Hi
For interest, a summary of the Aluminium Industry pre-war in Germany is included in the NID Geographical Handbook 'Germany Volume III - Economic Geography' (November 1944) it has the following:
Mike
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
HiAfter a rather cursory search, the main European sources of aluminum ore were Russia, Norway, and Germany.
In addition to targeting fuel refineries, I'd also work on rail depots. I know they're easier to repair. But you slow down internal communications, force a decision about workforce deployment, cut into steel output. and maybe seed both targets with delayed-action cluster bombs to keep the repair crews on their toes.
Make airfields the top priority though like Kenney did because if the aircraft are destroyed/damaged on the ground or have nowhere to safely land then they are no longer a threat to the bombers. Damaged aircraft take manpower and resources to repair and if the hangars are damaged/destroyed then repairing them becomes more difficult.
I recall reading that between 1 Jan 1944 and 31 Dec 1944 the Germans lost something like 20,000 aircraft while they were in the process of being delivered to the operational units. So it sounds like the USAAF got that aspect pretty well covered.Make airfields the top priority though like Kenney did because if the aircraft are destroyed/damaged on the ground or have nowhere to safely land then they are no longer a threat to the bombers.
USAAF peak strength 79,908 aircraft end July 1944, the USN had around 34,000 aircraft, which rose to around 41,000 in 1945 by which time the USAAF strength had fallen to around 69,000. The Luftwaffe is reported to have had around 7,700 combat types and transports end 1944, then add the trainers.
Germany is reported to make 10% of world aluminium supply at the end of the 1930's and 30% of a doubled world output at the end of the 1930's built with an eye to air attack. The immediate war problem was bauxite supply, the mid 1940 onwards problem was electricity supply to expand the industry. The industrial expansion plans continued into the war, Germany's oil products output was 4,652,000 tonnes in 1940, 5,542,000 tonnes in 1941, then 6,368,000 in 1942 and 7,508,000 in 1943. It would appear fuel supply was the first limit on Luftwaffe size, before aluminium. Williamson Murray notes Hitler's post Munich demand for a Luftwaffe 5 times its current size would absorb 85% of world aviation fuel production and cost around the total defence spend by Germany 1933 to 1939.
Lack of oil stopped German tactical ability and skill (from training), lack of rail (and water) stopped strategic and economic movement.
Bomber Command effort against oil targets, May 1940 to July 1941, long tons, 117, 375, 219, 297, 120, 299, 204, 88, 112, 140, 153, 79, 34, 4, 48, 6. For 1940, % of effort, 22.2% naval targets, 16.5% transport, 16.5% airfields and aircraft industry, 14.3% troops and defences, 13.2% oil, 8% specific industry.
After 1 Group was sent to France, Bomber Command had an average of 217 aircfraft with crews in September 1929, with the return of the Battle units and expansion Bomber Command hit 476.7 average aircraft and crews in September 1940, strength then fluctuated up and mostly down, only 419.3 in December 1942, average aircraft quality was up of course. By the end of 1943 it was 834, by end 1944 1,657. Bomb tonnage dropped per calendar year, 1939 to 1944, 31, 13,032, 31,704, 45,561, 157,457, 525,518
The German economy had around 36 million workers, plus contributions from occupied countries, the allied strategic campaign against Germany main effect to end 1943 was the cost of the defences (including lost opportunities by the withdrawal of strength from the fronts), the Germans had plenty of economic inefficiencies to remove. Britain costed its civil defence measures for the war at around £1,000,000,000 which is comparable to the cost of all the RAF 4 engined bombers built. The roughly 1 year of oil bombings 1944/45 used about 88% of the total strategic bomb tonnage dropped in 1943. The allied ability to successfully go after a specific sector of the German economy started around Q2/1944, with hindsight the path to there can be made more economical, but the force size requirements for a start make it hard to provide the size of trained forces needed much earlier, for example it was not until the second half of 1944 all 8th Air Force groups had H2X equipped pathfinders. Certainly better navigation aids would increase the economic effects of the bombs.
For this scenario the Battle of Britain is considered to last from 1 July to 31 October 1940. Also initially Coastal Command had the responsibility to attack enemy ports, plus shorter range target minelaying.
