"The case for the P-47 Thunderbolt being the greatest fighter of the Second World War " (3 Viewers)

[J.D.]

However, the P-47 arrived in the Pacific in 1943 and any experienced pilots transferred from the ETO would have to relearn combat tactics against Japanese elements.

Are we talking at cross purposes here?

 

[GrauGeist]

Are we talking at cross purposes here?

It was noted that the P-47 had a low kill-to-loss ratio against the KI-43 in the early months of it's initial PTO deployment.

I simply asked what was the level of experience of it's pilots.

Were they transitioned from other types like the P-39 and P-40, were they fresh from stateside after training on the P-47, etc.?

The KI-43 pilots had been transferred to New Guinea from China and the majority were experienced.

This is the nature of my question.

 

[J.D.]

It was noted that the P-47 had a low kill-to-loss ratio against the KI-43 in the early months of it's initial PTO deployment.

I simply asked what was the level of experience of it's pilots.

Were they transitioned from other types like the P-39 and P-40, were they fresh from stateside after training on the P-47, etc.?

The KI-43 pilots had been transferred to New Guinea from China and the majority were experienced.

This is the nature of my question.

Claringbould's comments are in a book covering a period from 1943 to 1945. I understand the pilots transitioned from P-39 and P-40 types into P-47s. Kearby himself transitioned from P-39s.

Interestingly, P-47 operations need to be refracted through the lens of the attacks on Japanese airfields by B-25s, ironically on the same date as the first Schweinfurt raid: 17 August, 1943. The contemporary claims for P-47 units, as Claringbould points out, were taken at face value while the bulk of the damage done to the IJAAF was done on the ground.

More recent appraisals show that the score was a lot closer than previously believed.

 

[drgondog]

However, the P-47 arrived in the Pacific in 1943 and any experienced pilots transferred from the ETO would have to relearn combat tactics against Japanese elements.

Dave - I was just pointing out that the 348th was activated at the same time. They were originally planned for ETO and there were no new Fgs save the 20th and 55th in line for assignment - which Arnold directed to ETO a couple of months later in July 1943.

Kearby was a high time pre-war pilot, but other than him the 348th was like all the others mentioned, with a few early Pacific (Java, etc) vets thrown in.

 

[drgondog]

Claringbould's comments are in a book covering a period from 1943 to 1945. I understand the pilots transitioned from P-39 and P-40 types into P-47s. Kearby himself transitioned from P-39s.

Interestingly, P-47 operations need to be refracted through the lens of the attacks on Japanese airfields by B-25s, ironically on the same date as the first Schweinfurt raid: 17 August, 1943. The contemporary claims for P-47 units, as Claringbould points out, were taken at face value while the bulk of the damage done to the IJAAF was done on the ground.

More recent appraisals show that the score was a lot closer than previously believed.

I'm not sure Claringbold is correct. Kearby was in 94th PS in 1941 with P-38Es through early 1942 and took command of 14th PS at Panama Canal which might have been P-39s, but only for a brief time before becoming commander of 348th. The 348th trained in P-47B/C. The 348th drew from a pilot pool that basically was out of advanced training at Sarasota in the P-40, which was typical, and any SWP vets that transferred in were likely P-39/P-40 time vets.

 

[drgondog]

If we are looking at the quality of the USAAF pilots, also take into account the quality and training of the Japanese pilots. Ther can be no doubt that the USAAF pilots were vastly better trained.

Glider I believe you are correct for comparisons of replacement pilots, but the IJN pilots in-theatre in 1942 and 1943 were probably better trained than US pilots.

 

[drgondog]

The first squadrons were formed from 71, 121 and 133 Sqns, RAF. These were American volunteers who formed Eagle Squadron. It was this cadre of experienced pilots who had learnt to fight with the RAF, who passed on their experience to the rest of the Eighth fighter groups.

The Eagle Squadrons formed the 4th FG and were the first to replace the departing 1, 14, 82nd FG P-38s headed for Torch. That said, the 78th FG pilots were recently in UK waiting for their P-38s which were stripped and sent to Africa as replacements and the 56th FG arrived with 100% P-47B experience. The 4th and 78th were equally unfamiliar with the P-47. True the former Eagle squadron pilots had combat experience but they weren't training anyone in P-47C combat tactics.

