The real combat history of the Ki-43

[RCAFson]

Outnumbered doesn't seem to usually make that much difference for the Ki-43s or for other Allied types. Being bounced sometimes does, especially if one side didn't remember to post top cover. Early warning was clearly a factor which greatly assisted AVG / CATF / 23 FG etc., and sometimes the Japanese too as they appear to have had early warning radar in some areas.

The JAAF pilots also mention in the book targeting the nose of Allied fighters, to get the radiators. They also targeted the cockpit. On a Hurricane there is a fuel tank in front of the pilot which is also vulnerable. This is, in part, how they were able to take out Hurricanes and often many other types, including bombers, so quickly on numerous occasions. I'd say it's evidence for something I've been suggesting for a long time, nose guns tended to be more accurate than wing guns.

It's also notable that the Ki-43 pilots did not seem to hesitate to go head to head with many Allied aircraft.

The most important aspect of air-combat is surprise (typically by aircraft with an altitude advantage) as most aircraft that are shot down never see their attackers.


"FIGURE 3. BOOM AND ZOOM, OR AMBUSH TACTICS

Surprise usually results from one opponent having an immense advantage in SA [Situational Awareness]. There are a number of definitions of SA, but one widely accepted definition summarizes SA as, "keeping track of the prioritized significant events and conditions in one's environment."10 Therefore, aerial combat can be viewed as a competition, or battle, for superior SA. Aircrew obtain and maintain SA through the use of their own senses, training, and experience to interpret inputsfrom the surrounding physical environment, aircraft displays, and communications from friendly offboard sources. More modern detailed analysis of 112 air combat engagements during the Vietnam War conducted by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in the 1970s concluded that 80 percent of aircrew shot down were unaware of the impending attack. Surprise, the tactical outcome of superior SA, is so important to success in air combat that it is assumed in the modern USAF air combat mantra of "First Look, First Shot, First Kill." Despite vast changes in aircraft, sensor, communication, and weapon capabilities over the past century, the fundamental goal of air combat has remained constant: leverage superior SA to sneak into firing position, destroy the opposing aircraft, and depart before other enemy aircraft can react."

https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Air-to-Air-Report-.pdf

 

[RCAFson]

"There is no doubt that the Hurricane is not up to the job." His original text added: "… and we must have Spitfires." - I agree with that 100%. Poor guy. It's a real shame there seems to have been some institutional resistance to replacing the Hurricanes when they clearly could and should have gotten better types. One of the biggest problems with the Hurricanes is that they did not seem to be well suited to the type of hit and run tactics that most of the other Allied fighter units were using. It's also clearly (and unfortunately) not the case that Ki-43s required lots of firing time to shoot down a Hurricane, or any Allied fighter necessarily. But we'll see that more clearly when I get to that part of the history.

That's clearly an oversimplification. The Hurricane II was well suited to the type of combat encountered in Burma as it had excellent LG and rough field STOL ability, lots of firepower, good bomb load or DT fuel capacity, good climb rate, manoeuverability and dive rate. However, it could not turn with a Ki-43 nor did it have the speed advantage to allow a high probability of interception without an altitude advantage, In fact, we can see that these same advantages could have been put to good use at Guadalcanal where the F4F-4 and it's narrow LG struggled with the rough airstrip available.

Again, I am reminded of the USN's comments about the F4F-4:

"(c) F4F-4 Airplanes
The fighter pilots are very disappointed with the performance and length of sustained fire power of the F4F-4 airplanes. THE Zero fighters could easily outmaneuver and out-climb the F4F-3, and the consensus of fighter pilot opinion is that the F4F-4 is even more sluggish and slow than the F4F-3. It is also felt that it was a mistake to put 6 guns on the F4F-4 and thus to reduce the rounds per gun. For the opposition now being encountered the combination of 4 guns and 450 rounds per gun is much superior to the 6 guns with 240 rounds per gun. Many of our fighters ran out of ammunition even before the Jap dive bombers arrived over our forces; these were experienced pilots, not novices. It is strongly urged that the Navy be supplied with a fighter that is at least equal of the Zero fighter. It is believed that 4-50 caliber fixed machine guns give sufficient fire power for carrier based fighters, especially in view of the loss of performance involved in adding two additional guns. (Yorktown action report - Midway)"

Yet, the USN was able to overcome the F4F's drawbacks through the intelligent use of tactics.

