The German Army...

[silence]

No, i havent. but books by Trevor Dupuy that i have read...

Understanding War: Military History And The Theory Of Combat, New York, 1986
Understanding Defeat: How to Recover from Loss in Battle to Gain Victory in War, New York, 1990
Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties And Equipment Losses In Modern War, Virginia, 1990
If War Comes, How To Defeat Saddam Hussein, Virginia, 1991; issued as a paperback with the title How To Defeat Saddam Hussein
Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous Flashpoints, New York, 1992


The guy Im talking abouyt was a decorated retired US Colonel.

Yep, same guy.

 

[silence]

Actually in the beginning of the war I believe the opposite was true. At least on the "small" unit level. Lower level leaders were encouraged to take action quickly and NOT wait for orders for higher up. It helped keep up the momentum of attacks and allowed for quick response and flexibility in defense. Like many other things though the well trained and experienced pre and early war NCOs and low level officers suffered a disproportionate amount of causality's and the "system" could not supply enough replacements especially while trying to expand the army.

I read someplace years ago ( could have been a Jim Dunnigan Game extra) that a German NCO week long tactics course had the students given one problem every hour, they had 5 min to come up with a plan and then several of the plans (but not all) were discussed before the next problem was presented. This went on for a week. In contrast a British NCO week long tactics school and one problem in the morning and one in the afternoon (after lunch) with an hour being given to come up with a plan and then the discussion. In a Week the German NCO was presented with 3-4 times the number of problems and while his plans may not have been as carefully thought out there was a definite emphasis on the speed of coming up with some sort of plan.

Correct. German doctrine was "mission-oriented": basically, the superior gives the objective, and the unit commander is expected to determine how to best achieve it. This gives the advantages of having someone on the spot determining the best course of action and also gives them the ability and authority to improvise if an unexpected opportunity suddenly presents itself. This also helps build trust at all levels. Also check out Cordell and Zabecki's On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung, a translation of the German Combat Unit Command manual. it also has as an appendix a post-war review by some German generals of the US Army's manual. Some of the comments, views, and criticisms are very interesting. Its a great buy for $20 or so.

Back to topic: What's really interesting is that on the Eastern Front this is how the Heer started out, but as the reversals started and AH became more and more of a micromanager mission-oriented gave way to Simon-says, while for the Red Army the almost exact opposite happened when Stalin learned that some of his generals could actually be trusted - as much as he trusted anyone.

 

[parsifal]

I read someplace years ago ( could have been a Jim Dunnigan Game extra) that a German NCO week long tactics course had the students given one problem every hour, they had 5 min to come up with a plan and then several of the plans (but not all) were discussed before the next problem was presented. This went on for a week. In contrast a British NCO week long tactics school and one problem in the morning and one in the afternoon (after lunch) with an hour being given to come up with a plan and then the discussion. In a Week the German NCO was presented with 3-4 times the number of problems and while his plans may not have been as carefully thought out there was a definite emphasis on the speed of coming up with some sort of plan.

This is a parqadox. On the one hand you are obviuously not a convert to someone like Dunnigan and his work, but in the same breath are singing the praises of the german system of "gaming" out problems. Your understanding of how the germans developed small unit tactics is wrong, but the sentiment is clear enough....the germans emphasises quick thinking and encouraged even small unit NCOs to think clearly about military problems, the British army far less so. in fact this is about the only aspect of the summary that is correct. The secret of the German system was their embracement of "Krigspiel", literally "wargame" which in its original modern form dates back to 1811, in the Prussian War College. Major changes were made in 1871 with something called "free form Kriegspiel". Free form simulation was the format used to test plans and train officers until after WWII. it was less accurate than "rigid" Kriegspiel, but it enabled battle problems to be analysed very quickly.

Rigid Kriegspiel is more accurate, but slow. It forms the basis of the CNA system, and it is significant that it was used as a training aid at Sandhurst until the mid 90s. The germans virtually abandoned rigid kriegspiel except at very senior command levels. Barbarossa was tested using both free form and rigid Kriegspiel, Midway wqas tested using Free form Krigspel in its naval format. Both plans ended up being a failure...barbarossa because the assumptions that underpinned it proved incorrect, Midway because the gamers changed the parameters to suit their preconceptions as to the outcome....Sort of defeats the purpose of simulation in my opinion.....

The debate really gets down to systems based on analytical problem solving versus intuitive problem solving. Free Kriegspiel is much more attuned to intuitive problem solving, whereas the British system was far more attuned to analytical problem solving. The Germans embraced free form kriegspiel, whereas the emhasis in the British officer training remained rigid krigspiel oriented until after WWII

Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. But in the case of the British Army, the problem with their NCO training was not that they were given training in one system or the other. It was that they were given no training at all in problem solving. Problem solving in the British Army was considered an commissioned officer responsibility. The British Army published a handbook in 1938 that set out in written form, the various tactical approaches to a given battle problem. NCOs were expected to read that book and know it backwards. to a much greater extent, German NCOs were encouraged to think and come up with alternative solutions. It explains in large measure, the various performances of the two armies in WWII....the Germans were flexible, but sometimes things did go wrong, the British were rigid and unimaginative, but always dependable and measured. both systems had advantages and disadvantages

http://www.usma.edu/cfe/Literature/MacNab_12.pdf