Bearing in mind and in full disclosure, of course, that I am a dyed in the wool F4F booster (wouldn't be here without it) between the A6M2 and the F4F, truth be told, they were probably pretty close to equal with the positive qualities of one canceled out by the positive qualities of the other. Analysis of actions in the first year of the war suggests that F4Fs and A6M2s fought to a standstill with perhaps maybe one more F4F than A6M2 being lost in air to air combat. One can talk all day about the nuts and bolts of speed, wing loading, and what not, but the proof is in the actual air combat arena.
The F4F was marginally slower than the A6M2 at their top ends, but the F4F remained maneuverable at top speed while the A6M2 suffered from frozen ailerons and an inability to roll to the right and an engine cutoff problem under conditions of negative G. These interesting phenomena was noticed in the evaluation of the A6M2 recovered from the Aleutians and was quickly communicated to the VF/VMF squadrons. Two separate, unrelated, Allied evaluations, one in California and the other in China noted these deficiencies.
LCDR Eddie Sanders, XO of Flight Test at NAS Anacostia, was sent to NAS San Diego where he was first to fly the rebuilt A6M2 captured in the Aleutians noting the float type carburetor and specifically in his report of 29 September 1942, "Engine quits on push-overs." Sanders also reported, "Ailerons get very stiff at higher speeds making fast rolls at high speed (above 250 knots) physically impossible. At 200 knots the rate of roll (with ailerons) is slightly slower than an F4F. At lower speeds the Zero probably has an increasing advantage in any rolling maneuvers since it is highly maneuverable."
In China with the 23rd Fighter Group, LTC Bruce Holloway, CO of the 23rd, noted in his flight evaluation of 6 February 1943 with regards to an A6M2 recovered near Teitsan on the
southeastern coast of Luichow Peninsula: ". . . at 300 m.p.h. requires a great deal of force on the controls for even a gentle turn. At these speeds the airplane is very stable, and especially so about the longitudinal axis. It has no tendency to roll in a dive, at 300 m.p.h. it is practically impossible to make it roll," "At speeds above 200 m.p.h. indicated, it is believed impossible to exert enough pressure on the elevators to cause the airplane to stall. This was not actually tried, however, for fear of a structural failure," and "the engine will not run under any conditions of negative acceleration, inverted or in a steep skid. A Zero is unable to follow any airplane which does a sharp pushover unless it rolls and it cannot roll at high speed." Holloway also noted the view over the nose problem, "Visibility is very poor directly ahead and down."
The lessons here were clear. The A6M2 was extremely dangerous in a mid to low speed, turn and burn, type gunfight. The F4F drivers knew that speed was life and, with the USN pilots, almost from the initial encounter at Coral Sea declined to play that game. The USMC F4F pilots only needed a couple of lessons to adopt the same attitude. After the analysis of the captured A6M2 was completed, the word quickly went forth, keep your speed up and do not dogfight with a Zero.
The F4Fs ruggedness was almost legendary. It could, and did, absorb damage that a fraction of which would leave an A6M2 spiraling off in flames. This same ability made the beam defense developed by Jimmie Thach a viable tactic that presented a difficult nut for the A6M2 drivers to crack.
Part of that equation comes from tactics and tactical formations generally. The USN/USMC squadrons operated in two plane sections and four plane divisions. Sections could be internally supportive one with one and externally supportive in divisions, two with two. The Japanese, on the other hand were saddled with the three-plane section, nine-plane division, a practice that looks nice in air shows and was more suitable for WWI type tactics. The 3-9 set up, indeed, evolved during WWI as it provides a better lookout doctrine in the biplane world. The 2-4 set up takes advantage of the monoplane construction with no overhead and forward wing to block the view. While one might think that the greater numbers would work to the Japanese advantage, in practice it was hard to maintain section cohesiveness. Oft times the third man in a section turned out to be the odd man out and it was he who was sure to get burned in an approach on weaving F4Fs. The USN/USMC fighter pilots were already experimenting with, and some squadrons had firmly established, the 2-4 formations before they ever got into the war. The Japanese maintained their 3-9 formations into 1944.
