the Blenheim in battle of britian

[pbehn]

The 408 and 420 did in fact fly Hamptons. When the RCAF were flying their 3 Hercules powered Lancaster squadrons they had 5 Merlin powered Halifax squadrons and 1 Merlin powered Lancaster squadron. On top of that they then added 4 new Hercules powered Halifax squadrons, so I don't think anyone was trying to decrease the logistics load on the RCAF.
As to the statement that the RCAF was given easier targets I suggest you read "The Berlin Raids" by Martin Middelbrook." 4 and 6 groups were flying their Merlin Halifaxs on the same missions as the other Groups until their losses became intolerable. 3 Group's Stirlings were decimated but they also flew as long as humanly possible. Both were removed from frontline service shortly after. I have to say the Lancaster MkIIs fared a lot better than the Merlin Halifaxes and actually better than the Hercules Halifaxes.
According to Middelbrook, counting only effective sorties, the Lancaster loss rate was was 5.6%, the Halifax 8.9% and the Stirling 15.8% in the Battle of Berlin.

Does that support your argument that the Canadians were given poor equipment. How many RCAF squadrons were operating Stirlings? The losses on Berlin raids were unsustainable for bomber command, and as with the first 1000 bomber raids the planes came from everywhere. Harris preferred the Lancaster for all sorts of reasons, by the time of the Dresden raid all were Lancasters on such missions. Half of bomber commands aircraft once the Stirling retired were Halifaxes, it was in service before the Manchester let alone the Lancaster and as the war progressed the Lancaster was the plane of choice especially on long range missions.

 

[Greyman]

No, because the "turret" didn't have 360 degree rotation. I am not sure it could even do 180 degrees? it was power traverse and power elevation though. It was also semi retractable.

The turret could rotate 60 degrees port / starboard, and the gun cradle could rotate 40 degrees port / starboard.

 

[ClayO]

The turret could rotate 60 degrees port / starboard, and the gun cradle could rotate 40 degrees port / starboard.

It seems like the rotation of the turret would cause an uneven airflow: with the single gun turret, the wide gap for the gun would scoop up the air when the turret was rotated to port; on the twin gun mount, the back of the square turret would deflect the airflow unevenly when the turret was rotated either port or starboard. Maybe the Blenheim was too slow for that to matter, but I can't help thinking that the uneven airflow would cause enough buffeting to throw off the gunner just a little - but a little is all it would take to cause him to miss.

 

[Greyman]

Square turret?

 

[ClayO]

Square turret?

Not quite square, but it looks like the turret has a flat back.

Blenheims operating out of India. A MK V in the background. Larger turret may have given gunner more room to work or had other improvements but it had higher drag than the old turret. The rearward firing gun mount under the nose was of dubious value but contributed a fair amount to drag (and weight)

Few, if any, of the MK Vs had the turret faired into the fuselage, just sort of plopped into the large opening.

 

[Greyman]

Ah I thought you were referring to the twin-Browning version of the B.1 turret.

EDIT: looking through info on the Bristol B.X turret -- it sounds like it was a very satisfactory turret and no mention is made of adverse effects during rotation tests at various speeds/altitudes.

Maybe the turret was cleverly shaped to counteract the airflow hitting the gun barrels when rotated off centre? Just a shot in the dark.

 

[pbehn]

The poor Blenheim was supposed to be a bomber, fighter and photo recon aircraft. It never had a chance, as with many things pre war, did anyone try them out? Like trying intercepting a Blenheim with a Blenheim.

 

[Shortround6]

Not sure if they tried that but in shipping strikes the bomber Blenheims could outrun the fighter Blenheims on the way home.

 

[pbehn]

Not sure if they tried that but in shipping strikes the bomber Blenheims could outrun the fighter Blenheims on the way home.

As I understand it they tried all sorts of things in training/ practice but everything was immersed in a vat of confirmation bias. How else did they conclude that a Wellington would shoot down Bf 109s as fast as they could take off. Or that any serving RAF bomber alone or in a group could operate over enemy territory. The RAF defence system was convinced that the Germans couldn't.

 

[ThomasP]

re: "Question on the dorsal turret. When this is turned forward wouldn't the gunner have the airstream straight in his face?"

Although they are not fitted in the up-thread picture of the B.1 Mk I turret, as originally designed/manufactured the turret had 2 rotating sections (left and right) that could be slid open and closed as needed to reduce the size of the opening. The rotating sections pivoted around the small rounded hub at the top center of the turret, leaving only a narrow vertical slot for the gun, and served as both wind and weather shield. At some point the sliding sections were determined to be more trouble than they were worth (partly due to the somewhat flimsy construction), and most sliding sections were removed from operational turrets.

Similar rotating sections (of much sturdier construction) were used on rear of the Boulton-Paul Type A 4-gun top turret, as shown below:

Note that Bristol B.1 Mk I turret had the sliding sections on the inside, and the Boulton-Paul Type A had the sliding sections on the outside.

