The real combat history of the Ki-43 (3 Viewers)

I do love the Hayabusa though, its such a trim, elegant machine.
I just wish they would have incorporated a retractable tail wheel, it almost ruins the clean lines

Wild_Bill_Kelso said:

Well, that may be true, but the Germans needed something else than the Bf 109 by 1944 too, I'd say. And yet the two stories are told very differently.

There is an interesting dynamic with some of these long-lived types, that even while they may have become obsolescent, they remained far from useless (and never a 'safe bet' for Allied pilots). The Ki-43s was not feeble, it turns out, but had quite a sting. It was not flimsy, but was a tough bird that often brought it's pilots home in spite of heavy damage. It was not a one-trick pony, but a very flexible and versatile aircraft. You can see, in the operational history, why so many Japanese pilots continued to prefer it over all the newer types.

And the Hayabusa, in spite of all the aggravation and insults, was worth a closer look. It is a lesson in WW2 aviation, because it shows pretty well that top speed and heavy firepower really aren't everything. We kind of oversimplified this in the postwar narrative, and have done similar crude simplifications again and again in subsequent aviation eras since WW2.

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I think we tend to give way too much credit, good or bad, to the aircraft, and ignore the human element, the pilot.

Clayton Magnet said:

The Bf 109 had the capacity to be upgraded to a point that it remained competitive with the very best of Allied types, within an increasingly narrow envelope. A G-10 or K-4 was still a formidable adversary in 1945, even when flown against a P-51D or Spitfire Mk.XIV.
The Ki-43 was still dangerous in 1945, but it was no longer competitive with the best. The 109 was living on borrowed time by 1945, and should have been replaced, arguably after the F-4 variant, but it still had a 100mph speed advantage over the Ki-43.

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One of the problems with the Ki-43 was that it stagnated as far as armament went.
Weight of fire is simplistic but it does provide a base.

K-43 with two 12.7mm guns, 1.012kg per second. (unsynchronized) from most of 1942 to Aug 1945.
US fighter with four .50 cal guns, 2.236kg/sec
Soviet fighter with one 12.7 and one 20mm, 1.872kg/sec
Soviet fighter with two 12.7 and one 20mm, 2.496kg/sec
109 with two 13mm and one 20mm, 2.397kg/sec
109 with two 13mm and one 30mm 4,455kg/sec.
A6M2 with two 7.7mm and 20 20mm, 2.555kg/sec.
A6M5B with one 7.7mm one 13.2mm and two 20mm guns. 2.877kg/sec.
British fighter eight .303(7.7) 1.688kg/sec.
JAAF fighter with four 12.7mm guns 2.024 kg/sec.

This is just the weight of metal coming out of the guns, no allowances for veleocity or times of flight or other "stuff"

Ki-43 engines went from
year.....................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941....................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942...........1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m
1944.....................1190hp.........................1230/2800m.....................950hp/6800m

Now compare to the 109 engines through the years.
Or consider building a plane in 1944 that would just barely beat a 1940 Spitfire MK II and have only 2/3rds the firepower.

Yes the Ki-43 could inflect loses on the allies. But the goal is inflict more losses than the Japanese sustained and that was getting harder for the Ki-43 to do in 1944.
Devoting 1900kg of airplane (empty) to get two low powered 12.7mm guns and 500 bullets into the sky was a poor return on investment.

Clayton Magnet said:

The Bf 109 had the capacity to be upgraded to a point that it remained competitive with the very best of Allied types, within an increasingly narrow envelope. A G-10 or K-4 was still a formidable adversary in 1945, even when flown against a P-51D or Spitfire Mk.XIV.
The Ki-43 was still dangerous in 1945, but it was no longer competitive with the best. The 109 was living on borrowed time by 1945, and should have been replaced, arguably after the F-4 variant, but it still had a 100mph speed advantage over the Ki-43.

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That is arguably true, though of course it is debatable (and debated ad infinitum) how competitive Bf 109 was against a P-51D or Spitfire XIV, or a range of other Allied fighters, depending on the altitude, from Tempest to later model P-47, P-38, and even, dare I say it, the Yak 3. At higher altitude (again, arguably) the two-stage or turbo-supercharged engines had an advantage, and at lower altitude some specific low altitude types, (including the LF Spitfires, the Tempest and the Yak 3) seem to have maybe had an advantage.

But I concede it's true that in good hands a late model Bf 109 could still give any of those planes a run for their money. And it's also true that the Ki-43 was already having trouble with P-51B and Spit VIII in late 1943, though it seemed to still be somewhat competitive into early 1945.

And yet, WW2 fighter combat isn't a Grand Prix race, and it isn't what some of us (myself included, admittedly) have experienced in online flight sim games.

The Bf 109, I would argue, was somewhat hamstrung by a Strategic limitation, namely it's range. The small size that kept it competitive in speed and climb also meant it didn't carry much fuel. The lack of a long ranged fighter was already becoming a problem for the Luftwaffe in 1942. And I agree with you, the Bf 109F-4 was probably the peak variant.

Ki-43 proved extremely versatile, much more than I had realized before I got into this operational history, proving capable of escort, interception and destruction of heavy bombers, night fighting, effective fighter-bomber work, and more... and it did have the range. I would say that evened things out a bit. The Bf 109 definitely remained much more competitive as an interceptor and (at least in the East) frontal aviation fighter by 1944-45, but the Ki-43 could take on a wider variety of roles throughout the war, including escorting bombers to fairly long distances. And this enabled the JAAF to for example bomb British airbases and so on, long after the Luftwaffe was losing this kind of operational capability, at least in the Mediterranean and Western areas.

tyrodtom said:

I think we tend to give way too much credit, good or bad, to the aircraft, and ignore the human element, the pilot.

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Obviously the pilot is a major part of the equation, but if the pilot (including training, personality, individual skill) was the only, or even predominantly significant factor, they probably would not have put all the effort into updating aircraft designs and creating new aircraft designs throughout the war.

Some people here apparently believe, or claim to believe, that you can't discern anything about the capabilities of an aircraft based on operational histories. But in fact, you definitely can, and you can see individual units which transitioned to improved fighter types, and a dramatic change in combat outcomes. Bf 109E to F is one of those. P-40E to K or F is another. Spitfire V to VIII or IX. P-51A to B or C etc. Hurricane II to Spitfire V, F4F to F4U or F6F. P-40 or (especially) P-39 to P-38. And most pertinent to this thread, Ki-43-I to Ki-43-II. Same units, same pilots, very different outcomes.

