THE AVRO CF-105 ARROW - WAS IT REALLY THAT GOOD?!?

[Gixxerman]

More fantasies that don't help ....

Welcome to the official website for the Super Arrow Interceptor.

MM

Looks like a fun site (surprised at the kicking the F35 is getting there though, it's an ambitious project bound to have issues but lemon? hmmm juries out for a few more years I guess until it enters service in numbers).

Interesting day-dreaming going on there.
I can't claim to be a stealth expert but from what I have read internal structures have a lot to do with it as well as an outer shape.
That liquified air engine allowing a 250000ft ceiling would be something.
Somehow I can't help thinking if it was that easy......

I know the Avro CF105 was a great plane killed by politics (like several other non US ventures).
Great pity as elsewhere it destroyed much of the nations tech base ability to make their own major defence kit.

 

[iron man]

The material is my own original copy; IOW? I am the author.


The truth of the matter is that we were trying to "punch" WAY "above our weight" as a nation during this period and given the other pressing burdens on the DND's budget, the Arrow was an extravagance that the nation could not afford...period. When the axe fell at Malton, Canada was facing some other major procurement issues. Pre-eminent among these was the re-equipment of the 9 day fighter (Sabre5/6) and 3 all weather (CF-100 MkV) fighter squadrons based in Europe, as part of our NATO commitment. Funds had already been recently committed to a large naval construction program; huge funds were also being spent on RCAF infrastructure at the time.

The problem with the Arrow was that it was perfect for us, the US, and the USSR. The US already had a "Billion Dollar Baby" (boondoggle) of their own, the "1954 Interceptor", (i.e. F-106). Selling CF-105's to the Russians wasn't in the cards.

So what it comes down to is the cold hard truth that despite the fact that we'd blown a ton of money getting the program to the point it was, we still had not flown an aircraft with the indigenous (Iroquois) engines, the automated (SAGE integrated) weapons system was still years from IOC and we had no customers to help defer the massive R&D funds that had got us this far into it. Avro was quick to jump on the "Cook-Craigie" theory (all the rage south of the border at the time) whereby hand built prototypes were to be dispensed with, in favor of building the tooling and production jigs and building "pre-production" aircraft...then tweaking the jigging as required. This sucked up a ton of money and yes, the production line was ready to commence full series production at the time of cancellation, but this cost a pile of upfront money and rubbed some "people" the wrong way...some of these in the upper levels of RCAF, truth be told.

The bird was a significant achievement but as it sat on the tarmac on that fatal day...it was still very much a work in progress. Far from the operational interceptor that (we thought) we needed.
Convair's F-106 is illustrative of what would still be required if we wanted to get the CF-105 from where it was, into frontline service with the RCAF/NORAD. The USAF threw bucketloads of money at the MX-201/MX-1179 programmes (F-106 and MA-1 weapons system) and eventually it was produced...300 units in total, cut from an initial "requirement", on the order of ~2000.

The F-106 finally reached IOC, almost ten years late, billions over budget and with so many bugs (being "fixed" on the assembly line) that some 16 plane Squadrons had as many as five (significantly) different versions sitting on the same flight line. The Republic F-105 Thunderchief was pretty much the same story.

FWIW, when the "plug" was "pulled" the "ASTRA" weapons system (being developed by the Canadian subsidiary of RCA) was on the verge of entering litigation (this was being filed by Hughes) for propriortory patent infringements. This system eventually matured and surfaced on the F-14 Tomcat...in the early '70's.

Bottom line? It all looks good with 50 years of hindsight; the people who actually made the decision to "pull the plug" (and it WASN'T Diefenbaker) on our "Ultimate Interceptor" knew a heck of a lot more about the extant situation than anyone sitting here lamenting the "demise" of Canada's aviation industry could ever hope to.

The CF-101 did a fine job for our NORAD needs.
The F-101B was the (de facto) "Ultimate Interceptor" for the USAF's ADC during the first half of the 1960's.
The F-101A/C was the "stand in" for the (delayed) F-105, in the role of low level penetration (nuclear) fighter-bomber at the same time.

Damned fine machine that Voodoo.

Bomarc...on the other hand? That's another matter.

And from the same thread (in response to another poster).