 

[Greyman]

This doesn't seem to be fitted very often at all. Any photos around?

Rotating some top-view diagrams of the B.1 turret in photoshop, it looks like the 'leading' frame is at 90 degrees and trailing frame is at about 27 degrees. So it's entirely possible it avoids air blasting in the turret.

1938 A&AEE tests say 'the gunner is afforded satisfactory protection from the force of the airflow' but complain about draughts a) on the gunner's neck from the joint of the dome and the fuselage and b) the three footholds on the port side of the fuselage.

 

[Greyman]

One ghastly thing from an AFDE report:

It required no less than 50 seconds for the air gunner to get out of the turret into a position from where he could jump and use his parachute. This timing was the average of several tests made with the aircraft stationary on the ground, and with the gunner fully aware of what he was about to be told to do.

 

[nuuumannn]

According to Middlebrook, counting only effective sorties, the Lancaster loss rate was was 5.6%, the Halifax 8.9% and the Stirling 15.8% in the Battle of Berlin.

Loss rates were one reason why the Halifax wasn't so highly regarded at the time. These days we tend to look at it with rose-tinted glasses because of its war effort, which was, undoubtedly substantial and important, but it gained success despite itself. The early Merlin engined Halis had numerous issues and the type became known for high losses on ops, not just to enemy action, either. The most serious fault was rudder overbalance, which knocked the aircraft into an irrecoverable dive and was not cured until the B.II Series IA with its bigger D-shaped vertical stabilisers in late 1942/early 1943. These were fitted to subsequent marks and cured the overbalance. The good performance and reliability of the Lancaster I when it entered service didn't help perceptions of the Halifax either.

Once the Hali III entered service it had marginally superior performance to the Lanc I, but the Lanc III could outperform it in terms of cruise speed, altitude, range with a heavy load and it could carry a greater tonnage of bombs, and a greater variety of them. In favour of the Halifax is that it was arguably more survivable than the Lancaster, and supporters state this as a benefit, but the reality was that Halifaxes suffered higher losses operationally than Lancasters and were more likely to crash.

Harris' disregard for the Halifax was well known and while the Hali III redressed the balance a little, it came along just as Lancaster production numbers were increasing and Merlin Halifax units often replaced theirs with Lancs.

Anyway, back to Blenheims.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Loss rates were one reason why the Halifax wasn't so highly regarded at the time. These days we tend to look at it with rose-tinted glasses because of its war effort, which was, undoubtedly substantial and important, but it gained success despite itself. The early Merlin engined Halis had numerous issues and the type became known for high losses on ops, not just to enemy action, either. The most serious fault was rudder overbalance, which knocked the aircraft into an irrecoverable dive and was not cured until the B.II Series IA with its bigger D-shaped vertical stabilisers in late 1942/early 1943. These were fitted to subsequent marks and cured the overbalance. The good performance and reliability of the Lancaster I when it entered service didn't help perceptions of the Halifax either.

Once the Hali III entered service it had marginally superior performance to the Lanc I, but the Lanc III could outperform it in terms of cruise speed, altitude, range with a heavy load and it could carry a greater tonnage of bombs, and a greater variety of them. In favour of the Halifax is that it was arguably more survivable than the Lancaster, and supporters state this as a benefit, but the reality was that Halifaxes suffered higher losses operationally than Lancasters and were more likely to crash.

Harris' disregard for the Halifax was well known and while the Hali III redressed the balance a little, it came along just as Lancaster production numbers were increasing and Merlin Halifax units often replaced theirs with Lancs.

Anyway, back to Blenheims.

Note that the loss rates even for the Lancaster were well beyond sustainable. Harris almost succeeded in completely destroying his command for no real advantage. The man who always belittled others for their advocacy of "Panacea Target's" went for the biggest Panacea Target of them all. In that time frame he could have done much greater damage to the Ruhr, likely at a lower cost.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

One ghastly thing from an AFDE report:

It required no less than 50 seconds for the air gunner to get out of the turret into a position from where he could jump and use his parachute. This timing was the average of several tests made with the aircraft stationary on the ground, and with the gunner fully aware of what he was about to be told to do.

Not a lot of thought was given to air crew survival in general. Defiant gunners had almost no chance of bailing out and their survival rates showed it.

 

[ClayO]

Ah I thought you were referring to the twin-Browning version of the B.1 turret.

EDIT: looking through info on the Bristol B.X turret -- it sounds like it was a very satisfactory turret and no mention is made of adverse effects during rotation tests at various speeds/altitudes.

Maybe the turret was cleverly shaped to counteract the airflow hitting the gun barrels when rotated off centre? Just a shot in the dark.

