The real combat history of the Ki-43

[EwenS]

To pick up on some of the points raised above.

USN presence in the IO
The USS Saratoga and 3 escorting destroyers joined the Eastern Fleet at sea off West Australia on 27 March 1944. In conjunction with HMS Illustrious they raided Sabang (northern tip of Sumatra) on 19 April. That was followed up with a raid on Soerabaja on 17 May. The next day Sara took her leave of the Eastern Fleet and sailed for a refit at Puget Sound Navy Yard.

Spitfires
There were NO Spitfire IX seent to the Far East or Australia.

In post #13 I gave you details of the Spitfire Vc & VIII squadrons in the theatre in 1943/44. The last Vc were withdrawn from front line squadrons in Aug 1944. I've updated that post with equipment changes, disbandments etc up to late Aug 1945.

The only other Mk.VIII squadrons up to 15 Aug 1945 were:-
132 & 131 arrived in India from the UK in Jan/Feb 1945 and initially received Spitfire Mk.VIII. 131 Spitfire squadron disbanded in June 1945 and its numberplate was passed the very same day to 143 Thunderbolt squadron. This happened to a number of squadrons in India in the summer of 1945.

9, 4 & 10 squadrons IAF started giving up their Hurricanes for Spitfire VIII in May, June & Jul 1945 respectively

Spitfire F.XIV began arriving in India in Feb 1945 followed by FR.XIV in May. The first squadron to receive them was 132 in May followed by 17 in June following its withdrawal from Burma. Both in place of Mk.VIII. 11 squadron on Hurricanes was also withdrawn from Burma in May and received Spitfire XIV in June. The first planned operations for these was to have been during Operation Zipper, the invasion of Malaya, when they would have been the first fighters ashore, flying from escort carriers on D+1.

Night Fighter Hurricanes
176 squadron was given a flight of experimental night fighter Hurricanes in May 1943. These had been stripped of their armour to compensate for the weight of the AI radar. The only notes of their activities in Bloody Shambles Vol 3 was on 5 Dec 1943. Sent up at 1030 they were recalled and back on the ground again just after 1100 without engaging. Two other Hurricane squadrons did engage. When a second wave of Japanese aircraft was detected they were sent up again at 1130, "ordered to send every available aircraft". They intercepted IJN G4M Betty bombers and their Zero escorts. They were bounced from above, one was damaged and made it home, 3 were shot down (2 pilots killed) no mention of what happened to the fifth aircraft launched on that occasion.

The last of the Hurricane NF.IIc were withdrawn from 176 squadron by 3 Jan 1944.

It should be noted that the Spitfire Vc sqaudrons that had been based in the Calcutta area, had been moved forward to the Chittagong area to support the upcoming Second Arakan Campaign, leaving only the Hurricane squadrons available in the Calcutta area.

Mohawk IV
There is no comparison between the contribution made by the Hurricane squadrons and the Mohawk squadrons to the Far East Campaigns.

Firstly there only were about 90 Mohawk IV available at most. And only 2 squadrons took them into combat.
5 - Dec 1941 to June 1943 (replaced by Hurricanes)
155 - Aug 1942 to Jan 1944 (replaced by Spitfire VIII).

In addition, 146 had some Mar to Apr 1942 (non-operational on type. Lost its few aircraft to 5 squadron and got Buffalos for a month and then Hurricanes)

Hurricanes
I'm surprised about your reference to
"There were 5-6 squadrons active in combat, and they all took pretty heavy losses. Considerably worse even than the Mohawk IVs."

Just what are you counting and when?

In the RAF Order of Battle for 15 Nov 1943 in the RAF Narrative I linked there are the following Hurricane squadrons deployed as part of Air Command South East Asia (the air element of SEAC). Hurricane squadrons only listed.

221 Group Calcutta -
293 Wing Calcutta- 79 sqn Hurricane IIc (Single Engined Fighter SEF)
170 Wing Imphal - 28 Hurri IIb (Fighter Recce FR); 34 Hurri IIc (SEF)
184 Wing Kharagpur - 5 Hurri IIc (SEF)

224 Group Chittagong
Cox's Bazaar - 28 Det Hurri IIb (FR)
165 Wing Ramu - 258 Hurri IIb (SEF)
166 Wing Chittagong - 67 & 261 Hurri IIc (SEF)
185 Wing Fenny (or Feni) - 11,60,146 Hurri IIc (SEF)

222 Group Colombo Ceylon
17, 30, 273 Hurri IIc (SEF)

225 Group Madras
135 Hurri IIc (SEF)

Non operational squadrons
Kalyan - 20 Hurri IId (SEF)
Yelahanka - 42, 113 Hurri IIc (SEF)

Even if you only classify the squadrons in 221 Group (Calcutta & Northern front) and 224 Group (Arakan Front around Chittagong) as "active in combat", that is still 9 SEF & 1 FR Hurri squadrons. Total 10. By 1 Jan 1944 the number had risen to 12 SEF, 1 FR and 2 FB. Total 15. The 3 non-operational squadrons listed above were now operational and joined by 6IAF and 134 newly arrived in theatre. By April it was 17 Hurri squadrons in those 2 Groups. By July it was down to 10 (but there were then 7 squadrons listed as non-operational on Hurricanes or Thunderbolts).

