The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany

[MikeMeech]

After a rather cursory search, the main European sources of aluminum ore were Russia, Norway, and Germany.

Hi
For interest, a summary of the Aluminium Industry pre-war in Germany is included in the NID Geographical Handbook 'Germany Volume III - Economic Geography' (November 1944) it has the following:

Mike

 

[MiTasol]

In addition to targeting fuel refineries, I'd also work on rail depots. I know they're easier to repair. But you slow down internal communications, force a decision about workforce deployment, cut into steel output. and maybe seed both targets with delayed-action cluster bombs to keep the repair crews on their toes.

Make airfields the top priority though like Kenney did because if the aircraft are destroyed/damaged on the ground or have nowhere to safely land then they are no longer a threat to the bombers. Damaged aircraft take manpower and resources to repair and if the hangars are damaged/destroyed then repairing them becomes more difficult.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Make airfields the top priority though like Kenney did because if the aircraft are destroyed/damaged on the ground or have nowhere to safely land then they are no longer a threat to the bombers. Damaged aircraft take manpower and resources to repair and if the hangars are damaged/destroyed then repairing them becomes more difficult.

Definitely an angle to attack, but attacking refineries, or the rail-cars that transport that fuel, will also keep those aircraft on the ground -- albeit it will take longer, it will have larger ripple effects on the wider economy.

 

[MIflyer]

Make airfields the top priority though like Kenney did because if the aircraft are destroyed/damaged on the ground or have nowhere to safely land then they are no longer a threat to the bombers.

I recall reading that between 1 Jan 1944 and 31 Dec 1944 the Germans lost something like 20,000 aircraft while they were in the process of being delivered to the operational units. So it sounds like the USAAF got that aspect pretty well covered.

I recall reading that in order to supplement their AL the Germans used an alloy that used an unusually high percentage of MG. When they caught fire the skin of the aircraft itself would burn.

 

[MiTasol]

Quite a few American aircraft also had magnesium sheet or castings as well.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Magnesium was mostly used in brakes as I understand it, as it was expensive and hard to source and not in sufficient quantity for skinning thousands of planes. For American aircraft aluminum was the sheeting of choice. Aluminum burns too, just not as readily.

Odd to use magnesium in brakes as it is not just flammable but prone to thermal shock -- i.e., if a plane locked brakes on landing causing a brake fire, throwing water on them would often result in brake discs exploding from thermal shock, sending shrapnel to Hell and breakfast.

By the time I was a USAF firefighter, we had Purple-K to smother brake-fires without putting water on the things, a dry powder that clung to the burning metal and killed the fire by anoxia.

 

[MiTasol]

Many castings on NAA aircraft during ww2 were magnesium as they are lighter than aluminium.

Bristol Hercules engines have a lot of magnesium in the rear cases.

Likewise other airframe and engine manufacturers used it randomly - including at least two turrets that I have worked on.

I cannot remember which but I have worked on at least one aircraft that had spot welded magnesium control surfaces. I think it was an early Vtail Bonanza.

I think the use on brakes was because of its rapid heat transfer/dissipation.

 

[swampyankee]

Some magnesium alloys have better properties than aluminum ones at temperatures above 100 Celsius or so.

 

[swampyankee]

USAAF peak strength 79,908 aircraft end July 1944, the USN had around 34,000 aircraft, which rose to around 41,000 in 1945 by which time the USAAF strength had fallen to around 69,000. The Luftwaffe is reported to have had around 7,700 combat types and transports end 1944, then add the trainers.

Germany is reported to make 10% of world aluminium supply at the end of the 1930's and 30% of a doubled world output at the end of the 1930's built with an eye to air attack. The immediate war problem was bauxite supply, the mid 1940 onwards problem was electricity supply to expand the industry. The industrial expansion plans continued into the war, Germany's oil products output was 4,652,000 tonnes in 1940, 5,542,000 tonnes in 1941, then 6,368,000 in 1942 and 7,508,000 in 1943. It would appear fuel supply was the first limit on Luftwaffe size, before aluminium. Williamson Murray notes Hitler's post Munich demand for a Luftwaffe 5 times its current size would absorb 85% of world aviation fuel production and cost around the total defence spend by Germany 1933 to 1939.

Lack of oil stopped German tactical ability and skill (from training), lack of rail (and water) stopped strategic and economic movement.