 

[Shortround6]

Yet, the USN was able to overcome the F4F's drawbacks through the intelligent use of tactics.

The British took a long time to use better tactics. The USN changed pretty quickly.
However this old point of view took a long time to go away (and hasn't yet)

For the opposition now being encountered the combination of 4 guns and 450 rounds per gun is much superior to the 6 guns with 240 rounds per gun.

The actual weight difference was something like 20-30lbs? The switch of armament gets a lot of blame because it was very visible and very obvious.
The less visible/obvious weight changes were the folding wing, the protected fuel tanks and the pilot armor.
You could change the guns/ammo back. You will get the longer firing time. It is going to do nothing for

that the F4F-4 is even more sluggish and slow than the F4F-3.

And that took the FM-2 to fix.
Note that the USN was using paired aircraft or groups of 4 (2+2) to do the Thach weave. The Japanese and British were using 3 plane formations. The British were changing over slowly.
It also took forever to convince the Pilots ( or commanders) that what worked against the Germans was not going to work against the Japanese. British planed out turned the Germans so just outturn the Japanese.

British gunnery was a bit on dismal side, how fast it got better???
USN gunnery was very good, US Army gunnery????

There a lot of things going on besides the speed and climb of the planes.

 

[mack8]

Just wanted to thank WBK for the tremendous effort to compile all this info. And of course hope you will feel better soon.

Ki-43 is one of those underrated planes of the war. It was a much more dangerous opponent that the basic stats would imply. It's biggest fault was that there weren't more of them in 1941 (due to IJAAF vaccilation). Earlier introduction would have meant earlier mitigation of the wing root weakness issues (also IJAAF fault, aiui weight was trimmed down to make it more maneuverable as the IJAAF kept asking), and perhaps ammo as well. Recall the Zero was already operational in autumn 1940. Imagine if there were as many Ki-43s in fighter units as there were Zeros (so say 200 plus), that would have made life even harder for the allied pilots of the day.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

That's clearly an oversimplification. The Hurricane II was well suited to the type of combat encountered in Burma as it had excellent LG and rough field STOL ability, lots of firepower, good bomb load or DT fuel capacity, good climb rate, manoeuverability and dive rate. However, it could not turn with a Ki-43 nor did it have the speed advantage to allow a high probability of interception without an altitude advantage, In fact, we can see that these same advantages could have been put to good use at Guadalcanal where the F4F-4 and it's narrow LG struggled with the rough airstrip available.

Again, I am reminded of the USN's comments about the F4F-4:

"(c) F4F-4 Airplanes
The fighter pilots are very disappointed with the performance and length of sustained fire power of the F4F-4 airplanes. THE Zero fighters could easily outmaneuver and out-climb the F4F-3, and the consensus of fighter pilot opinion is that the F4F-4 is even more sluggish and slow than the F4F-3. It is also felt that it was a mistake to put 6 guns on the F4F-4 and thus to reduce the rounds per gun. For the opposition now being encountered the combination of 4 guns and 450 rounds per gun is much superior to the 6 guns with 240 rounds per gun. Many of our fighters ran out of ammunition even before the Jap dive bombers arrived over our forces; these were experienced pilots, not novices. It is strongly urged that the Navy be supplied with a fighter that is at least equal of the Zero fighter. It is believed that 4-50 caliber fixed machine guns give sufficient fire power for carrier based fighters, especially in view of the loss of performance involved in adding two additional guns. (Yorktown action report - Midway)"

Yet, the USN was able to overcome the F4F's drawbacks through the intelligent use of tactics.

I certainly agree with the Navy assessment of the F4F-4, as has been discussed many times. IMO the F4F was in service at least a year too long. But the F4F had almost three times the range of the Hurricane which seems to have made a huge difference. It also appears to have been somewhat more agile.

