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Nobody knew what they were going to run into in late 1942 and early 1943 and the US Army was not happy with the P-39 and P-40. They were buying and issuing them because they didn't have enough P-38s and P-47s.
IMO the following thesis was 'under researched'Here is a quick synopsis from this document:
SCHWEINFURT RAIDS AND THE PAUSE IN DAYLIGHT STRATEGIC BOMBING
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History
By GREG A.GRABOW, MAJ, U.S. ARMY
B.S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 1990
Define deep. Hamburg, Keil, Oschersleben, Kassel, Hannover were 'deep' but not quite same distance as Schweinfurt. Those targets were attacked during Blitz Week 2-3 weeks before Schweinfurt/Regensburg - and reprsent the first use of the Republic 200gal Ferry tank to extend Escort past 175mi. Un escorted has meaning when referring to escort provided anywhere near the target . The RAF and VIII FC provided Penetration and Withdrawal escort to and from The German/Belgium border.IMO
Page 2: "The August 17, 1943 Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid was the first time in which a large American heavy bomber force would strike a target, deep in Germany, unescorted as the P-47s"
See comment about un-escorted.Page 3: "The force amassed to attack these targets were 376 B-17s with 268 P-47 sorties and 191 Spitfire sorties flown as escort"
The Schweinfurt mission lost 36 plus 3 scrapped and 118 damaged. The Regensburg mission lost 24 plus 1 scraped and 24 damaged. Several ditched and were rescued - B-17 lost but crew saved.Page 4: "Again, once most of the P-47 fighter escorts reached their range limit near the German border and turned back, the Luftwaffe savaged the B-17 formations. The raid ended with the loss of 77 B-17 Flying Fortresses, with 642 crewmen, while German records showed the loss of 32 fighters"
Cass Hough designed the suction capability for the C/L drop tank slaved from engine vacuum system - the major problem for the 200gal Ferry tank was that it would fail to draw above 20-22K altitude.Page 33: "At the time, the Spitfire's 125 mile radius and the P-47's 225 mile radius offered little to the realm of possibilities concerning the escort range problem for missions into Germany (Ref 1)"
(Ref 1): "The current belly tank available to the P-47 was a huge, unwieldy two-hundred gallon ferrying tank made out of paper mache and lacked pressurization. In response to pleas from the head of the Eighth's technical service section, Colonel Cass Hough, plane manufacturers worked on a pressurized tank. Satisfactory drop tanks did not appear in numbers until early 1944. Source: Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, 1983)."
That project started in 1942 and spawned from Naval destroyer escort fantasyPage 33: "An early attempt to solve the long range escort problem came by modifying the armament on existing B-17s. In May of 1943, twelve YB-40s (modified B-17s with three more machine guns, an additional ball turret, and twice as much ammunition) made their debut in raids against the submarine pens……………….. But because of the additional weight, the YB-40s could not keep up with the rest of the B-17 formation so the experiment was discontinued."
75gal (84 actual) began arriving in June but the B-7 bomb ack kits were installed in last week of August. Operations with the 75gal tank began in early September. The longest combat engagement by 56th FG w/75gal tank was Quackenbruck (276mi from Halesworth) on 10-8. The second Schweinfurt mission 6 days later found the 56th FG in a fight between Ans and Aachen (260mi)Page 52: "By late September, large quantities of 75 gallon fuel tanks began arriving in England and the P-47 escorts increased their range to 340 miles or just inside the borders of Germany."
There were only two AD's for October 14. Only 7 P-47 FGs and one P-38 FG. The 2nd BD (AD In Fall 1944) was the B-24 division which only flew a diversion - still recovering rom Tidal Wave/Ploesti. ONLY the 75gal tank was used but the Bowater-Lloyd paper tank was being delivered for November operations. The Ford/Brisbane tank was designedfor the four point P-47C thru P-47D-4 attach scheme and culd not be used w/B-7 shacklePage 52: "One group of P-47s would provide escort to each of the air divisions while another P-47 group would give withdrawal support and two squadrons of Spitfires would sweep the withdrawal route and escort stragglers."