Bomber Command effort against oil targets, May 1940 to July 1941, long tons, 117, 375, 219, 297, 120, 299, 204, 88, 112, 140, 153, 79, 34, 4, 48, 6. For 1940, % of effort, 22.2% naval targets, 16.5% transport, 16.5% airfields and aircraft industry, 14.3% troops and defences, 13.2% oil, 8% specific industry.

After 1 Group was sent to France, Bomber Command had an average of 217 aircfraft with crews in September 1929, with the return of the Battle units and expansion Bomber Command hit 476.7 average aircraft and crews in September 1940, strength then fluctuated up and mostly down, only 419.3 in December 1942, average aircraft quality was up of course. By the end of 1943 it was 834, by end 1944 1,657. Bomb tonnage dropped per calendar year, 1939 to 1944, 31, 13,032, 31,704, 45,561, 157,457, 525,518

The German economy had around 36 million workers, plus contributions from occupied countries, the allied strategic campaign against Germany main effect to end 1943 was the cost of the defences (including lost opportunities by the withdrawal of strength from the fronts), the Germans had plenty of economic inefficiencies to remove. Britain costed its civil defence measures for the war at around £1,000,000,000 which is comparable to the cost of all the RAF 4 engined bombers built. The roughly 1 year of oil bombings 1944/45 used about 88% of the total strategic bomb tonnage dropped in 1943. The allied ability to successfully go after a specific sector of the German economy started around Q2/1944, with hindsight the path to there can be made more economical, but the force size requirements for a start make it hard to provide the size of trained forces needed much earlier, for example it was not until the second half of 1944 all 8th Air Force groups had H2X equipped pathfinders. Certainly better navigation aids would increase the economic effects of the bombs.

For this scenario the Battle of Britain is considered to last from 1 July to 31 October 1940. Also initially Coastal Command had the responsibility to attack enemy ports, plus shorter range target minelaying.

Background, Bomber Command had 5 groups, Number 1 group had Fairey Battles, they had formed part of the RAF force in France, had taken heavy losses and were largely being re-equipped with Vickers Wellingtons, but some were used to attack channel ports and other targets in occupied Europe, in some cases using external bomb racks to up the bomb load from 1,000 to 1,500 pounds. Most of these operations took place in September and October, 150 and 48 sorties despatched respectively.

Number 2 group had Bristol Blenheims, the only type to undertake daylight operations during the battle. In addition a series of small trial night operations with Blenheims was run in the second half of July, 62 sorties despatched, followed by a near two week pause. Large scale night operations by Blenheims began on 12 August, with 316 sorties despatched by the end of the month, 786 in September and 469 in October. So the group was also active at night.

Number 3 group had Vickers Wellingtons.

Number 4 group had Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys.

Number 5 group had Handley Page Hampdens, the Hampdens were the only Bomber Command aircraft to drop mines and this would remain the case until the second half of 1941.

Bomber Command's staff were still adjusting to the increased tempo of wartime operations, so aircraft that crashed in England or landed away from their normal base were often omitted from the raid reports, effectively as if they brought their bombs back, or else their report was received too late to make it into the official figures, though it is part of the raid reports. Together with the assumption any missing aircraft did not attack a target it means the official figures are a slight underestimate of bombs dropped. A small source of difference is the RAF used long tons, 2,240 pounds, converting the bomb load to tons to 1 decimal place of accuracy. Given the non randomness of the bomb loads this introduces differences, for example the standard Blenheim load of 1,000 pounds is 0.45 long tons, usually reported as 0.4 tons. Many of the raid reports have totals written in pencil, which usually become the official figures. All up the figures here come to 6,657.1 long tons of bombs dropped July to October 1940 inclusive, the official total is 6,612 long tons.

Unfortunately some reports only give a list of targets attacked by a given aircraft type on a given day or night together with the bombs dropped, not a list of bombs dropped by individual target, so most of this deals with what the RAF wanted to attack, not what was actually attacked. On the other hand many reports give the bombing altitudes, showing 10,000 feet was high level and some were bombing from hundreds, not thousands, of feet high.

There is of course a number of contradictions both within the raid reports and the raid report versus the official figures, about how many aircraft attacked, what they attacked and what bombs they dropped. Many involve late reports but most will require records from the groups or squadrons to hopefully resolve.

This was still a time when aircraft unable to locate a target, even in Germany, brought their bombs back. For some reasons mines dropped on official bomb raids, for example in the Dortmund Ems canal, are defined as 1,500 pound type M bombs. These minelayers were going in at low level judging by their loss rate.

Day bomber.

