think there is considerable evidence to support that.

The reason I keep bringing up the 120 victory claims, is because it's quite unusual for a single-engined bomber. In fact it's higher than some US fighters managed. It's an indication that the SBD was used successfully as a "scout fighter" or perhaps more properly, an "emergency fighter". It could shoot down Japanese torpedo planes and dive bombers, it was in a desperate struggle against Zeros but it sometimes shot them down too. I don't think the Skua or the Swordfish could manage that.

If the British had been in that environment with those planes, against the Japanese, they would have lost catastrophically. Of that I am certain.

But I am comfortable with your not being convinced. I can't change your mind I can only present evidence as you requested. There is no way to definitively prove this beyond any possibility. In theory they could have won Midway using Gladiators and Fairey Battles. I just don't think it's very likely.

Schweik said:

Not for very long because due to the lack of armor and fuel system protection it had a loss rate much higher than the SBD, in fact even higher than the Skua probably. It's range was also a bit inferior to the SBD and it was far less well armed.

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Source for loss rates please? Again, no real justification in the fact that the D3A couldn't do what the Dauntless achieved if it were in US Navy hands. Let's also reassess the situation a little. The reason the SBD remained in service for as long as it did was because the SB2C Helldiver was a dog and gave the Navy all sorts of headaches. It didn't have the nickname Son-of-a-Bitch 2nd Class for nothing. Had it been issue free, then there's every likelyhood the SBD would have been retired sooner than it was. Regardless of its sterling career, it was getting long in the tooth even by Midway, it's finest hour, otherwise, why would the Navy be wanting a replacement? Remember the SB2C first flew in late 1940, but the Navy wouldn't accept it until changes were made.

Again though, I don't doubt your assessments of the Dauntless compared to the Skua and D3A Schweik, just that neither provide adequate reason why those types could not have done what the Dauntless did.

nuuumannn said:

Source for loss rates please? Again, no real justification in the fact that the D3A couldn't do what the Dauntless achieved if it were in US Navy hands.

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I already posted loss rates for the SBD. I don't know the rates for the Skua except for a few specific incidents, just that it was retired prematurely due to perceived vulnerability to enemy action, particularly fighters.

I will say the Skua was somewhat effective in early convoy action around Malta. It just didn't remain viable for long.

D3A is a good plane, but it definitely took higher losses. Again I don't have the totals handy but I do have books which show the numbers on a day by day basis for Coral Sea and Midway and the battles around Guadalcanal, and they were very high. Much higher than the SBD if the figure of only 80 lost to enemy fighters during the whole war is correct. The IJN lost more D3A than that in Coral sea and Midway alone.

Let's also reassess the situation a little. The reason the SBD remained in service for as long as it did was because the SB2C Helldiver was a dog and gave the Navy all sorts of headaches. It didn't have the nickname Son-of-a-Bitch 2nd Class for nothing. Had it been issue free, then there's every likelyhood the SBD would have been retired sooner than it was. Regardless of its sterling career, it was getting long in the tooth even by Midway, it's finest hour, otherwise, why would the Navy be wanting a replacement? Remember the SB2C first flew in late 1940, but the Navy wouldn't accept it until changes were made.

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I don't agree - I don't think it was long in the teeth at Midway, what other dive bomber anywhere in the world was better?

The Navy's biggest issues with the SBD was actually that the nature of the wing construction meant that they couldn't make the wings fold. Therefore you couldn't store enough of them on ships.

Again though, I don't doubt your assessments of the Dauntless compared to the Skua and D3A Schweik, just that neither provide adequate reason why those types could not have done what the Dauntless did.

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At the risk of repeating myself, the Skua definitely didn't. The range, bomb load and survivability of the SBD were all critical to the (very very tight margin of) victory at Midway and the Skua was lacking in all three areas, with the hapless gunner trying to stick corks in flaming fuel tanks, they would have gone down a day late and a dollar short. The D3A could have done it, (it too was an excellent dive bomber) but there wouldn't have been enough left (or enough aircrews surviving) for the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands campaigns afterward.

Schweik said:

the exaggerated vulnerability of the Skua.

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Hm, its primary vulnerability was against land based fighters, but in reality it was no more vulnerable than any other dive bomber, including the SBD, Stuka, D3A, Vengeance etc. Again, there's no saying how the circumstances might have played out. Yes, range was a factor and that the SBDs found the carriers was extraordinary and a testament to their range, there was also that little element of luck creeping in, too.

Schweik said:

In theory they could have won Midway using Gladiators and Fairey Battles. I just don't think it's very likely.

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Lucky then, that by mid-1942 the RN had Sea Hurricanes and F4Fs equipping its carriers and the RAF Spitfires as its fighters and Mosquitoes, Bostons and Mitchells replacing Battles then! I suspect a little anti-Brit bias creeping in in your argument.

Schweik said:

The reason I keep bringing up the 120 victory claims, is because it's quite unusual for a single-engined bomber. In fact it's higher than some US fighters managed. It's an indication that the SBD was used successfully as a "scout fighter" or perhaps more properly, an "emergency fighter". It could shoot down Japanese torpedo planes and dive bombers, it was in a desperate struggle against Zeros but it sometimes shot them down too. I don't think the Skua or the Swordfish could manage that.

