The real combat history of the Ki-43 (2 Viewers)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

GrauGeist said:
Either that, or they just went in circles until someone ran out of fuel.

Sometimes they stopped, had lunch and a cigarette, then went back at it 'til the bitter end.
Click to expand...
In Atlantis, they used "crystals" for energy, according to Edgar Cayce. So, fuel is not required.
I'm not sure about cigarettes. Did Atlanteans smoke? And what exactly?
 
Dimlee said:
In Atlantis, they used "crystals" for energy, according to Edgar Cayce. So, fuel is not required.
I'm not sure about cigarettes. Did Atlanteans smoke? And what exactly?
Click to expand...
They had a particular type of smoke that floated on water. Deep Purple wrote a song about it.
Terrestrial use requires a flare gun to make the smoke but I assume the Atlanteans would have used
a crystal ?
 
Greg Boeser said:
Smokey quartz, I presume.

A Guide to Smoky Quartz: Meaning, Properties and Everyday Uses – HAWKHOUSE A Guide to Smoky Quartz: Meaning, Properties and Everyday Uses
Click to expand...
From this article:
"Simply carrying or wearing smoky quartz can shield against negativity..."
Very important for Ki-43.
Incoming bullets are a sign of negativity, right?
Just place the smoky quartz near fuel tanks and the pilot's head, and you can save on other means of protection.
 
Comparing stall speeds is a lot more accurate, especially in this scenario. I'm not too familiar with either plane so I won't make the comparison.
Greg Boeser said:
(enhanced on planes like the Ki-43 with automatic "butterfly" flaps)
Click to expand...
On the Ki-43s they weren't automatic, but there was a very convenient button on the flight stick to extend them. The gun trigger was on the throttle instead. In any case, even against the lightest Spitfires in the Pacific, I doubt a Ki-43 would ever need to use them.
 

I know this is an old post, but contrary to the claim that the Brits "took a long time to learn better tactics", Shores says in Bloody Shambles that by 25 February, some Hurri units in Burma "had devised tactics to combat the manoeuvrability of the opposing Japanese fighters by climbing to maximum height, diving to attack and then continuing in the dive, either to head for home or up to regain altitude — in effect similar tactics to those employed with success by the AVG in Burma." By 27 Feb Hurri pilots were clearly using their superior diving speed to get away.

In contrast, the brilliant, fast-thinking USN put the Thatch Weave into use in June 1942. Yes, it was conceived earlier - but then again if we are talking theories held by one pilot then we have to allow for the fact that some Hurri pilots may also have had similar theories at the same time, or earlier. After all, the RAF had experience against the Italians, and 261 Squadron itself had downed a bunch of CR42s over Malta before heading east to meet the Japanese - clearly and contrary to what is often said, they were not only experienced in fighting German aircraft and they clearly had experience against slower but faster-turning fighters. Why, then, does it seem to be assumed that the Brits were fixated with the idea that the enemy was slower to turn?

So who "took a long time to learn better tactics"???? The guys who were using hit-and-run tactics in February or the ones who used new tactics four months later?
 
261 squadron is a bad example to use. The 261 squadron that flew over Malta was not the same 261 squadron that flew over Burma.

261 formed on Malta in Aug 1940 to take over the various Gladiator & Hurricane flights defending Malta. The survivors were absorbed into 185 squadron in May 1941.

127 squadron was formed out of No 4 Service Flying Training School at Habbaniya in Iraq in June 1941in the aftermath of the 1941 Iraq Revolt in which aircraft from that unit, and the airfield itself, played a major part in defeating. It then briefly saw action against Vichy French forces in Syria before being remembered as 261 squadron on 12 July. It then flew defensive operations over Iraq, Palestine & Cyprus until it was ordered to Ceylon in Feb 1942 and fought in defence of Colombo on 5 April 1942 losing some 8 aircraft to IJNAF Zeros. 261 wasn't moved to the Burma front until Jan 1943.

It is true that the RAF as a whole had experience in other theatres. However it is also true that there were few pilots with that experience in the squadrons already in and sent to the Far East at the beginning of 1942 because most had been newly formed during the course of 1941 whole with pilots straight out of OTUs. Those with experience were ggenerally filling roles as squadron & flight commanders. But it was very much a case of learn to adapt tactics or die at the hands of the enemy. So quite an incentive to learn and learn fast!
 

