The truth about Regia Aeronautica

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules


That's sadly hundred per cent true: a disgusting difference among officers and troops that had no equals in the other western warfares.
Good point.
But you will admit that in all countries not all the units fought similar? That's simply human, I think
 

"But you will admit that in all countries not all the units fought similar?"

I will admit it in an instant. NO army's units were constantly good or bad.
 
The reasons for the Italian lacklustre showing in the war are complex. There was not one single reason for the failures....there were multiple reasons.

Some that come to mind include:

1) Mussolinis misreading of the general war situation in 1940.....it meant that the armed services went to war unmobilized and with severe shortages in equipment. Most countries had some lead period in their decision to go to war, that allowed the buildup resources and spares to give their armed forces that bit extra punch at the time battle was joined. Italy did not get that opportunity. They did not use the 1939 easrly 1940 period as a period to prepre....italy went to war totally unprepared. In fact her strategic reserves were severely worn down by her wars in Libya and Ethiopia. Half her shipping was caught overseas and captured at the wars beginning because of Mussolinis snap decision to go to war

2) A weak and badly organized industrial base. The trademark of the Fascist system was its poor organization....Contracts would be given to friends and family memebers, that kind of thing. there was no co-ordination, no progrmas for planned obsoolesence, so that obviously superseded itmes (like the CR42) were kept in production long after they should have been replaced.

3) Poorly thought out tactical doctrinesand force structures. As an example, during the initia battles in Ethiopia, the italians and their colonial troops were still forming square....a Napoleonic solution in an age of machine guns....The Italians had trouble in achieving good organization for their armour, and their Infantry was based on a binary regimental system, which was inherently weak. It is significant that their better organizations....the Alpini divisions, were organized with a triangular force structure.

4) A lack of social cohesion, which translated into a poor officer to soldier relationship. Officers were often chosen for reasons other than their military abilities

5) A poor educational base which had deep seated bad effects in many areas. A well educated "workforce" makes them easier to train, they are more inclined to accept community values over personal or family needs. A well educated personnel pool is far more likley to be "selfless" and "nationalistic" over a guy who believes he owes little to his society, and a poorly educated guy is more likley to hold these opinions than a better educated guy.

One final comment on this reason. The army, particulalry the line Infantry formations tended to get the least well educated elements of italian society compar4ed to the Navy, the air force and the technical elments of the army like the engineers and artillery. Formations that were predominantly manned by Southern Italians and sicilians were less reliable than those from the north.

6) An aversion in the regime to technilogical development. The frascists were inherently conservative, and displayed, at best, a disinterest to technology. This meant that Italy lagged badly in areas such as radar, but even for "mundane" weapons, like machine guns there was a definite display of poor design. This was unfortunate, since Italian armoureres since the 15th century, at least, had shown great ingenuity and skill in the weapons they designed and built

7) For the navy, there was a poorly thought out process concerning warship design. The Fascist had offered bounties for maximum speed, which tended to lead to lopsided designs especially in their cruisers. Italian cruisers might be fast for the purposes of achieving high trials speeds, but in terms of wartime service these "greyhounds of the sea" were frequently found to be quite slow. Their turret designs frequently did not space their guns sufficiently leading to problems in dispersion. Metal working whilst in theory of a high standard was often in practice actually poorly heat treated, leading to armour that was often either butter soft, or over brittle. Italian submarines were often slow divers, and highly visible when surfaced, and the italians never gave too much thought mass attacks until shown by the germans....even then Italian sub commanders tended to be too conservative in their attacks. A number of Italian subs were lost because of sea water entering the battery rooms, which in turn produces chlorine gas inside the sub

On the other hand, the development of italian MAS boats and special forces was outstanding

The problem for the Italaian armed forces is that they suffered from all these handicaps simultaneously, and no amount of bombast from Mussolini or any of the Fascists could rectify that problem easily
 
I think people underestimate a soldiers "will to fight". I imagine that the Italians were very reluctant to fight and die for a government whose ideals they didn't agree with. Was the average Italian soldier happy with the Facist regime?
 
