The best 2-engined bomber in 1944-45?

[FLYBOYJ]

Has anyone thought that the Mosquito was a bare bones bird , I read of one guy post war losing his hydraulics and then (I hope I get this right) had a runaway prop which he was not able to feather because there was no resovoir . I can't quote this bible and verse as my book is sitting in a A340 somewhere I hope

That sucks!

AFAIK the Mosquito had an auto feather system where by the push of a button would feather the prop after the engine was shut down. In the case of a run away prop I would think that something happened so the prop hub lost hydraulic fluid (which is not part of the main system).

The Mosquito had a basic hydraulic hydraulic system with each engine driving a pump. I'm pretty sure it had a reservior but no accumulator.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The 8th AF did precision bombing? Why would the Mossie be flying slower than the B-17?

I don't know what it is for the bomber but for the FB VI the max speed for bomb bay open was 305kt or 350mph.

B-17s dropped their bombs at something like 130 mph.

 

[Siegfried]

This stands out as one of the more exaggerated of your statements. Yes other technically capable nations would eventually have proximity fuzes for artillery shells, but the Germans weren't anywhere near it at the end of the war. They had (several) workable concepts for 'soft' fuzes, but had not done any testing of versions hardened for firing from a cannon, and that was the big hurdle.
Joe

"As Isaac Newton once said: I have studied that matter, you have not." The German proximity fuse was built on a type of 'vacuum' tube called a cold gas thyratron. It was surviving shots in 1940.

These argon filled tubes had three electrodes: a cathode, anode and a 2nd anode near the cathode that is used as striking grid. Some were recovered from German bomb time delay fuses along with solid state selenium rectifier diodes. It was examination of these by "Mr Neutron" Cockroft that triggered development of the British fuse.

The shell needed no battery relying on a pre-charged capacitor. The triggering anode was connected to the nose of the shell and the other to the insulated base. As the shell flew through the air it generated an electrostatic field. The disturbance of this field by the presence of the aircraft triggered the tube which discharged into an ignition primer. This version had a range of about 2m though prone to ignition by clouds. Circuits did exist to overcome this.

R+D continued with a view to producing electronically programmed time delay fuses. The thyratron functioned as an accurate voltage comparator when used in a RC circuit. After two years of shelf life 80% of shells still complied with the 0.2% time accuracy.

By 1943 the program was reactivated. The control anode was connected to a nose antenna of length of radius of the shell. Rotation whipped the antenna about which perceived electrostatic field imbalances as an AC current. This was put through a bandpass filter. The result was a range of 15m and resistance to false triggering and ECM. Such fuzes are suitable for ABM missiles and are hard to jam.

The fuse featured a nose contact as a backup and was cheap.

The Germans had worked out that going for a direct hit and not bothering with fuze setting (it wasted time, cost money, required powerful explosives and complicated fragmentation). This was the best of both worlds.

There is some information here from the tube developers Siemens
http://www.cdvandt.org/CIOS-XXXI-50.pdf

The report of the actual fuze is supposedly in:
"Proximity Fuse Development - Rheinmettal Borsig A.G.
Mullhausen. CIOS report ITEM nos 3 file nos XXVI -1 (1945)

Another mentions thermionic tube development at Telefunken (instead of Siemens)
capable of surviving several thousand G
http://www.cdvandt.org/CIOS-XXXII-87.pdf

There are references to a KTB (Officers Daily Journal) of an officer sent to fetch a proximity fuse for a 5 inch FLAK shell for use in a V2 missile.

This fuse was essentially ready for production in 1944 as it was 95% reliable but unfortunately the factory was over run.

The battery seems to have been molten salt type first used in the V2 and adopted by the US post war.

The concept of the US fuze was adapted from a British concept from early in the war. Making it work in a shell with components that could be manufactured in quantity was the critical trick, and the Germans were not close to doing that.
Joe

The British fuse was inspired by the German one, had not the R+D program been suspended it would have had a good chance of success. There is little difference between a directly heated cathode triode tube and a cold gas triode. R.V.Jones even ended up with a shock hardened tube.