On the flipside, you do also see some pilots who excelled in somewhat obsolescent aircraft types, such as some of these A6M and Ki-43 aces later in the war, Wildcat aces, Hurricane aces during the BoB, French Hawk 75 aces during the Battle of France, or guys like Geoff Fisken who scored many victories in Brewster F2A's (under very difficult circumstances) before transitioning to more modern types. Half the pilots in the Finnish air force. And the same in Russia with pilots that became aces on I-153s or I-16s before transitioning to P-39s, La 5s or Yaks.

I think with aircraft types, there is usually a range where capabilities overlap enough, especially where the obsolescent type has some advantages to work with, that an experienced pilot who knows his aircraft, and even less experienced pilots who are well trained to exploit these advantages, could prevail even against a more capable type. This is basically the history of the Ki-43, P-40, A6M, Wildcat etc. from 1943 onward. But eventually, it's also true that some types just fall behind so much that it becomes too difficult to keep up when faced with much more capable enemy planes (and relatively well trained pilots).

The tricky part is defining what makes a plane more capable, or gives a somewhat obsolescent type enough of a lingering advantage to stay competitive. I think our shorthand that speed and firepower are the only things that really mattered in the long run, is reductive and simplistic.

Clayton Magnet said:

I do love the Hayabusa though, its such a trim, elegant machine.
I just wish they would have incorporated a retractable tail wheel, it almost ruins the clean lines

View attachment 769516

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My interest in taking a closer look at the Hayabusa was actually sparked by the combination of some photos of this exact warbird / aircraft, along with some stats claiming that Ki-43 was the highest scoring Japanese fighter.

Shortround6 said:

One of the problems with the Ki-43 was that it stagnated as far as armament went.
Weight of fire is simplistic but it does provide a base.

K-43 with two 12.7mm guns, 1.012kg per second. (unsynchronized) from most of 1942 to Aug 1945.
US fighter with four .50 cal guns, 2.236kg/sec
Soviet fighter with one 12.7 and one 20mm, 1.872kg/sec
Soviet fighter with two 12.7 and one 20mm, 2.496kg/sec
109 with two 13mm and one 20mm, 2.397kg/sec
109 with two 13mm and one 30mm 4,455kg/sec.
A6M2 with two 7.7mm and 20 20mm, 2.555kg/sec.
A6M5B with one 7.7mm one 13.2mm and two 20mm guns. 2.877kg/sec.
British fighter eight .303(7.7) 1.688kg/sec.
JAAF fighter with four 12.7mm guns 2.024 kg/sec.

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All that is true but, for example, let's look at the Hurricane IIB with twelve .303 guns (2.532 kg / second, or 2.5 times the firepower of the most heavily armed Ki-43), or the IIC with four 20mm Hispano cannons (I don't know what the weight of fire that one works out to be, but it's a lot). I would also note that the Ki-43 had serious problems with their HMG for at least a year after they were introduced, which is why many of them were still flying with just a pair of 7.7mm machine guns as late as 1943 in some cases.

And yet how did the Hurricane II, either version, hold up to the Hayabusa?

I think there is a problem in general with the "logistics based approach" to evaluating WW2 combat aircraft. I think this got us into a lot of trouble in the Vietnam era. We were very impressed by the weight in ordinance that we were 'moving' into enemy target areas. But what were we really accomplishing?

Whether it's guns on a fighter, or bombs on a bomber, weight of the ordinance coming out matters, but precision or accuracy matters considerably more, I would argue (depending on the target type).

The Hayabusa proved surprisingly (to me) capable of shooting down US heavy bombers, and various US and RAF medium and light bombers. Arguably better than the much more heavily armed A6M.

Once in an earlier thread you compared the Ki-43 to the MC.200 on this basis. This was actually also one of my inspirations to take a closer look at the Ki-43 operational history, as I already knew that for the MC.200 (and the somewhat similar and identically armed, Fiat G.50).

I believe at this point I can categorically say that the Ki-43 had a far more devastating impact, plane for plane, squadron for squadron, than the MC.200 did, even though on paper they look pretty similar in terms of performance and armament.

With the Ki-43, precision and the phenomenal agility, (and good dive performance and handling) as well as a surprisingly robust airframe, made it very deadly in spite of the light firepower.

Now that said, I suspect they probably could have gotten 20mm cannon into the nose of those Ki-43s much earlier, without a heavy deterioration in performance, and that might have improved their effectiveness.

Shortround6 said:

This is just the weight of metal coming out of the guns, no allowances for velocity or times of flight or other "stuff"

Ki-43 engines went from
year.....................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941....................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942...........1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m
1944.....................1190hp.........................1230/2800m.....................950hp/6800m

Now compare to the 109 engines through the years.
Or consider building a plane in 1944 that would just barely beat a 1940 Spitfire MK II and have only 2/3rds the firepower.

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I definitely agree, the Japanese were suffering from relatively weak engines. It's comparable to the problem with the F4F. But, like the F4F, it did surprisingly well in spite of it.

Shortround6 said:

Yes the Ki-43 could inflect loses on the allies. But the goal is inflict more losses than the Japanese sustained and that was getting harder for the Ki-43 to do in 1944.
Devoting 1900kg of airplane (empty) to get two low powered 12.7mm guns and 500 bullets into the sky was a poor return on investment.

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It was certainly getting harder by late 1944. But it was still much more of a threat even through that year than I think most people realize, especially considering that their pilot quality was falling off by then due to lags in training new pilots.

Wild_Bill_Kelso said:

The Hayabusa proved surprisingly (to me) capable of shooting down US heavy bombers, and various US and RAF medium and light bombers. Arguably better than the much more heavily armed A6M.

Once in an earlier thread you compared the Ki-43 to the MC.200 on this basis. This was actually also one of my inspirations to take a closer look at the Ki-43 operational history, as I already knew that for the MC.200 (and the somewhat similar and identically armed, Fiat G.50).