These were hampered by a lack of fighter escorts, meaning raids tended to be in weather bad enough to provide clouds to hide in, but good enough to see targets, as a result attack rates were low, only about a quarter of the day bomber sorties attacked a target. Sorties were despatched on 111 out of the 123 days July to October.

At the start of the battle Bomber Command kept attacking Germany, even by day, with about half the day bomber sorties despatched in July, a fifth in August, a 14% in September and half in October. There was a gap in daylight operations to Germany, from 9 September to 2 October, apart from 1 sortie sent on 28 September.

In July and August aircraft losses were about 20% of effective bomber sorties, 10% in September and under 3% in October.

Of the 550 bomber sorties despatched (NOT attacking) in July 258 were to targets in Germany, including 106 against oil targets, 50 against aircraft industry, 38 against ships and ports, 32 against airfields with most of the rest of the sorties to rail marshalling yards or aluminium plants. The 292 sorties to occupied countries included 210 to airfields (130 France, 58 Belgium), and 68 against ships and ports (44 Holland, 12 Denmark, 9 France)

In August 430 day bomber sorties were despatched. Of the 92 sent to Germany, 42 were against oil targets and 49 against aircraft industry targets, with 1 against a canal.

The 338 sorties to occupied countries were all to airfields, 32 Belgium, 10 Britain (Channel Islands), 79 France, 95 Holland and 86 to "Europe". The latter being sorties where no definitive target is given, rather an area is specified that usually is a mixture of Belgium, Holland and/or France.

In September there were 216 day bomber sorties despatched. The 30 to Germany (on the 1st to the 8th) were 16 aircraft industry, 10 oil, 3 canals and 1 anti ship.

The 186 sorties to occupied countries have 162 anti invasion, that is sorties against warships, merchant ships and ports. These comprised 32 to Belgium, 50 "Europe", 44 France and 36 Holland. Another 24 sorties were sent to airfields (4 Belgium, 10 France, 10 Holland). Sorties against airfields essentially ceased on 8 September, anti invasion sorties began on 9 September.

In October there were again 216 day bomber sorties despatched. Sorties against German targets resumed on the 3rd, with 107 sorties sent for the month, 54 to oil targets, 25 against ports and shipping, 15 against marshalling yards, 10 against aluminium plants and 3 against canals.

The 109 sorties to occupied countries were 72 anti invasion (12 Belgium, 9 Europe, 35 France, 17 Holland) and 34 against airfields, 31 of which were in France. Note 21 of the airfield sorties were on the 28th to the 31st.

So daylight operations harassed the Luftwaffe while trying for longer term results with attacks on aircraft industry and oil targets, and this strategy was maintained except for a roughly three week period from 9 September when effort was concentrated on the invasion fleet with 164 out of 170 sorties despatched sent against ships or ports. The anti shipping effort then tapered off. It would be revived post battle with operation Channel Stop.

On 5 August a day reconnaissance patrol was started, using aircraft based at Lossiemouth, the original navigation instructions were "Smith's Bank and position 090 Montrose 47 miles thence a course 060 depth 160 miles.", this was run almost daily with 6 aircraft until the end of October. Only two attacks were made, 1 on a suspected U-boat near the British coast, the second against escort vessels near Utsire Island, which is north of Stavanger in Norway.

Night Bomber.

Unlike the day raids there is no noticeable break in attempts to bomb targets in Germany, operations were conducted on 113 out of the 123 nights and sorties were sent to Germany on 112 nights, the only night of operations where no sorties were sent to Germany was 21 September. While there are some exceptions the target list in Germany did not change much over the 4 months.

There were 5,919 bomber sorties sent to Germany in the July to October period with the main themes being oil targets, 1,902 sorties, Marshalling yards and rail storage sidings, 836 sorties, shipyards and ports 710 sorties, aircraft industry targets, 634 sorties, electricity industry, 345 sorties, warships 326 sorties, aluminium industry 249 sorties. There was also the 98 sorties sent to try and create forest fires in the 6 days 1 to 6 September. In keeping with the over estimation on bomber effectiveness sorties sent to individual targets were small, of all the raids on marshalling yards for example only 4 had 10 or more sorties, aircraft were sent to the yards in Hamm on 65 nights, total sorties despatched was 207.

The raids on German aircraft industry targets effectively ceased on 1 September and only 165 sorties were despatched to oil targets in September, while attacks on electricity targets began on 19 August in an attack on Zschornewitz-Golpa and 438 of the shipping related sorties were in October. Despite these changes the general overall impression is of a constant set of targets within a plan to maintain a constant amount of activity against the targets. It is remarkable how much the target list looks like the one from 1944.