More generally, producing stuff in quantity wasn't some minor detail, but more like the heart of the matter. That was where the Germans fell well behind the Anglo-Americans generally in electronics by 1944; they simply had less resources.
Joe

This ignores the allied bombing campaign after 1944. The Germans fell behind in development of microwaves but this was an own kill with an decision to abandon work in December 1942 against strong objections by General Wolfgang Martini and physicist Dr Abraham Essau. Nevertheless the Germans had caught up by the middle of1944 with several microwave radars in production. The 1942 German microwave program was successful it could initially generate a 20kW pulse down to 12 cm using disk triodes (later with minor modifications the same power at 9cm and finally 3cm).

They did not fall behind in sophistication of their signal processing. They had coherent pulse Doppler (the allies not), they had track locking radars, they had elaborate anti-jamming circuits, only the width of their non microwave beams made them vulnerable to jamming.

The Germans were not about to produce AA systems in quantity comparable to the combination of US 90mm AA with M9 director and SCR-584 radar firing VT fuzed ammo already operational in large quantity, not even close.
Joe

The US 90mm was no better than the German 88mm FLAK 43 which featured autoloaders, autofuze setters and outstanding ballistics. The US 90mm AAA gun was better than the common FLAK 37 88mm but the FLAK 37 was barely over half the weight and was suitable for operation by school children (FLAK Kinder) including the future Pope Benedict. The larger 10.5 and 12.8cm German guns often had power control. Don't compare the US 90mm gun to the much lighter 88mm FLAK 37.

The Germans were about to produce a sophisticated 5.5cm remote power control radar directed AAA gun known as the Garaet 58; a weapon in which was aimed by computer.

The Germans had directors as good and in fact better than the M9 in having a full 3D algorithem.

The M9 implemented the defective algorithm of the mechanical M7. All it did was use more electronic hardware rather than mechanical hardware. It was no faster nor accurate: it was cheaper to make and lighter, that's all. It still required servo motors to drive the pick-ups of potentiometers moving over ballistics data on windings rather than a 3d camshaft.

The SCR-584 radar was a breakthrough in performance I very much agree with, the Bell M9 director was not. In fact the M9's electronics was behind that of the analogue computers the Germans were using.

Harry Nyquist developed a far superior director the "T2" which used mechanical subtraction rather than differentiation (so not vulnerable to noise as the M9's electronic differentiation ) and was more than twice as accurate as the M9.

Mechanical computers added/subtracted via differential gears, they used tacho generators to generate voltages that effectively differentiate shaft speed, servos to buffer shafts while 3 dimensional cams have trigonometric, log/antilog and ballistics data ground on to them.

The German FLAK directors was the Komandogaraet 40 that had an integrated 4m range finder but would accept synchro inputs from radars.

Kommandogeräte 40(M), a simplified, mechanical design by Zeiss;
kommandogeräte 40(e), by Askania, a fully automatic electronic director.

But if you want to assess the vulnerability of 1944-45 prop bombers (including A-26 or Mosquito) to the *best* heavy systems in 1944-45, which were the Allied ones by far, then yes prop a/c without good ECM to counter those systems would suffer heavy losses. German prop bombers, and even jets and V-1's suffered heavily to those systems in actual combat. But the Germans produced no effective ECM v microwave radars or VT fuzes; the Allies would have been in a much better position to do so. A USAAF study concluded that the air offensive over Germany would have been become infeasible v the best US AA weapons of 1944-45, far superior to what the Germans could actually produce in quantity or were near to doing. But it also assumed no ECM developed to counter the US weapons, whereas Allied bomber ECM was quite effective against the less advanced actually operational German systems of 1944-45, and countermeasures to the US AA systems were possible, though never developed by the Germans.
Joe

The Germans had 'effective' ECM, they were successful pioneers in the field. This included jamming the US SCR-268 radar in 1943 and 1944 forcing the SCR-584 to be rushed into service in January 1944. They at times jammed Chain Home. They invented windows before the British. (first test drops of Duppel in 1940). They could jam 9cm H2S. The problem for the Germans was that they weren't able to raid with a fleet of 500+ bombers each of which carried a noise jammer. In 1943 1944 the "baby blitz" raids almost completely shutdown British GCI radar due to 'duppel' drops.