What wasn't irrelevant was the fact that despite it's great potential, it still remained just that: potential. The tech that they were trying to achieve ("fly-by-wire" controls and a "look down-shoot down" radar/guided missile system, integrated into a system of ground-based radar control stations) was pushing way too hard against the "barriers" of the extant electronics capabilities. Hughes finally made MA-1 (the system the Arrow was originally "spec'd" for) work, but this took a "US-sized" defense budget. Tying the "in-house" development costs of such an apparatus (which were by no means clearly "defined") to the Arrow project, was the "straw that broke the camel's back".

As I mentioned in my previous post on the subject, the funds had been invested from the RCAF's slice of the total DND budget. At the point of cancellation, these monies had bought them a fully completed airframe production line (with twenty-odd machines in various states of production moving along it), five flying pre-production machines with J 75 engines, an indigenous engine that was still a long way from IOC (Initial Operational Capability), and a weapons system that was also years (and tens, if not a hundred million dollars) away from service; one which was also about to get the proverbial "rug pulled out from under it" by means of a lawsuit being brought by one of the richest men on the planet...

"Hughes" is "that" Hughes...

I am not like the myriad of authors that suggest the aircraft itself was flawed, far from it. Arrow was an amazing achievement (as an advanced airframe) and Iroquois pushed axial turbojets to another level as well.

I truly wish they would have flown RL 206 with the Iroquois (before scrapping the program), just so we would have a definitive answer to "that question".

With respect to this "great unknown", one thing that is worth pointing out?

The fact that application of additional thrust power to an airframe design is not a lineal equation. Some of the "attempts" I've seen at "extrapolating" performance data for an Iroquois powered machine are just plain ignorant as to the aerodynamics/physics involved.

In summation?

The RCAF had fallen into a trap. This was created by the great success of the CF-100, an economically produced "home grown" air defense solution; one tailored to our specific national requirements. They (and AVRO) thought we were now ready to play with the "big boys".

We weren't...not in light of our huge defense commitments and our small taxation base.

And that fills this post. More follows.

 

[iron man]

You've got to look at the "big picture" guys. This is the way it was in 1957, here in Canada.

As I said in the other thread, there were numerous concurrent factors that played into the decision to cancel the program. Politics did indeed play a role, but not to the exclusion of other strong contributors. Chief among these "other" factors is the role played by the RCAF's top brass in all of this.

It was they who were tasked with maintaining things on "the pointy end". One of the largest areas of responsibility was administrating all of the various procurement schemes that were in various stages during the period: the CF-105 project was but one of these. During this period the RCAF maintained a large overseas commitment to NATO. 1 Canadian Air Division encompassed 4 Wings (3 Squadrons each) of Canadair Sabres; each of these Wings with it's own organic support infrastructure. They were based on airfields at Marville (France), Grostenquin (France), Zweibrucken (FRG), and Baden-Soellingen (FRG). In addition to this, the RCAF maintained (i.e. funded) a large support facility for the major maintenance requirements of this fleet (Scottish Aviation; Prestwick). During this period, it was becoming apparent that the day of the VFR light fighter aircraft was coming to an end. Plans were being formulated to "re-purpose" the RCAF's NATO contribution; first with the "stop gap" measure of adding an all weather fighter capability to the Air Division by means of deploying CF-100 units. Secondly with a full scale replacement of the entire fleet of Sabres with an as yet undetermined all weather fighter.
This was going to cost a bundle of money. Not just for purchasing the machines themselves; moreso for the anticipated costs of retraining aircrew and "erks" on a far more sophisticated machine and purchasing all of the related equipment that the "erks" would need to keep 'em flying.

Also falling under RCAF purview was the ongoing construction and manning of the early warning radar lines. These were popping up like mushrooms all across Canada's desolate northern frontier at the time and providing required transportation (primarily by airlift) was proving a major burden on the available "heavy lift" assets (C-47's and C-119's). A program to address this (C-130 acquisition as it turned out) "issue" was also going to require funding and as with the case of the Sabres in Europe, it was not going to be cheap.
Don't forget the multi-millions being spent on the radar installations (purchasing/construction/training/staffing) themselves...

Concurrently, we were standing up squadrons in preparation for the arrival of the CP-107 Argus fleet. These were a "made in Canada" solution to the growing SLBM threat; they were planned to supplement (not replace)the existing ASW Neptunes in RCAF service and finally allow the retirement of the Lancaster MkX. This was not a "small" program either...

