"The Axis often sent pilots into battle barely able to fly".
That is one more of the many myths created by the Allied propaganda.
First things first: Germany was not Japan.
Germany lacked fuel to sent its fighter units against the USAAF from the final weeks of 1944 until the very end of the war. The exceptions were perhaps the Ardennes offensive and Bodenplatte.
Perhaps the Japanese indeed sent guys who could hardyl fly, with the sole mission in mind of smashing themselves against US navy targets.
The Allies, in this case the USA, wants to make it seem that in the final days, both scenarios -Pacific and Europe- were nearly identical; that is totally unaccurate and has very little to do with what actually happened.
That in the last year and a half of the war the training programs of new German pilots got shortened is true, but to say the Luftwaffe sent guys who "could hardly fly" to achieve virtually nothing and just to get killed in mass is not true.
October 1944 saw the Luftwaffe fighter force shooting down some 400-450 enemy planes (RAF USAAF, fighter and bombers)
On november 26th, 1944, German pilots destroyed in combat about 100-110 USAAF planes (fighters and bombers).
On December 17th, 1944, German fighters destroyed about 85 USAAF planes.
On december 23rd, 1944, the Luftwaffe shot down about 100 USAAF planes, both bombers and fighters.
By then fuel was already lacking, and getting it was a drama, and a good amount of it, was being stockpiled for Bodenplatte. So shooting down 100 USAAF planes in the last week of 1944 speaks of an air force certainly not comprised by pilots who can hardly fly.
If possible try to get any comparative numbers of the Pacific theather of operations: you will see that by Nov/Dec 1944 losses at the hands of Japanese fighters were very low.
That is one more of the many myths created by the Allied propaganda.
First things first: Germany was not Japan.
Germany lacked fuel to sent its fighter units against the USAAF from the final weeks of 1944 until the very end of the war. The exceptions were perhaps the Ardennes offensive and Bodenplatte.
Perhaps the Japanese indeed sent guys who could hardyl fly, with the sole mission in mind of smashing themselves against US navy targets.
The Allies, in this case the USA, wants to make it seem that in the final days, both scenarios -Pacific and Europe- were nearly identical; that is totally unaccurate and has very little to do with what actually happened.
That in the last year and a half of the war the training programs of new German pilots got shortened is true, but to say the Luftwaffe sent guys who "could hardly fly" to achieve virtually nothing and just to get killed in mass is not true.
October 1944 saw the Luftwaffe fighter force shooting down some 400-450 enemy planes (RAF USAAF, fighter and bombers)
On november 26th, 1944, German pilots destroyed in combat about 100-110 USAAF planes (fighters and bombers).
On December 17th, 1944, German fighters destroyed about 85 USAAF planes.
On december 23rd, 1944, the Luftwaffe shot down about 100 USAAF planes, both bombers and fighters.
By then fuel was already lacking, and getting it was a drama, and a good amount of it, was being stockpiled for Bodenplatte. So shooting down 100 USAAF planes in the last week of 1944 speaks of an air force certainly not comprised by pilots who can hardly fly.
If possible try to get any comparative numbers of the Pacific theather of operations: you will see that by Nov/Dec 1944 losses at the hands of Japanese fighters were very low.
