The real combat history of the Ki-43

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I think we tend to give way too much credit, good or bad, to the aircraft, and ignore the human element, the pilot.
 
One of the problems with the Ki-43 was that it stagnated as far as armament went.
Weight of fire is simplistic but it does provide a base.

K-43 with two 12.7mm guns, 1.012kg per second. (unsynchronized) from most of 1942 to Aug 1945.
US fighter with four .50 cal guns, 2.236kg/sec
Soviet fighter with one 12.7 and one 20mm, 1.872kg/sec
Soviet fighter with two 12.7 and one 20mm, 2.496kg/sec
109 with two 13mm and one 20mm, 2.397kg/sec
109 with two 13mm and one 30mm 4,455kg/sec.
A6M2 with two 7.7mm and 20 20mm, 2.555kg/sec.
A6M5B with one 7.7mm one 13.2mm and two 20mm guns. 2.877kg/sec.
British fighter eight .303(7.7) 1.688kg/sec.
JAAF fighter with four 12.7mm guns 2.024 kg/sec.

This is just the weight of metal coming out of the guns, no allowances for veleocity or times of flight or other "stuff"

Ki-43 engines went from
year.....................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941....................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942...........1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m
1944.....................1190hp.........................1230/2800m.....................950hp/6800m

Now compare to the 109 engines through the years.
Or consider building a plane in 1944 that would just barely beat a 1940 Spitfire MK II and have only 2/3rds the firepower.

Yes the Ki-43 could inflect loses on the allies. But the goal is inflict more losses than the Japanese sustained and that was getting harder for the Ki-43 to do in 1944.
Devoting 1900kg of airplane (empty) to get two low powered 12.7mm guns and 500 bullets into the sky was a poor return on investment.
 

That is arguably true, though of course it is debatable (and debated ad infinitum) how competitive Bf 109 was against a P-51D or Spitfire XIV, or a range of other Allied fighters, depending on the altitude, from Tempest to later model P-47, P-38, and even, dare I say it, the Yak 3. At higher altitude (again, arguably) the two-stage or turbo-supercharged engines had an advantage, and at lower altitude some specific low altitude types, (including the LF Spitfires, the Tempest and the Yak 3) seem to have maybe had an advantage.

But I concede it's true that in good hands a late model Bf 109 could still give any of those planes a run for their money. And it's also true that the Ki-43 was already having trouble with P-51B and Spit VIII in late 1943, though it seemed to still be somewhat competitive into early 1945.

And yet, WW2 fighter combat isn't a Grand Prix race, and it isn't what some of us (myself included, admittedly) have experienced in online flight sim games.

The Bf 109, I would argue, was somewhat hamstrung by a Strategic limitation, namely it's range. The small size that kept it competitive in speed and climb also meant it didn't carry much fuel. The lack of a long ranged fighter was already becoming a problem for the Luftwaffe in 1942. And I agree with you, the Bf 109F-4 was probably the peak variant.

Ki-43 proved extremely versatile, much more than I had realized before I got into this operational history, proving capable of escort, interception and destruction of heavy bombers, night fighting, effective fighter-bomber work, and more... and it did have the range. I would say that evened things out a bit. The Bf 109 definitely remained much more competitive as an interceptor and (at least in the East) frontal aviation fighter by 1944-45, but the Ki-43 could take on a wider variety of roles throughout the war, including escorting bombers to fairly long distances. And this enabled the JAAF to for example bomb British airbases and so on, long after the Luftwaffe was losing this kind of operational capability, at least in the Mediterranean and Western areas.
 
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I think we tend to give way too much credit, good or bad, to the aircraft, and ignore the human element, the pilot.

Obviously the pilot is a major part of the equation, but if the pilot (including training, personality, individual skill) was the only, or even predominantly significant factor, they probably would not have put all the effort into updating aircraft designs and creating new aircraft designs throughout the war.