And then we get to the next big ticket item on the RCAF's plate: the ever evolving needs of the Air Defense Command. And here's where the CF-105 Arrow program comes into play. In the period, the RCAF fielded 3 Wings (3 Squadrons each) of CF-100 all-weather interceptors and a further 6 squadrons of Canadair Sabre day fighters devoted to this task. In addition to these operational organizations, there was also a large OCU dedicated to producing CF-100 crews and a far larger one producing Sabre "jocks" for both home and for 1 Air Division.

It is into this aspect that "politics" becomes a major factor.

Due to the nature of our unique situation as the "monkey in the middle" (positioned between the USSR and the USA on the most direct routes), it was realized that Air Defense would require a joint effort. The USAF's Air Defense Command (ADC) had already been very active in this regard, contributing huge sums toward the ongoing construction of the vast radar net in Canada's north. With regards to the Operational/Reserve RCAF ADC squadrons; this capability had grown from a few Vampire/Sabre day fighter squadrons centered in Ontario and Quebec into a force of 6 Wing equivalents (including auxiliaries), which now spanned Canada from coast to coast. This had required a major construction effort to provide basing for these units; between 1952 and 1956 major ADC airbases were constructed/improved at Comox, Cold Lake, Namao, Saskatoon, North Bay, Uplands, St. Hubert, Bagottville, and Chatham. Additionally, forward deployment fields were also built during this period.

While on the subject of infrastructure spending during this period, there is another factor that is rarely mentioned. Evolution of the demographic of those seeking out a career in the RCAF (Army and RCN as well) was raising "issues" with the provision of supporting infrastructure for families. This was applicable both at home and abroad during the period and was reaching embarrassing proportions in some cases. In Europe, "shantytowns" were showing up outside the gates of the airbases; more and more airmen were paying passage for their wives and children rather than facing separation during deployment. Acceptance of this reality was slow coming but the financial implications (for the budget at the DND level) was an obvious "elephant in the room".

But I digress...back to politics and North American air defense.

When the newly formed USAF ADC had assessed the options for dealing with the USSR's growing manned bomber threat, they had settled upon the concept of SAGE (Semi-Automated Ground Environment). This system was planned to be an integration of ground-based radar systems and the fighter units, with major control centers which would direct the aircraft. Throughout the pre-SAGE period, Canada (Avro, Malton) built the CF-100 to equip the frontline units. The CF-105 had been conceived as it's successor and the "Arrow" was initially designed to operate much in the same manner as did the CF-100, using ground direction and leaving control of weapons launch in the cockpit of each aircraft. The SAGE was designed to change this method to one whereby the pilot became nothing more than a means of getting the aircraft from it's base to it's firing position and then returning. With the formation of NORAD and Canada's resultant POLITICAL commitment to SAGE, all of the RCAF's plans for the ongoing defense of Canada's airspace were thrown into the wastebasket. To whit, the RCAF were committed to funding the construction and staffing of this system; this was to include a control center at North Bay, Ontario, built with RCAF dollars. Caught in this rapidly evolving situation, the CF-100 (unable to operate in SAGE) and it's planned replacement (also unable to operate in SAGE-as designed) came under a serious re-appraisal by AVM Easton, then Chief of Operational Requirements. As amply demonstrated above, the budget of the RCAF was already under considerable pressure at the time and to put it bluntly? AVM Easton was no friend of the Arrow project as it was siphoning increasingly scarce funds from what he (rightly, BTW) considered to be far more pressing matters. Easton was no friend of SAGE either, but that decision was taken at a level far above his purview...here's your actual "political" aspect. Settling on a weapons system for the CF-100's successor had already been a thorn in the side of Avro all throughout the development of the airframe and engine. With the completely unforeseen fall of the Liberal government (of Louis St. Laurant); with political rumblings about curbing Canada's rising defense expenditures, the Arrow "situation" came to a head at the highest levels of the RCAF.

And that's not all when talking about SAGE and NORAD...far from it.

As shown by the "thread drift" in the "axing" topic, this was also the period where Canada found itself faced with the matter of reaching a military/political consensus concerning policy on nuclear weapons. Both SAGE and the NORAD agreement played a large roles in forcing this matter upon Ottawa. Within the USAF ADC's planning for SAGE, a program to develop a SAM with a nuclear warhead (Boeing's BOMARC) had been in development since 1950. By 1957 (when the NORAD agreement came into effect), Canada was aware that this system was in an advanced state of testing and was soon to become operational. USAF ADC had already embarked on construction of launch bases and the intent was to use these missiles in Canadian airspace if war broke out. This was one of the "prime movers" which forced Canada off the fence with regards to the nuclear question...<more to follow> Limited by this site.