The bottom line is that units flying the Wildcat went about even with the Zero and the Ki-43 wherever they crossed paths, whereas the Hurricane units were massacred by both, wherever they crossed paths.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The British took a long time to use better tactics. The USN changed pretty quickly.
However this old point of view took a long time to go away (and hasn't yet)

The actual weight difference was something like 20-30lbs? The switch of armament gets a lot of blame because it was very visible and very obvious.
The less visible/obvious weight changes were the folding wing, the protected fuel tanks and the pilot armor.
You could change the guns/ammo back. You will get the longer firing time. It is going to do nothing for

And that took the FM-2 to fix.
Note that the USN was using paired aircraft or groups of 4 (2+2) to do the Thach weave. The Japanese and British were using 3 plane formations. The British were changing over slowly.
It also took forever to convince the Pilots ( or commanders) that what worked against the Germans was not going to work against the Japanese. British planed out turned the Germans so just outturn the Japanese.

British gunnery was a bit on dismal side, how fast it got better???
USN gunnery was very good, US Army gunnery????

There a lot of things going on besides the speed and climb of the planes.

I also notice that a lot of units in the CBI were flying Hurricane IIb or even IIa instead of IIc. Was that simply because the IIc were unavailable (as late as 1944-45?) or because they didn't like the cannon armed versions with their very short shooting time and small ammunition load? Not sure about weight.

 

[tomo pauk]

I certainly agree with the Navy assessment of the F4F-4, as has been discussed many times. IMO the F4F was in service at least a year too long.

Agreed.

But the F4F had almost three times the range of the Hurricane which seems to have made a huge difference. It also appears to have been somewhat more agile.

Have you computed the ranges with both aircraft outfitted with drop tanks?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

yes we debated all this endlessly in some other threads. Maybe once this one is done we should make another one specifically about the Hurricane in the Far East, though I'm not sure it's really necessary. We already did a long detailed one comparing the Hurricane to the F4F.

I also, just as an aside, don't mean to be such an enemy of the Hurricane. It does not show up as the only rather baffling failure in this Ki-43 story either. I like the Hurricane, I have a couple of models of it sitting behind me. I think it was a good design especially for the mid 30s when it came out, extremely valuable in the early days of WW2 in 1940-41, especially during the Battle of Britain but also in Greece, in the early days in North Africa, and so on. It was just one of those designs that seems to have hit a wall, in this case at some point in 1942. And as we know, it's replacement struggled to become viable, as many of the second generation fighters did in the roughly 1943 period.

F4F-3 was good in 1942, F4F-4 was extremely lacking in many respects in 1943, with the exception that it had the (relatively) good high altitude performance. They should have put something more like the FM-2 into service in 1943 IMO, but I guess the big effort was going into the F6F which they also wanted to do a good (lengthy!) run-up and shakeout of before putting it into combat. Luckily the USN seems to have had very good training and discipline, and early successes in 1942 helped a lot in their struggle against the IJN prior to the arrival of the F6.

But I think 1943 was a tough year for a lot of USN pilots, sailors and Marines though partly because of the limitations of the F4F-4.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The actual weight difference was something like 20-30lbs? The switch of armament gets a lot of blame because it was very visible and very obvious.
The less visible/obvious weight changes were the folding wing, the protected fuel tanks and the pilot armor.
You could change the guns/ammo back. You will get the longer firing time. It is going to do nothing for

If you had a bit less ammunition, say 300 rounds, and four guns, it would have been considerably lighter. F4F-4 was very close to the tipping point on weight. One factor that probably saved a lot of pilots is that the performance improved once they had been flying for a while (climbing up to altitude and patrolling) and burned up some of the fuel.

Conversely another factor which seemed to hinder the Hurricane in Theaters like Burma and India was the tropical filters they used, and the carb intake being on the bottom of the engine. The Vokes type filters had a big impact on performance, both in terms of drag and also cooling efficiency.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

Wild_Bill_Kelso I said something wrong in my earlier comment about why the Ki-43 was seen as being poorly made.

In this schematic of the 1939 Ki-43-I, it shows a three-spar design which is probably made of Alu-7075. The schematic also shows a U-shaped carrythrough/passthrough sparring. The Ki-43-I could definitely be roughly handled. I don't know what would have caused the wing root failures.

 

[RCAFson]

But the F4F had almost three times the range of the Hurricane which seems to have made a huge difference. It also appears to have been somewhat more agile.

Absolute Nonsense. You've been quite reasonable in this thread so far so maybe you can revise your statement. How in god's name can the F4F-4 with 24% more internal fuel and the approximately the same DT fuel capacity have 2 to 3 times the range of a Hurricane II?

