The Myth of the British "Fixing" The Corsair

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All of the info is elsewhere in the forum. We did all this about a year ago with dates of first USN carrier dates and the orders to standardise on the F6F for supply convienence. Much documentation is here somewhere. I am not computer savvy enough and have limited forum finding stuff ability to know exactly where.
 
Late-1930s: The US Navy adopted a curved landing approach for all carrier aircraft.
When did they do away with that? It would seem a straight-in approach was planned initially for the F4U-1 with VF-17.
 
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The same place I got the scan of the carrier trial results also had one that tl;dr was:

"Marines need fighters ASAP, send every Corsair we have now."

With the US carrier forces still rebuilding for much of early 1943 (Enterprise and Saratoga out of action for repairs from the Guadalcanal campaign, their air groups badly depleted and needing to be rebuilt, and the first Essexes were still fitting out) it makes sense that the carrier groups would be a lower priority to receive the new fighters than the Marines that were in the war zone NOW and were desperate for equipment. With every F4U available being rushed out to the Pacifc, that naturally meant the Hellcats were what was available in the States to build the carrier groups around, which then led to the logistics decision once the distribution of aircraft was established.
 

Great point that's often over-looked..

In early 1943 the US Navy considered both the F4U and F6F to be excellent carrier-based fighters but during this period the US Marines desperately needed newer fighters in the Solomon Islands to replace their worn-out F4Fs. With Grumman ceasing production of the F4F in favor of newer more advanced F6F, the ready available F4U seemed like the best candidate as the Wildcat's replacement within US Marine air units.

The F6F was just becoming operational with the US Navy during this time. With it's more docile handling characteristics it was thought that carrier pilots could be commissioned at an even faster rate so the US Navy decided to continue equipping US Marine air units with the F4U and made the F6F the standard shipboard fighter.

This makes perfect sense, as the supply chain was already fully established for the F4U so why change anything when you have Grumman solely concentrated on F6F production to fill the need for future shipboard fighters? It was the simplest answer which allowed for both requirements to be met in the shortest logistical time-frame possible.
 
USN testing of a captured Zero showed that it was superior in every aspect to the F4F-4 except level speed at sea level and high speed rolls.

 
Don't forget the Wildcat's ability to dive like a block of lead.
The USN compared the diving performance and found:

"...In dive the two planes are equal with the exception that the Zero's engine
cuts out in pushovers...
"

So the Zero might suffer a momentary loss of power if the nose is pushed down from level flight, but if the dive is entered via a roll or in a turn, then the F4F-4 has no advantage.
 
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The Zero was NOT a good diver as it has a relatively low max dive speed. Otherwise, it was fine. The A6M5 Model 52 sort of "fixed" that by going with thicker wing skins, but that only pushed the dive speed up by about 20 - 30 mph, if memory serves. The Wildcat SHOULD have had a good diving advantage by dint of dive speed alone.
 
The tests conducted by the USN were of the two aircraft flying side by side.
 
Seriously, this would completely invalidate one of the key tactics that allowed Wildcat pilots to turn the tables on the Zero in the first place. IIRC even Japanese accounts expressed frustration by the Wildcat's ability to scoot away in a dive and escape.
Was it the F4F that didn't have a "do not exceed" IAS?
I think it's more likely that the Zero had better initial acceleration, and the dive tests simply weren't long enough for the Wildcat's greater weight and higher do not exceed speed to take over.
 
In theory the F4F's VNE (450 mph IAS below 10,000 ft) was significantly higher than the A6M's (~400 mph IAS below 10,000 ft). In practice the difference was small - the drag of the F4F precluded it from accelerating particularly rapidly (the drag was similar to the Hurricane) and reaching very high dive speeds did not occur within the normal operating conditions. It is interesting that in both the F4F and Hurricane pilot's notes there is a disclaimer saying that the aircraft was 'not expected to reach VNE in service'.

The idea that the F4F could out-dive the A6M and use this as a tactic is something of a misunderstanding. The reality was that the stiffening of the ailerons on the A6M at speeds above around 350-400 mph IAS meant the A6M could not roll quickly enough to follow the F4F when it rolled into a new turning direction.