My note: This statement in the thesis pertains to the second Schweinfurt raid 14th October 1943 and here written in black and white is a clear intention to escort the bombers within the range capabilities of the escorts. So if the P-47 really could carry a 200 gallon tank at this time and extend the escort range even further, then why didn't they fit it? Well probably simply because it was not feasible to do so.
Actually the Priority for P-51B was moved to number 1, not the P-47. All P-38 and P-51B deployments were ordered to ETO until January 1944. They were assigned to 8th nd 9th AF but tasked to 8th until end of May. The 8th still went to Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel, Osnabruck, Ludwigshaven - well past P-47 range bit escorted first by P-38, them P-51B in December. andPage 67: "The second Schweinfurt raid changed aircraft production priority to fighter production with a focus on the P-38 and the P-47 at the time. Arnold ordered all P-38 and P-47 fighter groups deploying overseas to be sent to Britain but it took time to receive aircraft, train aircrews and emplace the necessary technical support. In the meantime, Major General Ira Eaker sent Eighth Bomber Command out on relatively short missions, within fighter escort range"
Wrong partially. The 75gal combat tank was made in US. UK made 108gal paper but also 110gal steel, the US made 108/110gal steel and 150galsteel flat tank as well as the Lockheed 165/150gal tak in use since February 1942. The 52, 60 and 75gal self sealing tanks passed all Mat.Cmd destruct testing by end of May 1943 and contracted them for Production. In October Arnold directed Mat.Cmd to cease testing and start producing.Page 67-68:" A more successful solution to answer the call for increased fighter escort range came in the form of external auxiliary fuel tanks for fighters. As early as 1942, the Eighth AAF inquired whether jettisonable fuel tanks could be made available for the P-47 but the solution was foolishly delayed by the industrial bureaucracy and the lack of emphasis by the USAAF leadership. Meanwhile, local sources in England were tapped to produce a limited quantity of 75 gallon tanks for both the Spitfire and the P-47. Due to the shortage of wartime material in Britain, these 75 gallon tanks were often made of inferior material and had mechanical issues at higher altitudes. By August of 1943, Army Material Command (AMC) was still experimenting at a slow pace with external tanks but had yet to produce its own model. It took a desperate plea by the Eighth's technical service section chief, Colonel Cass Hough, to get the external fuel tank program kick started. Due to further political pressure applied by the Combined Chiefs, a suitable 150 gallon drop wing tank was quickly developed. In September of 1943, the monthly production of 150 gallon wing tanks for the P-47 was only 300; by December it was 22,000. If the tasking was taken seriously a year earlier, this one innovation could have decreased bomber losses during the fall of 1943 but emphasis arrived too late. As Brigadier General Hume Peabody would put it, the auxiliary tank problem indicated "a lack of forward thinking. 'By early 1944, the 150 gallon wing tanks had a significant impact on the fighter escort solution'."
The P-51 and P-38 saved POINTBLANK and accelerated the pressure with five P-51B and 3 P-38J FGs to perform the Required Target support with P-47s 150 to 300 miles in arrears.Page 79-80: "What was the fallout? The heavy bomber losses throughout the fall of 1943 was the fallout from the failure to obtain long range fighter escort earlier for the heavy bombers. Initially, the Eighth AAF adopted a daylight strategic bombing doctrine which did not heed the call for fighter escort once three hundred heavy bombers "punched" through the templated German fighter defenses. Too late, the P-38 was rushed in to fill a role it was not mechanically suited for and Army Material Command's (AMC) sluggish progress on expendable drop tanks was taken off the back burner. A technological impact readily accepted throughout all levels of the USAAF were the effects of additional internal and external fuel tankage on the P-47 which increased its range from an initial 175 miles to 400 miles and put it in range of most targets in western Germany. The P-47 remained the workhorse of the Eighth AAF which laid the groundwork to resume daylight strategic bombing and saved operation POINTBLANK. The P-47 was supplemented by the P-51 Mustang, in numbers by the summer of 1944, which exploited the victory. Also, the USAAF's disinterest in the P-51 Mustang prevented the plane from being in action six months earlier and at a crucial time. Expendable drop tanks and the need for long range escort fighter were requested before the initial Schweinfurt raid but the second Schweinfurt raid was a wake up call to speed up the process."