The difference in range was about 10-25% in favour of the F4F-4 on internal fuel. The Hurricane was more maneuverable, with a lower wing loading, better turn radius and roll rate. Even with the Vokes filter the Hurricane II's Merlin 20 gave it a superior climb rate and approximately the same speed at FTH. At low level with full overboost even the Vokes filter Hurricane IIC was faster than an F4F-4. The attachment shows Boscombe down test results for various Mks of Hurricanes. The last two entries are speed at FTH and the notes give the range of a IIC with two DTs.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Wild_Bill_Kelso I said something wrong in my earlier comment about why the Ki-43 was seen as being poorly made.

In this schematic of the 1939 Ki-43-I, it shows a three-spar design which is probably made of Alu-7075. The schematic also shows a U-shaped carrythrough/passthrough sparring. The Ki-43-I could definitely be roughly handled. I don't know what would have caused the wing root failures.

it could just be from the skin coming off.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Absolute Nonsense. You've been quite reasonable in this thread so far so maybe you can revise your statement. How in god's name can the F4F-4 with 24% more internal fuel and the approximately the same DT fuel capacity have 2 to 3 times the range of a Hurricane II?

The difference in range was about 10-25% in favour of the F4F-4 on internal fuel. The Hurricane was more maneuverable, with a lower wing loading, better turn radius and roll rate. Even with the Vokes filter the Hurricane II's Merlin 20 gave it a superior climb rate and approximately the same speed at FTH. At low level with full overboost even the Vokes filter Hurricane IIC was faster than an F4F-4.

The devil is in the details. Lets save this particular derail for the Hurricane vs. F4F thread, or a new one on Far East Hurricanes.

 

[RCAFson]

The devil is in the details. Lets save this particular derail for the Hurricane vs. F4F thread, or a new one on Far East Hurricanes.

The problem here is that if you really believe what you stated, it destroys your credibility and calls into question your ability to undertake an objective analysis of the Hurricane vs the Ki-43 (or any other aircraft).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The problem here is that if you really believe what you stated, it destroys your credibility and calls into question your ability to undertake an objective analysis of the Hurricane vs the Ki-43 (or any other aircraft).

Right back at you mate, for a long time.

As tempting as it is to wade (back) into this debate, and follow it to the bitter end, not to mention respond in kind to your risible personal comments, I am going to hold off on that in this thread, and I will revisit it in another. I'm perfectly happy to debate this and get as vicious about it as you want to, until we are both permanently banned from the forum or considerably worse. But first I am going to finish as much of the actual Ki-43 history as I can get to in this one, and I'm not going to let it be derailed.

I will add that there is no reason to rely on my personal credibility or analysis, since (as usual) I am giving my sources and I'm not the only person here who has this specific book and others which provide the same data. I can also distinguish between my own subjective analysis and objective facts, which is not a universal trait sadly.

 

[RCAFson]

Right back at you mate, for a long time.

As tempting as it is to wade (back) into this debate, and follow it to the bitter end, not to mention respond in kind to your risible personal comments, I am going to hold off on that in this thread, and I will revisit it in another. I'm perfectly happy to debate this and get as vicious about it as you want to, until we are both permanently banned from the forum or considerably worse. But first I am going to finish as much of the actual Ki-43 history as I can get to in this one, and I'm not going to let it be derailed.

I will add that there is no reason to rely on my personal credibility or analysis, since (as usual) I am giving my sources and I'm not the only person here who has this specific book and others which provide the same data. I can also distinguish between my own subjective analysis and objective facts, which is not a universal trait sadly.

When you make these incredible statements, you have to be challenged on it:

"But the F4F had almost three times the range of the Hurricane"

The Hurricane IIA/B/C has 97IG of internal fuel and used two x 44IG DTs. Range on internal fuel was ~450 miles with reserves and with DTs ~950 miles with reserves.

The IIA data card shows a range of 500 miles (at 212mph) at 20K ft with a 29IG allowance for TO and climb to 20K ft.

F4F-4 has 120IG internal fuel and could carry two 48IG DTs.

How can the F4F-4 possibly have almost 3 times the range? We all make mistakes, so why not admit to one here and then we can carry on with an interesting discussion.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

So, back to it.