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The Hayabusa capability for shooting down heavy bombers, often B-24s depended on several things. One was the discipline/team work of the the Japanese pilots. A small group of planes would attack the same B-24 and try to make repeated passes on the same plane in the formation in order to inflict fatal damage. Perhaps a large number of Ki-43s (8-12?) would pick on 2-3 B-24s? The Japanese had learned early to attack from the front where the early B-24s did not have power turret. They could also maximize the damage to the Cockpit.
The Early B-24 clashes were often over Rangoon which meant hundreds of miles over water with damaged aircraft. The Early B-24 raids were unescorted. Not a surprise with missions of around 700 miles each way (memory, could be easily be wrong). Trying to compare them to European raids or Med maybe misleading?

I will admit that I didn't think that the Ki-43 improved quite as much at it did, however the improvements came late. So we have to separate out the time periods.
and just for accuracy sake
Ki-43 engines went from
year........................................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941.......................................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942............................1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m
MC.200 engine..................870hp (?) .......................840hp/3800m or 950/3000m emergency? single speed supercharger.
Now please note that there were just under 150 MC.200s in service in June of 1940 and it took the Japanese until sometime in the end of of 1941 to build that many Ki-43s.
Also note that while the MC 200 used somewhat slower firing guns (about 3 rps slower) the MC 200 carried about 50% more ammo. The only improved engine the MC 200 got was the DB 601

Wild_Bill_Kelso said:

I definitely agree, the Japanese were suffering from relatively weak engines. It's comparable to the problem with the F4F. But, like the F4F, it did surprisingly well in spite of it.

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The engines were weak and/or late. Getting 2 speed engines in late 1942/early 1943 helps but the F4F is no longer the goal. a 1100-1200hp 2 speed engine is not going to cut it in early 1943 against F4Us.

The changing landscape also can affect the Ki-43 vs A6M match ups. A Ki-43 has close to 20 seconds of ammo (16.66 seconds if the guns were not synchronized) An early A6M had about 7 seconds of cannon ammo and then they had to fight with two .303 Vickers guns. weight of fire is abysmal. Later A6M's got about 11-12 seconds of firing time.
Took until the A6M5s for things to improve after that but improve they did while the Ki-43 was stuck in a rut. In 1941/early 1942 the longer firing time of the Ki-43 may have allowed it to do things the A6M could not do, added by the less protected Allied aircraft of the time. By late 1942 most of the allied aircraft had better protection/fuel tanks (Hurricanes may still be suspect).

I just read about an very rare instance of a Hurricane IIC in the dessert. Pilot put shells into 5 different JU-87s, 2 claimed shot down, one probable and 2 damaged. What the other side says but four 20mm Hispano's don't take long to wreck a Ju-87s day if properly aimed. Pilot only had about 9 seconds of firing time.

Shortround6 said:

The Hayabusa capability for shooting down heavy bombers, often B-24s depended on several things. One was the discipline/team work of the the Japanese pilots. A small group of planes would attack the same B-24 and try to make repeated passes on the same plane in the formation in order to inflict fatal damage. Perhaps a large number of Ki-43s (8-12?) would pick on 2-3 B-24s? The Japanese had learned early to attack from the front where the early B-24s did not have power turret. They could also maximize the damage to the Cockpit.
The Early B-24 clashes were often over Rangoon which meant hundreds of miles over water with damaged aircraft. The Early B-24 raids were unescorted. Not a surprise with missions of around 700 miles each way (memory, could be easily be wrong). Trying to compare them to European raids or Med maybe misleading?

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Interesting points as usual, but you do not paint the complete picture.

It's definitely true that B-24 raids into Burma and other Japanese targets along the Pacific Rim were nowhere near the scale of the Strategic Bomber Offensive in Europe. There were no raids the size of Schweinfurt or 'Big Week'.

But you are also underplaying it a bit here. The B-24s raids obviously did not stop nor were they restricted to 1942, they were not limited to a handful of bombers (there were dozens of B-24s in action in several raids in 1943-1945), and (as you can see upthread but I'll go pull up a few more) the JAAF were still shooting down B-24s (both US and British flown Liberators) well into 1944, even when they were well escorted by fighters.

For example on 1 December 1943 a group of 44 x B-24s from 7th and 308th bomb group, plus 490th Sqn B-25s, were escorted by 15 x P-38s from 459 Sqn and 10 x P-51A from 530 sqn (who were lagging a bit and arrived late), on a raid against targets in Burma. They were intercepted by 64th and 204th Sentais flying Ki-43-II, and 21st Sentai flying Ki-45s, totalling about 50 fighters. Quoting directly from Shores here (page 124): "all of them then attacked the 7th Bomb Group formation head-on. In quick succession the US formation leader and his wingman, and a squadron leader were all shot down. Three other pilots pulled up their B-24s to close the gap, but one of these was also shot down. The 308 group was then hit, suffering one loss and one badly damaged. Other damaged bombers were then harried until the P-51As at last arrived." Total losses on this raid were apparently 6 x B-24s shot down, and one P-51A also shot down, with several other bombers heavily damaged. The JAAF lost 2 x K-43s, with four other heavily damaged (one with vertical stabilizer shot off and fuselage 'full of bullet holes', another with so many holes in the wing that a one of the landing gear had deployed and was hanging loose). The experienced 64th Sentai claimed 7 x B-24s and 3 fighters, and seem to have gotten most of the victories. The Ki-45 unit only claimed one bomber and one P-38, and the new to the Theater 204th Sentai (Ki-43) claimed two.

Shores later notes that on three daylight raids between 2-6 December 1943 the USAAF lost 12 x B-24s, 8 x P-51As, and 2 x P-38s. In the same period, the RAF lost 3 x Wellingtons during night raids. Most of these losses were to the Ki-43s.

It's noteworthy that the tactic they used, which I agree was instrumental, of attacking the front / nose of the aircraft, was also the same tactic used by the Luftwaffe pilots, though the Germans were also using much more heavily armed planes, including heavy fighters, and such devices as high caliber guns, rockets, 'mortars', aerial bombs, flak rockets, jets and rocket planes.

It continued to work for the Japanese with their humble Ki-43 and it's two guns though. And I think that is noteworthy. They also proved capable of catching and shooting down zippy Mosquito bombers, notoriously tough Hudsons, (relatively) fast and well armed B-25s, and both Wellingtons and B-24s flying at night.

