The end of the battleship (1 Viewer)

[Thumpalumpacus]

When you get a chance, give this a read:
Battle of the Bismarck Sea

Thanks for the article. I'm pretty familiar with that battle, but hadn't realized how the initial B-17 attacks broke up the convoy formation. The article doesn't report whether this was an intentional attack or whether that break-up of the formation was a happy accident. Do you have any information on that?

Just to be clear, in no way am I disparaging skip-bombing as a technique, nor am I saying that level-bombing never sank a ship; I'm just saying that versus underway shipping, level-bombing from altitude was far and away the least-effective method of attacking them. My only point is that Mitchell's demonstration with Ostfriesland was fairly unremunerative going forward in interdicting shipping.

Airplanes cooked the battleship's collective goose, without a doubt, but generally not in the way Mitchell had envisioned, but rather by these more-precise tactics of skip-bombing, dive-bombing, and torpedo-bombing.

ETA: There is a nice sense of justice in the fact that Bismarck Sea featured as a major component aircraft named after the late general. I have no doubt that had Mitchell lived to see it carried out, even differently than he had envisioned, he would still have heartily approved -- and probably feel vindicated, rightfully so in the broader sense that BBs didn't really stand much of a chance against airplanes once the right tactics were evolved.

 

[GrauGeist]

The initial attack by the bombers at about 7,000 was intentional.
They knew it would scatter the ships, making them easy prey for the incoming low-level boys.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The initial attack by the bombers at about 7,000 was intentional.
They knew it would scatter the ships, making them easy prey for the incoming low-level boys.

That's just badass.

 

[ThomasP]

David K. Brown, a prominent figure in the Admiralty's Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (ie warship design & construction engineering department) concluded that a battleship could be designed and built that would be able to defend and survive against aircraft, but that the battleship could not be designed and built that would have the ability to project power far enough to compete with the aircraft carrier. It was shortly post-war (early-1950s IIRC) when he said this, but I do not think he changed his mind in later life (he died in 2008). He wrote many books on naval ship engineering and design, and contributed to many more.

 

[The Basket]

Didn't the Iowas have cruise missiles so technically....

 

[GrauGeist]

Didn't the Iowas have cruise missiles so technically....

32 Tomahawk cruise missiles and 16 Harpoon A/S missiles was stanard compliment.

 

[The Basket]

Projection of power is the key.

After 1945 it was the atom bomb that was the battleship of its day.

The battleship was the battleship of its day.

The Knight in armour on horseback was the battleship of its day.

After 1945, it wasn't about convoy duties or how we commerce raid but how we launch atom bomb. That's where the cheese was. So an airplane has longer range than a battleship to deploy these mushroom cloud sprouters.

And if the Navy wanted it's seat at the top table with the big boys, it must be able to deploy nuclear weapons. That's where the money was.

 

[The Basket]

I was watching a documentary about the British Pacific Fleet in 1945.

The most powerful fleet the British ever mustered 100 ships.

And it was all about the Avengers.

End off. All about putting the Avengers where they need to be.

Attacking the oil refinery hundreds of miles away. No battleship can shoot as far as an Avenger can bomb.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I was watching a documentary about the British Pacific Fleet in 1945.

The most powerful fleet the British ever mustered 100 ships.

And it was all about the Avengers.

End off. All about putting the Avengers where they need to be.

Attacking the oil refinery hundreds of miles away. No battleship can shoot as far as an Avenger can bomb.

Which is why BBs are museum shops nowadays, while carriers are still being built.

 

[The Basket]

Palembang in the Dutch East Indies against the oil refinery.

Seafires, Hellcats, Corsairs, Fireflys, Avengers.

The fleet did have battleships which were the 4 KGV.

 

[EwenS]

TF57/37, the main offensive group of the BPF, generally operated with 1-2 KGV. Operation Meridian against Palembang only KGV was present. Operation Iceberg against the Sakishima Gunto and Formosa, KGV and Howe were present. And off Japan in July / August 1945 only KGV. Throughout 1945 the BPF was building its strength.