As 1944 rolls on the number of Hurricane squadrons starts to diminish as firstly some convert to Spitfire VIII (see above) and then as the Thunderbolt begins to arrive. The first Thunderbolt squadrons were 135 in May 1944 and 146 & 261 in June, 5 in Sept & 123 in Oct, all converting from Hurricanes. On the other hand more IAF squadrons become operational.

There is also a table in that document listing "Operational Wastage of Aircraft Destroyed and Missing" for Dec 1943 to Oct 1944 ("This table includes all aircraft lost on operations through enemy action, crashes and those which did not return to base"). For the Hurricane the monthly figures noted starting Dec 1943 were, 10,7,19,11,18,19,9,14,9,9,8 for a total of 133.

Given the number of squadrons involved and the official loss figures I'm not seeing anything to support the contention that:-

"These units had all kinds of other combat and operational losses. To the point that surviving a tour in one of those units - especially if they ever encountered other fighters, must have been really challenging. But I'll go through the whole history."

Ki 43
I noted way back in post #5 that the IJAAF recognised the weakness in the structure of the Ki 43-I even before PH. So much so that the aircraft of the 59th Sentai were replaced with Ki 43-Ib models and the 64th had the wings strengthened in Japan before the invasion of Malaya. The Ki 43-I model was in production from April 1941 to Feb 1943 with only 716 produced (approx 114 prior to PH). I find it hard to believe given that position, that action wasn't taken on the production line fairly early on to rectify the problem on the bulk of the production run.

While there may have been some structural failures after that do actually know how many? Perhaps it is a case that the later ones get mentioned, not because of their frequency, but because they were unusual and stand out to become worthy of note.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

To pick up on some of the points raised above.

USN presence in the IO
The USS Saratoga and 3 escorting destroyers joined the Eastern Fleet at sea off West Australia on 27 March 1944. In conjunction with HMS Illustrious they raided Sabang (northern tip of Sumatra) on 19 April. That was followed up with a raid on Soerabaja on 17 May. The next day Sara took her leave of the Eastern Fleet and sailed for a refit at Puget Sound Navy Yard.

Spitfires
There were NO Spitfire IX seent to the Far East or Australia.

I had read that there were some, I'll take your word for now but I need to double check this.

In post #13 I gave you details of the Spitfire Vc & VIII squadrons in the theatre in 1943/44. The last Vc were withdrawn from front line squadrons in Aug 1944. I've updated that post with equipment changes, disbandments etc up to late Aug 1945.

The only other Mk.VIII squadrons up to 15 Aug 1945 were:-
132 & 131 arrived in India from the UK in Jan/Feb 1945 and initially received Spitfire Mk.VIII. 131 Spitfire squadron disbanded in June 1945 and its numberplate was passed the very same day to 143 Thunderbolt squadron. This happened to a number of squadrons in India in the summer of 1945.

9, 4 & 10 squadrons IAF started giving up their Hurricanes for Spitfire VIII in May, June & Jul 1945 respectively

Spitfire F.XIV began arriving in India in Feb 1945 followed by FR.XIV in May. The first squadron to receive them was 132 in May followed by 17 in June following its withdrawal from Burma. Both in place of Mk.VIII. 11 squadron on Hurricanes was also withdrawn from Burma in May and received Spitfire XIV in June. The first planned operations for these was to have been during Operation Zipper, the invasion of Malaya, when they would have been the first fighters ashore, flying from escort carriers on D+1.

Night Fighter Hurricanes
176 squadron was given a flight of experimental night fighter Hurricanes in May 1943. These had been stripped of their armour to compensate for the weight of the AI radar. The only notes of their activities in Bloody Shambles Vol 3 was on 5 Dec 1943. Sent up at 1030 they were recalled and back on the ground again just after 1100 without engaging. Two other Hurricane squadrons did engage. When a second wave of Japanese aircraft was detected they were sent up again at 1130, "ordered to send every available aircraft". They intercepted IJN G4M Betty bombers and their Zero escorts. They were bounced from above, one was damaged and made it home, 3 were shot down (2 pilots killed) no mention of what happened to the fifth aircraft launched on that occasion.

The last of the Hurricane NF.IIc were withdrawn from 176 squadron by 3 Jan 1944.

It should be noted that the Spitfire Vc sqaudrons that had been based in the Calcutta area, had been moved forward to the Chittagong area to support the upcoming Second Arakan Campaign, leaving only the Hurricane squadrons available in the Calcutta area.

Mohawk IV
There is no comparison between the contribution made by the Hurricane squadrons and the Mohawk squadrons to the Far East Campaigns.

Firstly there only were about 90 Mohawk IV available at most. And only 2 squadrons took them into combat.
5 - Dec 1941 to June 1943 (replaced by Hurricanes)
155 - Aug 1942 to Jan 1944 (replaced by Spitfire VIII).