The P-47 that would have eliminated a need for Mustangs was the P-47D-25 (Bubble Top) w/65 extra internal gal of fuel, two wing pylons and a centerline pylon - but not available to perform a complete mission by VIII FC until July/August 1944 - It needed ALL three features to go to Berlin and Munich.I suppose there is always a risk that those who do not like the conclusions from this document may say that an officer like Greg Grabow has a horse in this race for some reason. However, it's a thesis after all and if what is written here is not historically correct then there would not only be a problem of some isolated individuals attempting to rewrite history, but a huge academic problem.
Why? Well because in that case a masters thesis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has passed muster but completely missed the fact that the P-47 actually could escort all the way to Schweinfurt with a 200 gallon tank and that some dog headed Generals sabotaged this opportunity.
Granted, I have not read the whole document page by page, but the pages I have read (I have filtered using "P-47") are well formulated and all important points backed up by references.
And in summary, to me Greg Grabow makes a very strong case in his masters thesis that the P-47 was unable to provide long range escort at the time simply because a suitable drop tank was not available. And in my opinion, the onus lies on those who think this thesis is wrong (about the 200 gallon tank) to provide credible evidence to support that. Not the other way around.
It was a declaration of war against Japan only. So, that argument doesn't apply. Aside from being a committed pacifist, she also believed that Roosevelt had backed the Japanese into a corner with the oil and scrap metal embargoes.A. Your country was sneak attacked.
B. Do you REALLY think the Nazi's were going to be placated?
You are correct, they knew that the war was global. They also knew the Japanese had deployed very advanced fighters in Dec 1941 and that the British where having trouble with Fw 190s in late 1941. Stuffing Merlin 20s into the P-40 might not be up to the task in Dec 1942.They (AAC/AAF) knew by early 1942 that the war is a global one, and that more fuel is needed.
You are correct, they knew that the war was global. They also knew the Japanese had deployed very advanced fighters in Dec 1941 and that the British where having trouble with Fw 190s in late 1941. Stuffing Merlin 20s into the P-40 might not be up to the task in Dec 1942.
Turns out the Japanese were rather slow in getting 2 speed superchargers into production ( or building engines bigger than the Sakae ) in 1942.
Also the trouble DN had with the 605 in 1942.
We know how things turned out. In 1942 they didn't know.
In Dec 1941 the Allies were caught by surprise, The Japanese had more advanced aircraft than the Allies suspected. They also didn't know that the Japanese fighters were using single speed superchargers.There was no 'very advanced fighters' by Japanese in Dec 1941, and, if anything, Allies were a tad underestimating Japanese gear, not over-estimating.
The XP-47B flew in May 6th 1941,By the time P-47 flew, they (Americans) also knew that it was the fastest thing in the skies, and three factories were contracted with making them, thus adding quantity to quality.
No threat to the mainland but threats to non mainland areas was pretty significant.There was no threat to the US mainland by the enemy bombers - since US was unable to cover even half of Atlantic or Pacific with their bombers, expecting that Axis does it to the USA was as far-fetched as it goes.
Why?If the Merlin 20 in the P-40 will not cut it, stuff it in the XP-51 and see how that goes.
Very true but while we know that now, what did we know then?Japanese (especially IJN) were slow in installing the big radials on their fighters, despite manufacturing them.
In Dec 1941 the Allies were caught by surprise, The Japanese had more advanced aircraft than the Allies suspected. They also didn't know that the Japanese fighters were using single speed superchargers.
They also knew the Japanese had deployed very advanced fighters in Dec 1941
No threat to the mainland but threats to non mainland areas was pretty significant.
If the Merlin 20 in the P-40 will not cut it, stuff it in the XP-51 and see how that goes.
Why?
How fast are you going to get a Merlin 20 powered Mustang?
