The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

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Resp:
Yes, I think Vejtasa would agree w you. However, he just wasn't going to give up. The way he told it, I suspect he was a student of the Zero's capabilities . . . as he stated that he knew the A6M3 could out climb and out turn him. He also wasn't the type of pilot to give up; hence his transfer to Fighters. His two assists were that he knew his capabilities in the SBD; it's turning radius . . . and its twin 50 cal nose guns! He was glad that he transferred to fighters, never flying bombers again.
 
Recently in Obituaries V2 wrote of the passing of Noble Frankland, historian, Imperial War Museum curator, founder of Duxford, etc, and mentioned his autobiography. It is well worth the read and contains some insights for those of us who are amateur armchair historians.

Below he says why he believed that the P-51 deserves the title of this thread.






 
Resp:
With his experience and wealth of knowledge Frankland ought to know about the aircraft that influence the outcome of the war.
 
I'm really late to the table
but
Gotta disagree about the Spit and Hurricane. Their role in The Battle is of course legendary bordering on mythic
but
THE WEHRMACHT NEVER CAME CLOSE TO AN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY IN 1940.
Didn't even have bow-ramp landing craft, so offloading heavy equipment would've required seizing at least two Channel ports intact.
And that
was
just
not
going
to
happen.

My nomination: the Douglas SBD Dauntless.
Imagine 1942 without them...
At which point nominations are closed!
 
I gave you a "winner". I just like SBD.
 
So after going back and thinking about this, I don't think we can nail down a single aircraft that turned the tide of the war. Why? There were so many different aircraft and so many different roles. To say one had a greater impact over the other is pretty much impossible.

What if the Soviets did not have the Sturmovick?

What if the British did not have the Spitfire (the German's may not have been able to launch an invasion, but they did not know that at the time, and it was still instrumental in winning the BoB)?

What if the US dis not have the P-51 to escort the bombers?

What if the US did not have the Dauntless in the Pacific?

What if the US did not have the B-17 or B-24 and had to bomb Germany with B-18s?

What if the allies had not had the PBY or Sunderlands in the Battle of the Atlantic?

Just my two cents…
 
I would go for 2 options:

  1. C-47 in that it provided an unparalleled logistics capability
  2. B-29 for finally ending the war (and for arguably forcing the Luftwaffe to waste resources as a potential counter)
 
Well, I'm just going back to my original proposal - the A6M Zero.

Without the Zero and its incredible range, Japan does not pursue the attack on Pearl Harbor. Without the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US doesn't enter the war with the same fervor and national commitment. In December 1941 the outcome of the war was uncertain. Afterwords .......
 
By "winning" the BoB, The Spitfire and Hurricane prevented a disastrous German invasion attempt of Britain which would have destroyed much of the German army and thousands of river barges (crippling river traffic in Europe). The war would have been much shorter if it weren't for the Spitfire & Hurricane lousing up the best chance for destroying German military power in 1940.
 
Why would Germany even try to invade if they had air superiority? What was the night time litz would be day time attacks o all ports and cities.
 
Had Germany kept up it's attacks on England's military and industrial centers and not switched to terror bombing, it may have produced much different results both with British military and public.

As for the A6M, if the IJN did not have it by 7 December 1941, the A5M would have been used, with the attack still being a success.
 

But the Wehrmacht didn't need to invade. All that was needed was a change of government in London. Loss of the Battle of Britain, leaving London and key ports entirely exposed, may have resulted in Churchill's cabinet being replaced by a more appeasement-focused Prime Minister. Take Britain out of the war and there's no bombing offensive, no D-Day, and, in all likelihood, a Soviet-dominated mainland Europe by 1947.
 
If Britain is out of the war, there is no North Africa campaign, no Balkan campaign to siphon off combat units, Germany can focus all it's attention on the Drang nach Osten, there is no Lend-Lease or other western supplies going to prop up the Soviet Union.
 

But Seelowe was predicated on air superiority. Having gained that, what might then make the Germans not invade? Bad weather? Well, that works against air attacks from France too.