Saying the pilots in the Far East came out of OTUs is being a tad generous in some respects. The Buffalo squadrons mainly comprised pre-OTU pilots fresh out of training, or pilots converting from non-fighter types (e.g. Geoff Fiskin and others). Many had never flown a modern aircraft with flaps, retractable undercarriage, and enclosed cockpit. Their "OTU" was a brief stint on Wirraways that had been cast off by 21 Sqn RAAF when it converted to Buffalos.
 
beers said:
Comparing stall speeds is a lot more accurate, especially in this scenario. I'm not too familiar with either plane so I won't make the comparison.
Click to expand...

Stall speeds are usually not accurate since there are huge differences between the actual stall speed and what the pilot reads off on his cockpit instruments. For example, on the Spitfire MkI the PEC (Position Error Correction) is in the order of 15-20 mph at stall speed. And even if you wanted to correct the cockpit IAS to TAS you can't do it since the PEC chart in the flight manual only covers 110-300 mph IAS.
 
Holtzauge said:
Stall speeds are usually not accurate since there are huge differences between the actual stall speed and what the pilot reads off on his cockpit instruments.
Click to expand...
Why do we care about what the cockpit instruments say? A lower stall speed is very representative of maneuverability, this will happen regardless of what the instruments are or aren't saying.
 
beers said:
Why do we care about what the cockpit instruments say? A lower stall speed is very representative of maneuverability, this will happen regardless of what the instruments are or aren't saying.
Click to expand...

Well on the Spitfire MkI for example, the IAS stall speed is 69 mph, while in reality the stall speed is about 87 mph TAS. If another aircraft is attributed a stall speed of 75 mph, is it more or less maneuverable than the Spitfire?

The point here being, where are you going to get the accurate stall speeds from so you know you are making an apples to apples comparison?
 
Last edited:
Holtzauge said:
The point here being, where are you going to get the accurate stall speeds from so you know you are making an apples to apples comparison?
Click to expand...
This is correct as many times the manuals or listed stall speeds are for the plane in "landing configuration" with flaps and landing gear down. Possibly useful if you are comparing one to another plane that use the same flap type/system and use flaps of the same size. If they don't use similar flaps comparing land stall speed doesn't tell you much about stall speed in a high speed turn.
Sometimes you can find the stall speed with flaps and landing gear up which is much better but in some cases (like Ki 43 to Spitfire) it doesn't work as the Spitfire cannot use it's flaps in combat the Ki 43 famously can. However the Ki-43 does not use the landing position of the flap in combat. It extends the flap and lowers it about 8 degrees which is nowhere near the landing setting. Spitfire flap does very little for lift and is pretty much an airbrake to create drag and steepen the glide path.

Spitfire Mk I N.3171 Trials Report

Spitfire Performance Testing, wartime flight trials and reports of Spitfire aircraft. Spitfire Mk I data.
www.spitfireperformance.com
Lists several stalling speeds and either does not say TAS when it is TAS or says ASI when it is ASI?
 

I'd normally bow to your greater knowledge but after checking the potted 261 history by Shores et al in "Malta, the Hurricane Years" it seems that we've each got it partly right. Shores says that 261 was disbanded in Malta in May 1941 with most of the pilots dispersing, some going to 249, some going to 127, and others elsewhere. Shores says that "a handful" of ex-Malta pilots went into the reformed 261 that was created in Iraq.

In the BBM database of pilots it's noted that F O N. Doughty was 'sent to Takali airfield for use by 261 Squadron in the defence of Malta. Doughty, however, only stayed until 6th July when he was posted to 127 squadron at Kasfareet in Syria flying Hurricanes…..On 12th of July, 127 squadron was absorbed into 261, Doughty rejoining his old unit on the 17th by flying six Hurricanes from Deir Ez Zor to Habbaniya." It is also stated that he joined the "reformed 261 as flight commander…..". My emphasis.