 

[J.D.]

I'm not sure Claringbold is correct. Kearby was in 94th PS in 1941 with P-38Es through early 1942 and took command of 14th PS at Panama Canal which might have been P-39s, but only for a brief time before becoming commander of 348th. The 348th trained in P-47B/C. The 348th drew from a pilot pool that basically was out of advanced training at Sarasota in the P-40, which was typical, and any SWP vets that transferred in were likely P-39/P-40 time vets.

The part about Kearby is my own add on. If choosing between me and Claringbould, the error will be mine.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Today I learned that the P-47 flew 3x as many hours in the theatre as the P-38 and P-51 combined.

Not quite, the data is 9th Air Force Only where for the campaign the P-47 groups totally outnumbered the P-51 groups and easily outnumbered the P-38 groups. Since the data was about fighter operations it did not include the 44,726 hours by F-6, 3,344 hours by P-51 reconnaissance aircraft and 13,309 hours by F-5. The 363rd FG arrived in February 1944 with P-51 and became a Tactical reconnaissance unit in September 1944, picking up an F-5 squadron, later losing an F-6 squadron to 1st TAF. The 10th PRG came with F-5, the 67th TRG with F-6 they later swapped a couple of squadrons to give them a mixture of F-5 and F-6.

The 8th Air Force chose not to be as detailed when it came to reporting flying hours, the monthly reports have nothing, the for campaign report just has aggregate hours by all types by year, operational/non operational

1942, 11,346 / 14,362
1943, 225,618 / 202,829
1944, 2,020,285 / 830,259
1945, 934,832 / 350,360
Total, 3,192,081 / 1,398,310
With the note some of the 1942 and early 1943 figures are estimates.

The 9th Air Force campaign flying hours total is 1,070,904 / 820,117, with the note it records no transport aircraft operational hours but 252,265 C-47/53 non operational hours and that it lost control of the transport groups after Normandy to 1st Allied Airborne Army.

The 8th Air Force 1944 yearly report does give a more detailed break down but for the most part includes fighter hours with those of the reconnaissance, Composite and Service Command units. First set of figures are operational, second set non operational hours.

