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Does that support your argument that the Canadians were given poor equipment. How many RCAF squadrons were operating Stirlings? The losses on Berlin raids were unsustainable for bomber command, and as with the first 1000 bomber raids the planes came from everywhere. Harris preferred the Lancaster for all sorts of reasons, by the time of the Dresden raid all were Lancasters on such missions. Half of bomber commands aircraft once the Stirling retired were Halifaxes, it was in service before the Manchester let alone the Lancaster and as the war progressed the Lancaster was the plane of choice especially on long range missions.The 408 and 420 did in fact fly Hamptons. When the RCAF were flying their 3 Hercules powered Lancaster squadrons they had 5 Merlin powered Halifax squadrons and 1 Merlin powered Lancaster squadron. On top of that they then added 4 new Hercules powered Halifax squadrons, so I don't think anyone was trying to decrease the logistics load on the RCAF.
As to the statement that the RCAF was given easier targets I suggest you read "The Berlin Raids" by Martin Middelbrook." 4 and 6 groups were flying their Merlin Halifaxs on the same missions as the other Groups until their losses became intolerable. 3 Group's Stirlings were decimated but they also flew as long as humanly possible. Both were removed from frontline service shortly after. I have to say the Lancaster MkIIs fared a lot better than the Merlin Halifaxes and actually better than the Hercules Halifaxes.
According to Middelbrook, counting only effective sorties, the Lancaster loss rate was was 5.6%, the Halifax 8.9% and the Stirling 15.8% in the Battle of Berlin.
No, because the "turret" didn't have 360 degree rotation. I am not sure it could even do 180 degrees? it was power traverse and power elevation though. It was also semi retractable.
The turret could rotate 60 degrees port / starboard, and the gun cradle could rotate 40 degrees port / starboard.
Square turret?
Blenheims operating out of India. A MK V in the background. Larger turret may have given gunner more room to work or had other improvements but it had higher drag than the old turret. The rearward firing gun mount under the nose was of dubious value but contributed a fair amount to drag (and weight)
Few, if any, of the MK Vs had the turret faired into the fuselage, just sort of plopped into the large opening.
As I understand it they tried all sorts of things in training/ practice but everything was immersed in a vat of confirmation bias. How else did they conclude that a Wellington would shoot down Bf 109s as fast as they could take off. Or that any serving RAF bomber alone or in a group could operate over enemy territory. The RAF defence system was convinced that the Germans couldn't.Not sure if they tried that but in shipping strikes the bomber Blenheims could outrun the fighter Blenheims on the way home.
According to Middlebrook, counting only effective sorties, the Lancaster loss rate was was 5.6%, the Halifax 8.9% and the Stirling 15.8% in the Battle of Berlin.
Note that the loss rates even for the Lancaster were well beyond sustainable. Harris almost succeeded in completely destroying his command for no real advantage. The man who always belittled others for their advocacy of "Panacea Target's" went for the biggest Panacea Target of them all. In that time frame he could have done much greater damage to the Ruhr, likely at a lower cost.Loss rates were one reason why the Halifax wasn't so highly regarded at the time. These days we tend to look at it with rose-tinted glasses because of its war effort, which was, undoubtedly substantial and important, but it gained success despite itself. The early Merlin engined Halis had numerous issues and the type became known for high losses on ops, not just to enemy action, either. The most serious fault was rudder overbalance, which knocked the aircraft into an irrecoverable dive and was not cured until the B.II Series IA with its bigger D-shaped vertical stabilisers in late 1942/early 1943. These were fitted to subsequent marks and cured the overbalance. The good performance and reliability of the Lancaster I when it entered service didn't help perceptions of the Halifax either.
Once the Hali III entered service it had marginally superior performance to the Lanc I, but the Lanc III could outperform it in terms of cruise speed, altitude, range with a heavy load and it could carry a greater tonnage of bombs, and a greater variety of them. In favour of the Halifax is that it was arguably more survivable than the Lancaster, and supporters state this as a benefit, but the reality was that Halifaxes suffered higher losses operationally than Lancasters and were more likely to crash.
