The Myth of the British "Fixing" The Corsair (2 Viewers)

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The tests conducted by the USN were of the two aircraft flying side by side.
According to the pilot manuals, the Wildcat should easily dive away from the Zero.

The original designer, Jiro Horikoshi, never claimed it was a good-diving airplane.
Great point that's often over-looked..

In early 1943 the US Navy considered both the F4U and F6F to be excellent carrier-based fighters but during this period the US Marines desperately needed newer fighters in the Solomon Islands to replace their worn-out F4Fs. With Grumman ceasing production of the F4F in favor of newer more advanced F6F, the ready available F4U seemed like the best candidate as the Wildcat's replacement within US Marine air units.

The F6F was just becoming operational with the US Navy during this time. With it's more docile handling characteristics it was thought that carrier pilots could be commissioned at an even faster rate so the US Navy decided to continue equipping US Marine air units with the F4U and made the F6F the standard shipboard fighter.

This makes perfect sense, as the supply chain was already fully established for the F4U so why change anything when you have Grumman solely concentrated on F6F production to fill the need for future shipboard fighters? It was the simplest answer which allowed for both requirements to be met in the shortest logistical time-frame possible.
I seriously doubt the US anything saw the Corsair as an excellent carrier fighter. They were not in Service until 2 Feb 1943 on Guadalcanal.

They didn't see actual combat until Sep 1943, and weren't carrier-approved until early 1944.
 
According to the pilot manuals, the Wildcat should easily dive away from the Zero.
I gave you a link to the flight test report, which says otherwise.

We also have to remember that Zeros were often used on long range missions, where they couldn't afford to pursue diving F4F-4s. This was certainly the case during Rabaul-> Guadalcanal Zero missions.
 
I seriously doubt the US anything saw the Corsair as an excellent carrier fighter. They were not in Service until 2 Feb 1943 on Guadalcanal.

They didn't see actual combat until Sep 1943, and weren't carrier-approved until early 1944.
???

12 F4U-1 of VMF-124 flew into Guadalcanal on 12 Feb 1943, and flew their first combat sortie that afternoon, cover for a rescue mission. Next day it was an escort mission to take PB4Y-1 to Bougainville. Their first claims, and losses, were on the 14th Feb. That squadron was in theatre for the next 6 months, being joined over that time by about 7 more IIRC.

VF-17 was equipped with F4U-1 and worked up on the new carrier Bunker Hill, first going aboard on 28 June 1943. When the carrier reached San Diego in Sept, VF-17 was replaced aboard by a Hellcat squadron to simplify Pacific Fleet logistics. VF-17 was then sent to the South Pacific.

When US carriers hit Rabaul on 11th Nov 1943, aircraft from VF-17, by then shore based in the Solomons, were used to provide additional fighter cover. These were refuelled and rearmed that day on the Bunker Hill, although that was very much a one off operation.
 
The USN had to make a decision.

Do they operate both types aboard a carrier, which would have meant reduced supply per type or pick a single type for dedicated air groups?

They decided the latter and they chose the F6F for several reasons. One of which, was it's ability for F4F pilots to quickly transition. Another reason, was that it was more docile than the F4U.

The Corsair was given to USMC air elements, mainly operating from land bases and thus, had it's own dedicated logistics chain, which allowed the Carrier groups to focus on a single type for their logistics.
 
The USN had to make a decision.

Do they operate both types aboard a carrier, which would have meant reduced supply per type or pick a single type for dedicated air groups?

They decided the latter and they chose the F6F for several reasons. One of which, was it's ability for F4F pilots to quickly transition. Another reason, was that it was more docile than the F4U.

The Corsair was given to USMC air elements, mainly operating from land bases and thus, had it's own dedicated logistics chain, which allowed the Carrier groups to focus on a single type for their logistics.
That is a good summation and is part of the carrier problem story as well. I have read several accounts over time that the Corsair had to be land
based because it wasn't working out well on carriers. More likely that the explanation above led to this assumption as the F4U was a good aircraft
and another use was found for it.

The myth/non-myth argument stems from both the FAA and USN finding their own way of 'fixing' F4U problems around the same time. Thus we get
some people saying we did it and others saying no, we already did. Probably a case of they both did under their own trial and solve conditions.
 
