I assume they are not known for accuracy?
There were a whole bunch of problems such as the fact that, while many of the older pilots were quite skilled in aerial combat, many of the newer pilots weren't as well trained as they should.
If there were any restrictions about BVR combat at the immediate start of the war, they were implemented soon enough (if I recall, there was at least one friendly-fire case).
The problem with the BVR engagement was that it wasn't possible to identify a target by radar-return alone (the exception might have been the Tu-95), and at least some IFF's weren't readable (Assuming Soviet IFF could be read, exports couldn't) which meant you either assumed any aircraft without IFF was an enemy: Something not always a good idea as IFF made detection easier under at least some circumstances (I'm not sure if the IFF system only sent out a return when properly signalled/interrogated, or simply spat out a return when lit up by radar) and, in doing so, increased maximum detection range.
From what I remember, some of our pilots would shut them off when entering enemy airspace. The enemy of course kept theirs on as it helped them determine which blips were theirs and which were not, so it was there interest to keep those on.
The general requirement (it wasn't absolute -- there were "missile free" zones) was to go into visual range to identify one's opponent as hostile wasn't a total problem provided the aircraft had sufficient performance, were manned by crews that were skilled in aerial combat. The F-4 ironically had the ability to use the vertical, and below 15,000-20,000 feet, the agility of the aircraft was quite good (sustained agility was one of the best).
The problem had to do with the fact that most aircraft that were employed as day-fighters and fighter-bombers either had guns, or guns and missiles in either the USAF and USN; USAF dedicated all-weather interceptors usually just had missiles, or a combo of missiles and rockets (the USN's dedicated interceptors prior to the F-4 had provision for guns, as well as rockets and/or missiles). Since the former were used in air-to-air combat, this wasn't really a big deal until the F-4 came around as it was used both as an interceptor and a fighter-bomber.
Had they had a gun and were properly trained, they wouldn't have had much trouble if they ended up inside minimum range; they'd switch to guns and proceed from there. I suppose one could argue further that a combination of tactics (have one pair of planes race in for a sneak-n-peak and then radio the rear pair to fire; switch from finger/fluid-four to loose-deuce/dual-attack), and training (particularly tactics that allow one to gain for separation) would have been just fine as is (that said, it seemed a gun was a nice bonus).
Is that the sole reason why they were micromanaging things like that? Or was it also some form of penis-waving move by the President to show he was boss?
Mike Wint had mentioned that there were all sorts of problems ranging from
- Fear of producing a scenario like Korea: I'm not sure I get the point
- Fear of escalation into WWIII: China didn't have a mutual-defense pact with North Vietnam -- not sure if POTUS knew that or not
- Diplomats objecting to training of counter-insurgency forces and jungle-warfare experts
- Fear of being honest with intelligence data because of the fear of being labeled as a possible traitor/useful-idiot: Thus people published data they knew in their heart to be inaccurate, but simply hoped would be understood for what it was
- Intelligence withholding useful data: Such as the fact that they could read enemy transponders and not relaying that to the fighters, or the fact that they knew the NVA had a guns-hold requirement below 3500 feet.
Who did Robin Olds have to blow to get that done?
Different administration.
Yeah, it's hard to even keep track of the number of ways
- The NVN being told where and when we were goig to attack: It makes a lot of sense now how they were able to pick so many of our planes off. Supposedly, they were doing it for the purpose of preventing Russian military advisors from being killed, and to convince the NVN that we would not bomb population centers and would insure they could get their people out (while I'm not for bombing population centers to kill people for it's own sake -- I just acknowledge openly that it was our policy in WWII and Korea), I wouldn't mind my enemy not knowing what I'm going to do -- maybe the fear could do something useful.
- President Nixon via Kissinger sabotaged Johnsons efforts for peace, which could have ended Vietnam by 1969 (even as ineptly as it was being fought)