They were until Mussolini led them to war. Italians as a people did not like the germans, they had fought against the Germans in the first world war, and did not like the extremism that pervaded the Nazi regime. For example, the Fascists were not anti-semitic, until the Germans demanded that they be. Italians also resented the inroads the germans had made into areas they considered to be part of their sphere of interest, like Austria.
 
No, I think many Germans knew from an early stage that they had embarked on a war they could not win. But the the person that mattered, Hitler, was either too blind, or too stubborn to admit the problems the Axis faced.

I personally believe that even Hitler realised he could not win outright or easily by the latter part of 1942. He and Halder travelled to the southern sector of the Russian front about Septemeber or October of 1942, and witnessed the defeat of Kleists forces in the caucasus, and the relaization that the Caucasian oilfields would not be restored to production for years (following Soviet sabotage). He is reported to have slumped back in his chair on hearing this news, and muttered something about "this is it then"....or similar
 

Hi,

I'd say that the RA would have to rank last if comparing to the two other major Axis air forces based on the criteria of overall mission success. This is because unlike the other two, the RA failed to critically impact any of the major campaign that it participated in. The Luftwaffe for example, achieved great overall success in France, being a vital component in the German operational model of warfare as well as in the Balkans and Russia where it's efforts were of critical importance to the German army on the ground. Japan quickly gained mastery of the air over a wide region of the Pacific during the early days of it's war which was a decisive factor in that nation's rise to preeminence (for a period). In comparison, the RA, IIRC, failed to signifigantly impact or alter the situation in any of it's major campaigns....most notably Malta where it never wrested either complete air superiority from the RAF nor shut down the base (by itself)
Local successes and credible achievements? yes......but concrete end results that impacted the war? not really.

The reasons for this are a major topic of discussion and some of the fine points have already been mentioned...and largely rest in the technological and industrial areas.....the latter in particular where Italy in WWII was weak. There were also issues with training above the pilot level. Bottlenecks in new technology and production hobled the RA and impacted overall servicability. There were also mentions of training issues in group tactics and such.

All that said...the RA had strengths and fought hard, gaining grudging respect from it's opponents and winning some notable tactical battles. Problem with the above is that it tends to lead people to dismiss the RA as a clown act....which it most certainly was not. The "numbers" game, if nothing else, proves that. For example in East Africa, where both principle opponents were consigned to fight with largely secondary forces, the Commonwealth exchanged approximately 210 aircraft lost to all causes to 271 Italian. The Commonwealth gained the upper hand in part due to it being able to be resupplied and supported at the end of a tenous logistical link whereas the R.A. in East Africa mostly had to fight with what it had with little support from the outside. Eventually it withered and died on the vine, but accounted for it's actions credibly.

Over Malta in 1940, the RA lost approximately 83 planes to 61 Commonwealth (all causes). The Italian fighter pilots in particular gained the respect of the British who found them very aggressive and skilled.....even to the point of using head on attacks with their CR-42's which initially proved quite difficult for the Hurricanes to shoot down. In 41 the exchange (Axis vs Uk) was approx 220 to 281. (though around 47 were attributible to German fighters) The Greece fighting saw approximately 104 UK aircraft lost to 138 Italian (+61 Luftwaffe)

So in most cases it wasn't the exchange of numbers (which was reasonably competetive) but the lack of overall mission success. Despite the close proximity of the British base Malta to Sicily, the RA proved unable to suppress it without Luftwaffe help. Issues cited were servicability, lack of radios, and tactics. North Africa, similar: (68 Uk to 166 Italian) up to end 1940/Jan 41 when it was mainly the RA vs RAF but in this case it includes "claims" so the accuracy is more particularily an "estimate" here. Still....similar comments arise from the pages.....the Italian fighter pilots were aggressive and skilled but, one point that was noted on more than one occasion....was that RAF pilots commented that at times it seemed the Italian pilots were more concerned with fancy acrobatics than getting the kill or the job done....in other words they seemed to lack the killer instinct that drove the German fighter pilots. Ultimately the growing obsolecence of the CR-42, teething issues with it's replacements and group tactics favored the RAF side. In fairness....despite the spectactular successes of the German "Experten" Shores noted that overall the Luftwaffe failed to gain true air superiority in NA and failed to prevent the RAF executing it's bombing missions....the principle casualties being among the escort fighters....who were the target of choice of the German Frie Jagd patrols. Great for running up personal scores....not so great in thwarting bombing missions on the troops on the ground.