There are other things to consider. The favorite attack from the Japanese was the aft overhead run. The F4F types, having some experience from their per-war training, were well acquainted with the defense for this problem. The defense was the logical extension of their own attack training in deflection gunnery. So, when an attacker starts his run, the F4F driver throws it over to offer only a full deflection shot . . . a tough shot to make without considerable practice, and especially in an A6M2. The position of the cockpit relative to the nose of the A6M2 forced the A6M2 driver, in a full deflection situation (see Holloway's comment), to drop the nose in order to get a sight picture and then raise it in order to fire at a location in space where he expects the F4F to be when the bullets get there. An alert F4F pilot, finding himself on his own with an A6M2 boring in on him and setting up the full deflection problem as his first move, can spot this action. As the nose goes up, the A6M2 guy momentarily loses sight of the F4F, and the F4F breaks off in another direction (preferably down and to the right . . . remember the A6M2 problem with rolling right), leaving the A6M2 firing at nothing. In a defensive weave situation, it gets even worse for the A6M2 guy as the raising of the A6M2 nose to take a full deflection shot at one quarry leaves it completely vulnerable for an underside head-on (and near zero deflection) shot from the F4F approaching from the opposite tact if in a Thach Weave situation. The F4F did not suffer from this design problem. The nose of the plane sloped gently down from the pilot's position in the cockpit, allowing full time observation of an opponent in a full deflection situation.
Armament is another issue. The F4F-3 carried four 50-caliber guns. This seemed to work as advertised at Coral Sea for VF-2 and VF-42. For the most part it was also enough to at least ensure survival for the few USMC F4F-3's at Midway. The F4F-4 was "improved" with folding wings (squadrons went from 18 -3's to 28 -4's) and a battery of six 50-caliber guns. Unfortunately, there was no improvement in the engine, so the added weight of the folding mechanisms and the two extra guns presented a problem. Additionally, the two additional guns resulted in less ammunition per gun, hence less firing time. Some pilots felt quite strongly that the change to six guns did not help the situation. Jimmie Thach remarked that if a pilot was not going to hit with four guns, he certainly was not going to hit with six. So, the F4F-4's performance was nominally degraded by these changes, with losses in the speed and climbing ability arenas. The A6M2 carried two 7.7 machine-guns firing synchronized through the propeller arc and a 20 mm cannon in each wing. Ammunition for the 20 mm was limited to about, without looking it up, 80 rounds per gun. The standard practice was for the A6M2 pilot to cut loose with his 7.7's for ranging (the 20 mm was somewhat short ranged) and then let go with the 20 mm's when on target. This pitter-patter of 7.7 could be another warning for an, up to that point, unwary F4F guy to get out of Dodge. The twin 7.7 was a typical 1930s, WWI rifle ammunition holdover. Against a plane armored such as the F4F they were relatively worthless.
So . . .
Speed - A6M2 is better, but it was not necessarily an advantage due to the maneuverability and engine cutoff problems. The F4F could out-dive an A6M2 any day and at top speed was more than more maneuverable. Offsetting advantages and disadvantages. 0 points.
Armament - F4F was better with the battery of six 50 cals outweighing the MG and cannon arrangement of the A6M2 in terms of range and impact. With only four 50 cals in the F4F-3 and the later FM series the weight was about equal, but "Ma-Deuce" was a much better gun. F4F, 1 point
Armor protection - F4F hands down … A6M2? What armor? F4F, 1 point.
Maneuverability – Goes to the A6M2, especially at low to mid speeds. Advantage goes away at top end speeds. The F4F was generally a better, more stable, firing platform as well; the A6M2, much more sensitive to control pressures, sometimes had a tendency to skid in firing situations (this tidbit from a USN F4F type ace who had the opportunity to fly B/N 4593, the famous Koga Zero, on several occasions in the fall of 1944). A6M2, 0.5 points
Climb - goes to the A6M2. F4F was not even in the park. A6M2, 1 point
Range – A6M2, but this led them into arrangements of long distance missions with minimal combat time and a long haul back, possibly with damage, such as in the Guadalcanal campaign, with little or no hope of air-sea rescue. The greater range was really only an advantage in terms ferrying from outpost to outpost or of loiter time in a CAP situation. Historically, the A6M2's range created more problems than it solved when it came to encounters with F4F's. 0 points.
Score (on my unofficial scale): F4F - 2; A6M2 - 1.5
My pick, in terms of survivability, which, of course is the bottom line, is the F4F. You can't fly combat if hits from a good solid burst tend to cause your plane to explode.
Regards,