Month

1st

Division

2nd

Division

3rd

Division

Other

Total

1st

Division

2nd

Division

3rd

Division

Other

Total

Month

Bomber

67th FW

Bomber

67th FW

Bomber

67th FW

Other

Total

Bomber

67th FW

Bomber

67th FW

Bomber

67th FW

Other

Total

Jan-44​

15,087​

7,471​

12,678​

19,671​

54,907​

8,647​

4,518​

5,496​

16,250​

34,911​

Feb-44​

23,036​

15,463​

24,599​

29,445​

92,543​

6,779​

4,198​

5,393​

13,873​

30,243​

Mar-44​

31,401​

22,286​

23,604​

40,932​

118,223​

9,648​

7,489​

9,630​

17,956​

44,723​

Apr-44​

28,663​

25,784​

28,917​

50,298​

133,662​

10,320​

7,277​

14,340​

27,081​

59,018​

May-44​

42,886​

38,201​

40,495​

61,257​

182,839​

15,249​

17,556​

24,442​

38,360​

95,607​

Jun-44​

54,827​

53,408​

53,581​

93,477​

255,293​

9,032​

8,429​

14,157​

34,882​

66,500​

Jul-44​

53,776​

47,061​

50,536​

77,742​

229,115​

15,011​

16,050​

21,510​

42,296​

94,867​

Aug-44​

51,530​

46,127​

46,492​

87,036​

231,185​

12,740​

18,617​

24,863​

36,454​

92,674​

Sep-44​

42,294​

21,043​

30,160​

19,853​

49,238​

21,164​

6,901​

190,653​

12,860​

3,900​

23,068​

6,144​

19,009​

3,423​

22,122​

90,526​

Oct-44​

42,000​

18,555​

33,441​

17,570​

44,401​

19,744​

3,505​

179,216​

15,921​

4,371​

19,781​

7,323​

21,465​

3,989​

16,153​

89,003​

Nov-44​

42,147​

17,615​

26,953​

20,211​

38,782​

20,659​

3,870​

170,237​

17,241​

3,988​

16,679​

6,696​

19,760​

4,779​

6,873​

76,016​

Dec-44​

41,181​

17,626​

29,764​

18,344​

46,402​

19,407​

4,029​

176,753​

11,889​

3,021​

11,812​

4,903​

14,477​

3,570​

4,867​

54,539​

Total

468,828​

74,839​

376,119​

75,978​

459,725​

80,974​

478,163​

2,014,626​

145,337​

15,280​

155,474​

25,066​

194,542​

15,761​

277,167​

828,627​

To give an idea on average sortie length, total hours flown and total sorties reported. Note in the for campaign reports, Airborne = Total Sorties, Less spares = Less spares and operations abroad, Sorties = Credit Sorties, Completed = Effective.

Month

Fighter

P-47

P-47

P-47

P-47

P-51

P-51

P-51

P-51

P-38

P-38

P-38

P-38

Total

Hours per

Month

Op. Hours

Airborne

less spares

Sorties

Completed

Airborne

less spares

Sorties

Completed

Airborne

less spares

Sorties

Completed

sorties

Sortie

Sep-44​

62,060​

3,831​

3,743​

3,594​

3,341​

10,318​

10,066​

9,659​

9,009​

692​

683​

639​

523​

13,892​

4.47​

Oct-44​

55,869​

2,770​

2,669​

2,536​

2,479​

10,760​

10,526​

10,124​

9,587​

26​

26​

26​

22​

12,686​

4.40​

Nov-44​

58,485​

2,269​

2,204​

2,135​

2,084​

11,815​

11,611​

11,101​

10,673​

13,236​

4.42​

Dec-44​

55,377​

1,384​

1,365​

1,281​

1,247​

12,820​

12,722​

12,006​

11,658​

13,287​

4.17​

Total

231,791​

10,254​

9,981​

9,546​

9,151​

45,713​

44,925​

42,890​

40,927​

718​

709​

665​

545​

53,101​

4.37​

For the campaign 261,039 sorties, 257,443 Less spares and operations abroad, 242,931 credit, 234,393 effective sorties, totals include scouting units, made up of 207,857 heavy bomber support and 49,586 strafing, bombing and sweeps, with 14,990 of these dropping bombs.

Without more detailed figures all that can be said is in the final 4 months of 1944 the 8th Air Force P-51 units flew 42,890 credit sorties, compared with the 9th Air Force campaign total of 24,505, average sortie length for the 8th Air Force P-51 September to December 1944 was over 4 hours, somewhere between 1 and 1.5 hours longer than the 9th Air Force P-51 campaign average.

While the RAF was steadily increasing its effort in early 1944, the USAAF really stepped up the ETO operational tempo, operational hours

Month	8th	9th	total
Jan-44​	54,907​	6,035​	60,942​
Feb-44​	92,543​	16,279​	108,822​
Mar-44​	118,223​	26,781​	145,004​
Apr-44​	133,662​	43,673​	177,335​
May-44​	182,839​	93,293​	276,132​
Jun-44​	255,293​	110,966​	366,259​

 

[drgondog]

The P51D was a totally different aircraft to the P51A, the P47N was totally different from the P47C, Me109E and 109K ditto FW190Ato FW190D, no pre '42 aircraft were the same as post '44 models.

Long time ago but worth mentioning - The P-51D (and B) had many parts in common. The wing, the empennage, the basic structure such as longeron and stringer and wing mounts, floor, shelves etc were NA-73 part evolutions. The XP-51F/G/J/H were complete departuress.

The P-47N was an evolution of the D-25 and Subs models, primarily due to addition of wing plugs to install the 90 gal wing tanks - there were many common parts and assemblies.

 

[drgondog]

Merlin engined Mustangs couldn't have flown those missions without the Spitfires Typhoons Tempests of 2nd TAF and P47's of the 8th AF giving them a clear run. The Mustang was an awesome aircraft but the best?, no chance.