Not that shooting down B-24s was considered an easy task by the JAAF. They rated it as a dangerous opponent and often took losses, but I think they proved that there was more than one way to skin that proverbial cat. And having learned the hard lesson that B-24s (chin turret or not) required an escort against JAAF fighters, the US and British used them effectively, in spite of the ongoing losses. The B-24s probably did more to destroy the JAAF by wrecking their bases and destroying planes on the ground with bombs, than any US or British fighter did. The same aircraft type also played a nearly identical role in this respect (destroying Axis air bases and aircraft on the ground) in North Africa in 1943.

On the other hand, the B-24s were almost useless in the support of ground units, proving largely ineffective at destroying bridges or Japanese strong points. The Vengeance was probably the standout bomber type for that role, though Beaufighters, B-25s, and fighter bombers did very well in that role in general.

Shortround6 said:

I will admit that I didn't think that the Ki-43 improved quite as much at it did, however the improvements came late. So we have to separate out the time periods.
and just for accuracy sake
Ki-43 engines went from
year........................................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941.......................................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942............................1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m
MC.200 engine..................870hp (?) .......................840hp/3800m or 950/3000m emergency? single speed supercharger.
Now please note that there were just under 150 MC.200s in service in June of 1940 and it took the Japanese until sometime in the end of of 1941 to build that many Ki-43s.
Also note that while the MC 200 used somewhat slower firing guns (about 3 rps slower) the MC 200 carried about 50% more ammo. The only improved engine the MC 200 got was the DB 601

The engines were weak and/or late. Getting 2 speed engines in late 1942/early 1943 helps but the F4F is no longer the goal. a 1100-1200hp 2 speed engine is not going to cut it in early 1943 against F4Us.

The changing landscape also can affect the Ki-43 vs A6M match ups. A Ki-43 has close to 20 seconds of ammo (16.66 seconds if the guns were not synchronized) An early A6M had about 7 seconds of cannon ammo and then they had to fight with two .303 Vickers guns. weight of fire is abysmal. Later A6M's got about 11-12 seconds of firing time.
Took until the A6M5s for things to improve after that but improve they did while the Ki-43 was stuck in a rut. In 1941/early 1942 the longer firing time of the Ki-43 may have allowed it to do things the A6M could not do, added by the less protected Allied aircraft of the time. By late 1942 most of the allied aircraft had better protection/fuel tanks (Hurricanes may still be suspect).

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Ki-43 units in China, India, Indochina, Indonesia etc. were still causing significant Allied losses all through 1943 and well into 1944, and even in 1945 as we just saw in the Sumatra raid.

Shortround6 said:

I just read about an very rare instance of a Hurricane IIC in the dessert. Pilot put shells into 5 different JU-87s, 2 claimed shot down, one probable and 2 damaged. What the other side says but four 20mm Hispano's don't take long to wreck a Ju-87s day if properly aimed. Pilot only had about 9 seconds of firing time.

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I will agree with that, actually looking at Shores in MAW II and III, you can see from the Axis losses that Hurricanes several times wrought serious havoc on Ju-87s and sometimes on Ju-88s too (when they could catch them, which wasn't always). The Hurricane did seem to be a very effective bomber-destroyer.

Shortround6 said:

I will admit that I didn't think that the Ki-43 improved quite as much at it did, however the improvements came late. So we have to separate out the time periods.
and just for accuracy sake
Ki-43 engines went from
year........................................take-off.........................1st height............................2nd height
1941.......................................990hp...........................970hp/3400m................................
Nov 1942............................1150hp.........................1100/2850m.....................980hp/6000m

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One thing mentioned by one of the Japanese pilots in the Osprey book is that with the late 1944 vintage Ki-43-III, they could run the engine at full power for 40 minutes, which he said would get him in serious trouble with the ground crew if he did that on the Ki-43-II.

As for the MC 200, I agree the DB 601 version / MC 202 is a much closer matchup to the Ki-43 in terms of operational history.

Greetings from Imphal, Please read Air Battle of Imphal by Frank Norman, will give some rough Idea about the battle in this part of the world.

But do not buy it from Amazon Australia. Buy it from Amazon USA or Bookfinder.com
USA price


Aus price

Clayton Magnet said:

The Bf 109 had the capacity to be upgraded to a point that it remained competitive with the very best of Allied types, within an increasingly narrow envelope. A G-10 or K-4 was still a formidable adversary in 1945, even when flown against a P-51D or Spitfire Mk.XIV.
The Ki-43 was still dangerous in 1945, but it was no longer competitive with the best. The 109 was living on borrowed time by 1945, and should have been replaced, arguably after the F-4 variant, but it still had a 100mph speed advantage over the Ki-43.

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You assume hit and run tactics and especially speed generally were by definition superior, even though hit and run usually required an unaware target (implying poor radios as well) that went straight, and also firing at the last second at point blank range on top of that. Period guns hated speed, as demonstrated by the Me-262 getting properly slaughtered with few results until it got R4M rockets, despite only 6.4% falling within 20 miles of their bases as is the assumed legend of their weak point...

Fw-190D-9 pilot Erich Brunotte describes never using more than 50-60% of available power during combat (0.9 to 1.2 ATA out of 1.9 ATA available). This means they turned in combat all the time. In fact, it meant that the VERY NOTION of combat, in his mind, meant turning...

Another Fw-190A-8 1945 ace said: "Our wings were NEVER level in combat. We turned to one side without interruption. By 1945, outnumbered as we were, it was the only way to survive." He also describes doing this mostly near the ground....

If turning all the time was such a help, you can now understand why 745 Ki-43s were still produced in a crumbling Japan in 1945 alone... And why it was vastly preferred to the Ki-84...

The weak point of the Ki-43 was its low firepower, as firepower is always marginal in these things, which is why the steady targets of turn fights were so useful...: You could not roll out of a turn due to geometry reasons so the target was "trapped". What should have been world class would be to have an aircraft with near the turn rate of the Ki-43, but with the firepower of the Ki-84. And that is pretty much what they got with the Ki-100...

And the Ki-100 had a top speed of only about 580 km/h, or a measly 360 mph. And would-be historians, who understand little about the true priorities of WWII air combat, wonder in puzzlement why the Japanese Army at the time considered the Ki-100 by far their best fighter aircraft...

Firepower and turn radius at a given rate were the two most important things. By that measure, the deadliest air to air fighter of the US Navy in WWII was the FM-2 Wildcat (and even more so the P-61 Black Widow, which out-turned every US type except the Wildcat). While I don't give much credence to the claimed US kill ratios, perhaps there is a clue in the FM-2 having the highest US WWll kill ratio of them all.

wrathofatlantis said:

Period guns hated speed, as demonstrated by the Me-262 getting properly slaughtered with few results until it got R4M rockets, despite only 6.4% falling within 20 miles of their bases as is the assumed legend of their weak point...