Harris' disregard for the Halifax was well known and while the Hali III redressed the balance a little, it came along just as Lancaster production numbers were increasing and Merlin Halifax units often replaced theirs with Lancs.
Anyway, back to Blenheims.
Not a lot of thought was given to air crew survival in general. Defiant gunners had almost no chance of bailing out and their survival rates showed it.One ghastly thing from an AFDE report:
It required no less than 50 seconds for the air gunner to get out of the turret into a position from where he could jump and use his parachute. This timing was the average of several tests made with the aircraft stationary on the ground, and with the gunner fully aware of what he was about to be told to do.
Ah I thought you were referring to the twin-Browning version of the B.1 turret.
EDIT: looking through info on the Bristol B.X turret -- it sounds like it was a very satisfactory turret and no mention is made of adverse effects during rotation tests at various speeds/altitudes.
Maybe the turret was cleverly shaped to counteract the airflow hitting the gun barrels when rotated off centre? Just a shot in the dark.
I mentioned the Hampden to correct the record. Your post seemed to imply that the RCAF didn't fly Hampdens. Since you mentioned it, I did some further research and found what I think is further ammunition for my argument. The RCAF used the Hampden in the bomber role much longer than the RAF. The last mission over Germany by Hampdens was flown by RCAF 408 Squadron in September 1942. . The RAF had withdrawn their Hampdens (7 squadrons) from Bomber Command in April, 5 months earlier. RCAF Squadron 420 flew its last Hampden in August. The counter argument is that 5 of those squadrons received Manchesters. (Out of the frying pan into the fire) As for the Stirling, luckily for the Canadians, most of the Stirling squadrons were formed before the Canadians showed up in force. Luckily for everyone, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Shorts factory in Rochester was an own goal in that it set back Stirling production and thereby limited the number of Stirling squadrons.Does that support your argument that the Canadians were given poor equipment. How many RCAF squadrons were operating Stirlings? The losses on Berlin raids were unsustainable for bomber command, and as with the first 1000 bomber raids the planes came from everywhere. Harris preferred the Lancaster for all sorts of reasons, by the time of the Dresden raid all were Lancasters on such missions. Half of bomber commands aircraft once the Stirling retired were Halifaxes, it was in service before the Manchester let alone the Lancaster and as the war progressed the Lancaster was the plane of choice especially on long range missions.
Good pics of Canadian Hampden ops here Harold A. Skaarup web pagesI mentioned the Hampden to correct the record. Your post seemed to imply that the RCAF didn't fly Hampdens. Since you mentioned it, I did some further research and found what I think is further ammunition for my argument. The RCAF used the Hampden in the bomber role much longer than the RAF.
I mentioned the Hampden to correct the record. Your post seemed to imply that the RCAF didn't fly Hampdens. Since you mentioned it, I did some further research and found what I think is further ammunition for my argument. The RCAF used the Hampden in the bomber role much longer than the RAF. The last mission over Germany by Hampdens was flown by RCAF 408 Squadron in September 1942. . The RAF had withdrawn their Hampdens (7 squadrons) from Bomber Command in April, 5 months earlier. RCAF Squadron 420 flew its last Hampden in August. The counter argument is that 5 of those squadrons received Manchesters. (Out of the frying pan into the fire) As for the Stirling, luckily for the Canadians, most of the Stirling squadrons were formed before the Canadians showed up in force. Luckily for everyone, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Shorts factory in Rochester was an own goal in that it set back Stirling production and thereby limited the number of Stirling squadrons.
In his book Bomber Offensive, Sir Arthur Harris spends a few paragraphs disparaging the capabilities of "colonials" (he specifically included Canadians in his list). I would presume that if he had any say in the distribution of aircraft, he would favour the airmen he considered to be superior. " ….and I say without hesitation that the finest fighting crews of the whole lot were beyond a doubt the British crews……" I don't know if this was a general view in the RAF but Harris generally got what he wanted.
Certainly, the Canadians were done no favours as an all Halifax group for most of the war and as I pointed out previously RAFs Group 4 received the superior Halifax Mk VI while the RCAF received the Mk VII.
The attached paper is an interesting comparison of the capabilities of the Halifax vs the Lancaster