China
May 1942

Up until this point, from Nov-Dec 1941, the JAAF in China was flying fixed undercarriage Ki-27 fighters, who were contending with the P-40b (or whatever precise version of Tomahawk it was) of the American Volunteer Group. I am not going to go into deep detail of the story of the AVG here, because most people are familiar with it, except to note that the good reputation of the AVG seems to be largely upheld by the author Hirochi Ichimura, and the people he interviewed. I'll transcribe a couple of quotes. "Again, victories were few and far between, and both sides made inflated claims. However it was obvious that JAAF losses in both fighters and bombers in that time greatly exceeded those of the CATF. The JAAF claims were optimistic in mission after mission, but it was clear that the real victor was the CATF." Fighting seems to have been at a fairly low intensity though. In May-June 1943 the Ki-43-II began arriving, which improved the situation for the JAAF.

I would like to note that there are not enough dates in this book, I'm having trouble verifying the dates of specific events since he often gives the day but not always the month or the year. So if I mess up a date don't crucify me.

JAAF units
33rd 54th Sentai, (Ki-27)
24th Sentai, 25th Sentai, 10th independent Flying Chutai, 33rd Sentai (replaced 24th Sentai in September) (Ki-43-1* in May 1943 Ki-43-II)
47th independent Flying Chutai (from November, Ki-44*)
Bombers 58 Sentai and others (Ki-21, later Ki-48)
Air Surveilance Unit (Ki-15, Ki-46)

* the Ki-43-I arrived in May-June 1942, the Ki-43-II came in to gradually replace the Ki-43-I in May-June. They did not go back to Japan for conversion.
** this apparently was an evaluation unit for the very early Ki-44

Allied units
China Air Task Force
(originally) AVG (P-40B, by spring 1942 P-40E)
23rd Fighter Group [74th, 75th, 76th FS], after July 1942 (P-40E and P-40K, mid- 1942 P-51A and P-43, in mid 1943 P-38 and in 1944 P-51B, C, D)
51st Fighter Group, in India from Jan 1942, in Burma from March 1942, 16th FS in China from June 1942, rest of the group in China October 1943 (P-40E, P-40K, P-40M and P-40N, in 1944 P-47, and in 1945 P-51D)
USAAF 10th Air Force based in India (originally over 23rd and 51st FG and associated bomber units)
USAAF 14th Air Force (after March 1943) based in China (replaced China Air Task Force and took control of several units from 10th Air Force)
7th Bombardment Group [11th BS] (B-25C and D, later H and J), 308 Bomb Group, [373rd, 374th, 375th and 425th BS], (B-24D)
341st Bombardment Group (B-25)
Chinese-American Composite Wing (Provisional)
3rd FG (P-40E later P-40M and P-40N, Vultee P-66)
1st Bombardment Group (B-25D, later B-25H and J)

By 1943, fighting began to intensify in conjunction with major Japanese ground offensives. 23rd FG, aka Claire Chennaults personal branch of the USAAF, continued to do well in fighter vs fighter combat especially with the P-40s, in spite of the arrival of the Ki-43-II, partly due to their good network of ground spotters and the use of radar, as well as Chennaults aggressive but cunning tactics. Allied fighter units were often, though not always, prepared and had time for top cover to climb to altitude. The Japanese also apear to have had radar by this time and also made use of ground spotters so they were also usually prepared for raids.

Both the 25th and 33rd Sentai's in China received special training from the experienced 50th Sentai in Burma about how to deal with US bombers with head-on attacks. The USAAF still thought that B-24s could fly raids unescorted against the lightly armed Ki-43s but this turned out to be wrong. On [I think] July 20 1943, 14 B-24D from the 373 and 375th BS on a raid were detected by Japanese radar at Yochow. They missed rendezvous with fighter escort and were attacked by 25th Sentai Ki-43s, 2 being shot down including the leader, 1 more made a forced landing at a fighter base and 9 were heavily damaged. The bomber gunners claimed 57 JAAF fighters shot down, but none were actually destroyed.