As far as sophistication goes the both the US and Germany introduced the only two track locking radars of WW2 in Jan 1944 the FuSE 64 Mannheim and the SCR-584. Prior to that German AAA radar was superior to US in all key parameters.

US AA weapons had 2 advantages worthy of consideration.
1 The proximity fuse, which was potentially very vulnerable to jamming due to the limited sophistication possible.
2 A microwave radar system whose narrow beam provided greater angular accuracy and resistance to jamming but was not superior in range accuracy or features such as auto track.

The Germans were already fielding 2, several microwave radars but had a setback producing the magnetrons due to bomb damage.

A big advantage for the Germans would have been a 3-5 year lead in SAM development and so long as they could make their radar resilient enough aircraft such as the B-29 and B-36 would be neutralised.

 

[tyrodtom]

Reliability during test and operational reliability can vary greatly.

If that fuze was ready for production in 1944, but was prevented by the factory being over run, It must have been ready for production very late in 44, and that factory must have been awfully near the western border, because no allied soldiers got into Germany till Oct. 44.

Like someone else said about the wunderwaffe, could've, would've, should've, but didn't. In other words irrelevant in the discussion about about twin-engine bombers.

 

[wuzak]

Why not? It shows they are able to continue to perform a role way past this operational heyday.

I dispute that it was the case for the A-26.

NOT TRUE - they were used extensively during the Korean War and served in National Guard units up to and into the Viet Nam War

The Korean War didn't extend past the service life of the Mosquito.

And what did guard units use them for?

That proves the aircraft resiliency for the time it was operated. Take that airframe and put it out in the desert or Jungle and bring it back to England and see what would have happened - another reason why the Mosquito didn't last long in the post war period.

Not the case at all. Mosquitos had difficulty in the tropics because of the glue, but that was solved during the war.

Mosquitos were replaced by jet aircraft - like the Canberra.

But it does have a shelf life - it expands and contracts, is harder to repair and will eventually break down - the Mosquito was cleverly constructed in its heyday but let's face it, "wood composite" structures on a primary airframe quickly became a thing of the past. Metal does fatigue, but it can be made to last longer than any wood structure.

I would argue that the Mosquito's structure was easier to repair. Depending were the damage was it could be just patched. Winds could be sawed off and another spliced in place.

 

[nuuumannn]

I'd have to rate it better than the Mossie in terms of operational matainability (a round engine vs. liquid cooled and also wood vs. metal construction - this subject has been beat to death on other threads).

Trying desperately to stay on thread and avoid more discussions about the merits of German wonder weapons! I gotta agree with you to a certain extent, but the argument that Mossies were inferior to the A-26 in 1944-45 for this reason isn't that strong. There was an entire industry supporting the maintenance of the Mosquito in RAF service; wooden construction and in-line engines were definitely not a disadvantage at this time.

Still Mossie for me. Tu-2 as well, disadvantage was that the bomb load wasn't all that big 1 to 3 tons internally (4 x 500 kg bombs) up to 4 tons with external load of 2 FAB-1000 bombs, but impressive stats: (translated from Russian, hence kilometres), Tu-2S Max t/off weight 11,450 kg (25,243 lb), Tu-2S max speed 550 km/h (342 mph) at 5.7 km, Tu-2M max speed 605 km/h (376 mph) at 8.8 km, Tu-2S climb time to 5 km, 9.5 min, Tu-2M climb time to 5 km, 8.5 min, Tu-2S ceiling 9 km (29,530 ft), Tu-2M 10.4 km (34,120 ft), Tu-2S range 2100 km (1300 miles) Tu-2M range 1950 km.

 

[Siegfried]

Reliability during test and operational reliability can vary greatly.

If that fuze was ready for production in 1944, but was prevented by the factory being over run, It must have been ready for production very late in 44, and that factory must have been awfully near the western border, because no allied soldiers got into Germany till Oct. 44.

Like someone else said about the wunderwaffe, could've, would've, should've, but didn't. In other words irrelevant in the discussion about about twin-engine bombers.