 

[iron man]

Another was the matter of USAF's SAC and their ongoing development of forward deployment facilities at Cold Lake, Namao, Fort Churchill, and Frobisher Bay (in addition to the extant SAC bases at Goose Bay (Labrador) and Harmon (Newfoundland)).
It is worth pointing out the highly classified agreements (in place since 1952) whereby Canada accepted that storage of nuclear weapons had been a fact at Goose Bay since 1950. Most of the documentation relevant to these agreements remains classified to this day (and will likely remain so forever), but their existence has been proven by recent archival research. In Namao (outside of Edmonton...20km from where I sit typing this BTW) SAC pushed forward with a massive expansion of the USAAF facility constructed during WWII to ferry Lend Lease aircraft to the USSR. This included a runway capable of handling the B-36 "Peacemaker" at it's MTOW of 410,000 lbs...the concrete is 8 feet thick! A similar runway exists at CFB Cold Lake, 300 km ENE of here. These bases were nominally declared as FOB's for fleets of tanker aircraft (once the B-47 came into prominence) but rumours of nuclear weapons storage persist to this day and they're most likely entirely factual.

In short, due to our "special relationship" with the US, our hand was forced on the SAGE/NORAD matter; from this political decision, introduction of BOMARC/W40 into RCAF service became a foregone conclusion. The money to fund these unforeseen projects had to come from somewhere...funding our SAGE contribution was a back breaker in light of everything else that the RCAF had on their plate in 1957.

While the loss of aerospace engineering capability on such a scale was profound, it was not the end of Canada's aerospace industry...not by a long shot. Did it set us back? Yes.

Did it turn us into a nation of "have-nots" in this regard? No.

One would be advised to do a little research into the state of the Canadian aviation industry before going off about how we have had no appreciable global impact in aviation for the last 50 years... and how this is all Diefenbakers fault.

This is simply not true.

Money is a finite resource for any responsible government; outside of the area of National Defense there were pressing needs for social infrastructure as the country boomed in the post WWII period. Given our vast geography and limited taxation base (particularly as with regards to corporate tax revenue vis-a-vis the USA, for example) there was a strong emergent feeling that the day of reckoning was now upon us. Canada's population was exploding and centralizing in urban locations; this required government re-investment at all levels: Municipal, Provincial and Federal.

Highways, water and sewage, electricity and gas, schools, hospitals, protective services...all pressing matters that needed a much bigger piece of an only marginally larger "pie".

And the "Voodoo" was a pretty "sexy" machine in it's own regard...


Once they figured out the "pitch up" issue...

More (reply to poster)
Compared to the EE Lightning, Arrow had legs. Compared to other options (CF-101 for example) she really didn't. This was one of the big sticking points that AVM Easton had against the aircraft. If it could cruise, it had decent (projected) range but if it had to "dash", the situation was far different. Early 2nd gen turbojets were notorious fuel hogs when the afterburners were lit and this was certainly the case with the Iroquois from all I've read on it. Iroquois was Orenda's re-design of the Bristol Olympus/Curtiss-Wright J67 and while the output (static thrust) was truly eye-watering, the fuel consumption was insane. Projections were that if "scrambled" from North Bay and "sent north" at maximum speed (critical in the minds of the RCAF), the Arrow I would hit "bingo fuel" about 325 NM from base. True that Arrow I can get there in 20 minutes from "wheels up", but without the specified ASTRA (BVR) missile system these limitations were seen as completely inadequate; and the ASTRA was nowhere near operational when the decision to "cut our losses" was made.
Australia may have had an interest but really? What was their level of "need" for such a capability in the mid-60's? The RAF would hold the best prospects for export but they had indigenous approaches to this problem (Lightning) and given the "short range" nature of their situation...Lightning was the "right" aircraft for the RAF during the period.
The only ones who reallly could have used the Arrow were the USAF's ADC and they already had $Billions invested in WS-201 (the "Ultimate Interceptor": AKA F-102/F-106); they were also already quite far along on the F-12 (which makes Arrow look like "Tinkertoys") during the period.

Our "needs" were just not conducive to building an exportable product...it was a specialized bird, for our specialized needs.

That was only one of the causes of it's fate.

I've got more elsewhere, but this is the nuts and bolts of it.

 

[prem895]

With all that said,I still love the look of the Arrow

 

[iron man]

With all that said,I still love the look of the Arrow

Of course you do... that's a BIG part of the ongoing relevance when people opine on the topic.