To be fair, many VNE for early-war aircraft were measured by beginning the dive from altitudes of 20,000-30,000 ft and continuing to dive until the aircraft came apart or became marginally controllable. It really was not until the new generation of aircraft came along that VNE could easily be reached in practical situations.
 

Not mentioned is stiffening of controls.
 
Cumulative total production and cumulative allocation to British from total production. F4U first combat mission February 1943, F6F first combat mission August 1943, F8F on way to front August 1945. Number built to end of combat debut month, F4U 292, F6F 1,058, F8F 163 (In theory). Helps show the gap between production start and combat debut. Also how to end April 1943 the USN had been delivered around 2 F4U to 1 F6F.
MonthF6FF6FF4UF4UF8FF8F
MonthTotalTo BritishTotalTo BritishMonthTotal
Jul-42​
0​
0​
2​
Aug-42​
0​
0​
11​
Sep-42​
1​
0​
24​
Oct-42​
2​
0​
55​
Nov-42​
3​
0​
110​
Dec-42​
10​
0​
178​
Jan-43​
22​
0​
217​
0​
Jan-45​
0​
Feb-43​
57​
0​
292​
0​
Feb-45​
3​
Mar-43​
137​
10​
369​
0​
Mar-45​
4​
Apr-43​
268​
20​
484​
0​
Apr-45​
9​
May-43​
418​
42​
623​
20​
May-45​
27​
Jun-43​
598​
70​
792​
45​
Jun-45​
75​
Jul-43​
808​
90​
988​
94​
Jul-45​
131​
Aug-43​
1058​
110​
1194​
140​
Aug-45​
151​
Sep-43​
1353​
130​
1465​
175​
Sep-45​
163​
Oct-43​
1698​
160​
1750​
215​
Oct-45​
178​
Nov-43​
2098​
180​
2086​
269​
Nov-45​
189​
Dec-43​
2556​
200​
2471​
325​
Dec-45​
208​
 
The first F8F Bearcat squadron, VF-19, part of CAG-19 was transported from California to Hawaii in Aug 1945 to complete its training. It was destined for the USS Hornet CV-12. That ship however did not complete its repairs / refit at the Hunter's Point yard in San Francisco (damage caused by typhoon in June 1945), until 13 Sept 1945 after which she was diverted to Magic Carpet operations. However some sources say CAG-19 deployed on her for a short cruise Oct/Nov 1945.

So most likely, in the event of WW2 continuing, the F8F would have made its combat debut in operations in Oct 1945 as part of the lead up to Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu.

The next F8F squadrons were VF-18 & VBF-18 which were working up in California when the war ended. They do not appear to have been allocated to an operational carrier at that point.They went aboard the training carrier CV-4 Ranger at the end of Sept 1945 and were flown off to NAS New Orleans on 15 Oct.
 
Dana Bell's two books on the F4U-1 detail most, if not all, of the modifications made to the type on the production line during its production by Vought, Brewster & Goodyear including tying them down to individual construction numbers.


As for the wing spoiler, he noted its introduction on the production lines as follows.
Vought - c/n 943 BuNo 17640
Brewster - c/n 20 BuNo 04534
Goodyear - c/n 201 BuNo 13192

Unfortunately Dana hasn't posted on this site since a "falling out" in Dec 2022.

In the introduction to the first Vol he noted

"....While the project began exploring the few areas where earlier books disagreed, recently opened files at the National Archives offered the chance for completely new research. Dozens of boxes of correspondence, reports and photos led to a understanding of the Corsair. ...."

One modification he does attribute to the British was the addition of scoops on the side of the fuselage on aircraft destined for Britain, to eliminate the risk of carbon-monoxide build up in the cockpit. "The vents were introduced in Brewster production, installed on all Goodyear Mark IVs and retrofitted by Britain to earlier aircraft." Brewster was responsible for developing the "clipped" wingtips to allow a folded Corsair to fit British carrier hangars.
 
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The tests conducted by the USN were of the two aircraft flying side by side.
According to the pilot manuals, the Wildcat should easily dive away from the Zero.

The original designer, Jiro Horikoshi, never claimed it was a good-diving airplane.
I seriously doubt the US anything saw the Corsair as an excellent carrier fighter. They were not in Service until 2 Feb 1943 on Guadalcanal.

They didn't see actual combat until Sep 1943, and weren't carrier-approved until early 1944.
 

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