Those disregarding the value of sharp stall strips as a retrofit are showing a lack of knowledge. I can attest from experience that they are quite effective, and rescued many designs from dangerous vices, especially those conceived in the middle of the last century. Range of speeds from stall to cruise kept stretching, and aero science was slow to catch up.

Not only stall strips but vane and wedge turbulators, flow fences, gurney flaps, fillets, and wingtip or stab dihedral saved many planes from expensive and perhaps economically fatal redesigns. Great examples are the Jodels, early Lear jets, Cessna Caravan, MiG-15 and the F-4 ... which by the last S model was a flying package of aerodynamic kluges.

You'll still find those aero tack on tricks on some of the early models of current jet fighters.

Check out some of the tricked up light planes used in the short take off/landing contests so popular with Canadian/Alaskan bush pilots. They utilize EVERY wizard tweak imaginable and are flying science projects.

My personal eye opening came when asked to make initial flights of a completely rebuilt Culver. All went well until I engaged in some mild aerobatics, a common practice of mine, mainly to see if I could shake loose hardware or tools left inside. I pulled out of slow roll into a turn, ready for it to stall toward the inside wing, and was shocked when it snapped the opposite direction, entering a 2-3 turn spin before I could recover. Whew!

My first thought was misrigging, and I called a friend with Culver experience. He related they had that issue with the first models built, but it should have been fixed with the leading-edge angle stall strip on the inner wing. I checked, and the rebuilder had removed it ... they thought it was ugly!

While I did fly a CAF FG Corsair briefly in the '60s, I don't recall the stall strip, but was highly impressed by how responsive it was, especially in roll, in both directions. The P-51s I flew often were sluggish by comparison ... not bad, but not as sporty, and more of a difference between roll directions.
 
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USN testing of a captured Zero showed that it was superior in every aspect to the F4F-4 except level speed at sea level and high speed rolls.
Every aspect of maneuverability. It was acknowledged by our fighter pilots that a Wildcat should not engage a Zero in a one-on-one dogfight. Instead, Wildcat pilots learned how (and then taught others how) to use the Wildcat's strengths to beat the Zero.
A Wildcat had more hitting power than a Zero (and a Wildcat could take more punishment than a Zero). A Zero would disintegrate from one solid burst, while a Wildcat had to be hit again and again before falling.
A Wildcat had superior dive speed. It could bounce a Zero, fill it full of holes (or worse) and then keep going and get away.
Wildcat pilots developed better teamwork, leading to the expression "One Wildcat is no match for a Zero, but two Wildcats can take on four Zeroes." (Read up on the Thach Weave.)
Speaking of teamwork, Wildcats had working radios; Zeroes generally did not. So a Wildcat team leader could give verbal instructions to the rest of the team, while a Zero team leader could only point, or waggle his wings.
This is why Wildcats actually had more victories than defeats against Zeroes by late 1942. Not by as large a margin as the Hellcat would enjoy later on, but the ratio was still positive. A flight of Wildcats flown by trained, skilled pilots was quite capable of defeating a flight of Zeroes.
 
Though frequently mentioned, what exactly is "sea level"? A Wildcat diving away from a Zero at sea level seems counter productive. So, is sea level a statistical starting point (that no one actually routinely operated at) or an altitude range?
 
Though frequently mentioned, what exactly is "sea level"? A Wildcat diving away from a Zero at sea level seems counter productive. So, is sea level a statistical starting point (that no one actually routinely operated at) or an altitude range?
It probably has an exact definition in terms of air temperature and pressure, but I've always understood it just to mean within a couple of hundred feet of the water. I.e. not twenty or five or even one thousand feet up. Differences of a hundred or two hundred feet in altitude aren't significant in terms of air density, which at higher values--that is, lower altitudes--creates greater resistance to forward motion, but also supplies more oxygen to an (unboosted) carburetor.

[Edit: I found the definition. "Sea level" is considered to be when the air temperature is 59° F and pressure is 29.92 inches of mercury]
 
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I have a friend, now in his mid-90s, who was in the U.S. Marines and who flew F4U Corsairs in the immediate post-war period. Being interested in the subject of deck landings on an aircraft carrier, I asked him recently about the problems of landing the Corsair on deck. He simply replied: "Problems? There were no problems landing the F4U on a Carrier. You just had to get it right."
 

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