It was noted that any question of Italian "seriousness" went out the window once the USAAF started making runs on Italian cities. No glib attitudes towards war there.....deadly serious but by that point the light armament of most Italian fighters was a handicap vs. the Heavies. Still....the pressing home of attacks was noted.

There were some notable Italian achievements and laurals. The development (albeit belated due to administrative issues) of torpedo bombers was a credible achievement by the RA and gave them some notable successes. Italian skill at high level bombing was cited but ultimately flawed, in part due to issues with the Italian 3E bombers but more so due to the fact that, as all nations would find out....high level bombing at sea was inherantly inaccurate....so while some spectacular near misses were gained, ultimately it didnt' stop the RN. Biggest issue here was lack of coord between the RA and the RM...a problem that was never fully solved. There were also issues with ship recognition. Later war Italian fighters were among the most beautful and capable......i'm a particular fan of the MC-202....a sleek warbird....marred only by it's reletively light armament.

So ultimatley while the RA did not live up to pre-war expectations....it fought hard and well in places and deserves respect but it failed to win any long term battle of domination of which Malta, I consider the worst defeat. Its a subject i continue to explore with interest. This thread already pointed out a couple of books i'd like to investigate further than might fill in some questions i have regarding why certain things were done the way they were.
 
Last edited:

Please let me express to you all my sincere consideration for the above writing, rich of interesting informations and objective evaluations of the RA pros and cons.
If I coluld help you in getting more data, you just have to ask me.
Best Regards
Fabio - Saetta66
 
".... rich of interesting informations and objective evaluations of the RA pros and cons.
If I coluld help you in getting more data, you just have to ask me."

Right on. Great post, Nikademus.

MM
 
For those who read this thread and need some basic infos about RA. This could help them understand more the sense of my questions.