JAAF had some other successes. On a JAAF bombing raid on the 23rd, 2x Ki-21s were shot down but "one P-40 or P-43 pilot was killed and another bailed out" and 2 x P-66 were shot down. No Ki-43s were destroyed. On the 25th, a raid by CATF B-25s and 7 x B-24s, escorted by 10x P-40s, were intercepted by 40 x Ki-43s from 25th and 33rd Sentai. Noting that the B-25s were "fast and agile", they made one pass against the B-25s and then focused on the B-24s, making head on attacks. 4 x B-24s were shot down, for the loss of 3 x Ki-43s, including 33rd Sentai commander Maj Watanabe. 2 of the Ki-43s lost were shot down by the P-40s, one by B-24 gunners.

In August 1943 5 x B-24s from 373rd attacked Hanoi where 25th Sentai was now based, unescorted, possibly due to the distance. The raid was detected by ground surveilance and fighters vectored in by radio. 35 Ki-43s intercepted them, as usual they concentrated on the lead aircraft and then picked off the rest one by one. 4 x B-24s were destroyed, for the loss of 1 x Ki-43. On a followup raid on 1 October escorted by 24 x P-40s, 3 x P-40s were shot down with two Chinese pilots killed, 2 x Ki-43s were shot down, no B-24s were destroyed. On 6 October, 21-victory ace Lt Isamu Hosono's aircraft was heavily damaged by P-40s while escorting Ki-48 bombers. Realizing he would not make it back to base, and unwilling to become a PoW, he elected to crash his plane into a river, which was praised by newspapers in Japan.

Losses
From 23 July - 6 Oct 1943 JAAF 3rd Air Division claimed 113 victories, and lost 49 aircraft (25 fighters, 14 bombers and 1 transport).
Allied units lost 30 aircraft and 80-90 aircrew.

The 25th Sentai, which was the highest-scoring Ki-43 unit, claimed 54 victories in this period, losing 8 pilots. Their actual victories as confirmed by Allied records were 12 aircraft - 6 x B-24s, 2 x P-40, 2 x P-43, 1 x P-38, and 1 x P-66

Author notes "Despite having suffered heavy losses to USAAF and CAF fighters, the JAAF considered the summer offensive a success because it resulted in the Furteenth Air Force scaling back its activities in China. The real reason for this was a reduction in the number of supply missions being flown over the Himalayas because of bad weather and the implementation of Operation Tsujigiri in northern Burma by the 50th Sentai" (attacks on transport aircraft going over "The Hump")

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

When you make these incredible statements, you have to be challenged on it:

"But the F4F had almost three times the range of the Hurricane"

The Hurricane IIA/B/C has 97IG of internal fuel and used two x 44IG DTs. Range on internal fuel was ~450 miles with reserves and with DTs ~950 miles with reserves.

The IIA data card shows a range of 500 miles (at 212mph) at 20K ft with a 29IG allowance for TO and climb to 20K ft.

F4F-4 has 120IG internal fuel and could carry two 48IG DTs.

How can the F4F-4 possibly have almost 3 times the range? We all make mistakes, so why not admit to one here and then we can carry on with an interesting discussion.

You are just going to have to wait home boy, although if you are impatient, you can read through the old F4F vs Hurricane thread to be reminded of the numerous errors you have made in your last several posts.

 

[SaparotRob]

Now wait a minute, guys. We know I ain't checking any numbers but wouldn't 3 times the range of a Hurricane be Mustang territory?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Continuing

China
Oct 1943

Breakdown of units is consistent with my previous post, with more of the newer Allied types coming into the fight. In 1944 (I think) some B-29s came into the Theater.

The JAAF was augmented as follows:
85th Sentai came into the Theater with Ki-43-II,
11th Sentai arrived in the area in Dec 1943 also with Ki-43-II. They would remain four months until April when they converted to Ki-84 Hayate.
9th Sentai became active with Ki-44s.
48th Sentai converted to Ki-43 and returned to theater.

Good tactics continued to prove that the Ki-43-II was an effective weapon, even against theoretically more advanced types.

For example, on 29 Oct 1943, having been warned of a concentration of Japanese supply ships in the Yangtze river, the 14th AF sent 8 x P-38 from the 449th FS with 500 lb bombs to attack the shipping. It's unclear what version of P-38s these were or if there was any high cover. They were hit simultaneously from 3-o'clock and 9-o'clock positions by Ki-43-IIs of the 25th Sentai. 4 x P-38s were shot down for 1 x Ki-43. Advanced warning did not always help the Allies. On 21 Nov 25th Sentai escorted 9 x Ki-48 to a CAF base at Enshi. They were 'bounced' but 3 x Vultee P-66 were shot down. CAF claimed 4 victories but no JAAF planes were lost in this raid.

