German Luftwaffe Fighter Staff Conference 1944

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Snautzer01

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Mar 26, 2007
Tlie intensification of Allied air attacks on the Gei^nan aircraft
industry, in Fehruary, IShk, caused a serious loss of production hut also
stirred the Germans to greater efforts. The responsihility for filter
production was taken over hy a "Fighter Staff" (jagerstah) under Albert Speer,
the Minister of Armaments and War Production, with Field Marshal Milch as his
deputy and Otto Eaur as the chief executive. Tlae Fi^iter Staff functioned
from. March to June 19^4, when Speer took over full control of the whole of the
aircraft production programme. At the same time, the post of Director General
of Equipment at the Air Ministry (held hy Milch since December 1941},
abolished.
was
During its existence, the Filter Staff was able to eiTect a remarkable
rise in fighter production, in spite of the heavy Allied air attacks on the
industry. This was achieved by taking drastic measures for the repair of dama,ged aircraft and for the protection of factories against air attacks,
including dispersal of plant. A review of the aircraft production programmes
was also undertaken, which led to a reduction in the nimber of aircraft types
produced. From the standpoint of industrial organisation, therefore, the Fighter Staff achieved considerable success. The effect on the fitting
strength of the Luftwaffe was, however, not very noticeable, as many of the
aircraft produced were destroyed by Allied air attacks,
argued that the German filter arm would have been better served if the
industry had concentrated its effort on the production of jet aircraft (the
Messerschmitt 262 in particular). General Galland, the A.O. for Fighters
put this point of view at this time when he said he would rather have one
Me, 262 than five Me, 109*s.
The translation which follows contains extracts from the verbatim reports
of the Figjiter Staff conferences, with particular reference to the effect
of Allied air attacks. These reports are part of the collection of Milch
documents which were captiired at the end of the War

 
Tlie intensification of Allied air attacks on the Gei^nan aircraft
industry, in Fehruary, IShk, caused a serious loss of production hut also
stirred the Germans to greater efforts. The responsihility for filter
production was taken over hy a "Fighter Staff" (jagerstah) under Albert Speer,
the Minister of Armaments and War Production, with Field Marshal Milch as his
deputy and Otto Eaur as the chief executive. Tlae Fi^iter Staff functioned
from. March to June 19^4, when Speer took over full control of the whole of the
aircraft production programme. At the same time, the post of Director General
of Equipment at the Air Ministry (held hy Milch since December 1941},
abolished.
was
During its existence, the Filter Staff was able to eiTect a remarkable
rise in fighter production, in spite of the heavy Allied air attacks on the
industry. This was achieved by taking drastic measures for the repair of dama,ged aircraft and for the protection of factories against air attacks,
including dispersal of plant. A review of the aircraft production programmes
was also undertaken, which led to a reduction in the nimber of aircraft types
produced. From the standpoint of industrial organisation, therefore, the Fighter Staff achieved considerable success. The effect on the fitting
strength of the Luftwaffe was, however, not very noticeable, as many of the
aircraft produced were destroyed by Allied air attacks,
argued that the German filter arm would have been better served if the
industry had concentrated its effort on the production of jet aircraft (the
Messerschmitt 262 in particular). General Galland, the A.O. for Fighters
put this point of view at this time when he said he would rather have one
Me, 262 than five Me, 109*s.
The translation which follows contains extracts from the verbatim reports
of the Figjiter Staff conferences, with particular reference to the effect
of Allied air attacks. These reports are part of the collection of Milch
documents which were captiired at the end of the War

Tremendous contributions. Danke schoen!
Und...

Arte.png
 
This document in the link gives you a very good idea how the reasoning for simplifying aircraft industry came about. It wasnt only Speer.
One could get the odeur of mismanagement and amateurs.
Interesting read. I found myself both agreeing and sharply disagreeing with some of the foundation premises of his arguements.

Would be interested in the resume of the primary author.

To contrast the 'capital/capital directed' philosophy of Americans - versus the blatant criticisms the author directed to German leadership and chain of command to both industrial philosopy, weapons systems selection and allocation of resources - he clearly had no idea how that worked in the US.

It is easy to start at the very top to contrast Roosevelt vs Hitler. On one hand subordinates providing unwanted advice faced less severe consequences under Roosevelt.

From my persepctive two fundamenta differences apply to contrast against the author's narrative of Germany's leadership failures.

The US Joint Chiefs, despite political and philosophical differences regarding the relative 'importance' of the armed forces branch each led (Marshall, King and Arnold), worked together with a common goal. In this respect, they were each knowledgable regarding their force structure, each smart men, each politically astute relative to the necessity of 'salute and excute' to political nuances as Roosevelt and Churchill would agree affecting their own branch. But because they were each very smart leaders - and demonstrated competence - they were essentially unmolested by Roosevelt.

Each Branch had a Plan. In the case of Army Air Force it was Air War Plan Directive -1 from July 1941 in response to Roosevelt's question to the Joint Chiefs "What will it take to defeat Axis (Germany/Italy)" The AWPD-1 for AAF was a detailed plan to destroy enemy industrial capacity and deny the enemy air force control of the air.

From AWPD-1, and as revised based on combat lessons learned, were derived R&D, aircraft type and selection priorities as well as production priorities. While circumstances dictated changes to equipment and production priorities, the core of the plan remained intact from Casablance Conference through EOW.

'capitalism' came into focus at the production side with contractors competing not only on performance but also cost. Pretty sure the author did not understand much about the US War Fighting/Mobilization Model.

I have no clue regarding the industrial leadership below Milch level (Saur?) but another contrast between the German implied model amd the US model was our War Production Board into which major industrial leaders were inserted to work with Armed Forces leaders (i.e. Echols as CO of AAF Materiel Command) to thrash out issues and solutions to allocations based on the Plans and available resources.

Obviously altruism can be assumed as influention, and the ones closest to Roosevelt may be assumed as more equal than others, but at a scale far removed from Hitler leadership model.
 
This document in the link gives you a very good idea how the reasoning for simplifying aircraft industry came about. It wasnt only Speer.
One could get the odeur of mismanagement and amateurs.
I forgot to mention that with de-centralizing aircraft industry, comes inevitable quality control to central base design as well a supply chain issues involving surface transportation for assembly depots - where once again becomes a target rich environment.
 
This document in the link gives you a very good idea how the reasoning for simplifying aircraft industry came about. It wasnt only Speer.
One could get the odeur of mismanagement and amateurs.
Worth noting that the reference in the translated document of entry 27 April 1944, on page 7of trans, mentions the importance of the improved Bf 109 with the "AS (Argus) engine". This is a mistake in translation or original copy because the engine being referred to is the DB605AS engine, which is the DB605A Special engine with larger supercharger and improved performance above the rated altitude of the DB605A engine. Later in the document, mention is made of the increased use of Water-Methanol.

Eng
 
Thanks for that bit of info, I was wondering about the AS(Argus) bit. :) I could not remember that Argus ever worked on an engine that would have enough power to improve the Bf 109's performance. That is now a rabbit hole I do not have to crawl into.
 
Thanks for that bit of info, I was wondering about the AS(Argus) bit. :) I could not remember that Argus ever worked on an engine that would have enough power to improve the Bf 109's performance. That is now a rabbit hole I do not have to crawl into.
Thanks Tom. The DB 605 AS engine was first built in the Autumn of 1943 and the prototype Bf 109 G-AS was test flying by December 1943. The positive improvements of performance above the rated altitude of the DB 605 A engine were recognised after the testing, with strong recommendation for production of the engine and airframes in Jan '44.

Eng
 

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