The Regia Aeronautica (RA), was established in 1928 with 1700 planes and a vigorous aviation industry. Italian airplane manufacturers, dominated by industrial giant Fiat, were strongly committed to the air-cooled engine. They believed them to be more reliable and less prone to combat damage than water-cooled engines, notwithstanding the limitations that design imposed on power. Air-cooled engines meant minimal power and minimal power meant minimal defensive weapons, minimal bomb carrying capacity and no protection from armor plating. In the early years, and for some kind of planes since 1942,Italian-made airplanes were generally not equipped with any type of radar or radio communications system and thus needed daylight and good weather conditions in which to operate.
Thanks to hard work of the Air Marshall Italo Balbo, an experienced pilot and member of the first Fascist Party that took part on the march on the Rome, very close to Mussolini, who was a fan of the aviation, a great impulse was given to the new air weapon: for example the gouvernment gave the founds to make advanced schools of stratosphear flying and high speed flying.
At the same time the many trans world air cruises made by Balbo and his crews were happenings that had immense international resonance and gave a big notoriety to italian aviators and aircrafts.
Also the aeronautical industry grow up making competitive planes that many other european countries came to buy from big producers like Fiat, Macchi, Siai, Breda. The first war test of the new armed force was the campaign of Ethiopia with approximately 500 airplanes, that took the complete dominion of the sky. To be honest we have to say that the enemy has just few aircrafts.
Second heavier test was the civil war of Spain: Italian aviation participated with more than 700 airplanes and nearly 6,000 men, giving proof of efficiency and making experience in the aerial combat. It must be said that also this time the enemy aerial defense wasn't really competitive and for sure had even less experience than RA. Therefore grew up the wrong general opinion that italian military air force was competitive. This mistake was deadly because at the beginning of the second world war Mussolini and the Supreme Chiefs of the Armed Forces thought that RA was competitive when it should have been clear to every one that the greater part of the aircrafts was obsolete or even out of order.
The Italians were reluctant to commit to a single mass-produced fighter and instead began production on several competing models simultaneously. Either they couldn't or wouldn't make a decision or they didn't want to put all their eggs in one basket. The Fiat G-50, Italy's transition from bi-wing to mono-wing fighters, with a terrible preliminary safety/performance record in Spain, came into service in June of 1940 in the campaign against France. 780 were ultimately built.
When it was declared war to the Allied nations, Italian aviation could count on 105.430 men, whith 6,340 pilots, and 3.296 aircrafts for war employment, of which 1,332 bombers, 1,160 fighters, 497 observation aircrafts, 307 sea rescue ones, and more than a thousand training airplanes; although only 54% of the total was ready for effective employment. There were various types of aircrafts, and many already obsolete and old. Italian aircraft producers suffered poverty of raw materials and technical knowledge if compared to the other powerful countries in war. From june 1940 to september 1943 there were made 10,388 airplanes, not enough to compensate the unstoppable losses; moreover the industrial production was dispersed in the construction of various types of airplane, instead that to concentrate on little but valid models. At the moment of the armistice italian aviation could still count on 1.200 airplanes, but only half of them was ready to fly.
From 1943 to the end of the war there were two Italian air forces: one, called the Aereonautica Nazionale Republicana that operated in Northern Italy into the fascist's Republica Sociale Italiana, using, among the others, Macchi MC 205 Greyhound, Fiat G55 Centauro, Reggiane Re 2001; the other one called Aeronautica Cobelligerante that operatedinto the Savoy's Southern Kingdom and was part of the the Balkan Air allied Force, using also P-39 Airacobra and Spitfires.
But this is another history …..

Now let's see closerly the most important scenaries where RA operated during WW2.

Libyan Campaign.
Although the Libyan campaign was seriously limited because of desert conditions, the Règia Aeronautica managed to retain a force of nearly four hundred airplanes, most of them obsolete biplanes such as the Fiat CR-32 and Fiat CR-42. During the first offensive towards Sidi Barrani, the Règia Aeronautica performed poorly, despite minimal enemy resistance. During the first British counter-offensive, the Règia Aeronautica suffered heavy losses (over 400 aircraft) until the German attack on Greece, when British forces had to divert a major part of their land and air forces thus giving the Italian forces enough time to deploy more units and strengthen their air forces. These were supplemented by the arrival of Rommel's Afrika Korps, and the attached Luftwaffe forces deployed almost 200 airplanes in Libya and another 600 in Sicily.
Next to the Luftwaffe, the Italian air force performed better due to the exchange of tactical doctrine between services and the arrival of more modern aircraft. During Rommel's first offensive they managed to keep RAF fighters away from Rommel's forces, and covered Rommel's retreat during the British Operation Crusader while inflicting heavy losses on the RAF bombing airplanes.
During Rommel's second offensive the Règia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe suffered considerable losses due to stronger Allied resistance until its almost complete destruction during the air battles over El Alamein and the bombing raids over Alexandria and Cairo.
The Règia Aeronautica, almost destroyed in Egypt, was quickly retired to Tobruk, Benghazi, Tripoli and eventually Tunisia.
The Règia Aeronautica also participated in the air offensive on the British controlled island of Malta in an attempt to gain control of the Axis sea routes from Sicily, Sardinia and Italy to North Africa. Although on the edge of starvation and suffering heavy losses, Malta managed to withstand the attacks from the Italian and German air forces, and inflicted losses of almost 1,500 planes. The battle cost the British 800 planes and considerable numbers of transport ships, but the price was worth it: 60% of Axis supplies sent to Africa were sunk thanks to Malta-based aircraft, submarines and destroyers.