The facts are the facts..."sexy" or not.

 

[swampyankee]

I've read that the F-106 was quite maneuverable (until it got into that near-unrecoverable spin), so I would not be surprised if the Arrow was not quite maneuverable, too.

I think there are very few reliable reports of relative fighter maneuverability in the open literature, and a good analysis would require access to some high-end CFD software and accurate and detailed drawings, and even that would not be able to model the behavior of the flight control system. As an example I've read that the "dog fight capability" of current and near-current US fighters was something like F-16 > F-14 > F-15 > F-18, but I have essentially no faith in that ranking. Of course, F-22 > any of them, mostly because it's got a much higher thrust:mass ratio.

 

[iron man]

I've read that the F-106 was quite maneuverable (until it got into that near-unrecoverable spin), so I would not be surprised if the Arrow was not quite maneuverable, too.

I think there are very few reliable reports of relative fighter maneuverability in the open literature, and a good analysis would require access to some high-end CFD software and accurate and detailed drawings, and even that would not be able to model the behavior of the flight control system. As an example I've read that the "dog fight capability" of current and near-current US fighters was something like F-16 > F-14 > F-15 > F-18, but I have essentially no faith in that ranking. Of course, F-22 > any of them, mostly because it's got a much higher thrust:mass ratio.

Full "Delta" planforms are a thing of the past. For (now) obvious reasons. One has to understand/appreciate the manifold advances of basic aerodynamics which were seen in the period we are talking about. Imo? The quantum "leap" in actual "aerodynamic" design occurred between 1955 and 1960. By this point, the delta planform was proven to be a dead end and subsequent designs reflect this fact. This would make the "Arrow" a "dinosaur" (relatively speaking) in the modern world. Look at the design approach used with the F-15 as an example.

That's a whole other kettle of fish to fry...

Let's talk about the F 35 now...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I've read that the F-106 was quite maneuverable.

Actually it wasn't. My father in law flew them and ran the detachment that operated the last 106s in the USAF inventory. He said they were fast as hell but bled off a lot of energy in turns.

F-106 Delta Dart B-1B Chase Flight Test Program

590061 B-1B Chase 1987

 

[davparlr]

Actually it wasn't. My father in law flew them and ran the detachment that operated the last 106s in the USAF inventory. He said they were fast as hell but bled off a lot of energy in turns.

F-106 Delta Dart B-1B Chase Flight Test Program

590061 B-1B Chase 1987

I believe that you are right, delta wings do have high induced drag, certainly at low altitude. I believe the Mig-21 suffered from this problem. However high altitude performance is pretty good. I worked with a friend who flew B-58s, another delta winged aircraft, and he told me that the only plane that could intercept them at high altitude was the F-106 which could fly ahead of them and turn around and attack, something no other aircraft could do.

Interesting note. One of the F-106 sites stated that the F-106 still has the airspeed record for single engine air breathing aircraft, greater than 1500 mph.

A stunningly beautiful aircraft. While growing up the two planes I would have wanted to fly was the F-106 and the F8U. Unfortunately the F8U had been grounded by the time I got my wings (and, thanks to a Naval Flight Surgeon who failed to sign my flight physical, I was in the AF, which worked out wonderful for me), and the F-106 was allocated to Guard, one of which was in my class and got one.

 

[swampyankee]

I'm really not on any side,so to speak. What I mean about the 35 is that by the time all of the bugs are worked out,I think it's stealth capabilities will have been figured out by the so called bad guys.
Lockheed sees great progress on F-35 fighter | Reuters
F-35 JSF Testers Report Progress, Problems
Lockheed Martin
This report that Flyboy posted is great new indeed. Has Lockheed really ever produced a dud?

Of course. Nobody's always successful.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Of course. Nobody's always successful.

The last "dud" fighter produced by Lockheed was the F-90. Its undoing was the engine. Look what followed after that.

 

[RpR]

Actually it wasn't. My father in law flew them and ran the detachment that operated the last 106s in the USAF inventory. He said they were fast as hell but bled off a lot of energy in turns.

F-106 Delta Dart B-1B Chase Flight Test Program

590061 B-1B Chase 1987

From communicating with person at the F-106 website, the F-106 was extremely maneuverable.
There is a website, I no longer have the address with the Air Force reports on how Air Force air craft should deal with Mig fighters in "Nam.
The F-106 is the only one that could take them on straight-up with no performance weakness, its only lacking was it did not have a gun.
The site lists how aircraft with short comings should deal with that problem.