In addition, 146 had some Mar to Apr 1942 (non-operational on type. Lost its few aircraft to 5 squadron and got Buffalos for a month and then Hurricanes)

These Mohawk IVs are listed in the operational history in the book I've been quoting from so far in this thread multiple times. There may have been relatively few of them in Theater, but their contribution was significant. They were used several times to escort RAF bombers which were otherwise getting slaughtered. Their comparatively outsized contribution may be down to their much greater range than the Hurricanes.

The significant contribution or frequent appearance in the combat history by rare types is something I encountered a lot in the book. In addition to P-51A, in the China section as we will see, Republic P-43s and P-66 Vanguards show up a fair bit as well.

Hurricanes
I'm surprised about your reference to
"There were 5-6 squadrons active in combat, and they all took pretty heavy losses. Considerably worse even than the Mohawk IVs."

The key part here is "active in combat".

Just what are you counting and when?

I'm counting units mentioned in action in the book.

In the RAF Order of Battle for 15 Nov 1943 in the RAF Narrative I linked there are the following Hurricane squadrons deployed as part of Air Command South East Asia (the air element of SEAC). Hurricane squadrons only listed.

221 Group Calcutta -
293 Wing Calcutta- 79 sqn Hurricane IIc (Single Engined Fighter SEF)
170 Wing Imphal - 28 Hurri IIb (Fighter Recce FR); 34 Hurri IIc (SEF)
184 Wing Kharagpur - 5 Hurri IIc (SEF)

224 Group Chittagong
Cox's Bazaar - 28 Det Hurri IIb (FR)
165 Wing Ramu - 258 Hurri IIb (SEF)
166 Wing Chittagong - 67 & 261 Hurri IIc (SEF)
185 Wing Fenny (or Feni) - 11,60,146 Hurri IIc (SEF)

222 Group Colombo Ceylon
17, 30, 273 Hurri IIc (SEF)

I believe these were the ones slaughtered during the IJN Indian Ocean raid...

225 Group Madras
135 Hurri IIc (SEF)

Non operational squadrons
Kalyan - 20 Hurri IId (SEF)
Yelahanka - 42, 113 Hurri IIc (SEF)

Even if you only classify the squadrons in 221 Group (Calcutta & Northern front) and 224 Group (Arakan Front around Chittagong) as "active in combat", that is still 9 SEF & 1 FR Hurri squadrons. Total 10. By 1 Jan 1944 the number had risen to 12 SEF, 1 FR and 2 FB. Total 15. The 3 non-operational squadrons listed above were now operational and joined by 6IAF and 134 newly arrived in theatre. By April it was 17 Hurri squadrons in those 2 Groups. By July it was down to 10 (but there were then 7 squadrons listed as non-operational on Hurricanes or Thunderbolts).

Most of these, being in India and having very short operational range, did not seem to be engaged in combat very much, at least until the Japanese Army reached India, by which time I believe many of the Hurricane units had been upgraded to newer types. Of the ones which did engage with the JAAF, the losses were (in my opinion) extreme and I think that it would have been difficult for pilots to survive a tour. But as I told RCAFson, when time permits I'll do a complete list of all the engagements mentioned with Hurricane units vs Ki-43s in the book. I don't remember any in which Hurricanes were attacked while doing CAS, but we'll see when I go back through it. I'll list the units when avalaible (he doesn't always give the units). I still need to go through the history in China, New Guinea, and the Philippines.

As 1944 rolls on the number of Hurricane squadrons starts to diminish as firstly some convert to Spitfire VIII (see above) and then as the Thunderbolt begins to arrive. The first Thunderbolt squadrons were 135 in May 1944 and 146 & 261 in June, 5 in Sept & 123 in Oct, all converting from Hurricanes. On the other hand more IAF squadrons become operational.

There is also a table in that document listing "Operational Wastage of Aircraft Destroyed and Missing" for Dec 1943 to Oct 1944 ("This table includes all aircraft lost on operations through enemy action, crashes and those which did not return to base"). For the Hurricane the monthly figures noted starting Dec 1943 were, 10,7,19,11,18,19,9,14,9,9,8 for a total of 133.

I believe there were many losses prior to Dec 1943

Given the number of squadrons involved and the official loss figures I'm not seeing anything to support the contention that:-

"These units had all kinds of other combat and operational losses. To the point that surviving a tour in one of those units - especially if they ever encountered other fighters, must have been really challenging. But I'll go through the whole history."

Most of the Hurricane losses seem to have been in 1942 and 1943, after that it seems like more Spitfires show up. But as I promised, I'll go through the whole history as reported in the book, and we can compare notes. I stand by my contention.

Ki 43
I noted way back in post #5 that the IJAAF recognised the weakness in the structure of the Ki 43-I even before PH. So much so that the aircraft of the 59th Sentai were replaced with Ki 43-Ib models and the 64th had the wings strengthened in Japan before the invasion of Malaya. The Ki 43-I model was in production from April 1941 to Feb 1943 with only 716 produced (approx 114 prior to PH). I find it hard to believe given that position, that action wasn't taken on the production line fairly early on to rectify the problem on the bulk of the production run.