Could Churchill survive that? Probably. Weather getting worse, RAF nightfighters getting better. Meanwhile, Brit fighter production is outstripping losses by the end of Aug 1940. German bombers suffering operational attrition from all causes, and the seaborne invasion is verklempt. I doubt the LW by itself could put the clamps on such a fightin' nation.
 
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Imagine a scenario where the Luftwaffe actively targets Chain Home and Fighter Command C2 nodes. The Observer Corps can't provide enough warning for Fighter Command to adequately intercept incoming raids. The forward airfields of 11 Group become untenable, essentially leaving the approaches to London undefended. Under those conditions, i can absolutely see a vote of no confidence in Parliament to force a change of leadership.

It's all hypothetical, and requires the Nazis to have the foresight and imagination to focus on destroying Fighter Command's ability to defend. However, it's far from impossible, IMHO. Ultimately, my point remains that the Wehrmacht didn't need to invade Britain to force a change of government. Lord Halifax was not alone among the political class in wanting to reach an agreement with Hitler, even given what we know today and the actual chain of events.
 
It's all hypothetical, and requires the Nazis to have the foresight and imagination to focus on destroying Fighter Command's ability to defend.

There's your problem, though. You have in Goering a commander who doesn't understand the conditions required for victory, and in Hitler a leader ordering city-bombing reprisals despite the fact that they do not shape the battle-space for further ops.


Perhaps. But are those night-raids going to be so dire that they force a political upwelling? The RAF had already shown German daylight raids prohibitively expensive, and the British populace withstood a further 9 months' bombing on the reg after that historically without turning Winnie out.

And none of this even addresses the fact that Addie had already decided to turn east by July 1940.
 
The problem is, historically, German attacks were taking it's toll on Britain's air assets.
The idiotic shift to terror bombings gave the RAF the much needed reprieve to rebuild and hold the line as well as building a moral resolve of the public.

Admiral Raeder was not in favor of an invasion and *if* Germany had stayed the course and remained focused on military targets, it seems certain that public and political pressure would have re-examined Hitler's offer of Britain remaining neutral (he actually hoped Britain would join the Axis).

If this happened, it would have kept the U.S. at arm's length and, would have realized the USAAC's fear of not being able to reach Europe proper without an Extra Long Range Bomber (XBLR) - which is where the B-29 project was born (USAC Project "A" and Project "D").
 
There's your problem, though. You have in Goering a commander who doesn't understand the conditions required for victory, and in Hitler a leader ordering city-bombing reprisals despite the fact that they do not shape the battle-space for further ops.

Again, I'm simply observing that the Wehrmacht didn't need to invade. My scenario is improbable but far from impossibole.



I said nothing about night raids. The only reason daylight raids were prohibitively expensive was because of Fighter Command's radar-enabled C2 networks. Picture the concerted attacks on Chain Home that took place in August 1940 becoming the first priority for the Luftwaffe in early July 1940, or even sooner if Hitler kept moving after the fall of France. Even a modest break in Chain Home coverage would have significantly reduced Fighter Command's warning time, significantly reducing the effectiveness of RAF fighter interceptions while enabling the Luftwaffe relative freedom of manoeuvre inland, including taking out 11 Group airfields. Without early warning, Fighter Command's only option would be to maintain continuous patrols which are incredibly expensive in aircraft and still aren't effective against concerted, organized attacks.

Hitler only issued the Barbarossa order in December 1940 and no assets were diverted to that purpose until 1941. There's plenty of time for the Luftwaffe to significantly attrit Fighter Command's capabilities, potentially making 11 Group's airfields untenable.
 

According to Speer Hitler had already decided to invade the USSR by the time they visited Paris in the summer. This is backed up by other sources as well.

The Germans lacked leadership and focus. The British, not so much.
 
Hitler wanted to attack the Soviet Union from day one.

His taking France was about getting revenge for post-WWI humiliation as well as protecting his back as he turned eastward to crush the Communists, who he held a deep hatred of.

The key to this success was for Britain to remain neutral, or as he had expressed a hope of, them joining his Axis.

Here is a UPI artical from Summer 1940:

 

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