Bleeding off airspeed too quickly is a combat factor in all delta aircraft, the Mirage suffered the same problem.
Pilots said the if the Six had a few thousand pounds more thrust that problem would have gone away.

In one of the posts at the Six site, it speaks of a Navy Pilot who did a inter-service transfer to fly the Six. He flew against other members of his F-14 squadron in a inter-service Top Gun type exercise and technically defeated the F-14s he flew against in dogfights.
He told the pilots who flew the Six regularly that it was a very good airplane, you just had to fly it to its strengths.

From a pilot who flew the Six, if you took in full burner and went all out without backing off, within twenty minutes you would be looking for a tanker or a landing strip.
No one there will say how fast a Six could actually go but one pilot said that during one exercise he was slightly above mach 2.2 and accelerating easily when the flight path called for a turn that bled off speed.
He said that was the fastest he remember he had ever gone.
A ground crew chief wrote that once a Six came in with all the leading edge paint burnt off and paint heat blisters behind the missing paint.
He said he had never seen that before or after and that the pilot left the aircraft without saying one word and he was not going to ask any questions.
Nothing was ever said about what actually happened.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

From communicating with person at the F-106 website, the F-106 was extremely maneuverable.
There is a website, I no longer have the address with the Air Force reports on how Air Force air craft should deal with Mig fighters in "Nam.
The F-106 is the only one that could take them on straight-up with no performance weakness, its only lacking was it did not have a gun.
The site lists how aircraft with short comings should deal with that problem.

Bleeding off airspeed too quickly is a combat factor in all delta aircraft, the Mirage suffered the same problem.
Pilots said the if the Six had a few thousand pounds more thrust that problem would have gone away.

My father in law didn't think it was that maneuverable, he had a few hundered hours in the -106 (if not more) and was the guy in the picture I posted, but then again during the same period he was also doing some flight test work in the F-5 and F-15, so he might have been a little biased there. He liked high energy maneuvers in the 106 rather than yanking and backing.

In one of the posts at the Six site, it speaks of a Navy Pilot who did a inter-service transfer to fly the Six. He flew against other members of his F-14 squadron in a inter-service Top Gun type exercise and technically defeated the F-14s he flew against in dogfights.
He told the pilots who flew the Six regularly that it was a very good airplane, you just had to fly it to its strengths.

When the Rockwell detachment was operational they occasionaly deployed when there wasn't enough "chase work" at Palmdale, occasionally they would go up against early F-15s during dissimilar aircraft training and many times they would beat the 15 under certain circumstances. "Bob" had a picture of an F-15 in a gunsight I guess taken during one of these deployments.

From a pilot who flew the Six, if you took in full burner and went all out without backing off, within twenty minutes you would be looking for a tanker or a landing strip.

During FCFs they would go north of EDW into a high speed corridor, light up the burners and hit mach, turn around and land back at Palmdale with "just enough reserve."

No one there will say how fast a Six could actually go but one pilot said that during one exercise he was slightly about mach 2.2 and accelerating easily when the flight path called for a turn that bled off speed.
He said that was the fastest he remember he had ever gone.
A ground crew chief wrote that once a Six came in with all the leading edge paint burnt off and paint heat blisters behind the missing paint.
He said he had never seen that before or after and that the pilot left the aircraft without saying one word and he was not going to ask any questions.
Nothing was ever said about what actually happened.

Bob told me it would keep picking up speed until it self destructed. He also said the F-111 would to the same.

 

[davparlr]

From a pilot who flew the Six, if you took in full burner and went all out without backing off, within twenty minutes you would be looking for a tanker or a landing strip.

I am not sure many fighters could beat this.

 

[buffnut453]

The Lightning could! It could empty its fuel tanks easily within that timeframe.

 

[davparlr]

I can see both sides of my comment. What I meant,is that I believe very few fighters using full afterburners can stay up longer than 20 minutes. ABs gobble fuel. In the T-38, all you could do on a burner flight was take off, climb to altitude, fly a supersonic TACAN arc back to inbound course and land.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Lightning could! It could empty its fuel tanks easily within that timeframe.

... And oh, so spectacularly! I got told once by a Jaguar driver that it was the only combat aircraft that counted its take off run in its combat radius!

 

[Zipper730]

FLYBOYJ

I've been wanting to put this out there for some time, I'm sure all of our Canadian friends will enjoy this one.