Of course they could have flown the target escort missions without any of the short range fighters in either 8th or 9th AF. Visualize escort operations in summer 44 through VE Day, when the P-47/P-38 inventory reduced to 4 P-47 FG, then two by December, then one. The P-38 inventory disappeared in September. Somehow the 8th AF easily soldiered on with 'only' Merlin Mustangs.

Obviously the relay system was important during the build up of Mustangs in early 1944 through April - at which time the inventory increased to point where escort amounted to 2xFG per Bomb wing. More losses for sure but far better, and tolerable, than summer/fall of 1943.

The LW adopted a retreat strategy to avoid Penetration and Withdrawal support from P-47FG (as well as very short escort by Spitfires). Changing strategy to intercept earlier would have increased bomber losses, but increased LW losses - acknowledged by Galland which is why the LW stopped trying to intercept before P-47s ran out of combat radius.

 

[BobB]

Long time ago but worth mentioning - The P-51D (and B) had many parts in common. The wing, the empennage, the basic structure such as longeron and stringer and wing mounts, floor, shelves etc were NA-73 part evolutions. The XP-51F/G/J/H were complete departuress.

The P-47N was an evolution of the D-25 and Subs models, primarily due to addition of wing plugs to install the 90 gal wing tanks - there were many common parts and assemblies.

Did F/G/J/H keep same loft lines as earlier P-51 models or was that all new?

 

[drgondog]

Well, let's compare apples to apples if we're discussing the Spitfire and the Mustang. The latter never received the Griffon engine operationally, so using the fact that the Spitfire needed mods to accommodate it is tilting the analysis, IMHO.

But the V-1650-9 achieved near parity in delivered HP and still enabled 44,300 foot ceiling in the P-51H - with no dimensional changes to the engine bay. The wing was moved 6" further aft to enable the 50-gal fuel tank to remain inside the CG lmits. The fuselage was also lengthened 12", actually 13" but the rudder chord was 1" less. The RAF also modified the Mustang III to accept the Merlin 100 which again, brought the Mustang close in low altitude climb rate and faster in level flight.

You are correct that the Griffon was never installed in the standard P-51 airframe. Too many changes were required and the production committed schedules were not accepted. That said the Griffon could have been designed into the NA-126 P-51H, but why?

The Mustang design moved the wing 2in forward just to accommodate the Merlin and its heavier prop. The Spitfire, meanwhile, used exactly the same main fuselage (aft of the firewall) and same wing mounting position for every variant from MkI thru MkIX. Even after the Griffon was introduced, the wing mounting position remained unchanged, as did the basic planform of the wing.

Nope, but did add 66 pounds of aft ballast. More below.

Regarding the wing itself, most changes were driven by evolving requirements for heavier weapons (see acquisition context below). Similarly, the Mustang Mk1a was often fitted with 4x20mm cannon which clearly drove internal changes compared to the initial wing armament of 4x30 cals or the later, 4x50 cals and then 6x50cals. The early Mustangs were also not plumbed for drop tanks whereas later ones were.

More below.

Also, the Spitfire took on roles, like long-range, high-altitude PR, that the Mustang never fulfilled.

Chalk one up for the Spitfire. Was it doing long-range low altitude recon? Did it ever compare to any version of the Mustang in low altitude armed recon or medium range fighter bomb role?

The Mustang also benefitted from 4 years' worth of lessons learned and technology development that Mitchell and his team didn't have when they first designed the Spitfire.

What lessons did Mitchell or Supermarine apply that NAA adopted? Other than Merlin engine series.

The Mustang remains a tremendous design. It was clearly much better suited to mass production, and the NA team did an amazing job creating a truly world-beating design. However, I think you're underplaying the changes that took place during its WW2 production, and overstating changes wrought upon the Spitfire. We also can't ignore the very different acquisition conditions. The Spitfire was procured at a time when it was hoped war could be avoided, whereas the Mustang was acquired when it was clear we were going to be in a war for a number of years.