Background, Bomber Command had 5 groups, Number 1 group had Fairey Battles, they had formed part of the RAF force in France, had taken heavy losses and were largely being re-equipped with Vickers Wellingtons, but some were used to attack channel ports and other targets in occupied Europe, in some cases using external bomb racks to up the bomb load from 1,000 to 1,500 pounds. Most of these operations took place in September and October, 150 and 48 sorties despatched respectively.
Number 2 group had Bristol Blenheims, the only type to undertake daylight operations during the battle. In addition a series of small trial night operations with Blenheims was run in the second half of July, 62 sorties despatched, followed by a near two week pause. Large scale night operations by Blenheims began on 12 August, with 316 sorties despatched by the end of the month, 786 in September and 469 in October. So the group was also active at night.
Number 3 group had Vickers Wellingtons.
Number 4 group had Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys.
Number 5 group had Handley Page Hampdens, the Hampdens were the only Bomber Command aircraft to drop mines and this would remain the case until the second half of 1941.
Bomber Command's staff were still adjusting to the increased tempo of wartime operations, so aircraft that crashed in England or landed away from their normal base were often omitted from the raid reports, effectively as if they brought their bombs back, or else their report was received too late to make it into the official figures, though it is part of the raid reports. Together with the assumption any missing aircraft did not attack a target it means the official figures are a slight underestimate of bombs dropped. A small source of difference is the RAF used long tons, 2,240 pounds, converting the bomb load to tons to 1 decimal place of accuracy. Given the non randomness of the bomb loads this introduces differences, for example the standard Blenheim load of 1,000 pounds is 0.45 long tons, usually reported as 0.4 tons. Many of the raid reports have totals written in pencil, which usually become the official figures. All up the figures here come to 6,657.1 long tons of bombs dropped July to October 1940 inclusive, the official total is 6,612 long tons.
Unfortunately some reports only give a list of targets attacked by a given aircraft type on a given day or night together with the bombs dropped, not a list of bombs dropped by individual target, so most of this deals with what the RAF wanted to attack, not what was actually attacked. On the other hand many reports give the bombing altitudes, showing 10,000 feet was high level and some were bombing from hundreds, not thousands, of feet high.
There is of course a number of contradictions both within the raid reports and the raid report versus the official figures, about how many aircraft attacked, what they attacked and what bombs they dropped. Many involve late reports but most will require records from the groups or squadrons to hopefully resolve.
This was still a time when aircraft unable to locate a target, even in Germany, brought their bombs back. For some reasons mines dropped on official bomb raids, for example in the Dortmund Ems canal, are defined as 1,500 pound type M bombs. These minelayers were going in at low level judging by their loss rate.
Day bomber.
These were hampered by a lack of fighter escorts, meaning raids tended to be in weather bad enough to provide clouds to hide in, but good enough to see targets, as a result attack rates were low, only about a quarter of the day bomber sorties attacked a target. Sorties were despatched on 111 out of the 123 days July to October.
At the start of the battle Bomber Command kept attacking Germany, even by day, with about half the day bomber sorties despatched in July, a fifth in August, a 14% in September and half in October. There was a gap in daylight operations to Germany, from 9 September to 2 October, apart from 1 sortie sent on 28 September.
In July and August aircraft losses were about 20% of effective bomber sorties, 10% in September and under 3% in October.
Of the 550 bomber sorties despatched (NOT attacking) in July 258 were to targets in Germany, including 106 against oil targets, 50 against aircraft industry, 38 against ships and ports, 32 against airfields with most of the rest of the sorties to rail marshalling yards or aluminium plants. The 292 sorties to occupied countries included 210 to airfields (130 France, 58 Belgium), and 68 against ships and ports (44 Holland, 12 Denmark, 9 France)
In August 430 day bomber sorties were despatched. Of the 92 sent to Germany, 42 were against oil targets and 49 against aircraft industry targets, with 1 against a canal.
The 338 sorties to occupied countries were all to airfields, 32 Belgium, 10 Britain (Channel Islands), 79 France, 95 Holland and 86 to "Europe". The latter being sorties where no definitive target is given, rather an area is specified that usually is a mixture of Belgium, Holland and/or France.
In September there were 216 day bomber sorties despatched. The 30 to Germany (on the 1st to the 8th) were 16 aircraft industry, 10 oil, 3 canals and 1 anti ship.
The 186 sorties to occupied countries have 162 anti invasion, that is sorties against warships, merchant ships and ports. These comprised 32 to Belgium, 50 "Europe", 44 France and 36 Holland. Another 24 sorties were sent to airfields (4 Belgium, 10 France, 10 Holland). Sorties against airfields essentially ceased on 8 September, anti invasion sorties began on 9 September.