Some people here apparently believe, or claim to believe, that you can't discern anything about the capabilities of an aircraft based on operational histories. But in fact, you definitely can, and you can see individual units which transitioned to improved fighter types, and a dramatic change in combat outcomes. Bf 109E to F is one of those. P-40E to K or F is another. Spitfire V to VIII or IX. P-51A to B or C etc. Hurricane II to Spitfire V, F4F to F4U or F6F. P-40 or (especially) P-39 to P-38. And most pertinent to this thread, Ki-43-I to Ki-43-II. Same units, same pilots, very different outcomes.

On the flipside, you do also see some pilots who excelled in somewhat obsolescent aircraft types, such as some of these A6M and Ki-43 aces later in the war, Wildcat aces, Hurricane aces during the BoB, French Hawk 75 aces during the Battle of France, or guys like Geoff Fisken who scored many victories in Brewster F2A's (under very difficult circumstances) before transitioning to more modern types. Half the pilots in the Finnish air force. And the same in Russia with pilots that became aces on I-153s or I-16s before transitioning to P-39s, La 5s or Yaks.

I think with aircraft types, there is usually a range where capabilities overlap enough, especially where the obsolescent type has some advantages to work with, that an experienced pilot who knows his aircraft, and even less experienced pilots who are well trained to exploit these advantages, could prevail even against a more capable type. This is basically the history of the Ki-43, P-40, A6M, Wildcat etc. from 1943 onward. But eventually, it's also true that some types just fall behind so much that it becomes too difficult to keep up when faced with much more capable enemy planes (and relatively well trained pilots).

The tricky part is defining what makes a plane more capable, or gives a somewhat obsolescent type enough of a lingering advantage to stay competitive. I think our shorthand that speed and firepower are the only things that really mattered in the long run, is reductive and simplistic.
 
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I do love the Hayabusa though, its such a trim, elegant machine.
I just wish they would have incorporated a retractable tail wheel, it almost ruins the clean lines

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My interest in taking a closer look at the Hayabusa was actually sparked by the combination of some photos of this exact warbird / aircraft, along with some stats claiming that Ki-43 was the highest scoring Japanese fighter.
 

All that is true but, for example, let's look at the Hurricane IIB with twelve .303 guns (2.532 kg / second, or 2.5 times the firepower of the most heavily armed Ki-43), or the IIC with four 20mm Hispano cannons (I don't know what the weight of fire that one works out to be, but it's a lot). I would also note that the Ki-43 had serious problems with their HMG for at least a year after they were introduced, which is why many of them were still flying with just a pair of 7.7mm machine guns as late as 1943 in some cases.

And yet how did the Hurricane II, either version, hold up to the Hayabusa?

I think there is a problem in general with the "logistics based approach" to evaluating WW2 combat aircraft. I think this got us into a lot of trouble in the Vietnam era. We were very impressed by the weight in ordinance that we were 'moving' into enemy target areas. But what were we really accomplishing?

Whether it's guns on a fighter, or bombs on a bomber, weight of the ordinance coming out matters, but precision or accuracy matters considerably more, I would argue (depending on the target type).

The Hayabusa proved surprisingly (to me) capable of shooting down US heavy bombers, and various US and RAF medium and light bombers. Arguably better than the much more heavily armed A6M.

Once in an earlier thread you compared the Ki-43 to the MC.200 on this basis. This was actually also one of my inspirations to take a closer look at the Ki-43 operational history, as I already knew that for the MC.200 (and the somewhat similar and identically armed, Fiat G.50).

I believe at this point I can categorically say that the Ki-43 had a far more devastating impact, plane for plane, squadron for squadron, than the MC.200 did, even though on paper they look pretty similar in terms of performance and armament.

With the Ki-43, precision and the phenomenal agility, (and good dive performance and handling) as well as a surprisingly robust airframe, made it very deadly in spite of the light firepower.