I think most aviation buffs would be interested regardless of nationality...

I think an aircraft like an F-5 would of flown rings around her in a dogfight

From what I remember the F-5E had similar performance characteristics to the MiG-21 from around 300-400 knots, better performance below (higher aspect wing, the leading-edge root extension, and LED's), with the exception of a slightly lower climb-rate, and a possibly superior roll-rate.

The F-102 & F-106's were similar in turn-rate and roll-rate if I recall, and comparable to some MiG-21 variants, and slightly inferior to others; the F-106 would appear faster than the MiG-21 in an all out dash. I'm not sure how the F-5A compared to the F-5E though it might have had a lower T/W ratio.

The F-5's were smaller and might have had better overall pilot visibility, smaller and harder to see, and would have been useful in this regard.

PM Diefenbaker killed 90% of the Canadian aircraft industry with his decision, but let's imagine things were different. If built, how do you think her mission would of changed?

I have a feeling UCAV's would have come earlier...

Would a gun been installed like on the F-106?

It would have been easier than the F-106 due to the package.

Although the B-47 looked fragile I am told it was quite maneuvable and could be looped and rolled.

It's maximum g-load was 3.5 x 1.5 right?

BTW Look at the range!!!! I'm sorry but I don't care how good the Iroquois "would of" been, it ain't helping the range situation much!!!!

Firstly, those figures might have been based on a supersonic radius.

Otherwise, those numbers look wrong, in a number of ways actually

• The aircraft had a 2800 gallon fuel capacity, at 6.55 to 6.6 pounds a gallon that would produce a weight of 67380-67520
• Falcon armament would yield a weight of 1016 to 1180 pounds, bringing up the weight to 68396 to 68700

These numbers would get a fuel fraction of 26.8% to 26.9%

If the aircraft was fitted with the Iroquois, they'd be 4,000 pounds lighter in total producing a weight of 45,040, a weight of 63380-63520 pounds with fuel, and 64396 to 64700 in an air to air load. With the fuel load the same 28.5% to 28.6%

These figures seem on par or better than the F-106.

Glider

Zurakowski declared that the Arrow was easier to fly than the F-102 or the Gloster Javelin, two other delta-winged fighters.

Easier doesn't actually mean better handling... it just means it has less quirks that can get you killed.

Zurakoski complained about the high workload in the cockpit, despite the sophisticated AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System)

That's a surprise with a two-man crew: In fact, I'm surprised they'd even need such automation to get the A/C into position for a missile shot: The F-4's didn't require it.

the reliability of the electronic systems was better than expected

Now that is impressive for that time frame.


plan_D

Being that the CF-105 was primarily an interceptor it's handling wouldn't need to be amazing.

In theory, yes. In actual fact, not necessarily: The larger wing is good for high altitude maneuverability, particularly depending on mach number.

When supersonic, you could do just fine with a plane like the F-101B and F-104A: Neither had a light-wing loading but a higher mach number correlates to a higher IAS and that still puts you on top if your L/D ratio is decent (both were), and control power was high enough (both were), particularly if radar equipped with GCI.

The EE Lightning didn't have a very good turning circle but it was quite manuverable in other areas due to the whole tail-plane moving instead of just elevators at the back.

I was under the impression that it's corner velocity was lower than the F-104?


Nonskimmer

Bang on. It was just far more expensive than it would have been worth, so it was cancelled.

How much would the plane have been worth?

If I recall, the F-102 was $1.9 million; the F-106 around $4.5-5.0 million; the F-4 around $2.4 million


pbfoot

First a/c to fly with fly by wire AND artificial feedback (feel).

It was the first FBW equipped aircraft with SAS integrated. Much like the F-16 of the 1974.

First a/c to be developed using an early form of "computational fluid dynamics" with an integrated "lifting body" type of theory rather than the typical (and obsolete) "blade element" theory.

I would have never thought of that as it's not as evident as the F-15 and F-16. The top of the fuselage/wing seem to fit the bill though I guess.

First a/c to have marginal stability designed into the pitch axis for better maneuverability, speed and altitude performance.
First a/c to have negative stability designed into the yaw axis to save weight and cut drag, also boosting performance.

As I recall, they originally planned to make the tail larger, and from that they decided instead to use with neutral directional stability with FBW & SAS.

Relaxed stability means less trim-inputs, which makes the delta-wing much more effective than otherwise possible.