In October there were again 216 day bomber sorties despatched. Sorties against German targets resumed on the 3rd, with 107 sorties sent for the month, 54 to oil targets, 25 against ports and shipping, 15 against marshalling yards, 10 against aluminium plants and 3 against canals.
The 109 sorties to occupied countries were 72 anti invasion (12 Belgium, 9 Europe, 35 France, 17 Holland) and 34 against airfields, 31 of which were in France. Note 21 of the airfield sorties were on the 28th to the 31st.
So daylight operations harassed the Luftwaffe while trying for longer term results with attacks on aircraft industry and oil targets, and this strategy was maintained except for a roughly three week period from 9 September when effort was concentrated on the invasion fleet with 164 out of 170 sorties despatched sent against ships or ports. The anti shipping effort then tapered off. It would be revived post battle with operation Channel Stop.
On 5 August a day reconnaissance patrol was started, using aircraft based at Lossiemouth, the original navigation instructions were "Smith's Bank and position 090 Montrose 47 miles thence a course 060 depth 160 miles.", this was run almost daily with 6 aircraft until the end of October. Only two attacks were made, 1 on a suspected U-boat near the British coast, the second against escort vessels near Utsire Island, which is north of Stavanger in Norway.
Night Bomber.
Unlike the day raids there is no noticeable break in attempts to bomb targets in Germany, operations were conducted on 113 out of the 123 nights and sorties were sent to Germany on 112 nights, the only night of operations where no sorties were sent to Germany was 21 September. While there are some exceptions the target list in Germany did not change much over the 4 months.
There were 5,919 bomber sorties sent to Germany in the July to October period with the main themes being oil targets, 1,902 sorties, Marshalling yards and rail storage sidings, 836 sorties, shipyards and ports 710 sorties, aircraft industry targets, 634 sorties, electricity industry, 345 sorties, warships 326 sorties, aluminium industry 249 sorties. There was also the 98 sorties sent to try and create forest fires in the 6 days 1 to 6 September. In keeping with the over estimation on bomber effectiveness sorties sent to individual targets were small, of all the raids on marshalling yards for example only 4 had 10 or more sorties, aircraft were sent to the yards in Hamm on 65 nights, total sorties despatched was 207.
The raids on German aircraft industry targets effectively ceased on 1 September and only 165 sorties were despatched to oil targets in September, while attacks on electricity targets began on 19 August in an attack on Zschornewitz-Golpa and 438 of the shipping related sorties were in October. Despite these changes the general overall impression is of a constant set of targets within a plan to maintain a constant amount of activity against the targets. It is remarkable how much the target list looks like the one from 1944.
July, of the 1,615 sorties despatched 1,477 were to Germany and 67 to France, 44% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 28% attacked secondary targets. Most of the sorties to occupied Europe were against airfields.
August, of the 2,067 sorties despatched 1,574 were to Germany, 299 to France and 72 to Italy, 51% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 25% attacked secondary targets. Near nightly raids to targets in Belgium, France and Holland began on 12 August, however they were mainly directed at airfields with 284 sorties and French oil targets, 93 sorties, none were against shipping or ports.
September, of the 3,088 sorties despatched 1,221 were to Germany, 1,170 to France and 597 to Belgium, 73% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 14% attacked secondary targets, showing the effect of more closer range targets.
Remarkably sorties attacking shipping or ports in occupied Europe only started on 2 September and that was 12 sorties to U-boat docks at Lorient, on the 5th 13 sorties were sent to E-boat docks at Boulogne, plus 3 sorties to attack barges at Delfzijl in Holland. It was not until 7 September sorties to Belgium, France and Holland became almost exclusively against ports and shipping, with a further 1,618 sorties despatched to the end of the month. Over 100 sorties per night were sent on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 19th. It means that of the 1,850 sorties sent to Belgium, France and Holland in September 1,682 were against invasion targets and 57 against airfields. Some 21 of the aircraft despatched to invasion targets were listed as missing, or around 1.25% compared with an overall night bomber loss rate of 1.68% for the month. The ports were certainly well defended.