While there may have been some structural failures after that do actually know how many? Perhaps it is a case that the later ones get mentioned, not because of their frequency, but because they were unusual and stand out to become worthy of note.

As again, I noted previously, there do seem to have been some significant issues with the Ki-43-1 which were noted by pilots and unit commanders in the Malaysian campaign, and there were fairly quickly some field repairs done and changes to the manufacturing. They mentioned structural failures, skin on wings wrinkling, and premature detonation of 12.7mm 'cannon' rounds all as major problems. This seems to have been largely resolved within a few months. By 1943 the Hayabusa pilots seemed to trust their aircraft sufficiently that they were routinely engaging in 'ramming' operations, often successfully downing Allied fighters and bombers (including B-24s) this way. They also frequently took fire from heavy (12.7mm) guns and made it back to base damaged but not destroyed, or engaged in forced landings. So they did not seem to be overly flimsy, at least per the narrative in this book.

 

[tomo pauk]

Take care, Bill. Covid is one nasty bugger.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Take care, Bill. Covid is one nasty bugger.

Thanks... yeah it's still got a bit of a grip on me.

 

[Shortround6]

Get well.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sorry for the long delay in continuing this. I have been going through my first ever case of Covid, caught via the wife through her hospital job. Can't say I am enjoying it. But looks like I'll probably live (knock on wood).

Get well, brotha.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Did

Did the quality of the replacements start to slip in the JAAAF late war, as it did in the Navy?
I also noticed several times that it mentions veteran pilots being returned to Japan to help train new pilots, though most tried to avoid this or do everything in their power to make sure their tour of training was as short as possible.

I'm not sure, but I would assume they did, though the author doesn't mention this. They did seem to keep providing high-ish ranking officers to the unit, the Sentai commander was usually (or always?) a Major but they kept going through them at an alarming pace. I think maybe 5 or 6 commanders for 64th Sentai were killed in 1943-1944. Some of them only lasted a couple of weeks. By late 1944 and early 1945 the author and the pilots he interviews both describe what sounds like exhaustion and a decline in morale, or defeatism, such as pilots fleeing from combat and referring to tactics to stay alive. The most grim (and feared) Theater by far for them seems to have been New Guinea (which the author calls 'Green Hell'), but I've not gotten to that part yet.

I think the first big morale decline in Burma was due to the appearance of the B-24. Not just because they were so dangerous and costly to attack, but because of the devastation they were wreaking on IJA airfields and logistics etc. The Spitfire VIII arriving in late 43 and early 44 also clearly posed a serious threat, partly because due to it's good climb rate, it negated one of their main combat tactics.

I would also add that you can read between the lines a little and see that the leadership was brutal and harsh, and the pilots were pushing ridiculously hard to overcome very difficult odds in the first couple of years of combat. You can see this in the ramming incidents, the repeated massacre of Allied pilots in their parachutes (sometimes leading to JAAF pilots crashing), and reckless decisions to chase Allied aircraft long distances, which sometimes resulted in a surprising victory (such as when chasing down a P-51 or P-38), but sometimes in the JAAF pilot never returning. I don't recall too many of them being rotated back, though a couple do go back to Japan to train pilots especially after being wounded.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Get well, brotha.

Thanks bruv, much appreciated. Everybody watch out for this one. I managed to avoid it for nearly four years. I'm real glad I didn't get the more virulent version, this thing is no joke.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Get well.

Hey thanks man. Us old guys gotta stick together

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Thanks bruv, much appreciated. Everybody watch out for this one. I managed to avoid it for nearly four years. I'm real glad I didn't get the more virulent version, this thing is no joke.

I had a version back in Jan 21, it was no walk in the park.

 

[EwenS]

I'm now getting really confused. One minute we are talking about 1943/44 and the next you are harking back to Operation C in April 1942. Which is it?

The Japanese invasion of India, Operation U Go, began in March 1944. That is exactly the time when I posted the Hurri & Spitfire sqn data for. The Hurri was still the major RAF fighter in theatre at That time.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'm now getting really confused. One minute we are talking about 1943/44 and the next you are harking back to Operation C in April 1942. Which is it?

The Japanese invasion of India, Operation U Go, began in March 1944. That is exactly the time when I posted the Hurri & Spitfire sqn data for. The Hurri was still the major RAF fighter in theatre at That time.

My contribution to this thread, going back to the OP, is (so far anyway) mainly from this book

Since the OP I have posted excerpts and highlights from this book, so far just in Burma, from late 1941 - mid 1945. I just finished the Burma section and am about to start China.

I have posted multiple examples of combat and loss rates for both sides given in the book in Burma and India for various periods starting at the beginning of that date range and going on through the end of the war in 1945. RCAFson was commenting on a remark I made about the severe difficulties encountered by the Hurricane units, and the fact that contrary to what I've been told in various other threads on this forum, the losses in combat vs Ki-43 units did not seem to be in any way related to Hurricanes being caught low and slow while doing CAS. To the contrary, they were flying bomber escort or intercepting JAAF bomber raids. I may have missed it but I don't recall any fighting mentioned in the book where the Hurricanes were flying fighter bomber missions or CAS.

