Probably adding little to the previous high quality contributions. The inter war thinkers had little real evidence to work from. The German raids on Britain in WWI dropped around 300 tons of bombs, killing about 1,400 people and wounding about 4,800, First Blitz by Neil Hanson. Translate to 500 mid 1930's modern bombers dropping 1,000 tons of high explosive killing say 4,000 and wounding 16,000, and many more if chemical and/or biological weapons were used. Then doing it again the next day. I believe one of Admiral Tirpitz's pre or early WWI quotes was along the lines of a small bombing raid on a city is "odious", but a big raid, now that becomes a war weapon. The logic of Mutual Assured Destruction meant no bomber gaps. At the same time the cost and capability of that bomber was going up, using weights as a proxy the Do17 and Ju86 weighed in at around 5 to tons empty, the He111 had upped that to around 8 tons and the Ju88 to 10 tons. If the He177 was deployed it would be around 18 tons empty. Made it hard to obtain large numbers in peace time (or even desirable given the pace of development) and had repercussions on fighter armament, heavier aircraft tend to be harder to shoot down. The British Bombing Survey Unit put the cost of Bomber Command at 7% of war effort, calculated in worker hours, British Civil Defence is put at 3% of effort. The cost was higher in industrial terms but remember Bomber Command was a minority of the world wide RAF, the way tanks cost around the same as a fighter plane and the RN and civil ship construction programs
In WWI there was no warning system so the public was generally unaware of the danger and had little shelter options anyway. Apparently the first Gotha raid encountered cloud and one bomber released over Folkestone as a target of opportunity, hitting the shopping area and killing 56 women and children. The third raid was on 13 June 1917 with 14 Gothas and caused 600 casualties. There were 54 Zeppelin raids, 277 sorties of which 202 attacked, 17 lost including 5 to weather. Almost all raids at night, the defences seem to have made attacks too expensive in the second half of 1916. There were 8 daylight aircraft raids, 193 sorties of which 143 attacked, 14 lost including 4 to weather. There were 19 night raids, 253 sorties, 187 attacked, 16 lost, including 2 to forced landings.
The western allies had started "strategic" attacks late in WWI, including at night using the glow of foundry furnaces as guide. Air power was in many ways a late arrival in WWI, I think it was 1918 before the RAF had 100 squadrons, while peaking at a nominal 204 squadrons at the armistice. Again lots more air power promise than evidence.
The German civilian morale had definitely cracked in 1918, with the usual assortment of reasons why, pick the one that fitted your view. The bombing of Britain in WWI had a shock of new effect, given how safe Britain had been for centuries, or not, pick the view that fitted your outlook
Look up what (almost) happened to some of the early balloonists when they landed in areas that had never seen a balloon, the introduction of rapid fire weapons required a rapid fire supply system and the real risk troops might blow though their ammunition so quickly their only options were retreat or surrender. A Napoleonic infantryman could expect to carry all the ammunition he needed for the campaign in his kit, not so much the artillery. The way little actual evidence tends to result in loud groups of people dividing into this changes everything versus a total waste of time, with everyone locked deeper into a view as time goes on.
Bombing targets in the enemy homeland was the genuine independent air force role, most other operations overlapped with the other services, leading to the inevitable who ends up in charge arguments. The WWII RAF had infantry and armoured car units for airfield defence, run that idea past the Army Command in 1938.
Then comes who is the designated bad guy in the planning, in Europe it was repeat WWI but there were votes for the USSR. For the US it was more ambiguous, in 19th century only the British Empire could provide a credible threat of invasion and WWI had way diminished that threat, while USN and IJN had designated each other and largely agreed on war plans, the only major difference being who wins.
Realistic training means more losses, and in peace time more losses translates to less public support. Blowing things up to find out how to blow things up requires paying for the things to blow up. One of the interesting effects of the clash between what was possible now versus what was forecast to be needed in the next war is in the USAAF deliberations, the plans for what to do in a major war could devolve down into debates about small units of aircraft or maybe single aircraft. The reality of what they had now being projected onto a situation where they are expecting to have thousands of everything.
The rise of radar had a radical effect on the situation, including an increase in the power of aircraft carriers, but only Britain could claim to have a good handle on this when war began and it was very recent and still to be tested. While the Luftwaffe had good radio navigation aids. The USN had its carrier beacons. Everyone kept building fighters etc. as no one could be really sure who would be fought, when and where, and what force mix that would require, but the bombers were the capital aircraft, everything else in support. That included fighters flying as escorts.
The doctrine became rapid precision destruction of important objectives causing the collapse rather than due to people being killed in the raids, it moved into faith territory and rejected opportunities to gather and evaluate evidence. Actually buying or taking donations of obsolete factory equipment and bombing it before selling the scrap, the one pre war RAF trial bombing staked out obsolete aircraft, results showing it was harder than theory said. Exercises where bombers were sent to take target photographs of nominated targets, some done, results below theory. Finding the camouflaged target on the bombing range, again some done, results usually below theory. Do all this again in cloudy weather. The problems of navigation even by day and more at night were clear. The issue of ground defences forcing bombing from higher altitudes and that effect on accuracy, again some work done better bomb sights. The need to attack in formation and that effect on accuracy, how much did all this decease the average accuracy versus the one aircraft at a time on a good day on a clearly marked target the crew would end up attacking many times? All the above were within the scope of the Air Forces to come up with better data than they actually did. But you can always do more and we have hindsight.
Beyond that are the ones that require some leaps in thinking, like in large day raids the way the initial bombs would create enough smoke and dust to often obscure the target. How accurate could a wartime weather forecast be for an area hundreds of miles in enemy territory?
Even beyond that is no one had ever tried to stop an economy, or at least an important bit, some important bits, by selective destruction and it had to be some vital parts were harder to destroy than others, so which were the vital parts the bombers could knock out? Was one part easy to hurt but too big, another small enough but too hard to hit? How to tell the damage done?
All leading to the situation that on 26 October 1940, the RAF sent 3 Whitleys carrying a total of 3.5 tons of bombs fully expecting to do real damage to the Wessling oil refinery, finding their way using astral navigation, the 1944 attacks were in the order of 200 bombers with 1,000 tons of bombs, using radio beacons as much as possible to navigate, with specialist crews to mark the target. The pre war theory was that far out across the board for night operations and by not much better for day ones.