Duke of York didn't arrive in Australian waters until 24th June 1945 when she arrived at Fremantle. She didn't arrive in Japanese waters, carrying Admiral Fraser, until 18th August, after the announcement of the Japanese surrender.

Anson arrived in Sydney in July 1945. She sailed from there on 15th Aug 1945 with other BPF ships to reoccupy Hong Kong at the end of the month.

KGV and Howe with supporting cruisers and destroyers bombarded airfields in the Sakishima Gunto on 4th May. On 29th July KGV and supporting cruisers and destroyers joined US Battleships, cruisers and destroyers to bombard the Japanese mainland. This was the last time a British battleship fired its guns in anger.

Bombardments of Truk took place in June 1945 as part of Operation Inmate by British, Canadian and New Zealand manned cruisers and destroyers. HMS Newfoundland had also joined HMAS Hobart to bombard Wewak in New Guinea in May 1945.

Big guns still had their part to play right to the end of the war. But yes the days of the battleship were largely over.

It is worth remembering the US Battleships were active with their big guns during the Korean and Vietnam wars and in Gulf War I.

 

[The Basket]

No Renown or Nelsons. No QE or Rs.

So just the KGVs or the ones still afloat. So pretty much the vanguard (if you pardon the pun) of the battleship fleet.

But a lot of carriers.

So yeah if I was looking into that the. Maybe I would be making a decision based on this.

To say a battleship can offer flak support is valid but a cruiser can also do that at a cheaper cost. And a monitor can do shore bombardment.

So yeah.

Shore bombardment only works when your winning. Against a peer opponent, rocking up to your enemy coast is a surefire way of a one way trip to the bottom of the sea.

 

[EwenS]

No Renown or Nelsons. No QE or Rs.

So just the KGVs or the ones still afloat. So pretty much the vanguard (if you pardon the pun) of the battleship fleet.

But a lot of carriers.

So yeah if I was looking into that the. Maybe I would be making a decision based on this.

To say a battleship can offer flak support is valid but a cruiser can also do that at a cheaper cost. And a monitor can do shore bombardment.

So yeah.

Shore bombardment only works when your winning. Against a peer opponent, rocking up to your enemy coast is a surefire way of a one way trip to the bottom of the sea.

R class - the end of 1943 saw 2 sent to reserve as they were worn out and the RN needed the crews to man more modern ships. Royal Sov refitted late 1943 in USA but still had problems so she went to the Soviets in May 1944 on loan until 1948. Ramilles used for bombardment purposes off Normandy and to reserve in 1945.

QE class - Warspite severely damaged by bomb and mine by late 1944 and not worth repairing. Malaya old, slow, poor machinery state, to reserve in Aug 1944. Valiant in the East Indies in 1944 supporting carrier operations until almost lost in Aug 1944 when the dry dock at Trincomalee collapsed with her in it. Under repair at end of war. QE spent most of 1944/45 in the East Indies incl support for carrier raids on Sumatra/Burma/Malaya. Replaced by Nelson in July 1945 when home to reserve.

Nelson class - Rodney was in a very poor material state by Sept 1944 after bombardment duty off Normandy and badly overdue for a reconstruction which she never got. Home Fleet flagship in 1944/45 but rarely left harbour. Nelson mined off Normandy and under refit until early 1945. Then to East Indies in time for the end of the war.

Renown - spent 1944 and early 1945 in the East Indies supporting carrier operations. Brought home in March 1945 in case of a last minute sortie by German Fleet (DoY and Anson were just completing refits at that point and needed to work up before heading for the Pacific so were not available for the role).

The use made of the KGVs in 1945 mirrors that of the 10 USN fast battleships supporting TF38/58. Look at the AA armament that a KGV, particularly the refitted DoY, Anson and Howe (from Sept 1945) can bring to the fight compared to a Town or Fiji class cruiser in terms of the number of director controlled multiple pom pom and bofors mounts, which is what really counted in dealing with the kamikaze menace.

DoY etc - 16x5.25, 8 octuple and 6 quad pom pom, 2 quad bofors plus many single and twin 20mm and single 40mm. KGV lacked the extra 6 quad pom pom.