Install all and any V-1650-1 that can be gotten on the Mustangs, revert the P-40s to the V-1710s as a trade off.Any and all Merlin 20 powered Mustangs built in 1942 and early 1943 will take engines from P-40F and L aircraft. Probably P-40Ls by the time testing and production can be set up and such work may be at the cost of the two stage Merlin program since they have the Prototype flying in at the end of Nov. 1942.
Very true but while we know that now, what did we know then?
The Ki-44 underwent combat trials in SE Asia in Dec 1941. The Allies did not know how long it would take to get them into production. The Allies in 1942 did not know how long it would take for the IJA to put a two speed supercharger into the Ki-43.
we're discussing a second (non live) discussion, much more source oriented, to get closure on several open questions.He is working on a video which will cover the sources he referenced. If you think he made a few mistakes, pass it along to him. I'm sure he will clarify. Such errors in a live debate aren't unusual.
The technical issues were a headache for everyone, but it did seem like you got the brunt of it.
I think you should consider taking him up on his offer to do a video about your dad. I would love to see that story told live.
Fair points but what's the reason Roosevelt was laying down embargoes, Japanese depredations in China.It was a declaration of war against Japan only. So, that argument doesn't apply. Aside from being a committed pacifist, she also believed that Roosevelt had backed the Japanese into a corner with the oil and scrap metal embargoes.
Hitler declared war first, which helped end any possibility of meaningful opposition to getting involved in Europe.
The argument that we should only fight Japan, or that we shouldn't get involved in Europe until Japan was defeated, wasn't irrational.
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were evil empires that needed to be eradicated . . .
To clarify, I am saying that the name "Brisbane tank" is a fiction, having never been used during the war years. There were numerous Australian companies manufacturing internal and external fuel tanks then for the US and Australian Air Forces. General Motors Holden were manufacturing 300-gallon tanks, while the Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., was producing self-sealing tanks. Ford (Australia) for example was also manufacturing both external belly tanks, and self-sealing wing and fuselage tanks for P-47s, in both Victoria (Geelong), Queensland (Eagle Farm), and New South Wales (Granville and Forbes). The USAFIA first approached Ford Australia in late August 1942, with an order for 600 x 150-gallon belly tanks. It was a year later when Ford appears to have received its first order for 4,500 x 200-gallon (Contract No. US.1413), and 20,400 155-gallon belly tanks. By November 1943 Ford Australia's total belly tank output was up to 2,000 units per month. These ranged in capacity from 30 gallons (Spitfire) to 260 gallons. Nothing has been found to date to indicate that 200 gallon tanks were ever manufactured by Ford in Brisbane. Although negotiations to this end commenced in late 1943, contract settlement negotiations had commenced by February 1944 at which time, interest appears to have switched to the new 260-gallon belly tank.So are you saying the name Brisbane Tank was never used at the time or that there was no drop tank at all at that time that corresponds with what some now refer to as the Brisbane Tank?
Totally agree.The Soviet Union too, but expediency made them allies. At least until the other two were defeated.
Excellent source. Do you have images of the 155gal belly tank? Based on the order size I suspect that it is designed with same lug spacing as US built belly tanks.. and would work With P-47D-2 and D-4 retrofitted wih B-7 racks.To clarify, I am saying that the name "Brisbane tank" is a fiction, having never been used during the war years. There were numerous Australian companies manufacturing internal and external fuel tanks then for the US and Australian Air Forces. General Motors Holden were manufacturing 300-gallon tanks, while the Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., was producing self-sealing tanks. Ford (Australia) for example was also manufacturing both external belly tanks, and self-sealing wing and fuselage tanks for P-47s, in both Victoria (Geelong), Queensland (Eagle Farm), and New South Wales (Granville and Forbes). The USAFIA first approached Ford Australia in late August 1942, with an order for 600 x 150-gallon belly tanks. It was a year later when Ford appears to have received its first order for 4,500 x 200-gallon (Contract No. US.1413), and 20,400 155-gallon belly tanks. By November 1943 Ford Australia's total belly tank output was up to 2,000 units per month. These ranged in capacity from 30 gallons (Spitfire) to 260 gallons. Nothing has been found to date to indicate that 200 gallon tanks were ever manufactured by Ford in Brisbane. Although negotiations to this end commenced in late 1943, contract settlement negotiations had commenced by February 1944 at which time, interest appears to have switched to the new 260-gallon belly tank.