The A-26 had no influence on the war. It came way to late to matter. When it did come into service into numbers it was post war and was used to strafe small statured people fighting wars of liberation who had little in the way of suffcient numbers of sophisticated defences and what they did have they didn't make themselves but received. It was easy to intercept, it's remote controlled armament was ineffective and in fact of such little use it was removed. It relied on air superiority on vastly more advanced aircraft. A competantly conceived A-26 would at least have had a radar directed tail gun if it were built to the times. The A-26 entered service at the same month as the Jets that outmoded it. The A-26 was an anachronism from the first day it entered service in september 1944 (the same time as the Me 262 and Meteor) to the day it was retired. I still state that by its nature it was inadaquete against an enemy of equal technical sophistication. The Mosquito belongs in the discusion, the A-26 does not.

The Rheinmetall-Borsig factory that was lost was in Eastern Parts of Germany, now Poland. It was very difficult to get anything new into mass production in 1944 in Germany.

The coulda would shoulda joke is just plain silly. I have given dates for either service entry and field trials of these weapons. They are not weapons that were mere projections, they were built and either in full production (like the manheim radar) or low level production (like the German microwave radars only held back by damage to magnetron production) or in an advanced state of development. About 2000 rounds of 88mm gun shell with proximity fuze was fired with reliabillity starting at 90% and reaching 95%.

As far as the Rheinmetall-Borsig electrostatic proximity fuzes reliabilly: it would have been much more reliable than the allied radio fuze by its nature. The cold gas thyratron was intrinsically far more reliable than a thermionic tube and only 1 or 2 tubes was needed instead of 7 or 8. No unreliable battery was needed (only a capacitor which are easily shock hardened)

 

[CobberKane]

Run now!!!!

Although the Mosquito was able to carry the same bomb load it was not able to deliver it from altitude at the speeds it was famous for if deployed in the same manner. To carry out a daylight precision strike like the 8th AF did with the Mosquito would be placing the same amount of aircraft over a target at 130 - 150 mph while a lead plane with a bomb sight guided the formation over the target. Flying straight and level, how long would that two man crew survived? Also remember the Mosquito was not able to drop its bombs at top speed, I think the opening of the bomb bay doors were limited to something like 280 or 300 mph (that subject was discussed on another thread somewhere on this site)

Fair enough, although I think your description of the 8th AF performing 'precision stike(s)' is more a reflection of the wishful thinking of the times than the historical reality. I think by D-Day the USAAF tacticians had pretty much accepted that destroying the intended target generally involved taking out half the surrounding city as well. What was that oft-used expression? The RAF area-bombed precision targets and the USA precision-bombed area targets. I suspect the distinction might have been lost on the people underneath. Full credit to the Americans for trying to keep the civilian casualties down, but the technology of the time just wasn't sufficient for the job.
Of course, if you really wanted to take something out with pinpoint accuracy the best option was a low level strike with a fast manouverable bomber - like the Mosquito.

 

[nuuumannn]

The coulda would shoulda joke is just plain silly. I have given dates for either service entry and field trials of these weapons. They are not weapons that were mere projections, they were built and either in full production (like the manheim radar) or low level production (like the German microwave radars only held back by damage to magnetron production) or in an advanced state of development. About 2000 rounds of 88mm gun shell with proximity fuze was fired with reliabillity starting at 90% and reaching 95%. As far as the Rheinmetall-Borsig electrostatic proximity fuzes reliabilly: it would have been much more reliable than the allied radio fuze by its nature. The cold gas thyratron was intrinsically far more reliable than a thermionic tube and only 1 or 2 tubes was needed instead of 7 or 8. No unreliable battery was needed (only a capacitor which are easily shock hardened)

Didn't make a lick of difference to Germany's war effort or the inevitable outcome, in which the de Havilland Mosquito played a decisive part in 1944 -45.

 

[Tante Ju]

Didn't make a lick of difference to Germany's war effort or the inevitable outcome, in which the de Havilland Mosquito played a decisive part in 1944 -45.

Decisive? Important yes but decisive.. conventional heavy bombers hit the most important targets, the Mosquito was just try to draw away german force with not-so-important small raids.

 

[Juha]

Re Siegfried's message #83. Reading p. 22 of the
http://www.cdvandt.org/CIOS-XXXI-50.pdf

gave me an impression that German fuzes were far from ready for deployment

Juha

 

[JoeB]

1. The Germans had worked out that going for a direct hit and not bothering with fuze setting (it wasted time, cost money, required powerful explosives and complicated fragmentation). This was the best of both worlds.