This is where you chimed in with some useful data as always.

At no time did I limit myself to U Go or any specific operation. I was commenting on the excerpts I already posted in this thread, and what the book covered in the periods covered going back to the original fighting in Burma, through the end of the war in 1945. So I don't know what your complaint is here.

Once I get through the other theaters, I said I will go through and count up all of the engagements involving Hurricanes, since this was being disputed, and post the data. I also have some other books in the queue which may shed further light.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

That may be the case on that particular day, but the overall pattern is that all Hurricanes had a dismal record against the Ki-43, from the very beginning, regardless of the specific loadout or type. I'll repeat one list from the book on the top of page 34:

"All told the 64th Sentai had lost 19 x Ki-43s and 15 pilots in combat between 9 September and 29 May 1943, with the 50th Sentai losing 16 fighters and 11 pilots. Allied records show that Hurricane pilots claimed nine Ki-43s, P-40 pilots ten, P-36 pilots five, B-24 gunners five and Blenheim gunners two. Four Ki-43s fell to flak. In return, 36 Hurricanes were shot down by Ki-43s and 25 pilots killed. The Allies also lost five P-36s, five B-24s, five Blenheims, three P-40s, two B-25s, one Beaufighter, one Hudson, one Wellington, and one F-4 to Ki-43s."

So 35 (31 to fighters) Ki-43s in total, vs 59 Allied planes in that period. The ratio for Hurricanes was 36 lost for 9 claims, the ratio for P-40s was 3 lost for 10 claims, for Mohawk IV was five lost for five claims. Same for the B-24.

@Evan this was one specific post that RCAFson was responding to, which referred to losses suffered by Allied units between 9 Sept 1942 and 29 May 1943. This was of course not the only losses, but just one example. But this was the section RCAFson was dismissing as a small percentage of the 15,000 Hurricanes produced, which I think was very misleading. But again, I'll go through all of the engagements mentioned with the Hurricane units and total up the losses, and then we can revisit this.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

My goal with this thread was to improve the signal to noise ratio in these debates, by providing some of the operational history. Your contribution of the unit assignments is helpful and complimentary to that. Once we have more of the data here, we can all debate interpretations further.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm certainly learning a lot in following the discussion. That's what I like about this forum.

 

[RCAFson]

This is excerpt from Bloody Shambles V3:


"Saturday, 13 February 1943
Capt Kuroe led 12 64th Sentai Ki 43s to Donbaik, north of Akyab, as escort to six Ki 48s on 13th. After the bombing, Lt Kurosawa's element took the bombers home while the other nine fighters patrolled over the frontal area at 10,000 feet. Corporal Sakuichi Umeda spotted enemy aircraft at 13,000 feet, and at once Kuroe's and Lt Takahashi's elements climbed, Umeda then diving on four Hurricanes, followed by the other five pilots. Their opponents were five Hurricanes of 261 Squadron's detachment which had been out on an offensive patrol over the Mayu Peninsula and Akyab during the morning. They spotted what they took to be four Ki 43s climbing across their front, but these seem to have been the lower section of three Ki 43s, led by Capt Jiro Seki. Flt Lt J.V. Marshall, the flight commander, attacked the rear aircraft, which stalled, pouring white smoke from the wing roots. Wt Off K.A.S. Mann, RAAF, dived on the leading fighter, sending three bursts into Seki's aircraft, whilst the two wingmen, Sgt Miyoshi Watanabe and Lt Saburo Nakamura, evaded. Nakamura then attacked Mann's Hurricane, and the Australian felt the control column shake in his hands as the aircraft was hit. As 'Kas' Mann saw Seki's aircraft pour black smoke, he was forced to break away due to Nakamura's attack, but then saw another Ki 43 approaching and got some hits on this, which also poured black smoke. He was then attacked by two more, which were Kuroe's and Umeda's aircraft diving on the British formation. He zoomed up vertically and turned to send a deflection shot at the second Ki 43, turning onto Umeda's tail and firing from 100 yards. He saw the cockpit full of flames and the fighter went down, smoking. Mann's own aircraft, BN323, had been badly damaged by Nakamura's fire, and he now withdrew. Meanwhile Capt Kuroe found only two Hurricanes still in the area of the fight, one of which he pursued and fired at. Oil sprayed back over his windscreen, blinding him, and the attack was taken up by Sgt Watanabe, Seki's second wingman, who chased the Hurricane in a dive and claimed to have shot it down. Watanabe then spotted two Hurricanes strafing Akyab harbour, attacking these and claiming one further victory here, although his own aircraft was hit and damaged. Lt Nakamura also claimed one Hurricane shot down in flames (possibly Mann's Hurricane), but his aircraft too had been damaged, he and Watanabe both making force-landings at Akyab airfield. Kuroe had seen four aircraft burning on the ground, and confirmation was later received from Akyab that four British aircraft had crashed. This was not correct however, for only Sgt A.D.D. Gee of 261 Squadron had been shot down and killed, although Flg Off R. Mayes' HV786 had also suffered damage; this pilot claimed one Ki 43 damaged. Kuroe had now led the remaining Ki 43s to circle west of Rathedaung, where Major Yagi had gone down the day before. Six Hurricanes were then spotted behind and slightly higher, both formations climbing frantically for altitude advantage, although they then broke away from each other as they reached 21,000 feet. The bodies of Capt Seki and Cpl Umeda were later found in the wreckage of their aircraft, one two miles south of Lehkwason and the other two miles south of Rathedaung. Other Hurricanes had been engaged during the day, and may have become involved with the 64th Sentai during the combat with 261 Squadron. Two sections of 79 Squadron's Mark IIcs had strafed near Chaunge, Sgt R.L. North being shot-up by a Ki 43, force-landing HV405 near Indin, while Sgt T.B. Evans claimed one Japanese fighter shot down. During the afternoon A Flight of 135 Squadron at Ritz strip had a patrol returning at 1600 hours when Ki 43s appeared and attacked. Sgt R.E. Windle claimed one shot down, Sgt D.P. Robertson one probable and Flg Off R.A. Prince one damaged. Two of 27 Squadron's Beaufighters made their first claim on this date during a strafing attack on Toungoo and Tennant, a Ki 21 being claimed destroyed in flames on the ground. However, a B-25C of 681 Squadron sent to reconnoitre Rangoon docks and Mingaladon in the hands of Flg Off Barnett, failed to return."