Actually only the Brits were wise enough to procure the Mustang two years before AAF. The jump in production output came as a result of 1.) building the Dallas Plant beginning 1941 before we were in the war, and 2.) the incremental funding for tooling, and Inglewood plant expansion and priority assignment for critical materials and suubcontractors when the P-51A contract was let in June 1942.

I don't believe I have overstated changes applied to the Spitfire - I only addressed changes that were Not made. The Mustang fuel fraction increased nearly 50% when the 85-gal fuse tank was added... which is what Growth Potential comparisons were focused on. The core difference between the Mustang and the Spitfire was the planned large volume of wing tank while still accomodating a wide range of intalled armament - and easily add plumbing and wing shackles to carry a wide variety of stores. If you seriously think about the versatility of the Mustang, it pretty much overlapped the Typhoon, Tempest, Spit IX, Spit XIV - better in some cases and not so good in others - It remained until the P-51H was delivered that the performance matched or exceeded all of them.

"Your argument that the Spitfire didn't have "growth potential" doesn't stack up against its proven ability to remain at the forefront of air combat for a decade. Both the Spitfire and the Mustang were phenomenal designs and both evolved. I'm not sure playing a game of "my cat's blacker than your cat" achieves much."

The Mustang did not move the wing forward to accommodate the Merlin. The Wing/Waterline dropped three inches from the P-51-NA airframe which was modified for the Merlin installation, to the P-51B/C/D but the 1/4 chord of the same wing remained constant at FS 99.0 for the NA-73/83/91/97/99/101/102/103/104/106/109/110/122 and 124. The location of the wing attach mounts remained at the same FS throughout the series until the lightweight fighters.

The 20mm cannon and ammunition bays were an optional design in the original wing, was proposed for NA-73X, was installed on All NA-91/Mustang IA. That was the reason for the slanted mounts on 50 caliber guns in the NA-97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 110 -mand why they were not changed to vertical until NA106/P-51D and subsequent.

All Mustangs were plumbed for drop tanks and bombs beginning with A-36. All Mustang carried more fuel by a large margin in wing tanks alone

My argument against the Spitfire 'growth potential' was directed at the difficulty of increasing internal fuel as it began as a smaller airframe and had great difficulty in making large internal modifications such as fuselage tanks - similarly the Lightweight XP-51F was so constrained and could not add a fuselage fuel tank for several reasons. Growth was meant to be understood as Gross Weight increases over the life cycle. However it still had as standard 180-gal internal fuel and 75-gal drop tank

My comments were not 'fanboi' in nature, nor did I intend to imply that 'my cat is blacker than yours'. Airframe designers are deviled by General Arrangement to place heavy stuff near the Cg as well as stuff that is consumed in flight. There was 'growth potential' in the more volumetric Mustang airframe, and accompainied by increasing gross weight, lesser turn radius, lower rate of climb and lower structural limit loads - but still equal or better after 20% increase in gross weight of internal loads, to the Bf 109, Fw 190 over their capital.

 

[drgondog]

Did F/G/J/H keep same loft lines as earlier P-51 models or was that all new?

No, but they were 'close' until the J engine section and not close for the P-51H

 

[buffnut453]

But the V-1650-9 achieved near parity in delivered HP and still enabled 44,300 foot ceiling in the P-51H - with no dimensional changes to the engine bay. The wing was moved 6" further aft to enable the 50-gal fuel tank to remain inside the CG lmits. The fuselage was also lengthened 12", actually 13" but the rudder chord was 1" less. The RAF also modified the Mustang III to accept the Merlin 100 which again, brought the Mustang close in low altitude climb rate and faster in level flight.

You are correct that the Griffon was never installed in the standard P-51 airframe. Too many changes were required and the production committed schedules were not accepted. That said the Griffon could have been designed into the NA-126 P-51H, but why?

Nope, but did add 66 pounds of aft ballast. More below.

More below.

Chalk one up for the Spitfire. Was it doing long-range low altitude recon? Did it ever compare to any version of the Mustang in low altitude armed recon or medium range fighter bomb role?

What lessons did Mitchell or Supermarine apply that NAA adopted? Other than Merlin engine series.

