207 Pe-3 + 134 Pe-3bis were built. The OKO-6 by Tairov was ready for serial production (one of the Soviets' missed opportunities). Polikarpov's TIS and Mikoyan/Gurevich's DIS-200 were tested. The absence of a heavy fighter in mass production was a consequence of the weakness of the Soviet industry (primarily engine building) and the lack of aluminum.
Soviet air combat instructions indicated the possibility of using both vertical and horizontal maneuvers, but ONLY vertical maneuvers were considered offensive tactics, and horizontal maneuvers were exclusively defensive. Moreover, the instruction considered turn fighting as "absolutely unacceptable" when the fighter had sufficient vertical maneuverability. I am too lazy to translate the Soviet instructions, I can post the Russian text, you can use automatic translators.
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They simply considered the La-5 as inferior to the Bf109G in
all kinds of maneuver. But already the La-5FN was nearly equal to the Bf109G-2 in vertical maneuver, and superior to the FW 190A-4 in climb rate - this was reflected in tactics. The La-5 of the first production batches was little better than the LaGG (if better at all). "Horizontal" fighters were those that were vastly inferior to enemy fighters in vertical maneuver. Don't laud the necessity as a virtue.
As soon as engine power was increased or the airframe lightened, the fighter immediately became "vertical" - regardless of the designer.
The Soviet pilots on the Spitfires first used turn fighting just because they did not know any other, as they flown planes that were too inferior in vertical maneuvering to the enemy previously.
The nomenclature reflects only insufficient performance of Soviet fighters in vertical maneuver until late 1943 or even early 1944 as well as the use of obsolete tactics due to insufficient training.
They did say horizontal tactics were "obsolete", but they also said that the Spitfire failed in those tactics, which is interesting on its own.
As an aside, it is funny that vertical and "Hit and Run" tactics are so praised as "modern", when they hardly ever happened by 1944...
I would say throughout the thousands of Encounter Reports I have read of the entire War, only about 10-20% of the overall total could qualify as "hit and run"
or vertical maneuvering,
or dive and zoom. And this is being
extremely generous... (For the 8th Air Force P-47s and P-51s in 1944, we are talking closer to 1%...)
The real overall Hit and Run/vertical figure is closer to 5-10% in 1944 (much more than that in 1940: Probably 30-40%, when they really believed in it), though for Spitfires and Zeros it could still be above 20-30% even in 1944.
By late 1944 Hit and Run had virtually disappeared from Western Europe (except for Spitfires), in part because the combat heights were generally lower. Turning broke diving attacks, remember?
What
did happen a lot between FW-190s and P-51s (and it is notable for its consistency) were repeated head-on passes, as the P-51 could not follow the 190A in low speed right turns (but it could match it in left turns, so it extended and went around in a left turn while the 190 came back in a right or left turn). Between Me-109Gs, P-47s and P-51s it was pretty much circles near-100% of the time, if not sneaking up under the tail (which was about 10-20%).
70-80% of all WWII air to air combat involves at least one full circle (except for the Zero and Spitfire, less prone to prolonged turns), the vast majority of those at least 2-3 consecutive circles, with a good 25-30%
4 consecutive circles or more (
I would say 2 to 6 consecutive circles is the most common form of air combat in WWII). There are a few P-51D vs Me-109G-6 encounters that go on for 20 straight minutes to one side, which means
40-50 consecutive circles. 6-10 circles was less common, but not rare, and included even fast aircrafts like the Tempest V.
The Soviet advice when flying the La-5FN in 1944 was thus: "
Never hesitate to engage the German in low speed turning combat, as the German lacks the nervous stamina to endure tense turning battles of any duration."
So apparently
not so defensive after all...
And is it not notable how well this advice also fits with the German Western Front impatience with turns?:
-Maj. Robert Elder, 24 March 1945 (P-51D): "
With this top cover to encourage me, I managed
to out-turn another FW-190, and, just as I was about 30 degrees angle off, this Jerry reversed
his turn (they are stupid that way) and I latched on to his tail at about 100 yards range. I got
strikes all over the plane and he caught fire in the air and crashed."
-Capt. Glendon V. Davis, March 8 1944 (P-51B): "
I turned into him and he (lone FW-190A)
swung around, almost getting on the tail of Lt. Smith, following me. I called to him to put down
flaps and turn with him, as I had 20 degrees myself. We went around five or six times with the
issue very much in doubt. I could not quite get enough deflection to nail him, though I was
firing short bursts trying to get him to roll out, which he was too smart to do."
Osprey "VIII Fighter Command at War, -Long Reach-", P. 31 (On the tactical significance
of using the roll rate in combat, Lt. Col. H. C. Craig):
"
Once a turn is started in an engagement, it is of the most importance, and safety, to remember
to never reverse your turn. It has been my observation that a great majority of the
victories of my unit were made good when the Hun reversed the turn."
By late 1944, even the German Me-109 pilots were finally starting to learn (at least on the Western Front), and all you see them do is circles...
As a conclusion I would say, if you think of
late WWII combat, with ALL the later types (excepts jets or Spitfires) and the
first word that comes to your mind is not "
circles", then let me tell you you are off at sea without a paddle.