Looking at the picture again, I see that there's a lot of fairing around the turret, so the rotating part of the turret is basically round.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Does that support your argument that the Canadians were given poor equipment. How many RCAF squadrons were operating Stirlings? The losses on Berlin raids were unsustainable for bomber command, and as with the first 1000 bomber raids the planes came from everywhere. Harris preferred the Lancaster for all sorts of reasons, by the time of the Dresden raid all were Lancasters on such missions. Half of bomber commands aircraft once the Stirling retired were Halifaxes, it was in service before the Manchester let alone the Lancaster and as the war progressed the Lancaster was the plane of choice especially on long range missions.

I mentioned the Hampden to correct the record. Your post seemed to imply that the RCAF didn't fly Hampdens. Since you mentioned it, I did some further research and found what I think is further ammunition for my argument. The RCAF used the Hampden in the bomber role much longer than the RAF. The last mission over Germany by Hampdens was flown by RCAF 408 Squadron in September 1942. . The RAF had withdrawn their Hampdens (7 squadrons) from Bomber Command in April, 5 months earlier. RCAF Squadron 420 flew its last Hampden in August. The counter argument is that 5 of those squadrons received Manchesters. (Out of the frying pan into the fire) As for the Stirling, luckily for the Canadians, most of the Stirling squadrons were formed before the Canadians showed up in force. Luckily for everyone, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Shorts factory in Rochester was an own goal in that it set back Stirling production and thereby limited the number of Stirling squadrons.

In his book Bomber Offensive, Sir Arthur Harris spends a few paragraphs disparaging the capabilities of "colonials" (he specifically included Canadians in his list). I would presume that if he had any say in the distribution of aircraft, he would favour the airmen he considered to be superior. " ….and I say without hesitation that the finest fighting crews of the whole lot were beyond a doubt the British crews……" I don't know if this was a general view in the RAF but Harris generally got what he wanted.

Certainly, the Canadians were done no favours as an all Halifax group for most of the war and as I pointed out previously RAFs Group 4 received the superior Halifax Mk VI while the RCAF received the Mk VII.

The attached paper is an interesting comparison of the capabilities of the Halifax vs the Lancaster

 

[Greyman]

To be fair to Harris (and the other countries in the Empire) he was more praising British aircrew than disparaging the crews from other nations.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I mentioned the Hampden to correct the record. Your post seemed to imply that the RCAF didn't fly Hampdens. Since you mentioned it, I did some further research and found what I think is further ammunition for my argument. The RCAF used the Hampden in the bomber role much longer than the RAF.

Good pics of Canadian Hampden ops here Harold A. Skaarup web pages

Canadians didn't just operate the Hampden, we also made them.

Handley Page Hampden | The Canadian Museum of Flight

 

[MikeMeech]

I mentioned the Hampden to correct the record. Your post seemed to imply that the RCAF didn't fly Hampdens. Since you mentioned it, I did some further research and found what I think is further ammunition for my argument. The RCAF used the Hampden in the bomber role much longer than the RAF. The last mission over Germany by Hampdens was flown by RCAF 408 Squadron in September 1942. . The RAF had withdrawn their Hampdens (7 squadrons) from Bomber Command in April, 5 months earlier. RCAF Squadron 420 flew its last Hampden in August. The counter argument is that 5 of those squadrons received Manchesters. (Out of the frying pan into the fire) As for the Stirling, luckily for the Canadians, most of the Stirling squadrons were formed before the Canadians showed up in force. Luckily for everyone, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Shorts factory in Rochester was an own goal in that it set back Stirling production and thereby limited the number of Stirling squadrons.

In his book Bomber Offensive, Sir Arthur Harris spends a few paragraphs disparaging the capabilities of "colonials" (he specifically included Canadians in his list). I would presume that if he had any say in the distribution of aircraft, he would favour the airmen he considered to be superior. " ….and I say without hesitation that the finest fighting crews of the whole lot were beyond a doubt the British crews……" I don't know if this was a general view in the RAF but Harris generally got what he wanted.

Certainly, the Canadians were done no favours as an all Halifax group for most of the war and as I pointed out previously RAFs Group 4 received the superior Halifax Mk VI while the RCAF received the Mk VII.

The attached paper is an interesting comparison of the capabilities of the Halifax vs the Lancaster

Hi

Harris, who had gone to, the then, Rhodesia at the age of 16 (1908) to seek 'adventure' (working in various jobs including mining, farming and coach driving) joined the 1st Rhodesia Regiment at the outbreak of WW1, fighting in the brief campaign in German South West Africa before returning to Britain to join the RFC, completing his pilot training in January 1916. He wrote the following in his book 'Bomber Offensive', pages 63-64 reference 'colonials' to put it in context:

It should also be remembered that No. 408 (Goose) Squadron formed in No. 5 Group RAF, equipped with Hampdens when it joined, in July 1941, so that's what it got. All the RAF Hampden Squadrons flew more sorties with this aircraft than 408, as the RAF sqns had been operational since the outbreak of war. 408 moved to No. 4 Group when equipped with the Halifax. No. 6 (Canadian) Group was only formed at the beginning of January 1943.

Mike