There's a personal account on Fl Lt Pickering of 261 which refers clearly to the squadrom's "departure from Malta in about June 1941" on p. 409 of Shores et el - not disbanding. He refers to the need to alter tactics when fighting the Italian aircraft compared to when fighting 109s in the BoB and also that later experience in the Far East showed how tactics had to be altered for local conditions- something which was too often ignored. Pickering, together with fellow ex-261 pilot Len Davies, certainly flew in Burma - see Bloody Shambles Pt 3 p 372.

Birtles on p. 146 of "Hurricane: the illustrated history" says that in late May '41 261 (which had been a very big squadron earlier in Malta) was relieved by 249 Squadron. 261 was "relocating to the Middle East" (again, not being disbanded) and took 249's new Hurries, leaving 249 with old planes and no kit.

The carriers that flew off 249 are said to have flown off 48 Hurries in 3 squadrons although Birtles doesn't give a number on how many 249 had. All of 249's planes made it so we could possible assume they had 16+ Hurries that 261 took. When 185 was formed to go alongside 261 Birtles says there were 50 Hurries on the island, with 10 lost by the time 249 came.

Since 185 was formed from a nucleus of 261 it's probably quite likely that 261 had at least 25 Hurries (50% of the force) when the new squadron was formed and 20 when 249 arrived. So according to Birtles only some of 261's survivors were formed into 185 and 16 or so ex-249 Hurries were flown by 261 to their new home in "the Middle East" when 261 was "relocating".

So from Shores et al, Pickering (a first-hand source) and Brtles, it appears that some of 261's pilots went to 249 together with 261's old planes. The other 261 pilots flew out of Malta and the squadron was disbanded for a while but reformed with several of the earlier Malta pilots. Perhaps the "disbanding" was a planned bureaucratic way to clear the decks and do some pilots selection and reorganisation, give exhausted pilots a change of scenery or at least a rest, and then re-form 261 around a nucleus of old hands?

Some of these ex- "Malta 261" hands and other Malta pilots formed a reasonable proportion of the Far Eastern RAF in the early Pacific War. Shores et al's potted bios of Malta pilots also shows that about a dozen of them flew in Burma and Sri Lanka about that time. We know that least one (Pickering) specifically noted that the RAF had to change tactics to match the Italian aircraft and also to match the conditions in Burma, and that some pilots did so. We know that this was done by February 1942.

So we know from a very good source, or three, that a significant bunch of ex-Malta pilots were in Burma and Sri Lanka at the time; we know that some of them dropped the old "Battle of Britain" tactics and adopted new ones to suit the characteristics of Japanese aircraft quickly; and we know that some of them knew this sort of flexibility was required. That seems to add up to making it pretty clear that the RAF pilots were not slow-learners wedded to tactics that had worked against 110s and 109s - they were intelligent, aware of the need to change the tactics to meet the situation, and did so quickly.
 
Last edited:
Greg Boeser said:
When you consider that the USN as a whole had only a handful of encounters with Japanese fighters by June 1942, not bad at all.
Click to expand...

I didn't say the USN was slow to learn, although there was some tongue-in-cheek irony at play. I don't think they were.

The point was that to insult the RAF was being slow learners when at least some of them specifically altered tactics quite quickly under the stress of deadly combat in a fast-shifting environment, with lots of incentive but little or no rest or time to consider at leisure, when they were in unfamiliar situations, in mortal personal danger and mourning the loss of friends, is clearly wrong IMHO. That is particularly the case when they put their new tactics into play well before Thatch did so after having time and opportunity to thnk things over, so they had less time to think about the situation and clearly did not wait to learn from the (allegedly) quicker-thinking USN pilots.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 3 (members: 0, guests: 3)

Similar threads

Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44
6 7 8
Replies
157
Views
12K
beers
N
How capable was the Ki-44?
4 5 6
Replies
105
Views
10K
Irregualr23
I
The last dogfight of WWII
Replies
5
Views
2K
Gnomey
A
How did the I-16 Really Perform in WWII?
3 4 5
Replies
80
Views
4K
Airborne2001
A
C
B-29 Deployments to the Marianas - and the limits of AI
Replies
19
Views
1K
SaparotRob
Menu
Log in
Register