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Absolutely incorrect.

During it's short service, the Me262 accounted for 542 Allied aircraft (all types) downed for a loss of 100, the majority of those losses being during the landing or take off cycle.

This put the Me262 at a 4:1 kill/loss ratio which was far from being "slaughtered".

wrathofatlantis said:

While I don't give much credence to the claimed US kill ratios, perhaps there is a clue in the FM-2 having the highest US WWll kill ratio of them all.

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A lot also depends on the opposition and the actual missions flown. USN may have been vastly overclaiming. But the FM-2 didn't see combat until spring/summer of 1944.
Japanese pilot quality was in step decline.
There was also quite a bit of selective accounting going on. The most successful FM-2 squadron (61.5 victories), while loosing only a few pilots and planes that didn't make it back to carrier, wrote off 5 in one day as unrepairable after landing. The ability to land on a close by carrier in a damaged aircraft (and the FM-2's armor protection and rugged airframe) skewed the kill/loss ratio. The most successful pilot FM-2 pilot with 9.5 kills included 4 P1Y Frances bombers out of a larger formation during a Kamikaze attack (which is pretty amazing in itself). Other kills include a Val and a Jill. He also killed 2 Ki-44s and damaged one.
FM-2s were doing a lot of low level work and supporting ground attacks or anti Kamikazi or against Japanese anti shipping missions, most (all?) of the fighter combat was against shore based fighters.
The FM-2 roughly (very roughly) shot down about 1/3 as many enemy aircraft as the rest of the Wildcats and while over 300 kills is not small, it is not really large enough to draw good conclusions from (see arguments about the Buffalo).

USN WW2 Aviation Tables.
TABLE 1 - CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF NAVY AND MARINE CARRIER AND LAND‑BASED AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS FOR ENTIRE WAR


Which gives the claims to loss ratio of the 4 USN fighters as
F2A 0.71 : 1
F4F/FM 6.95 : 1
F4U/FG 11.32 : 1
F6F 19.12 : 1

The F4F/FM war service had two distinct phases, the first was very tough as it took on the then elite IJNAF, the second was spending much time in low threat environments, much more likely to see enemy bombers than fighters, it claimed 1.17 fighters per bomber, the F4U 3.48, the F6F 2.57, but then again the F4F from carriers had 112 fighters to 190 bombers reflecting how hard it was to catch an A6M in 1942 and the composition of the carrier based strike forces.

Meantime over at America's Hundred Thousand by Francis Dean

Sustained 3 G turn, no altitude loss, clean airframe, with the best turn radius assigned the value of 100
FM-2 100 units at 118.5 mph
P-63A-9 124 units at 132 mph
P-61B-1 133 units at 137 mph
F6F-5 138 units at 139 mph
P-51D-15 179 units at 159 mph
P-38L 205 units at 170 mph
P-47D-30 206 units at 170 mph
F4U-1D 212 units at 172.5 mph

Getting into that turn is another issue, at 100 mph the P-61 roll rate is around 18 degrees per second, linearly rising to under 50 degrees per second at 325 mph, the unboosted P-38 starts off at 25 degrees per second, peaks at under 80 at around 300 mph, the roll rate would probably equal the P-61 at around 350 mph. Assuming the P-61 keeps rising linearly then it would cross the P-39D at under 400 mph, F4F-3, F6F-5 and P-47C before 450 mph and the P-51B-1 at over 450 mph. The small size of the P-61 control surface obviously hurts at low speed where turn fights occur, but gains the advantage at high speed. Apart from the P-38 all the other US fighter types are rolling at tw0 to three times the P-61 rate in the 200 to 250 mph band.

The Ki-43 had two main production lines, Nakajima phased it out in favour of the Ki-84 during 1944, Tachikawa had no other types in production, if being built in 1945 is a sign of value, 748 Ki-43 to 1,485 Ki-84 to 1,715 A6M. Alternatively like everyone else the Japanese found it hard to quickly switch and ramp up production

The following is from a time when if you were out and about it was still wise to keep a look out for the occasional hungry T-Rex.

The Messerschmitt Me262 was a pointer to the future of fighter aircraft, when everything worked it was the highest performance aircraft to see combat in WWII. The trouble for the Germans was making it work. The references,

Dan O'Connell Messerschmitt Me262 The Production Log 1941-1945 It has a list of all known Me262s built and individual histories when known.

Manfred Boehme JG7 (In German), the appendix of claims and losses

John Foreman and S E Harvey The Messerschmitt Me262 Combat Diary which has lists of Me262 kill claims and losses and allied kill claims for Me262s

Dr Theo E W Boiten Nachtjagd War Diaries Volume 2. For Me262 nightfighter claim checking

Roger A Freeman Mighty Eighth War Diary For 8th Air Force losses

Roger A Freeman and David Osborne The B-17 Flying Fortress Story It has a list of all known B-17 built and individual histories.

John Foreman Fighter Command War Diaries Part 5 for RAF claims for and losses to Me262s

Norman L R Franks Royal Air Force Fighter Command Losses volume 3

W R Chorley Royal Air Force Bomber Command Losses volume 6

Richard Davis Spreadsheets of allied heavy bomber operations for allied targets, sorties, losses, bomb tonnages

The break down in Luftwaffe record keeping means any conclusions are tentative, there are clearly a number of Me262 losses in the air from February/March 1945 onwards that are not recorded accurately enough to enable reliable loss evaluations in the months when the Me262 was most active, similar for kill claims made by the Me262 units, though allied loss reports make up for most of this. Many losses with unknown work numbers in O'Connell also have no reference to support the listing, at the moment these are largely excluded, even when the German pilot or unit is explicitly mentioned. Also a number of RAF claims mentioned in O'Connell's "no work number known" Me262 loss list do not appear in Fighter Command War Diaries, so at the moment the bias is to exclude listings. Then there are the losses with unknown work numbers on unknown dates which are normally excluded.