As the accompanying primary source documents reveal, US forces in the Pacific were far more interested in the 155-gallon belly tank (than the 200-gallon tank). Again, this probably will not sit well with those invested in sustaining the Brisbane tank myth.
View attachment 780092
There was no 'very advanced fighters' by Japanese in Dec 1941, and, if anything, Allies were a tad underestimating Japanese gear, not over-estimating.
In Dec 1941 the Allies were caught by surprise, The Japanese had more advanced aircraft than the Allies suspected. They also didn't know that the Japanese fighters were using single speed superchargers.
Not trying to move the goal post. Trying to clarify the situation and not doing well. We have the advantage of hindsight. The Planners at the time did not. There were some warnings coming out of China in 1940-41 but they were rather ignored by most western planners. The men in the Philippines may have thought the Japanese had advanced aircraft compared to the P-35s, P-36s and early P-40s they had. They had a few P-40es but not enough. If the British thought the Japanese had better planes they may have provided at least a few squadrons of Hurricanes instead of Buffaloes? The Allies knew they were getting beat, They knew they didn't have the "best" planes in the theater. It was going to be months or a year before better planes (or much better planes) showed up and could they expect the Japanese to make little or no progress?Please, don't move the goal posts. "More advanced aircraft than the Allies suspected" is a whole another ball game when compared with
Trouble is we didn't know what the Japanese were planning. They could have built Ki-43 IIs over 6 months earlier than they did (Navy was fooling around with a prototype Zero using the two speed engine before Pearl Harbor). The Japanese army might have built more Ki-44 IIs in late 1942 or even a few hundred Ki-44 I in early 1942. The design and prototypes existed, production capacity and Army desire did not but that was unknown to the Western allies.Let's worry about the possible 350 mph Ki-43 once it receives the upgraded engine, since we're making a 420 mph fighter?
Thank you.Not trying to move the goal post. Trying to clarify the situation and not doing well. We have the advantage of hindsight. The Planners at the time did not. There were some warnings coming out of China in 1940-41 but they were rather ignored by most western planners. The men in the Philippines may have thought the Japanese had advanced aircraft compared to the P-35s, P-36s and early P-40s they had. They had a few P-40es but not enough. If the British thought the Japanese had better planes they may have provided at least a few squadrons of Hurricanes instead of Buffaloes? The Allies knew they were getting beat, They knew they didn't have the "best" planes in the theater. It was going to be months or a year before better planes (or much better planes) showed up and could they expect the Japanese to make little or no progress?
I'm not sure why the F-4F-Z will be needed, since Americans have the 400 mph F4U in pipeline, as well as the F6F.The Western allies had been shocked out of their own complacency during Dec 1941 and the first 6 months of 1942 while the Japanese had been lulled by their early successes.
The Allies did not know when the 350mph Ki-43 ( or successor or major engine change) was going to show up. Same for the Zero successor.
The Allies did not want to introduce a 350mph F4F-Z when the Japanese introduced a 375mph A7M (not real A7M).
I only brought that up because it's a logical flaw to argue that she should have voted for the declaration because of Hitle.The "only fighting Japan" did have a large following for sure, no denying that, but again, she could vote not to go to war after Pearl Harbor?
Grandstanding is about gaining popularity or votes. Opposing the war only hurt her. Regardless of my disagreement with her, she voted purely out of principle.Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were evil empires that needed to be eradicated, grandstanding a pacifist vote doesn't impress me. However, I suppose she at least stayed true to her ideals.
When I read the book, I was really surprised that they don't seem to have passed on any of this information to the U.S.From Boyd " The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" p229
"British military leaders have attracted harsh criticism for their lack of knowledge of Japanese aircraft performance. Although surviving records are patchy, accurate performance tables for all Japanese aircraft in use at the outbreak of war had been circulated across the British intelligence community by mid-1941."