Battle of Britain
This was definitely the biggest disaster of Regia Aeronautica during WWII.
From October 25, 1940, some 170 Italian planes (including 73 Fiat Br.20 bombers and old fighters lice fiat Hawk cr 42) were sent to occupied Belgium to form the Corpo Aereo Italiano (CAI) to participate in the Battle of Britain.
Pilots and aircrafts, as well as military chiefs, as usual, were totally unprepared for this kind of operations and fared poorly against the British defenders; about a quarter of the Fiat Br.20 were lost in 2 months of operations.
Weather and loss of radio and heat were the italian worst ennemies.
The Corps was finally withdrawn to Greece in December 1940.

Russian Campaign
Italian Air Force detachment sent to the Eastern Front were known as the "Corpo Aereo Spedizione in Russia" and acted from 1941 (from Ukraine),to 1942-43 (Stalingrad operations). It later operated under direct command of the German Luftwaffe under the name 1° Gruppo Aerotransporti "Terracciano", A.N.R. (known also as 1° Staffel Transportfliedgergruppe 10 (Ital)) and operated from the Baltic area and North Russian Front during 1944-45.

Sicilian Campaign
The Règia Aeronautica was put in a defensive role in Sicily, constantly fighting against allied efforts to sink Regia Marina ships. Just before the allied invasion of Sicily, a huge allied bomber offensive struck the airfields in Sicily in an effort to gain further air superiority. This left the Règia Aeronautica very weak, but still alive as planes continued to arrive from Sardinia, southern Italy, and southern France.
 
Now we can see the technical data of the 2 most diffused fighters used by italian pilots during last world war.

FIAT CR 42 FALCO

Type Fiat CR.32 Fiat CR.42 "Falco"
Engine Fiat A.30 Fiat A.74 RC.38
Total HP hp 600 hp 840
Wing span 9,50 m 9,70
Length 7,45 m 8,26
Height 2,71 m 3,30
Wing area 22,10 m2. 22,40 m2.
Weight 1,325 kg 1,720 kg
Max weight 1,865 kg 2,295 kg
Max speed km/h 375 @ 3,000 m km/h 440 @ 6,000 m
Range km 780 km 785
Armament 2 x 12,7mm SAFAT 2 x 12,7mm SAFAT
Crew 1
Total built 1,200 1,560


A front where the CR.42 operated in better conditions from the start was the North African one.The 127 "Falco" available in 13° Gruppo, 10° Gruppo and 9° Gruppo operated against an enemy equipped with the Gloster Gladiator, an equivalent biplane fighter. The first combat on 11/19/40 involved the Italian units and the Australian 3 Sqn. RAAF and this was followed by other combats on 12/10 and 12/26. Notwithstanding further CR.42s sent from Italy (among them those of 18° Gruppo, coming from C.A.I.), the Italian retreat and the loss of Cyrenaica by 2/41 brought to the loss of over 400 aircraft, many of them destroyed on the ground in front of the enemy advance. With the arrival of German troops and the start of the new offensive, the main task for the CR.42 biplane begun to be the close support to the ground units and when, on 4/41, the first CR.42 AS arrived (AS = Africa Settentrionale), equipped with sand filters and attachment points for two bombs, the switch of role was clear. The enemy had Hurricanes by now and the CR.42 surely was more useful in the ground support role. Thus, used more and more exclusively on this role with 160° Gruppo, 158° and 159° Gruppi (constituting 50° Stormo Assalto), 101° Gruppo Assalto and 15° Stormo Assalto, the CR.42s followed all the North African campaign showing on many occasions the bravery of its pilots and by early 1943 the surviving 82 examples were sent back to Italy from Tunisia.
Another task undertaken by the CR.42 was the convoy-escort role and, between 1940 and 1942 lots of mission were conducted from Sardinia and Sicily to protect the convoys headed to and from Libya. Last but not least, a few CR.42s were employed also in anti-shipping role with their two 100Kg bombs, dropping them after a dive. Some successes were obtained and the biplanes based in Sardinia took part to "mid-August battle" on 1942 with eight CR.42s. But there was more: the CR.42 was used also as night-fighter. The first attempt was made in Libya by using normal CR.42s in good visibility and with moonlight and five enemy aircraft were downed during 1941. Thus, several CR.42s were modified with shrouded exhausts, complete navigational instruments and radio equipment. Some operated in Sicily with 171° Gruppo from late 1941 but until the end of 1942 no more than seven of them were operational. By late 1942, two N.F. groups, 59° and 60° were based in Northern Italy, 167° Gruppo in Central Italy and several autonomous units in Southern Italy and the islands. A total of about 80 CR.42 CN (CN = Caccia Notturna) was used. Obviously the results were very scarce, due to the improved performance of the enemy aircraft. (taken from the site Comando Supremo)
The evolution of the conflict saw the CR.42 operate from Sicilian airfields as a night fighter. The armistice of September 8th left few planes in the south (under Allied control), while the larger number, mostly aircraft fresh from the factory, fell into German hands. Part of these planes was sent to Germany, while the remaining served in the "Repubblica Sociale" (Mussolini's) Air Force. After the war, very few aircraft were left and they served in training schools.
It was the end of the glorious life of the last Italian biplane, which, even if lacking speed, was able to gallantly fight on all fronts and in multiple roles.