JG7 as noted by its title covers the main Luftwaffe user of fighter Me262s only. Foreman and Harvey have tried for all Me262 combat units. Both books cover losses as well as kill claims. The lists of Me262 losses in Foreman and Harvey was used as the initial basis then checked and supplemented from O'Connell who covers all units and includes losses taken before delivery to a combat unit. Reading the aircraft histories in O'Connell it is clear build quality was slipping in 1945, along with either spare parts supply or distribution, that clearly hurt serviceability. Overall it when everything worked the Me262 was the best thing flying on operations in 1945, but the engine reliability, fuel consumption and airfield requirements were a big negative, as was the average pilot quality. So for example the Me262 could easily outpace a P-51, but only for a short time because of the fuel consumption problem, the P-51 could pursue and if the Me262 did not manage to evade or land quickly the P-51 could catch up and force a fight. The number of airfields capable of operating Me262s was also limited, enabling the allies to cover them with fighter patrols.

The list of destroyed Me262s has some 490 entries, of which 189 are not identified by their work numbers. This is out of around 1,200 Me262s built. With some 172 aircrew KIA, 27 MIA, 41 WIA and 2 PoW. However some 121 Me262s are listed as being destroyed by bombing and another 23 by strafing, with no aircrew casualties listed against these losses. This leaves 346 losses where about 57% of the time the pilot was killed. O'Connell indicates there are probably more losses to bombing. Plus a series of losses where the date is uncertain and work numbers unknown. These may or may not have been included in the F+H list in entries where the work number is missing. After bombing the next 3 highest causes for losses of Me262s are Fighter 89, Crashed 83 and Shot down 68.

The losses for JG7 in 1945 in F+H versus the JG7 book are, January 8 versus 6, February 11 versus 6, March 40 versus 31, April 57 versus 34. Which is not good agreement unless JG7 only covers combat losses.

To start off with allied claims against Me262s. Allied fighter kill claims against Me262s appear reasonable, with 188 claimed versus 89 losses listed to fighters and 75 listed as shot down or lost to enemy aircraft, a total 164. Note a number of these possibles would have been lost to bomber gunners or AA Fire, on the other hand a number of crashes are reported as after combat and other allied claims are a case of mistaken identity, it was not an Me262 that was actually attacked. The discrepancy between allied fighters claims and recorded Me262 losses is biggest in April 1945, 14 to fighters, 38 possibles versus 74 claims, a difference of 22, or almost all the total discrepancy of 188 kills versus 164 possibles.

O'Connell also has some Messerschmitt production reports, to end November 1944, 368 built at Augsburg, 26 at Regensburg plus a number sent to Blohm and Voss for conversion to 2 seat trainers.

In January 1945 the Luftwaffe quartermaster reported 162 Me262s produced in January, including 14 repaired airframes, another report noted that while Messerschmitt claimed to have produced 681 Me262s in December 1944, with 499 made available to the Luftwaffe, the rest unassembled and in storage, only some 186 of the 499 had made it to combat units, the rest destroyed, damaged or diverted. In February 1945 the Luftwaffe quartermaster noted 224 Me262s had been built, 212 new, 11 repaired, 1 recycled. Hence the problems in determining Me262, and German aircraft, production.

The kill claim list in Foreman and Harvey is the basis for an evaluation of the number of allied aircraft lost to Me262s. It does have a problem in that kill claims mentioned in the text do not always make it to the list. So the list has about 345 entries, expanded to 365 based on other kills mentioned and could have expanded more by accepting every mention of an allied aircraft being shot down. In the F+H List JG7 are credited with 243 kills in 1945, versus the list from JG7 of 217 kills, plus 42 probables. In detail, ignoring the probables, F+H 149 USAAF heavy bombers (Including 2 that really might be Lancasters), JG7 141, P-51 35 versus 31, P-47 18 versus 9, P-38 3 versus 6, others 38 versus 30. F+H have a table that says there were up to 616 kill claims made by Me262 pilots, but it is clear many of these must be initial claims, and would have been eliminated with checking.

The simplest way so see the overclaim is to note the USAAF thinks in 1945 the European Theatre of Operations saw the loss to enemy aircraft of 199 heavy bombers, 20 medium and light bombers and 227 fighters, total 446, the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations lists 7 heavy bombers, 3 light and medium bombers and 24 fighters lost to enemy aircraft, total 34. Overall total 480, and most Me262 operations were against the USAAF and in 1945. Of the 365 Me262 kill claims listed in the spreadsheet 161 are for B-17/24 heavy bombers in 1945, and 66 USAAF fighters or reconnaissance fighters, so the Luftwaffe piston engined fighter units were still active, even if all the Me262 claims in the list are correct.

It looks like to the end of October 1944 the Me262 units made 24 kill claims, of which 16 can be definitely verified by the sources. This was a period where most of the combat was single combat against allied reconnaissance aircraft plus some attempts to intercept USAAF day bomber raids.

As expected the accuracy of the kill claims by Me262s seems to have declined in large combats and towards the end of the war. On 3 March 1945 the Me262s claimed 11 (F+H) or 12 (JG7) B-17 kills and 3 (F+H) or 1 (JG7) P-51 kills. The text in F+H says some 21 allied fighters shot down, these claims do not appear in the kill list, the 8th AF lost 6 P-51s plus another written off. The 8th lost 12 B-17 and 1 B-24 MIA, plus 14 B-17 and 1 B-24 written off, 11 bombers choosing to land in Soviet territory. Freeman notes the Me262 attacks plus that 8 MIA B-17s were lost to flak, 1 to collision. Leaving 3 as actual MIA to enemy fighters, plus maybe the B-24, plus of course some of the 14 written off.

On 31 March the attack on a Bomber Command formation resulted in kill claims for 16 Lancasters (plus possibly another 2 claimed as B-17) in F+H or 14 plus a probable in the JG7 listing. Some 11 RAF heavies were lost that day, 6 definitely to Me262s, no cause of loss is given in Chorley for the other 5, F+H suggest 2 of these to flak and 2 to collision. In March 1945 the USAAF reports the 15th Air Force lost 13 heavy bombers to enemy aircraft, the F+H kill list has some 27 kill claims, the JG7 kill list has 25 claims for 15th AF heavy bombers. Comparison between the Me262 kill claims list in F+H and allied losses would indicate somewhere around half the claims are accurate, so around 180 to 200 out of the 365 listed.