The above starts with a meeting encounter, where the Hurricanes managed a bounce, then another meeting encounter where the high climb rate of the Hurricane II is apparent.

Then a bounce by Ki-43s against two ground attack Hurricanes, although this went badly for the Ki-43s. Then more encounters between ground attack Hurricanes and Ki-43s,

It's difficult to summarize all the encounters that occurred over several years, but the above was typical, in a general sense, that aircraft that gained a bounce were generally the victors.

 

[RCAFson]

This excerpt gives us a look at how faulty tactics were probably an issue for the Hurricanes but also it gives some understanding of the aircraft's strengths and weaknesses especially against the KI-43-II:

"Tuesday, 4 May 1943
During the morning 19 Ki 43s of the 50th Sentai escorted Ki 48s from the 8th and 34th Sentais to attack targets around Buthidaung and Maungdaw, reporting no engagements. In fact six Hurricanes from 79 Squadron had scrambled at 0730, and one section was attacked by hostile fighters, two Hurricanes being damaged, although both managed to land. These were HV795, flown by Plt Off O.J. Hodgson and HV662, flown by Sgt C.B. Smith. Some hours later the 50th Sentai despatched 13 more fighters to attack Cox's Bazaar, where they reported meeting eight Hurricanes, four Ki 43s each from the 1st and 2nd Chutais respectively, attacking these. Six more 3rd Chutai aircraft were providing top cover, when these also spotted four Hurricanes to the north which were climbing steeply at low speed, and attacked these head-on, claiming two shot down at once. During this afternoon engagement the Sentai claimed seven Hurricanes in total, one of them by Sgt Anabuki. Eight of 135 Squadron's aircraft had indeed taken part in two scrambles, during one of which Sgt Picton's aircraft was damaged and he crash-landed at base, although Plt Off D.A. McEachern claimed one of the attackers damaged. The two 146 Squadron aircraft and that flown by Picton were the only casualties on this date however. At this time the 64th Sentai was being held at Toungoo and Rangoon for air defence against an increasing number of raids by B-24s.

The two raids on 4th, and one which was not intercepted on 5th had been watched with a critical eye by an experienced fighter pilot. Wg Cdr Paul Richey, DFC & Bar, had undertaken two tours of operations in Europe, had claimed 11 victories, and had been shot down three times, being severely wounded on the first occasion. Famous as the author of the book Fighter Pilot, he had been promoted and posted to India, arriving in April. Joining AHQ, Bengal, as Wg Cdr Ops II, he had been given a roving brief by AVM 'Bill' Williams to investigate RAF fighter operations on the Burma front, reviewing tactics and strategy. Following these distinctly flawed attempts at interception, he reported critically on the performance both of the radar and the control of the operations, concluding that: "There is no doubt that the Hurricane is not up to the job." His original text added: "… and we must have Spitfires." While accepting the report, before it was circulated Williams deleted these latter words, explaining: "That's true, and both you and I know it, but we must never let the boys suspect it – it would destroy morale." He did not seem to credit the pilots with the wit to have worked this out for themselves. Richey however, later learned that the AOC-in-C, India, Sir Richard Peirse, had refused Spitfires on the grounds that the Hurricane was better for the job – apparently because its stronger and wider undercarriage was better for jungle strips. Richey suspected that the advice for this view could well have come from Williams originally. He followed his report with a document known as a Loose Minute, which included the following extremely relevant paragraphs:

