The Falklands

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CB... Why push the envelope. You are above this. And you only quoted half of his siggy.

Sorry, but I dont mean anything derogatory, I am just curious...why the word "regained" ?. I am not an english language expert but I suppose if somebody re-gain is because it had lost it.

And dont worry, despite my usual "high flight" I dont mind to "descend" in the dirty and muddy terrain in order to get the matters right.
 
One thing that really does stick out in this campaign is the fact that low tech A-4s with dumb bombs were able to make so many strikes against British ships. That really begs the question of whether this was the turning point for the British Navy to seek better close-in weapon systems.
 
It was for sure, most of the success was for flying so close to the ground and shaving the wavetops. The british ship whom participated in the attack against Irak in 1991 were equipped with all kind of Flak, porcupine like. Obviously that was due the experience of 1982 war.

By the way dont Think I forgot the pleads for info about the bomb question but I am still working on it, is a looong article.
 
The Argentine Bomb question part1.

Translation of an article first edited by the monthly magazine "Guerra Aerea por las Malvinas" ( Air war for the Malvinas) Reguero publisher, 1987.



The true History of argentine bombs.

Even today, more than 4 years after the end of the war for the Malvinas exist in a lot of media- including some foreign publications and studies- interroganst about the efficience of bombs used by the Argentine aviation.
Those doubts turned around the quality of maintenance of bombs, right arming or their fuzes, the presumed obsolencence of those artifact or the lack of training of the personnel in charge.

Now is possible to end the polemic and provide and answer to the classic question: why the bombs didnt explode ?
For that an expert was called, the vicecomodoro (1) Arturo Pereyra who during the War was precisely the specialist in Armament of the Departament of Operation High command air Force South, wich was created for conducting tactical, defensiva, suppy and strategical operations in its influence Area ( the patagonia)

When the war started the Argentine Air Force was studing adecuation of its weapons systems in order to operate over the sea, both in interdiction against supply ships or direct attack to warships.

The first idea was that attacking those "floating fortresses" like the english warship were, filled with flak , missiles and radars with the materiel in existence and according to the classic doctrines of employement was impossible.

According to the NATO recomendations, in order to strike a frigate like the british one a minimum of 16 aircrafts are needed, in a way that those saturate the ships radars and the defenses could be penetrated.

The idea is that even some could be shot down, others will reach the target.
That same doctrine indicates also the optimal angle of attack of the aircraft, a dive of 45º starting from an altitude between 3000 and 4000 meters.
In that scenario with the weapons in hand of the Argentine Air Force it could meaning the destruccion of all its aircarfts, maybe before a single bomb would be launched.


(1) No idea how the rank vicecomodoro in translated in US or UK ranks.
 
The argentine bomb question part II

As result other system was adopted, based in the achievement of some degree of surprize, with a very low flight and a bomb drop nearly over the target.

But that bringed the need to modificate the bombs, specifically the fuzes, the part called "fire train" (meaning the system wich makes the explosion) in a way they will explode at the moment of impact.

This fact wich seems easy, is actually the result of a delicate balance between several factors. In first place you need to consider the arming safety, a device present in every bomb wich avoid the detonation until a preselected distance from the launching aircraft.

This device requires 1, 2 or 3 seconds, depending on setting, to arm the bomb.
Given the way used by argentine aviators wich implied to launch the bomb at 250 meters per second at very close range. the space of time between they left the aircraft and hit the target wasnt enough for arming.
This problem was discussed with the pilots and they agree to reduce the arming time, sacrificing safety in favour of efectiveness.
Is worth to mention that not only they agree...sometimes that were reduced to fullfill the desire of the pilots.

After being armed the bomb, it teorically should explode in the moment the target is hit.

But if that happens it would damage the launching aircraft since the time would match the moment in wich the aircraft passed over the target due the bomb and aircraft velocity are more or less the same.

And not only the attacking airplane but also other components of the formation making the attack a "suicide mission" thing that was never in the mind of argentine pilots.

"when you define the retard of explotion - explains Vicecomodoro Pereyra- you must choose between two ways, one safe for the launching aircraft and other adecuate for maximum damage on the target. As the risk in this late case is excessive you need to put away target damage efficience to provide safety for the aircraft to avoid suicide missions. That time could not be inferior to 8 or then seconds"

Now other problem is on the table, the hull of this modern warship is very thin. 10 to 12 mm, reinforced only with an armor of 25 to 50 mm in the magazine area. If the bomb in its trajectory does not find any hard surface, as the engine or some bulkheads it would go trough from side to side.

If you consider that the average width of the hull is 15 meters and the bomb velocity is 250 m/s that gave as result that teorically, without any possible "drag" created by internal componentes of the ship, it should take only 0,06 seconds to get trough the hull.
Is obvious then the dificulties to adjust the parameters between those very tight figures.
 
 

I cant help you there, my knolewge is limited to the source above.

The translation will continue soon.
 
Thanks CB for the translation. I agree with the physics of the analysis, but wonder why such a simple math problem was lost on the A-4 mission planners. Perhaps a technical mission planned without technical analysts. A MAJOR mistake if you ask me.

One could argue that the low level tactics were necessary and, perhaps, genius with British AA capabilities. But I would argue that without sophisitcated weapon fuses or weapon flight retardation, the mission profile was rife with risk.

What is confusing to me is the complete utter lack of indication that the weapons ultimately detonated. Assuming that the fuses were set too long for detonation in the target hull, you would expect them to detonate after they had passed through. And contrary to that expectation there were more than a few occasions where the "live" bombs remained embedded in the target ship and did not explode. Seems awfully peculiar given the small number of ordnance dropped and the detailed after action reports.
 

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