In the spreadsheet JG7 lost 132 Me262s of which 3 were bombed, versus making 262 kill claims. The losses include to 101 to fighter, enemy aircraft, shot down, failed to return and bomber. So overall JG7 was losing about 1 Me262 per real kill, and in combat around 1 Me262 per 1.3 to 1.4 real kills.

The results from JG7 were undoubtedly better than the piston engine fighters (USAAF fighters in the European Theatre of operations claimed 1,362 kills in the air in 1945, mostly fighters, versus the 227 losses to enemy aircraft or 6 to 1, which is of course an overclaim, but it shows how many conventional Luftwaffe fighters were being shot down.) RAF fighter kill claims for 1945 were 732, or about half that of the USAAF, but with a number at night against bombers or night fighters.

For JG7 better is a 1 to 1 exchange rate overall and 1.3 or 1.4 to 1 in combat. A real measure of the improvement the Me262 would be to compare the above figure to the real losses and successes of the Luftwaffe piston engined fighters in the west in 1945.

Speculation time, as a hand waving exercise, 298 Me262 kill claims in 1945, say 150 are correct. There are 480 USAAF losses plus any RAF ones. RAF fighter Command Losses indicates 65 fighters definitely lost to enemy fighters, plus another 95 to unknown reasons, out of 809 losses (359 to flak and 137 destroyed on the ground on 1 January make up the bulk of the losses), the RAF day bomber force, number 2 group reported 1 bomber lost to enemy fighters in 1945, Bomber Command 6 losses to fighters on day operations. So the assumption is 150 RAF losses to enemy fighters, since the 150 figure neatly cancels out the Me262 claims. This leaves 480 allied aircraft, call it 500, to be placed against the only yardstick available, the number of accurate allied kill claims against Luftwaffe fighters. We have 2,100 RAF and USAAF kill claims, ignoring the 192 claims by USAAF bombers, so at 80% accuracy and 80% against fighters we end up with 1,344, or around 1,200 after taking away the kills made against Me262s.

So with every person trained in statistics reading this cringing in shock, (this is not skating on statistical thin ice but swimming amongst icebergs watched by hungry Polar Bears) it is possible the Me262 was about three times as good as the piston engined fighters the Luftwaffe had at the time. That is a real kill ratio in combat of around 1.3 to 1.4 to 1 for the Me262 versus around 0.4 to 1 for the piston engined types.

Of course if you use 90% of 90% the Me262 is about 4 times as good, 60% of 60% and the Me262 is about twice as good as the piston engined types. So the real conclusion is the Me262 was better, just how much requires more and better information.

Another way of looking at effectiveness is to note the casualty rate, which requires sortie totals, the JG7 book does have sorties for some days. They do not look complete, but claim from 636 sorties some 71 Me262s were lost, or 11%. This compares to figures for day fighters in Luftflotte Reich in 1944, a 10.3% loss rate, or fighters over France in 1944, 6% loss rate. The trouble with the figures for all of 1944 is the decline of Luftwaffe fighter pilot experience and training between January and December, you would expect a higher loss rate later in the year.

It does raise the possibility the Me262 was no more survivable than the piston engined fighters in terms of losses per sortie, but was better able to shoot down allied aircraft, given its top speed and firepower. The 636 sorties gave rise to 155 kill claims, in other words 2.2 times as many kill claims as losses, halving the kill claims would mean an overall 1.1 to 1 loss rate, or a real kill every 8 or so sorties.

In 1944 the Luftwaffe day fighters in the west and over Germany flew some 80,000 sorties. The USAAF credits enemy aircraft with causing 2,902 losses, out of 7,749 losses on operations. RAF bomber units report 14 losses to enemy fighters on day operations, with Fighter Command reporting 244 losses to fighters plus 241 for unknown reasons, flak caused 809 losses or around half the 1,665 recorded losses. So 300 to 500 RAF losses to Luftwaffe fighters, call it 400. Plus of course some of the 1,060 USAAF heavy bomber and fighter losses to enemy aircraft from the Mediterranean based units, when they attacked Austria, Czechoslovakia, France or Germany. Based on the Bomber loss figures from Davis about 60% of the 15th Air Force Heavy Bomber losses in 1944 were from attacking those countries. That would give say 600 bomber and fighters kills made by the Luftwaffe fighters based in then defined Greater Germany and France.

So 80,000 sorties for 3,900 real kills, a kill every 20.5 sorties, so around 40% the effectiveness of the Me262 in 1945. It does fit but the data needs considerable refinement, since a number of the Luftwaffe fighter sorties in the west would be ground attack for example, not interception, whereas JG7 was near exclusively on interception operations. Also something more than a yearly average for Luftwaffe fighter losses in 1944 and a more definitive listing of allied losses is required.

It is quite possible the Me262 loss rate per sortie was in fact around the same as the piston engined types, and the main improvement it brought was a better kill rate per sortie, perhaps 3 times as much. A more middle ground is an improvement in loss rates per sortie and a higher number of kills per sortie rate but lower than the 3 times hand waved above.

While such conclusion seems to indicate it was the greater firepower, the four 30mm cannon, that were the difference the reality is it is also performance related, the Me262 had the performance to carry the armament and stand a good chance of intercepting enemy aircraft then evading counter attack, compared with any piston engine fighter carrying the same armament.

In this video a tentative analysis indicates the loss rates of Me-262 within 50 km(!) of their air base was almost always below 40%. Given unknowns of the cause of loss within 10 km, we probably will never know, but it does suggest that the idea they were only vulnerable in a landing or taking off pattern is exaggerated: Over 60% were shot down beyond 50 km of their bases. I would suggest well under 20% were shot down in landing or take off pattern within 10 km of their base.


View: https://youtu.be/-RZztJkKtuU?si=CqKm9ROff9TLOziB
So most of their losses were full on air to air.

This original sources video (below) says the American 8th Air Force evaluation recorded 10 fighter losses to 262s for 130 262 kill claims, leading to a 13:1 kill ratio for... The prop planes!

Of course this is nonsense, but it still indicates that the 262 was hardly a terror of the skies, even though most of them were NOT shot down near their bases (and it also shows that kill claims are drastically unreliable, particularly from US pilots: I rate them level with IJN in claim credibility, which is also low.)