"3. It is considered, however, that the Air Staff has played ostrich for long enough in this matter of the respective points of the Hurricane and the 01. If everyone, from the pilots to the AOC-in-C is agreed that Japanese fighters have our fighters at a disadvantage in certain circumstances let it be admitted and let steps be taken to avoid those circumstances. No useful purpose can be served by telling the pilots they have the best aircraft in the world, because they know they have not and will merely regard the Air Staff as a bunch of nit-wits. 4. Rather let this be our line:- The Japanese fighters have good and bad points. Our own fighters have good and bad points. A comparison of the Japanese Army 01 and the British Hurricane makes it obvious from the start that in a certain type of fighting the Japs should come off best. On the other hand, in another kind of fighting we should come off
best. This is borne out by experience: the Japs can dog-fight better than we can; however, they are lightly armed and need to get in good long bursts against our heavily armoured aircraft before they can shoot them down. Their manoeuvrability enables them to do this if we try and dog-fight them. On the other hand, one short accurate burst from a Hurricane usually causes the disintegration of an 01 – and the Hurricane is faster. All this being so, the obvious thing to do is to work out tactics to give ourselves the maximum advantage. We won't dog-fight. We will only attack from above, diving and firing a short burst before climbing again. If we are caught out and are below the Japs or at their level we will immediately take steps to reverse this situation by diving away and climbing up again before attacking. We will defeat the Japs by cleverness. 5. It is suggested that talk along these lines would encourage our pilots as well as help them, for they will see that their problems are understood by the Air Staff and not, as they appear to think at the moment, merely ignored."

Richey's outspoken comments caused a good deal of hostility in higher command circles, particularly from Air Cdr A.L. Gray, MC, AOC of 224 Group at Chittagong, whose command had been the subject of Richey's investigations. He subsequently suggested sarcastically at a conference that Richey should borrow a Hurricane and ". . . show them all how to fight the Japs." It will be noted that Richey had in fact been proposing precisely the same tactics as Col Claire Chennault had been instructing his AVG to adopt back in 1941!"

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

"There is no doubt that the Hurricane is not up to the job." His original text added: "… and we must have Spitfires." - I agree with that 100%. Poor guy. It's a real shame there seems to have been some institutional resistance to replacing the Hurricanes when they clearly could and should have gotten better types. One of the biggest problems with the Hurricanes is that they did not seem to be well suited to the type of hit and run tactics that most of the other Allied fighter units were using. It's also clearly (and unfortunately) not the case that Ki-43s required lots of firing time to shoot down a Hurricane, or any Allied fighter necessarily. But we'll see that more clearly when I get to that part of the history.

 

[RCAFson]

"There is no doubt that the Hurricane is not up to the job." His original text added: "… and we must have Spitfires." - I agree with that 100%. Poor guy. It's a real shame there seems to have been some institutional resistance to replacing the Hurricanes when they clearly could and should have gotten better types. One of the biggest problems with the Hurricanes is that they did not seem to be well suited to the type of hit and run tactics that most of the other Allied fighter units were using. It's also clearly (and unfortunately) not the case that Ki-43s required lots of firing time to shoot down a Hurricane, or any Allied fighter necessarily. But we'll see that more clearly when I get to that part of the history.

These 3 days were probably the low point for the Hurricanes vs Ki-43-IIs:

"Sunday, 14 March 1943

Nine days after the loss of their two pilots, the 64th Sentai gained their revenge. Eight 135 Squadron Hurricanes set off to escort six Blenheims of 11 Squadron to Donbaik at midday. Sixteen Ki 43s were scrambled from Magwe, reporting meeting ten Hurricanes and three Blenheims (the British pilots identifying the strength of the opposition as 10-12 on this occasion). Plt Off A.M. Morrison (HV773) and Flt Sgt D.P. Robertson (HV783) were both shot down at once and killed, falling in the Maungdaw area at 1245. Sgt R.E. Windle force-landed his shot-up HV791 in the same area, while Sgt R. Edge's HV427 was badly damaged. Flt Lt K.A. Perkin in HV416 attacked the Japanese fighters, claiming one probable and one damaged, but his Hurricane was then hit in the engine, and he had to land at Hay strip on return. Sgt E. Picton also claimed one damaged, but his BN315 also suffered damage. Meanwhile, three of the Blenheims were attacked by nine of the Ki 43s before reaching the target, and two were damaged, while the third broke away with the left engine smoking and crashed near Harbgin; this was Z7927 flown by Flt Sgt K. Richardson, who was killed, as was one other member of his crew, the third man becoming a PoW. Destruction of the Blenheim was claimed by Sgt M. Watanabe, while the other Japanese pilots claimed four Hurricanes, one of these being shared by Capt Kuroe and Lt S. Ishii. Aboard the returning Blenheims, two air gunners submitted claims, Flt Sgt Cameron one fighter as a probable, while Flt Sgt T.J. Wixted claimed a damaged. During this engagement three Ki 43s were actually hit and damaged, Lt Mori and Lt Kakio force-landing at Akyab airfield as a result, from where they later flew back to Toungoo after repairs had been undertaken. Monday,