Now that said, I suspect they probably could have gotten 20mm cannon into the nose of those Ki-43s much earlier, without a heavy deterioration in performance, and that might have improved their effectiveness.


I definitely agree, the Japanese were suffering from relatively weak engines. It's comparable to the problem with the F4F. But, like the F4F, it did surprisingly well in spite of it.


It was certainly getting harder by late 1944. But it was still much more of a threat even through that year than I think most people realize, especially considering that their pilot quality was falling off by then due to lags in training new pilots.
 
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The Hayabusa capability for shooting down heavy bombers, often B-24s depended on several things. One was the discipline/team work of the the Japanese pilots. A small group of planes would attack the same B-24 and try to make repeated passes on the same plane in the formation in order to inflict fatal damage. Perhaps a large number of Ki-43s (8-12?) would pick on 2-3 B-24s? The Japanese had learned early to attack from the front where the early B-24s did not have power turret. They could also maximize the damage to the Cockpit.
The Early B-24 clashes were often over Rangoon which meant hundreds of miles over water with damaged aircraft. The Early B-24 raids were unescorted. Not a surprise with missions of around 700 miles each way (memory, could be easily be wrong). Trying to compare them to European raids or Med maybe misleading?

I will admit that I didn't think that the Ki-43 improved quite as much at it did, however the improvements came late. So we have to separate out the time periods.
and just for accuracy sake
Ki-43 engines went from
year........................................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941.......................................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942............................1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m
MC.200 engine..................870hp (?) .......................840hp/3800m or 950/3000m emergency? single speed supercharger.
Now please note that there were just under 150 MC.200s in service in June of 1940 and it took the Japanese until sometime in the end of of 1941 to build that many Ki-43s.
Also note that while the MC 200 used somewhat slower firing guns (about 3 rps slower) the MC 200 carried about 50% more ammo. The only improved engine the MC 200 got was the DB 601
I definitely agree, the Japanese were suffering from relatively weak engines. It's comparable to the problem with the F4F. But, like the F4F, it did surprisingly well in spite of it.
The engines were weak and/or late. Getting 2 speed engines in late 1942/early 1943 helps but the F4F is no longer the goal. a 1100-1200hp 2 speed engine is not going to cut it in early 1943 against F4Us.

The changing landscape also can affect the Ki-43 vs A6M match ups. A Ki-43 has close to 20 seconds of ammo (16.66 seconds if the guns were not synchronized) An early A6M had about 7 seconds of cannon ammo and then they had to fight with two .303 Vickers guns. weight of fire is abysmal. Later A6M's got about 11-12 seconds of firing time.
Took until the A6M5s for things to improve after that but improve they did while the Ki-43 was stuck in a rut. In 1941/early 1942 the longer firing time of the Ki-43 may have allowed it to do things the A6M could not do, added by the less protected Allied aircraft of the time. By late 1942 most of the allied aircraft had better protection/fuel tanks (Hurricanes may still be suspect).

I just read about an very rare instance of a Hurricane IIC in the dessert. Pilot put shells into 5 different JU-87s, 2 claimed shot down, one probable and 2 damaged. What the other side says but four 20mm Hispano's don't take long to wreck a Ju-87s day if properly aimed. Pilot only had about 9 seconds of firing time.
 

Interesting points as usual, but you do not paint the complete picture.

It's definitely true that B-24 raids into Burma and other Japanese targets along the Pacific Rim were nowhere near the scale of the Strategic Bomber Offensive in Europe. There were no raids the size of Schweinfurt or 'Big Week'.

But you are also underplaying it a bit here. The B-24s raids obviously did not stop nor were they restricted to 1942, they were not limited to a handful of bombers (there were dozens of B-24s in action in several raids in 1943-1945), and (as you can see upthread but I'll go pull up a few more) the JAAF were still shooting down B-24s (both US and British flown Liberators) well into 1944, even when they were well escorted by fighters.