The report of the actual fuze is supposedly in:
"Proximity Fuse Development - Rheinmettal Borsig A.G.
Mullhausen. CIOS report ITEM nos 3 file nos XXVI -1 (1945)

Another mentions thermionic tube development at Telefunken (instead of Siemens)
capable of surviving several thousand G
http://www.cdvandt.org/CIOS-XXXII-87.pdf

There are references to a KTB (Officers Daily Journal) of an officer sent to fetch a proximity fuse for a 5 inch FLAK shell for use in a V2 missile.

This fuse was essentially ready for production in 1944 as it was 95% reliable but unfortunately the factory was over run.

The battery seems to have been molten salt type first used in the V2 and adopted by the US post war.

2. This ignores the allied bombing campaign after 1944.

3. The US 90mm was no better than the German 88mm FLAK 43 which featured autoloaders, autofuze setters and outstanding ballistics.

4. The Germans had 'effective' ECM, they were successful pioneers in the field. This included jamming the US SCR-268 radar in 1943 and 1944 forcing the SCR-584 to be rushed into service in January 1944. They at times jammed Chain Home.

5. US AA weapons had 2 advantages worthy of consideration.
1 The proximity fuse, which was potentially very vulnerable to jamming due to the limited sophistication possible.
2 A microwave radar system whose narrow beam provided greater angular accuracy and resistance to jamming but was not superior in range accuracy or features such as auto track.

1. My source is "Radar History of WWII" by Brown. There's lot of verbiage in your response but no solid source quoted, (not 'supposed') that contradicts my statement: the Germans got as far as testing (several) designs of *soft* proximity fuzes, concepts they perhaps hoped to build into artillery shells, but never did the testing and development of hardened fuzes, and that was the biggest hurdle.

The British tested soft fuzes all through WWII but never mass produced hardened ones, and like I said, even the Japanese used soft proximity fuzes in actual combat. This was in each case far from 'almost' having mass issue shell fired fuzes (all the fuzes the British fired from guns were US produced, albeit as mentioned the fuze circuit concept used was developed by the Brits [independently], but a drawing of a fuze circuit or breadboard tests thereof, while necessary, was very different than mass issue shell fired proximity fuzes).

The German conclusion that impact fuzed shells worked just as well was in comparison to *time fuzed* shells, and given their radar and director capabilities; not proximity fuzed shells, which they didn't have.

2. It doesn't ignore anything, it just states the fact: the Germans fell progessively behind the Allies in electronics in the second half of WWII.

3. The overall combination, gun/director/radar/fuze, was far superior.

4. I said the Germans never developed effective ECM v Allied microwave radars, you're just repeating that.

5. the first advantage alone increased effectiveness on the order of 3-4 times (the USN determined in comparative use of time and VT in the Pacific), and the second was very significant as well. And again the Germans were not close to replicating either of those major advantages, whereas the basic US Army gun (or guns including the 120mm) and directors were also strong. The overall combination was vastly superior to what the Germans actually fielded in any quantity through 1945, and the US combination was in widespread use in 1944.

Joe

 

[tyrodtom]

The A-26 had no influence on the war. It came way to late to matter. When it did come into service into numbers it was post war and was used to strafe small statured people fighting wars of liberation who had little in the way of suffcient numbers of sophisticated defences and what they did have they didn't make themselves but received. It was easy to intercept, it's remote controlled armament was ineffective and in fact of such little use it was removed. It relied on air superiority on vastly more advanced aircraft. A competantly conceived A-26 would at least have had a radar directed tail gun if it were built to the times. The A-26 entered service at the same month as the Jets that outmoded it. The A-26 was an anachronism from the first day it entered service in september 1944 (the same time as the Me 262 and Meteor) to the day it was retired. I still state that by its nature it was inadaquete against an enemy of equal technical sophistication. The Mosquito belongs in the discusion, the A-26 does not.

The Rheinmetall-Borsig factory that was lost was in Eastern Parts of Germany, now Poland. It was very difficult to get anything new into mass production in 1944 in Germany.