15 March 1943
The next day proved to be another bad one for the RAF. At about 0900 four 136 Squadron Hurricanes and eight 607 Squadron aircraft set off to escort 12 Blenheims of 60 Squadron to Hawalagyaw and Laingwinghe. At much the same time 14 Ki 43s of the 64th Sentai had escorted 14 Ki 48s of the recently arrived 34th Sentai to Rathedaung. Four 1st Chutai aircraft were flying at 14,750 feet, five from the 3rd Chutai, led by Capt Kuroe, were at 13,000 feet, and five more from the 2nd Chutai were at 7,500 ft. The British bombers had just carried out a successful attack when the 2nd Chutai pilots saw four Hurricanes over Rathedaung at 16,500 feet and zoomed up to attack them. This seems to have been the 136 Squadron section, Flg Off F.J. Pickard (BN388) and Wt Off A. De Cruyenaere (BM936) being shot down and killed at once. The Hurricanes had been diving to attack the 1st Chutai when attacked, and Sqn Ldr Alfie Bayne claimed one shot down while Flt Sgt A.J. Carpenter claimed one damaged, this latter claim later being raised to one shot down. All three chutais then reported seeing the Blenheims and 607 Squadron Hurricanes at 3,000 feet and dived to attack them. Flg Off W.B. Gibbs (HW270) and Plt Off L.S. Main (HV788) were both lost, Gibbs' aircraft later being found with the pilot dead. Wt Off D.A. Blythe's BG955 was hit and he force-landed at Ritz. In return Plt Off A.M. Fraser claimed one shot down and one damaged, other pilots claiming two more damaged. Main returned later, having sustained severe burns, following which he had walked a considerable distance to safety. The second vic of Blenheims was also attacked head-on and the leading bomber, V5587, was set on fire. Flg Off A.W. Archer and his crew baled out safely. The two remaining aircraft joined the leading trio to form an enlarged vic of five. Two Ki 43s continued to attack, getting hits on several of the Blenheims, but one was then claimed shot down by the combined fire of the gunners; a second Ki 43 was also seen to crash and was believed to have been shot down by Sgt Warwick, the gunner in Archer's aircraft. On return Wt Off J.A. McMillan's Z7710 had the undercarriage collapse as it landed, while Sgt H.C. Allsop belly-landed at Feni in V5587 due to damage suffered to the hydraulic system. All the Ki 43s returned to land at Toungoo, the aircraft of Sgt Hirano and Sgt Watanabe having suffered damage. The Japanese pilots claimed seven Hurricanes shot down and an eighth probable (four were actually shot down and one force-landed), plus one Blenheim. Wednesday,

17 March 1943
A further JAAF raid was launched on 17th, this time Cox's Bazaar being the target. Five Ki 43s of the 64th Sentai's 2nd Chutai swept ahead to clear the air for 12 34th Sentai Ki 48s, escorted by a pair of Ki 43s led by Lt Takahashi. Finally four more Ki 43s from the 3rd Chutai were led to the area by Capt Kuroe as the support team. At 1456 hours three Hurricanes of 79 Squadron scrambled – Kuroe's formation reported spotting this trio, and then two pairs of Hurricanes flying in the same direction as themselves at 13,000 feet. The British pilots appeared to be seeing only the bombers, and unwittingly as they prepared to attack these, they passed directly beneath the Ki 43s, whose pilots at once attacked them, claiming three shot down without loss, including one each by Capt Kuroe and Lt Takahashi. Sgt F.H. Elder was killed in HV903, whilst the Hurricanes of Flg Off Bowes (HV653) and Sgt T.B. Evans (BN879) were damaged; Bowes claimed one Ki 43 shot down and one damaged. Other Hurricanes from the unit had got into the air, for it was reported that HV658, flown by Flt Sgt N.F. Simpson, was written off after he had crash- landed. On the ground BN169 of 136 Squadron was damaged as it was taking off and Flg Off I. Adamson was slightly wounded in the face by splinters. A body was subsequently discovered which was identified"

We can see that on two of these days the Hurricanes were clearly bounced and suffered as a result whilst on all days they were substantially outnumbered.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Outnumbered doesn't seem to usually make that much difference for the Ki-43s or for other Allied types. Being bounced sometimes does, especially if one side didn't remember to post top cover. Early warning was clearly a factor which greatly assisted AVG / CATF / 23 FG etc., and sometimes the Japanese too as they appear to have had early warning radar in some areas.

The JAAF pilots also mention in the book targeting the nose of Allied fighters, to get the radiators. They also targeted the cockpit. On a Hurricane there is a fuel tank in front of the pilot which is also vulnerable. This is, in part, how they were able to take out Hurricanes and often many other types, including bombers, so quickly on numerous occasions. I'd say it's evidence for something I've been suggesting for a long time, nose guns tended to be more accurate than wing guns.

It's also notable that the Ki-43 pilots did not seem to hesitate to go head to head with many Allied aircraft.