October, of the 2,118 sorties despatched 1,647 were to Germany, 285 to France and 94 to Holland, 51% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 24% attacked secondary targets. Of the 440 sorties sent to Belgium, France and Holland in September 351 were against invasion targets and 52 against airfields. Sorties against airfields in occupied countries were mainly done from the 20th onwards.
Essentially throughout the battle Bomber Command maintained a steady number of night bomber sorties to targets in Germany, devoting most of the additional effort against targets outside Germany and the campaign against the invasion fleet proper was only commenced at the start of the second week in September and within a week was causing significant shipping losses.
An ongoing minor campaign against the German guns at Cap Gris Nez used 19 sorties in August, 60 in September and 9 in October.
There were 26 nights of raids on Berlin, starting on 25 August, totalling 700 sorties, of these 298 were against electricity targets, including 5 different generator plants, 59 against gas works and 129 against the government buildings area.
Note at this time during the war Coastal Command was still laying mines, the following information only covers Bomber Command which had taken over the longer range work.
Minelaying, 528 sorties despatched on 59 nights July to October, 136 to Denmark, 160 to France, 220 to Germany and 12 to Norway. By month, 196 in July, 180 in August, 64 in September and 88 in October.
Until 19 August all sorties were to Denmark or Germany except for 12 to Norway on 6 August. On 22 August the first mines were laid in French waters, from then to 9 October 140 out of 184 sorties were to French targets. After 9 October the concentration on French targets was reduced. The breakdown for October was 38 to France, 39 to Germany and 11 to Denmark. Minelaying aircraft often carried a pair of 250 pound bombs and attacked various targets of opportunity, about a third of sorties despatched dropped bombs.
Leaflets, the regular bombers carried leaflets on raids, but designated leaflet raids, usually done by aircraft from the training units (numbers 6 and 7 group), began on 18 July, almost all were to France. All up 94 sorties despatched. The aircraft also carried bombs at times and attacked targets of opportunity, about 15% of sorties dropped bombs, including on the channel islands, so the RAF was attacking British territory.
Other operations run on a small scale include weather and photographic reconnaissance, air sea rescue and the start of intruder operations, in the latter case by Blenheim bombers.
Do we know that for certain?Concentrating on one target type throughout the war, whatever the war situation was, would more likely be a "losing strategy" rather than a "winning strategy".
It would be impossible to answer any such counterfactual for certain.Do we know that for certain?
Hi
Details from BBSU Report, reference the "Top Priority Objectives" and what type of targets were bombed:
RAF Bomber Command:
View attachment 826610
VIIIth USAAF:
View attachment 826611
XVth USAAF:
View attachment 826612
Concentrating on one target type throughout the war, whatever the war situation was, would more likely be a "losing strategy" rather than a "winning strategy".
German Oil Stats:
View attachment 826613
This is in thousands of metric tons.
I hope that is of interest.
Mike
That was kinda my point.It would be impossible to answer any such counterfactual for certain.
Neither Bomber Command nor the USAAF had the technology to accurately hit industrial targets. Lindeman all but acknowledged this when he proposed the real purpose of strategic bombing was to "dehouse" the enemy workforce. Dehouseing civilians doesn't kill enemy solders.
Unless WAllies are not deep in France by, say, August-September of 1943, there is no way that the war can end by May of 1944. Especially with LW being with full stocks of fuel and their aircraft manned with the pilots that have full set of flying hours as the WAllied pilots, and not just a half - or worse - as it was the case historically.Patrick Blackett wrote: "if the Allied air effort had been used more intelligently, if more aircraft had been supplied for the Battle of the Atlantic and to support the land fighting in Africa and later in France, if the bombing of Germany had been carried out with the attrition of enemy defences in mind rather than razing cities to the ground, I believe the war could have been won half a year or even a year earlier."
Idea of winning the war by killing the enemy soldiers is simple, but execution of that idea might not be. Luftwaffe will not be lured to fight above France in 1943 in a major way as the Allied planners might've wished. For the WAllies, to defeat Germany is to defeat Luftwaffe 1st, and Heer 2nd.Wars are won by killing enemy solders, plain and simple. GEN Marshall directed GEN Eisenhower to: "You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces…" If more industrial output had been used for tactical aircraft perhaps the German Army may have been destroyed sooner and the War ended sooner, but this is wise long after the events.
So.
The strategy (such as it was) against Germany in WW2 was less successful than it might have been.
What would have been the optimal strategy or elements thereof?
Assume the same resources available.
Fight!