MACCHI MC 200 SAETTA

Type Macchi Mc.200 Macchi Mc.202 Macchi Mc.205
"Saetta" "Folgore" "Veltro"
Engine Fiat A.74 RC.38 DB.601/A-1 o RC.41 DB.605/A o RC.58
Total HP 840 1,175 1,475
Wing span m 10.68 m 10.58 m 10.50
Lenght m 8.19 m 8.85 m 8.85
Height m 3,51 m 3,02 m 3,05
Wing area m2. 16,81 m2. 16,80 m2. 16,80
Weight kg 1,778 kg 2,357 kg 2,524
Max weight kg 2,208 kg 2,937 kg 3,224
Max speed km/h 512 @ 5,000 m km/h 600 @ 5,500 m km/h 650 @ 7,400 m
Range km 870 km 765 km 1.040
Max elevation m 8,750 m 11,350 m 11,350
Armament 2 x 12,7mm 2 x 12,7mm 2 x 12,7mm
2 x 7,7mm
Crew 1 1 1
Total build 1154
(MM.44952 - MM.8843) 1.100
(MM.7709 - MM.92007) (MM. 9288/9386 - 92153/92302


The Macchi C.200 Saetta (Italian:Lightning) was a World War II fighter aircraft built by Aeronautica Macchi in Italy, and used in various forms throughout the Italian air forces.
Following the end of Italy's campaigns in East Africa, a program was started to completely re-equip the Regia Aeronautica with a new interceptor aircraft of modern design. They were interesting planes powered with a radial engine, with 1-hour endurance, armed with a single 50 caliber (~12.7 mm) machine gun. After realizing the armament was wholly inadequate, they later modified the specification to the also-inadequate two guns. Several companies responded with designs.
At Macchi the design started under the direction of Mario Castoldi, designer of the Macchi entries in the Schneider Trophy races, and thus a direct counterpart to R. J. Mitchell at Supermarine. His design was a completely modern all-metal cantilever low-wing monoplane with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit. One interesting feature was the advanced design for the wing, the hydraulically actuated flaps were interconnected with the ailerons so that when the flaps were lowered the ailerons were drooped as well.
Power was provided by the 840 hp (626 kW) Fiat A.74 radial engine, even though Castoldi preferred inlines and had used them in all of his previous designs. Italian industrial leaders had been instructed to concentrate solely on radials due to their better reliability, but this change may have set back the entire engine industry several years.
The first prototype C.200 flew the day before Christmas in 1937. It was followed by a second prototype early the next year. Testing of the prototypes went smoothly. One of them attained a speed of 500 mph (800 km/h) in a dive, although the puny engine drove the plane to only 315 mph (500 km/h) in level flight. This was nevertheless better than the performance of the competing Fiat G.50, Reggiane R.2000 and Caproni Vizzola F/5, and in 1938 the C.200 won the competition and an initial order for 99 was placed. The G.50 was also placed in limited production because it could be in service earlier. However, first production planes showed control problems in slow speed maneuvers, as consequence of it, the design of the wings was subsequently modified by Sergio Stefanutti, chief designer of SAI Ambrosini.