View: https://youtu.be/hR2erZ0rKIs?si=DxjBLNxb6VpncM-u
The statistics on this other video below are more significant in my view (again, all original sources), even if flawed: It indicates most 262 bomber kills (50+) took place in March-April, when R4M rockets became available. More importantly, even if we account for the fact that, by then, the Me-262 was practically the only type that could operate with any safety at all against 50:1 odds, it still had a lethality per attack 3 times lower that a comparable prop fighter, and even the R4M rockets only brought this to barely par(!).


View: https://youtu.be/d38EXBxPzms?si=PI4x2-IFhBexkrCa
Again, I am not saying this is the absolute truth, but it does illustrate one of the most fundamental aspect of WWII air to air combat: WWII GUNS HATED SPEED DIFFERENTIALS...

That is why a 1945 D-9 pilot said he only used 50-60% of his available power in combat: "You didn't need that much in a fight."


View: https://youtu.be/kOuVqP89058?si=bxVXMo5y5sGMSHI6
At 13:15.View attachment 839863


This basically meant that to him combat is synonymous with turning, and this is so fundamental that he does not even bother to explain why he used only half his power in combat...

Most pilots, or at least a significant proportion, did not know this, so they used full power throughout combat... (Some types had to, like the weak early prop on a P-47, or the thin or deeply swept wings of Spitfires or Yaks, these apparently not liking reduced power) There is a problem with the understanding of the physics of these things, which explains why we do not understand why reduced power was so beneficial to radius while keeping a similar turn rate, a smaller radius being essential to get a steady aiming lead within a circle. Any notion of "energy" was antithetical to how these things worked...


The Japanese Navy loved notions of hit and run and speed, and never relinquished their dogmatic preference to avoid low speed circles (with resulting high losses)... By late 1944, even Me-109 pilots were starting to "get" that hit and run that worked so well in the East (against Russians with one-way radios: Rall: "You took out the tip of the V and the rest milled about in confusion. It was like fighting an apparatus.") was now dead in the West:

-"Defenders of the Reich" JG 1 p. 247: Ofhr. Hubert Heckmann (5 kills, survived the War): "I became wingman to the new Kommandeur, Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber (136 kills). His only experience was from the Eastern Front, and from time to time he used the words "pull up during air combat". I assumed that he would make use of this method in the West, and I warned him about doing so. As his "Kaczmarek", I did not want to lose my "protégé" on his first mission- that would be a bad omen. But he cast all my well-meant recommendations to the wind on our first mission. Weber had a highly polished aircraft (thus emphasizing speed) and whereas we all looked like gray mice, he differed from the rest of the formation. Besides he had Methanol on board (again, emphasis on speed in every option: Me-109G-6AS with MW-50)—7th June Flying at 1000 m. about 30 P-51s showed up some 500 meters above us. After passing us they made a downward turn. Weber didn't turn in, but pulled up steep into the sky, dragging a Methanol cloud behind him. I yelled "turn in!" but he did not listen. I saw 4 P-51s coming down on me, and pulled into a slight left bank (meaning he reduced his turn to entice them to him) to distract them from Weber. My self-sacrifice was of no use; two P-51s stayed behind me, and the other two went after Weber. I fought my two opponents for more than 30 minutes. They moved off when, eventually, they lost much of their speed. That evening we were informed Hptm. Weber (136 kills) was dead."

To understand WWII dogfighting, you must understand the supremacy of low speed circles at reduced power: An old pilot saying at the time went: "Dogfighting is a race where the slowest wins."

-Kyosti Karhila, 32 victory ace; "I found that when fighter pilots got in a battle,
they usually applied full power and then began to turn. In the same situation I used to
decrease power, and with lower speed was able to turn equally well. --When the enemy
decreased power, I used to throttle back even more."

And that is why rockets tripled the measly Me-262 effectiveness. As to kill ratios being reliable, I will point out again the last chapter of Osprey's "f4U vs A6M", where, by limiting to combats where only A6Ms and f4Us were present, and tallying the failed to return on specific airfields from original sources on both side, this more reliable kill loss ratio turned out to be 1:1 from February 1943 to February 1944.... A quite large sample.

Keep in mind even incomplete (but reliable) samples are highly predictive on complex subjects, the more complex the subject the more predictive, because each item is the result of a huge complex upstream. That is why Nielsen can measures TV audiences on a population of 30 million with only 1000 TVs (20 000 TVs in the case of the entire US)...












IIIIIIII

wrathofatlantis said:

Firepower and turn radius at a given rate were the two most important things.

Click to expand...

Wow, its wonder why the French didn't just keep the 37mm cannon armed SPAD XII in service until 1940. They would have won the war before it started.

I was having a difficult day until I read post 417.

I haven't had a good laugh like that in a while, thanks.

Clayton Magnet said:

Wow, its wonder why the French didn't just keep the 37mm cannon armed SPAD XII in service until 1940. They would have won the war before it started.

Click to expand...

If Japanese front-line commanders and pilots preferred Ki-43s over Ki-84s in late 1944, your understanding of how this went is not as good as you think it is.


-From Osprey "Ki-43 ' Oscar aces of World War: P.50: (Sgt Toshimi Ikezawa,
Ki-43 ace): "I heard Major Eto had refused delivery of the Ki-84. I think we owe our
survival to the Ki-43, as the Ki-84 would have left you in a mighty tight spot if you were
attacked from above by P-51s. ---Skilled (Spitfire Mk VIII) enemy pilots such as flight leaders
would pull out of their dives when they realized they could not catch us [unaware]. New pilots
would dive straight down on us, leaving them vulnerable in a turning fight."

One thing suggested by the above I have not mentioned before, is that while it is true that WWII guns did not like a speed differential, they LOVED targets that went straight...

This meant that while you may imagine in your mind that you could dive and then extend in a straight climb, the reality is that a straight climb made you very easy to hit... It is easy to pepper a spot where a straight line is going...

This meant that even if you used Hit and Run with a lot of excess speed, you still had to curve on exit to be less vulnerable.

A slower aircraft could then make a bee line to the end point of your curve, even if you were faster, forcing you to tighten the curve even further, and thus shortening the distance further.

You can see how Hit and Run ended up being about turning anyway in this other quote:


-Iseo Mochizuki (Ki-61 pilot ace, 2009 interview): "In the case of the Hien, you would make
a high-speed attack [makes dive and zoom hand gesture]. But then, because [of the speed]
the turn radius became wide, the enemy pilot [target] could turn inside you. Because of
that [speed] the chances of being shot down was high."

But you know better than these guys right?