Actually only the Brits were wise enough to procure the Mustang two years before AAF. The jump in production output came as a result of 1.) building the Dallas Plant beginning 1941 before we were in the war, and 2.) the incremental funding for tooling, and Inglewood plant expansion and priority assignment for critical materials and suubcontractors when the P-51A contract was let in June 1942.

I don't believe I have overstated changes applied to the Spitfire - I only addressed changes that were Not made. The Mustang fuel fraction increased nearly 50% when the 85-gal fuse tank was added... which is what Growth Potential comparisons were focused on. The core difference between the Mustang and the Spitfire was the planned large volume of wing tank while still accomodating a wide range of intalled armament - and easily add plumbing and wing shackles to carry a wide variety of stores. If you seriously think about the versatility of the Mustang, it pretty much overlapped the Typhoon, Tempest, Spit IX, Spit XIV - better in some cases and not so good in others - It remained until the P-51H was delivered that the performance matched or exceeded all of them.

"Your argument that the Spitfire didn't have "growth potential" doesn't stack up against its proven ability to remain at the forefront of air combat for a decade. Both the Spitfire and the Mustang were phenomenal designs and both evolved. I'm not sure playing a game of "my cat's blacker than your cat" achieves much."

The Mustang did not move the wing forward to accommodate the Merlin. The Wing/Waterline dropped three inches from the P-51-NA airframe which was modified for the Merlin installation, to the P-51B/C/D but the 1/4 chord of the same wing remained constant at FS 99.0 for the NA-73/83/91/97/99/101/102/103/104/106/109/110/122 and 124. The location of the wing attach mounts remained at the same FS throughout the series until the lightweight fighters.

The 20mm cannon and ammunition bays were an optional design in the original wing, was proposed for NA-73X, was installed on All NA-91/Mustang IA. That was the reason for the slanted mounts on 50 caliber guns in the NA-97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 110 -mand why they were not changed to vertical until NA106/P-51D and subsequent.

All Mustangs were plumbed for drop tanks and bombs beginning with A-36. All Mustang carried more fuel by a large margin in wing tanks alone

My argument against the Spitfire 'growth potential' was directed at the difficulty of increasing internal fuel as it began as a smaller airframe and had great difficulty in making large internal modifications such as fuselage tanks - similarly the Lightweight XP-51F was so constrained and could not add a fuselage fuel tank for several reasons. Growth was meant to be understood as Gross Weight increases over the life cycle. However it still had as standard 180-gal internal fuel and 75-gal drop tank

My comments were not 'fanboi' in nature, nor did I intend to imply that 'my cat is blacker than yours'. Airframe designers are deviled by General Arrangement to place heavy stuff near the Cg as well as stuff that is consumed in flight. There was 'growth potential' in the more volumetric Mustang airframe, and accompainied by increasing gross weight, lesser turn radius, lower rate of climb and lower structural limit loads - but still equal or better after 20% increase in gross weight of internal loads, to the Bf 109, Fw 190 over their capital.

As always great points...although replying to a post I made over 3 years ago had me scratching my head and desperately trying to remember that far back in the thread.

My point is that both airframes had development potential, it's just that the Spitfire started much earlier and its design team couldn't have imagined the developments that would take place in such a short space of time. Despite that, it still achieved considerable expansion in terms of capabilities:

Spitfire MkI: Fuel 85 Imp Gall; Gross Weight 5,844 lb
Spitfire Mk24: Fuel 134-138 Imp Gall; Gross Weight 9,900 lb
Seafire Mk47: Fuel 134 Imp Gall; Gross Weight 10,200 lb

This isn't a case of which aircraft is better. Rather, it's recognition that both the Spitfire and the P-51 were outstanding aircraft that, in reality, complemented each other rather well on operations.

 

[wuzak]

Seafire Mk47: Fuel 34 Imp Gall; Gross Weight 10,200 lb

Typo?

Should be 134 Imp Gal?

 

[buffnut453]

Typo?

Should be 134 Imp Gal?

Ooops...fixed it. Yes, 134 Imp Gal.