On 3 December 15 kill ace Sgt. Major Eiji Seino single-handedly engaged 8 x P-40s, claiming 1 destroyed and 1 damaged, and surviving to escape. No P-40s were lost but 2 from 75 Sqn were damaged. On 5 Dec 25th Sentai shot down 2 x P-40s from CAF 32 FS for no loss. On Dec 24 29 x B-24s from the 308th BG, escorted by 3 x P-51A and 12 x P-40 were detected by radar, the fighters being engaged by Ki-43s from 11th and 85th Sentai. The bombers, now on their own, were then attacked by 25th Sentai. 1 B-24 was destroyed.

Losses
Jan 1944 25th Sentai received a citation for 100 victories, while losing 25 pilots The author calculated that from January the actual Allied loss figure was 24 planes (7 x B-24s, 5 x P-38s, 5 x P-40s, 4 x P-66, and 3 x P-43s), with another 23 aircraft (12 x P-40s, 1 P-43, 2 x B-24, 7 x P-38s and 1 P-66) were lost in actions which included both 25th Sentai and other units.

In February 1944 Ichi-Go started. Fighting intensified.

On 4 March 3rd Chutai, 25th Sentai Ki-43s scrambled and attacked 6 x P-38s from 449th FS which were starfing river ships near Kuikang, shooting down 3 for no loss. On 9 March, 13 x B-25s escorted by 24 x P-40s attacked the river harbor of Kuikiang, and were intercepted by 25th Sentai and 9th Sentai (equipped with Ki-44). 9th Sentai claimed 2 P-40s, but only 1 was lost, plus 3 damaged and a B-25 damaged, for no JAAF losses.

Another raid on 6 May was intercepted by 24 x Ki-43s from the 25th Sentai. Escort was by P-38s of 449th FS and P-51Bs from 76th FS (led by former AVG ace, Col. Tex Hill). 3 x P-38s and 1x P-51B were lost, for 1 Ki-43 lost and 3 x heavily damaged. On 5 July, 25th Sentai engaged what they thought were 8 x P-51s and 4 x B-25 over Hengyang, claiming 2 x P-51s. The unit was actually P-40Ns from 75th FS, who claimed 3. Apparently 1 x Ki-43 was lost, no Allied fighters appear to have actually been lost.

Losses
Beteween 23 July 1942 - 25 July 1944 25th Sentai shot down 44 aircraft (18 x P-40, 11 x P-38, 5 x B-24, 2 x Pp51, 1 x P-43 and 1 x P-66) and participated in the destruction of 39 more, for the loss 48 pilots. The author (on page 71) calculates that "...Of this number, 23 were killed in combat with P-40s, 8 to either P-40 or P-51, 3 to P-51, 2 to P-38, and one to a P-38 or a P-51. One Ki43 was lost to defensive gunners from a B-25 and one to B-24, and one to flak. Two more pilots were killed on the ground in bombing attacks and six were killed in flying accidents."

[Note by yours truly - this "loss report" obviously overlaps with the previous ones, but it gives more detail so I included it.]

The author notes here that the P-51B was beginning to take a toll against the Ki-43-II. In November (of 1944?) the 25th Sentai requipped with Ki-43-III and some Ki-84.

On 9 November 4 Ki-43s were destroyed by P-51Bs and another six destroyed on the ground by strafing. On 18th December 25th Sentai intercepted a raid by B-29s escorted by P-51Bs over Hankow, losing "most of their Oscars" and the commander Maj Katuimi, plus two aces, were wounded. They rotated to Japan to pick up new Ki-43-IIIs. 3 of the units pilots still in theater were sent to attack a 14th AF airbase on 5 Jan 1945 and 1 turned back with mechanical problems but 2 made it to be shot down by P-51s. On 14 Jan the 48th Sentai lost 6 aircraft and 3 pilots and the 25th two more to Allied fighters on a raid they intercepted.

After this 25th Sentai was pulled back to Korea until the end of the war. So ends the fighting in the China Theater.