Belfast - 8x4", 6 quad pom pom, plus single and twin 20mm and single pom pom and bofors.

Most of the other cruisers in the BPF in Aug could only bring 3, 4 or 5 quad pom pom / quad bofors depending on ships concerned to the party. And the RN was not exactly swimming in modern cruisers with heavy AA armament by 1945.

You will find full details of the ships forming the BPF and EIF in August 1945 here.

BPF & EIF Fleets Home

But remember both fleets were building in strength as 1945 went on and as ships could be released from service in Home waters to be refitted and sent East. So those lists are not what was present in theatre at the start of the year, nor do they represent the further expansion that was planned. In the case of the BPF that build up was restricted by how quickly the Fleet Train could be built up to support them. Admiral King of the USN was adamant that the BPF should be self supporting. In practice those in command in the Pacific were prepared to be a bit more flexible.

 

[The Basket]

Compared to the USN fleet, the Pacific fleet was drop in the bucket.

A battleship may be good for flak escort but you can't do flak escort and shore bombardment at the same time.

RN simply didn't have the ships for this.

The KGV were also slower than the carrier they were escorting.

So as you said by 1945 only the KGV and Renown were fully capable of doing anything.

So you are going to have to build probably 12 ships just to replace losses and the obsolete. That big money.

King is well known for his er..... attitude to Britain and he didn't want anything to do with it. But he was told he has to take the British so he did but then didn't give any support.

Why Britain was there was more for picking up the pieces of Empire after wars end....a show of force or show of face.

Needed something to sail into Singapore and Hong Kong.

 

[EwenS]

The KGV were also slower than the carrier they were escorting.

You clearly don't understand the speeds that carrier groups operated at in WW2. While individual ships might be capable of operating at speeds up to 33 knots in the case of US carriers, Task Group speeds were generally in the region of 15-25 knots. There are many reasons for this

1. Fuel burn. This increases dramatically with higher speeds.
2. WW2 ASDIC/Sonar was only effective up to c18-20 knots. Speed of itself was not a protection from submarines. Ask the Japanese about the loss of Taiho and Shokaku at 25-26 knots.
3. A TG can only remain a coherent body if it stays together. Contrary to popular opinion carriers generally did not go hairing around the ocean outside of their rings of escorts.

The procedures that were worked out by the USN saw the whole group increasing or decreasing speed and changing course together when it came to operating aircraft. If a carrier needed to operate its aircraft outwith that sequence the rules were that it positioned itself as far downwind as possible while remaining within the destroyer screen. It then turned into wind and ran at the speed it needed to launch / recover its aircraft as quickly as possible while remaining within that screen. It then took up its designated position in the Task Group again.

Incidentally, for the first 2 weeks of Op Iceberg Illustrious was limited to 24 knots anyway by virtue of having her centre prop removed in Sydney due to vibration problems. Had Formidable not been delayed by her own machinery problems Illustrious would never have gone to the Pacific. The second carrier TG planned for the BPF would have been limited to 25 knots anyway as that was the max speed of the Colossus class light fleet carriers.

So the fact that the KGVs were slower than an Illustrious / Implacable class carrier is irrelevant on a whole variety of levels.

 

[Akuma]

Mitchell proved you can bomb an obsolete German battleship.

Which wasn't moving. Or shooting back. Or had no escort. Or any damage control. Or any air support.

And if you bomb it enough times it would sink.

I can be heavy weight boxing champion of the world based on the science of that test.

The Ostfriesland proves nothing at all. Nothing at all.

(Stupid Sexy Flanders)

What you say is true but you must remember, at that time, the Naval Authorities categorically refused to believe that a battleship could be sunk by an aircraft under ANY circumstances. It would be a fair assumption that some of the naval staff witnessing the test refused to believe the results of what they saw. Historian Mr. Bernard Brodie consulted US Naval leadership for a book he published in 1941 titled 'Sea Power in the Machine Age' in which he quoted naval staff as saying"At this time there is no weapon that can be carried by an aircraft capable of seriously damaging a major warship." This book was released for sale just prior to December 7th of that year.