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This secondary fighter capability is a much ballyhooed "feature" of the SDB, but I seem to recall that it was only done intentionally ONCE, I am open to correction but please give Names and date/s of the battles where SBDs were intentionally launched as anti torpedo or anti dive bomber planes?

Let's see if can either prove or disprove this "legend"?

Part of the problem with the Skua (like many pre-early war British planes) was there was effectively no MK II version. It went into service abou 1 1/2 years before the SBD even flew for the first time and it's 890hp single speed supercharged engine was no match for the SBD-3s 1000hp two speed supercharged engine.
Skua with 4 .303 Brownings in the wings certainly had a lot more firepower than the Val which was supposed to be used as a substitute fighter also.

Let's not forget that the Stuka had a fearsome reputation and in areas of air superiority it was unmatched, but in terms of performance, the Avro Lancaster was faster in a straight line than the Stuka. its cruise speed and maximum speed were both higher than those of the German aircraft. Kind of puts things into perspective when comparing performance figures. It doesn't always achieve the desired results and doesn't account for circumstance.

Schweik said:

At the risk of repeating myself, the Skua definitely didn't. The range, bomb load and survivability of the SBD were all critical to the victory at Midway and the Skua was lacking in all three areas. The D3A could have done it, (it too was an excellent dive bomber) but there wouldn't have been enough left (or enough aircrews surviving) for the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands campaigns afterward.

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Stick a 1000hp Wright R-1820 (TO) into the Skua instead of that 830hp Perseus (TO) and I wonder if the Skua couldn't have carried somewhat more fuel and and bigger bomb?

timing counts, The Skua was older and lower powered, of course it couldn't do some of what the SBD did. But at Midway many of the SBDs that attacked the Japanese carriers used 500lb bombs and only some used 1000lb bombs, so the SBDs 1200 or 2250lb bomb load was irrelevant to the battle.

The British were also aware of the Skua's shortcomings, this is why it didn't remain on carrier decks for long. The RN's acquisition policy and ownership of fleet responsibilities between the wars makes it all a complex situation that could have been avoided and it meant aircraft like the Skua and Swordfish were in service for longer than need be and that the latter's replacement wasn't much of an improvement when aircraft like the B5N and Devastator was on carrier decks when the Albacore was in service.

The RN had put out specifications to industry for modern single-seat fighters in 1939 before the war broke out, that the Firebrand was a dog was down to the manufacturers, also the RN was very keen on a Sea Spitfire at this time too, making it clear that was what was wanted.`In 1937 a modern eplacement for the Swordfish was tendered for, as an 'all singing all dancing' dive bomber, torpedo carrier, reconnaissance type spec S.24/37, which through much prevarication over the years ended up being the Barracuda. Again, that it took so long to enter service was down to design issues.

nuuumannn said:

Hm, its primary vulnerability was against land based fighters, but in reality it was no more vulnerable than any other dive bomber, including the SBD, Stuka, D3A, Vengeance etc.

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Categorically incorrect. The Skua lacked any kind of fuel system protection and barely had any armor. That means that a few bullets could set it on fire and destroy it which was the same problem that the D3A had and that all the early and mid-war Japanese aircraft suffered from. But the D3A had the benefit of being 50 mph faster than a Skua.

Regardless, with heavy armor protection for both pilot and gunner, and self-sealing fuel tanks, on top of a strongly made airframe, the SBD was one of the safest combat aircraft to fly in the Pacific. It was certainly much less vulnerable than the Skua and I'm sorry mate but that is just a fact there isn't a millimeter of subjectivity in that statement. You are wrong.

Again, there's no saying how the circumstances might have played out. Yes, range was a factor and that the SBDs found the carriers was extraordinary and a testament to their range, there was also that little element of luck creeping in, too.

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There I certainly grant your point - there was undoubtedly luck involved.

Lucky then, that by mid-1942 the RN had Sea Hurricanes and F4Fs equipping its carriers and the RAF Spitfires as its fighters and Mosquitoes, Bostons and Mitchells replacing Battles then! I suspect a little anti-Brit bias creeping in in your argument.

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I get accused of that every single time I say anything remotely negative about any British aircraft, but it is not the case. Some British aircraft were better than the US ones, the Mosquito for example was a better bomber than a Boston or a Mitchell. The Skua just wasn't one of those superlative designs. Nor the Swordfish.

Shortround6 said:

This secondary fighter capability is a much ballyhooed "feature" of the SDB, but I seem to recall that it was only done intentionally ONCE, I am open to correction but please give Names and date/s of the battles where SBDs were intentionally launched as anti torpedo or anti dive bomber planes?

Let's see if can either prove or disprove this "legend"?

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They were indeed. There were several cases including detailed combat accounts during Coral Sea and in the Solomon Campaigns. I do have books describing these, but in the past when I have taken the effort to transcribe this kind of data it has not resolved the discussion to any kind of reasonable conclusion, and I think if you really want to know these details you can find them yourself easily enough. I would recommend reading this book and this one.

Part of the problem with the Skua (like many pre-early war British planes) was there was effectively no MK II version. It went into service abou 1 1/2 years before the SBD even flew for the first time and it's 890hp single speed supercharged engine was no match for the SBD-3s 1000hp two speed supercharged engine.
Skua with 4 .303 Brownings in the wings certainly had a lot more firepower than the Val which was supposed to be used as a substitute fighter also.

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But it was 50 mph slower with a lot less 'power of maneuver' so it would probably lose a dogfight with a Val anyway...