First a/c designed to be data-link flyable from the ground

I did not know the plane was designed with this feature from the outset (if I read you right). If I recall right, the F-102A could use a data-link to coordinate intercepts in 1957.

First a/c designed with integrated navigation, weapons release, automatic search and track radar, datalink inputs, home-on-jamming, infrared detection, electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures operating through a DIGITAL brain.

Firstly, I thought home-on-jam and ECCM are basically the same?

The integration of the radar, navigation, IRST, ECM, ECCM, looks a lot like the F-15's systems: It had integrated jamming, radar, and ECM at least. I don't know about nav and IRST.

First sophisticated bleed-bypass system for both intake AND engine/exhaust. Everybody uses that now.
First by-pass engine design. (all current fighters have by-pass engines).
First combination of the last two points with an "ejector" nozzle that used the bypass air to create thrust at the exhaust nozzle while also improving intake flow.

I don't remember the PS-13 being a turbofan, if I recall it was a turbojet.

If you're talking about the inlet being oversized with excess air going around the engine to provide engine and afterburner cooling: That sounds a lot like the F-104 and F-4. As for the use of the exhaust to pump the duct, that sounds possibly like the F-104, and the L-133 concept (though that was for boundary layer control, it never flew though).

The F-106 didn't even have a nozzle, just a pipe.

Now that's not true: I asked on the a website dedicated to the F-106, and despite them being a bunch of seriously moody people, they did explain this one to me.

The nozzle of the F-106 is just like any other convergent divergent nozzle: It has a cooling shroud located around and behind it, and this also serves to disperse the exhaust at lower power settings when taxiing. The purpose of this is to avoid blowing around unsecured objects.

Use of Titanium for significant portions of the aircraft structure and engine.
Use of composites (not the first, but they made thoughtful use of them and were researching and engineering new ones).

I already knew the engine had composites in it; I did not know the airframe did. As for composites, I had no idea.

Use of a drooped leading edge and aerodynamic "twist" on the wing.

The B-58 had a conically cambered wing and flew earlier. The use of inverse cambered sections is interesting though (wing-root).

Use of a LONG internal weapons bay to allow carriage of specialized, long-range standoff and cruise missiles.

Wait, I thought the missiles to be carried included provisions for the following (at different times)

8 x Falcon
8 x Velvet Glove
4 x Sparrow II
4 x Genie

Integration of ground-mapping radar and the radar altimeter plus flight control system to allow a seriousstrike/reconnaissance role.

Sounds like a terrain-folowing AP

First missile armed a/c to have a combat weight thrust to weight ratio approaching 1 to 1. Few have been able to copy that.

Wait, I thought the engine was more powerful than the J75...

First oxygen-injection re-light system.

Which would allow a relight at all speeds?

First to use a variable stator on a two-shaft engine.
First use of a trans-sonic first compressor stage on a turbojet engine.
First "hot-streak" type of afterburner ignition.

I'm not sure what a hot-streak afterburner is, but I know what all the rest is.

What he is referring to is the next one off the production line that was powered by 2 of the indiginous Orenda Iroquois with 20000,lbs thrust tests up to 30000lbs in burner mode.

I'm surprised about that, especially with the J75 being 1.5 x J57 thrust

• J57: 12,500 to 13,500
  
• J75: 18,750 to 20,250

And from what I remember thrust boost was around 1.5 to 1.66666... on burner for the J57, so provided the proportion holds

• J57: 18,750 to 22,500
• J75: 28,125 to 33,750

I'd have figured the the Iroquois would have been able to do somewhere between 22,000 to 25,000 pounds of thrust.


Murray_B

It probably was not area ruled at the time but became so years after the fact through the miracle of historical revision.

I do remember something about the aircraft's spine conforming to it, but it could be bullshit.

The only impartial and reliable information I have on the maximum speed is from RCAF tests which indicates Mach 1.4.

Understood

The cancellation did create some problems for the US since we had already agreed on how to finance North American defense. By canceling the Arrow and buying Voodoos we forced the US government to cancel US contracts and move the same value of work to Canada. That must have cost them plenty but they did not complain about it much as far as I can tell.

Could the plane have made compatible with SAGE?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

You're kicking up a lot of old discussion Zipper, be advised that many of those members are no longer around including one who is deceased (RIP pb).

The Arrow was a magnificent aircraft, politics and a changing world doomed the program and forever changed the face of the Canadian aviation industry.