The coulda would shoulda joke is just plain silly. I have given dates for either service entry and field trials of these weapons. They are not weapons that were mere projections, they were built and either in full production (like the manheim radar) or low level production (like the German microwave radars only held back by damage to magnetron production) or in an advanced state of development. About 2000 rounds of 88mm gun shell with proximity fuze was fired with reliabillity starting at 90% and reaching 95%.

As far as the Rheinmetall-Borsig electrostatic proximity fuzes reliabilly: it would have been much more reliable than the allied radio fuze by its nature. The cold gas thyratron was intrinsically far more reliable than a thermionic tube and only 1 or 2 tubes was needed instead of 7 or 8. No unreliable battery was needed (only a capacitor which are easily shock hardened)

Then your date of ready for production in 44 must be a error, Russia didn't cross the border into Germany till Jan. 45.

Pretty dumb to put a factory that important that close to a border, must be some of Hitler's right brain thinking.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I dispute that it was the case for the A-26. The Korean War didn't extend past the service life of the Mosquito.

And what did guard units use them for?

From wiki...

"The USAF Strategic Air Command had the renamed B-26 (RB-26) in service from 1949 through 1950, the Tactical Air Command through the late 1960s, and the last examples in service with the Air National Guard through 1972. The US Navy also used a small number of these aircraft in their utility squadrons for target towing and general utility use until superseded by the DC-130A variant of the C-130 Hercules. The Navy designation was JD-1 and JD-1D until 1962, when the JD-1 was redesignated UB-26J and the JD-1D was redesignated DB-26J."

Not the case at all. Mosquitos had difficulty in the tropics because of the glue, but that was solved during the war.

And like all wood aircraft, it had trouble with wood swelling and drying.

Mosquitos were replaced by jet aircraft - like the Canberra.

As planned...

I would argue that the Mosquito's structure was easier to repair. Depending were the damage was it could be just patched. Winds could be sawed off and another spliced in place.

NOT TRUE - I have worked on both metal and wood aircraft and wood is way more difficult to inspect and repair. The shop enviornment has to be clean, glues and resins have to be prepared at certain temperatures and during the curing process the area has to be kept clean and sometimes at certain temperatures.

Trying desperately to stay on thread and avoid more discussions about the merits of German wonder weapons! I gotta agree with you to a certain extent, but the argument that Mossies were inferior to the A-26 in 1944-45 for this reason isn't that strong. There was an entire industry supporting the maintenance of the Mosquito in RAF service; wooden construction and in-line engines were definitely not a disadvantage at this time.

At that time all true but once that industry was taken away we seen much of the Mosquito fleet disappear as there was little or no field support for the aircraft in the post WW2 era.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Fair enough, although I think your description of the 8th AF performing 'precision stike(s)' is more a reflection of the wishful thinking of the times than the historical reality. I think by D-Day the USAAF tacticians had pretty much accepted that destroying the intended target generally involved taking out half the surrounding city as well. What was that oft-used expression? The RAF area-bombed precision targets and the USA precision-bombed area targets. I suspect the distinction might have been lost on the people underneath. Full credit to the Americans for trying to keep the civilian casualties down, but the technology of the time just wasn't sufficient for the job.
Of course, if you really wanted to take something out with pinpoint accuracy the best option was a low level strike with a fast manouverable bomber - like the Mosquito.

Agree -

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The A-26 had no influence on the war. It came way to late to matter. When it did come into service into numbers it was post war and was used to strafe small statured people fighting wars of liberation who had little in the way of suffcient numbers of sophisticated defences and what they did have they didn't make themselves but received. It was easy to intercept, it's remote controlled armament was ineffective and in fact of such little use it was removed. It relied on air superiority on vastly more advanced aircraft. A competantly conceived A-26 would at least have had a radar directed tail gun if it were built to the times. The A-26 entered service at the same month as the Jets that outmoded it. The A-26 was an anachronism from the first day it entered service in september 1944 (the same time as the Me 262 and Meteor) to the day it was retired. I still state that by its nature it was inadaquete against an enemy of equal technical sophistication. The Mosquito belongs in the discusion, the A-26 does not.

While I agree the A-26 had no real impact on the war it was a generation a head of the Mosquito as far as construction, operation, systems, room for growth and longevity. While the Mosquito had advantages over the A-26, just it's configuration made it an operational risk. The A/B-26 performed well not only during WW2 but two wars later in a number of roles.