The C.200 began to enter into service in October 1939, by which time it had been given the name Saetta (Lightning). When Italy entered the war in June 1940, 144 had been delivered and some were in front-line squadrons. The first combat missions were flown as escorts for SM.79's attacking Malta in the autumn of 1940, and the type served subsequently in actions over Greece and Yugoslavia. The Saetta saw extensive use in North Africa and a number were involved in operations on the Eastern Front during 1941-2 where they racked up an impressive 88 to 15 score in that otherwise disastrous campaign.
Performance was never good enough. An attempt to solve this came in the form of a single prototype of the C.201 with the 1,000 hp (750 kW) A.76 engine, but this was abandoned in favor of the Daimler-Benz DB 601 powered C.202. The Saetta was to have been replaced outright by the C.202 after only one year in production, but the C.200's life was extended because Alfa Romeo could not produce enough of the RA.1000 (DB 601) engines, and more C.200's were built using C.202 parts while they waited for production to pick up.
In the end 1,153 Saetta's were produced, but almost all were gone by the time of the armistice in September 1943. Twenty-three were flown to Allied airfields in southern Italy, and flown for a short time by pilots of the Italian Co-Belligerent Air Force.





Aces of the Italian Air Force

Name Kills
Franco Lucchini 26
Adriano Visconti 26
Teresio Martinoli 23
Leonardo Ferrulli 22
Franco Bordoni-Bisleri 19
Luigi Gorrini 19
Furio Lauri 18
Morosi 18
Mario Bonzano 17
Mario Visintini 17
Ugo Drago 16
Duilio S. Fanali 15
Adriano Mantelli 15
Luigi Giannella 14
Brunetto di Montegnacco 14
Corrado Ricci 14
Mario Bellagambi 13
Germano La Ferla 13
Vittorio Minguzzi 13
Guido Presel 13
Luigi Baron 12
Giovanni Dell' Innocenti 12
Attilio Sanson 12
Claudio Solaro 12
Gianlino Baschirotto 11
Carlo Magnaghi 11
Angelo Mastroagostino 11
Carlo Romagnoli 11
Carlo Maurizio Ruspoli di Poggio Suasa 11
Pietro Serini 11
Giorgio Solaroli di Briona 11
Ennio Tarantola 11
Mario Veronesi 11
Amedeo Benati 10
Fernando Malvezzi 10
Guido Nobili 10
Giulio Reiner 10
Giuseppe Roberto 10
Massimo Salvatore 10
Giulio Torresi 10
 
I noticed browsing the thread a few mentions of less than adequate Italian fighter design, particularly the G50 and Macchi C200 and I'm not sure if anyone has mentioned that actually the Castoldi airframe was quite celebrated internationally when it was prototyped as a leading design, but Italian aircraft manufacture was virtually castrated by lack of suitable aero engine production in the calibre of the Daimler and Merlin.

I find a relevant characterisation might be to think of the G50 and C200 a little like a Hurricane and Spitfire fitted with late series Bristol Mercury engines (on 130 grade it has similar performance to the Italian radial).
With Daimler engines the same designs changed markedly in the performance stakes, we all know the respect accorded the M-C202 and 205V or the G55. They'd be like a Merlin Spit (the Castoldis) or making the Hurricane all metal and tossing in the early series Griffon (for the DB-605 equipped G55). These are however the same basic airframe designs as the radial versions used in the early war (more changes made for the torquey DB-605 respectively, the M-C202 however is virtually identical airframe to the M-C200).