For example on 1 December 1943 a group of 44 x B-24s from 7th and 308th bomb group, plus 490th Sqn B-25s, were escorted by 15 x P-38s from 459 Sqn and 10 x P-51A from 530 sqn (who were lagging a bit and arrived late), on a raid against targets in Burma. They were intercepted by 64th and 204th Sentais flying Ki-43-II, and 21st Sentai flying Ki-45s, totalling about 50 fighters. Quoting directly from Shores here (page 124): "all of them then attacked the 7th Bomb Group formation head-on. In quick succession the US formation leader and his wingman, and a squadron leader were all shot down. Three other pilots pulled up their B-24s to close the gap, but one of these was also shot down. The 308 group was then hit, suffering one loss and one badly damaged. Other damaged bombers were then harried until the P-51As at last arrived." Total losses on this raid were apparently 6 x B-24s shot down, and one P-51A also shot down, with several other bombers heavily damaged. The JAAF lost 2 x K-43s, with four other heavily damaged (one with vertical stabilizer shot off and fuselage 'full of bullet holes', another with so many holes in the wing that a one of the landing gear had deployed and was hanging loose). The experienced 64th Sentai claimed 7 x B-24s and 3 fighters, and seem to have gotten most of the victories. The Ki-45 unit only claimed one bomber and one P-38, and the new to the Theater 204th Sentai (Ki-43) claimed two.

Shores later notes that on three daylight raids between 2-6 December 1943 the USAAF lost 12 x B-24s, 8 x P-51As, and 2 x P-38s. In the same period, the RAF lost 3 x Wellingtons during night raids. Most of these losses were to the Ki-43s.

It's noteworthy that the tactic they used, which I agree was instrumental, of attacking the front / nose of the aircraft, was also the same tactic used by the Luftwaffe pilots, though the Germans were also using much more heavily armed planes, including heavy fighters, and such devices as high caliber guns, rockets, 'mortars', aerial bombs, flak rockets, jets and rocket planes.

It continued to work for the Japanese with their humble Ki-43 and it's two guns though. And I think that is noteworthy. They also proved capable of catching and shooting down zippy Mosquito bombers, notoriously tough Hudsons, (relatively) fast and well armed B-25s, and both Wellingtons and B-24s flying at night.

Not that shooting down B-24s was considered an easy task by the JAAF. They rated it as a dangerous opponent and often took losses, but I think they proved that there was more than one way to skin that proverbial cat. And having learned the hard lesson that B-24s (chin turret or not) required an escort against JAAF fighters, the US and British used them effectively, in spite of the ongoing losses. The B-24s probably did more to destroy the JAAF by wrecking their bases and destroying planes on the ground with bombs, than any US or British fighter did. The same aircraft type also played a nearly identical role in this respect (destroying Axis air bases and aircraft on the ground) in North Africa in 1943.

On the other hand, the B-24s were almost useless in the support of ground units, proving largely ineffective at destroying bridges or Japanese strong points. The Vengeance was probably the standout bomber type for that role, though Beaufighters, B-25s, and fighter bombers did very well in that role in general.


Ki-43 units in China, India, Indochina, Indonesia etc. were still causing significant Allied losses all through 1943 and well into 1944, and even in 1945 as we just saw in the Sumatra raid.


I will agree with that, actually looking at Shores in MAW II and III, you can see from the Axis losses that Hurricanes several times wrought serious havoc on Ju-87s and sometimes on Ju-88s too (when they could catch them, which wasn't always). The Hurricane did seem to be a very effective bomber-destroyer.
 

One thing mentioned by one of the Japanese pilots in the Osprey book is that with the late 1944 vintage Ki-43-III, they could run the engine at full power for 40 minutes, which he said would get him in serious trouble with the ground crew if he did that on the Ki-43-II.

As for the MC 200, I agree the DB 601 version / MC 202 is a much closer matchup to the Ki-43 in terms of operational history.
 

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