 

[Siegfried]

While I agree the A-26 had no real impact on the war it was a generation a head of the Mosquito as far as construction, operation, systems, room for growth and longevity. While the Mosquito had advantages over the A-26, just it's configuration made it an operational risk. The A/B-26 performed well not only during WW2 but two wars later in a number of roles.

Certainly the A-26 was an excellent design, with deliveries commencing in Aug 1944 but first service in the PTO in Jul 1944 and Sept in the ETO. This extensive delay between first deliveries and opperational combat seems unique to American aircraft. The Luftwaffe tended to take A-0 pre series aircraft (eg FW 190A-0) in order to work out bugs, understand mainteance requirements and develope tactics with the occaisional controlled risk opportunistic mission. The A-26 might have been in service sooner and therefore been influential, but its fairly late intro certainly reduce its contribution. The Douglass Havoc was providing an extraordinary amount of 'bomb lift' approx equal to that of the B-26 and B-25 combined.

Whoever started this thread left the preimis wide open however "best 2 engined bomber". Between 1941 and late 1944 the Mosquito provided the most extraordinary cabillity to the RAF and I would argue it was incontrovertably the finest twin engine bomber in that period. Not because it was a fastes bomber but because it was in service in numbers. It did have limitations (not very resistant to ground fire damage hence use of aircraft like the Beaufighter) and it would be interesting to see how it would have performed in a role such as combat support for the Russian Army. (The Rocket firing FB or Fighter Bombers version quite well I immagine). (The Luftwaffe could incidently penetrate British airspace with a handfull of Ar 240 incidently)

I added in the "Ar 234" (only 76 to see service) as a bit of a curve ball. Everything is in context. Immagine a "What If analysis" of say the Luftwaffe being given 100 of the best US or British aircraft and attempting a raid against some of the most defended airspace of WW2; Britain itself.

I can't see a 'stike package' of A-26's and say P-51's penetrating British airspace in say December/44 to Jan 1945. They would be detected by radar and intercepted by Tempest V, with its extraordinary low altitude speed and deadly 4 x 20mm Hispano armament, Mk XIV Griffon Spitfires and also still capable Mk IX. Meteor I with upgraded Welland engines and Meteor III with the early derated derwent II engines would also be able of intercepting and overwhelming the small package.

I wouldn't count the A-26 as an easy target, it was fast, I believe an A-26 with Water Injection could manage nearly 400mph at low altitude but it was well within capabilities of the faster late war piston aircraft.

However the Ar 234, if lightly bombed up (single 250kg/550 lb bomb, possibly witth a single 500kg/1100lb bomb) could get through by relying on its speed either with or without an Me 262 escort. It might take some losses from opportune 'lucky intercepts' where an interceptor is position where it can dive onto its target. Of course if you can guarantee air superiority, like the USAAF could with its exceptional force of fighter aircraft the fire power and lift of the A-26 is going to be most effective.

The late war AAA capabilities as seen with US Army AAA defenses: an accurate radar, the SCR-584 training via a computer remote power control driven 90mm guns firing a proximity fuze shell itself makes the A-26 vulnerable. The Luftwaffe (who ran FLAK for the Army) had similar defenses though it lagged in deploying microwave radar and probably didn't get a proximity fuze into service. (there are tantalizing accounts of their use and existance however). One can see an extra-ordinary improvment in FLAK defenses comming on line, including some very capable SAM's.

 

[pbfoot]

That sucks!

AFAIK the Mosquito had an auto feather system where by the push of a button would feather the prop after the engine was shut down. In the case of a run away prop I would think that something happened so the prop hub lost hydraulic fluid (which is not part of the main system).