I don't think it's really true to say the Italians lacked in airframe design, it was really indigenous aero engine manufacture that hurt them in terms of fighter performance until the Germans chipped in.
Even then it seems the Italian license built Daimlers underwent marked resetting of tolerances and hand finishing and did not perform quite the same as German made Daimlers (with the exception of early series C202's which used imported and not license made Daimlers). Whilst their overall performance is said to have been a little better, their servicability in field conditions was much worse than for a Messerschmitt with the same engine. Walter Boyne gives a cursory mention of this in his series, among others. (before you say this is because of tropical filters, the Macchis used tropical filters, meanwhile a lot of Me-109s in Africa didn't).

It seems then a good example of an MC202 operating from a well serviced base is an excellent fighter type which is in every sense an early war design and an example of Italian aero manufacture on even footing. What is more impressive is that it was considered to remain contemporary with later war designs and was not at all out of place in service during 1943.

On the armament, the Breda 12.7mm was a pretty good gun according to Tony Williams and the Italians pioneered small calibre explosive shells later developed further by the Japanese, who chose this weapon for remanufacture over the Browning for Army fighters (Allies developed only tracer and incendiary types aside from hard core). In the early war Germany had also assured its allies (Italy and Rumania) that the 2cm aero gun would be made available to them but delivery was protracted, so it was only available from the midwar period. I'd say both nations were expecting to have much heavier armament on their fighters during 1941 but it didn't happen until later.
Back in 1938 however most manufacturers still thought one .50" was adequate interceptor armament and two .30" against fighters, look at the Curtiss Hawk or Brewster Buffalo for example. There was quite an elaborate review by the British ministry which resulted in much heavier armament fitted to regular fighters and pilot request in Germany generally resulted in the 2cm guns becoming standard (they were originally intended for ground attack missions).
The Hurricane, Spitfire and Messerschmitt were all originally intended to carry three or four small calibre MGs, a G50 or MC200 (or a Curtiss Hawk) were all heavily armed by comparison. This of course changes once 8-gun and cannon armament became standard fare which happened just leading into the war.

There is an old Navy saying that a Navy fights a war with whatever equipment it started with. This is a little true also about aero design and technology. Most of the deciding conflicts happen fairly early on, whilst the new models introduced during a conflict were often being prototyped at the start, whilst you fight those early deciding conflicts with what you already had in production.
Not strictly true, it's a very generalised statement, but I make it for introducing an important theme when making comparative assessments.
 
Last edited:
As was eluded to by previous posters, they committed themselves to an air cooled solution in aviation. But no one mentioned the Italians were world leaders in liquid cooled aviation engine technology in the early to mid thirties. It was a major blunder to drop development, assuming air cooled engines could be readily mastered. Ultimately they ended up borrowing liquid cooled inlines attempting to bridge the gap.
 
Hi saetta

You mentioned the first combats in the desert were against the 3rd squadron RAAF. This is correct, however, the squadron was initially equipped with Gloster gauntlets, and not the newer Gladiators. In rough capability, the gauntlet was approximately similar to the CR32, whilst the Gladiator was roughly equivalent to the later CR 42. I believe it was late 1940 or early 1941 before the squadron re-equipped with gladiators
 

This is true and your observation is a ... good point !
 

Punctual, as usual. Thanks !
 
al49 said:
Hi Saetta66, very good explanation of RA situation in WW2, well done!
Alberto
Click to expand...

Thank you mate


I agree with you 100% ! I will buy it ....
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

K
Regia Aeronautica
Replies
10
Views
1K
GrauGeist
D
About strafing Aces
2 3
Replies
55
Views
4K
Reluctant Poster
R
D
About "Bombs Away"
Replies
7
Views
1K
bse7entn
Question for HGabor about Tóth Lajos
Replies
0
Views
619
CHen10
Let's talk about SBDs
2 3
Replies
55
Views
5K
SaparotRob
Menu
Log in
Register