The Mosquito had a basic hydraulic hydraulic system with each engine driving a pump. I'm pretty sure it had a reservior but no accumulator.

on the turn I noted a variation in my port oil pressure and so decided to watch it on the southbound line. When the oil pressure drops you immediatly hope you have a faulty instrument .No Way the chance of an oil pressure guage lying to you is very much less then the chance of winning the lottery
After the pressure fluctuation increased Itold the crew that we were aborting the trip. I was going to feather the prop and head for home.Feathering means the prop blade edges arefacing into the oncoming air to give minimum drag. The prop stated a normal feather procedure and the as soon as it was just about to stop in the fully feathered postion it ran away. The rpm increased uncontrolled to whar was later estimated to be 5000 or 6000 rpm . The drag from the full fine position of a huge windmilling prop is alarming - like pushing a barn door through the air . The onset of high drag happened so suddenly that I was caught completely by surprise . The port side of the aircraft pivoted about 90 degres to the left. the turning movement from one prop in fine pitch dragging and the other in normal cruise changed the heading so rapidly it almost seemed like the fin and rudder were gone. The deacceleration was so great that the huge aluminium spiiner on the left prop pulled its bolts out the metal and spun off the prop feet from my head and moved ahead of the aircraft . It then came back as the aircraft caught up to it and was shredded by the screaming prop which sent pieces of spinner flying like confetti. This all happened in seconds
"I was terrified Vince was wide eyed .but imagine Barry in his cocoon at the back with all the noises and sound effects and no way of knowing what was happening. What had happened was that oil had not been added after the morning flight and we had simply run out of oil on that side . When the quantity was low , I had indication on the pressure guage and shut down the engine. Normally a return to base on one engine was no problem at all . What we did not knowwas that Rolls Royce had not installed a standpipe in their wartime engines. The purpose of this feature is maintain an emergency reserve of oil for emergency feathering
The 2 crew bailed out and the pilot was unable to flew it back to base 200 miles away he landed it and lived the aircraft burnt on landing . This Mosquito is currently under" restoration" in Calgary

 

[Shortround6]

The Americans believed in working up trained squadrons before committing them to combat. This includes training the mechanics and maintenance personnel on the type of aircraft. While a mechanic who has been working on B-24s for a year is certainly better than a guy fresh out of mechanics school giving both of them a number weeks or two months to 'wrench' on a new type like the A-26 stateside before sending them overseas would help the overall efficiency of the unit. Letting crews or pilots get 30-50 hours on their new aircraft before getting to a combat zone was also a plus.
Remember that the front lines were thousands of miles away from the american factories and planes could NOT be returned to the factories for reworking if something was wrong. Spare parts often came by ship. Fuel for training flights over England, North Africa or Asian areas of operation had to be brought by tanker. Why not do the initial flight training and familiarization in the US?


Bombers are essentially bomb trucks.
A worthwhile bomber has to carry a worthwhile bomb load to a certain distance.
A worthwhile bomber has to be able to hit the target (or come fairly close).
A worthwhile bomber has to have a survival rate good enough to keep losses to an acceptable level.

Needing 3-4 bombers to carry the same payload as a single bomber of another type is not a good thing.
Not being able to reach a fair number of targets is not a good thing.
Bombing at high speed from medium altitudes is probably no better than medium or low speed bombing from higher altitudes. Better bomb sights and electronic aids do help as the war goes on.
While it doesn't tell the whole story, planes lost per 100tons (or per 1000tons) bombs dropped might be a better indicator of a bombers "effectiveness" than number of planes lost per 100 or 1000 missions.

 

[wuzak]

Bombers are essentially bomb trucks.
A worthwhile bomber has to carry a worthwhile bomb load to a certain distance.
A worthwhile bomber has to be able to hit the target (or come fairly close).
A worthwhile bomber has to have a survival rate good enough to keep losses to an acceptable level.

Needing 3-4 bombers to carry the same payload as a single bomber of another type is not a good thing.
Not being able to reach a fair number of targets is not a good thing.
Bombing at high speed from medium altitudes is probably no better than medium or low speed bombing from higher altitudes. Better bomb sights and electronic aids do help as the war goes on.
While it doesn't tell the whole story, planes lost per 100tons (or per 1000tons) bombs dropped might be a better indicator of a bombers "effectiveness" than number of planes lost per 100 or 1000 missions.

So, do you have any comparitive numbers?

There are some numbers for Mosquitos - about 27,000 sorties for 106 aircraft lost and 88 damaged beyond economical repair during the night campaign from 1943-1945. I don't have the bomb tonnage dropped, but I believe it is just over a tonne per sortie.