July, of the 1,615 sorties despatched 1,477 were to Germany and 67 to France, 44% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 28% attacked secondary targets. Most of the sorties to occupied Europe were against airfields.

August, of the 2,067 sorties despatched 1,574 were to Germany, 299 to France and 72 to Italy, 51% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 25% attacked secondary targets. Near nightly raids to targets in Belgium, France and Holland began on 12 August, however they were mainly directed at airfields with 284 sorties and French oil targets, 93 sorties, none were against shipping or ports.

September, of the 3,088 sorties despatched 1,221 were to Germany, 1,170 to France and 597 to Belgium, 73% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 14% attacked secondary targets, showing the effect of more closer range targets.

Remarkably sorties attacking shipping or ports in occupied Europe only started on 2 September and that was 12 sorties to U-boat docks at Lorient, on the 5th 13 sorties were sent to E-boat docks at Boulogne, plus 3 sorties to attack barges at Delfzijl in Holland. It was not until 7 September sorties to Belgium, France and Holland became almost exclusively against ports and shipping, with a further 1,618 sorties despatched to the end of the month. Over 100 sorties per night were sent on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 19th. It means that of the 1,850 sorties sent to Belgium, France and Holland in September 1,682 were against invasion targets and 57 against airfields. Some 21 of the aircraft despatched to invasion targets were listed as missing, or around 1.25% compared with an overall night bomber loss rate of 1.68% for the month. The ports were certainly well defended.

October, of the 2,118 sorties despatched 1,647 were to Germany, 285 to France and 94 to Holland, 51% of sorties attacked the primary targets while another 24% attacked secondary targets. Of the 440 sorties sent to Belgium, France and Holland in September 351 were against invasion targets and 52 against airfields. Sorties against airfields in occupied countries were mainly done from the 20th onwards.

Essentially throughout the battle Bomber Command maintained a steady number of night bomber sorties to targets in Germany, devoting most of the additional effort against targets outside Germany and the campaign against the invasion fleet proper was only commenced at the start of the second week in September and within a week was causing significant shipping losses.

An ongoing minor campaign against the German guns at Cap Gris Nez used 19 sorties in August, 60 in September and 9 in October.

There were 26 nights of raids on Berlin, starting on 25 August, totalling 700 sorties, of these 298 were against electricity targets, including 5 different generator plants, 59 against gas works and 129 against the government buildings area.

Note at this time during the war Coastal Command was still laying mines, the following information only covers Bomber Command which had taken over the longer range work.

Minelaying, 528 sorties despatched on 59 nights July to October, 136 to Denmark, 160 to France, 220 to Germany and 12 to Norway. By month, 196 in July, 180 in August, 64 in September and 88 in October.

Until 19 August all sorties were to Denmark or Germany except for 12 to Norway on 6 August. On 22 August the first mines were laid in French waters, from then to 9 October 140 out of 184 sorties were to French targets. After 9 October the concentration on French targets was reduced. The breakdown for October was 38 to France, 39 to Germany and 11 to Denmark. Minelaying aircraft often carried a pair of 250 pound bombs and attacked various targets of opportunity, about a third of sorties despatched dropped bombs.

Leaflets, the regular bombers carried leaflets on raids, but designated leaflet raids, usually done by aircraft from the training units (numbers 6 and 7 group), began on 18 July, almost all were to France. All up 94 sorties despatched. The aircraft also carried bombs at times and attacked targets of opportunity, about 15% of sorties dropped bombs, including on the channel islands, so the RAF was attacking British territory.

Other operations run on a small scale include weather and photographic reconnaissance, air sea rescue and the start of intruder operations, in the latter case by Blenheim bombers.

I think the word "contributions," when applied to the countries invaded and occupied is inappropriate, as the word implies the goods and services were voluntary. "Stolen" or "extorted" may be more appropriate.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi

Details from BBSU Report, reference the "Top Priority Objectives" and what type of targets were bombed:
RAF Bomber Command:

VIIIth USAAF:

XVth USAAF:

Concentrating on one target type throughout the war, whatever the war situation was, would more likely be a "losing strategy" rather than a "winning strategy".
German Oil Stats:

This is in thousands of metric tons.

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

 

[tomo pauk]

Concentrating on one target type throughout the war, whatever the war situation was, would more likely be a "losing strategy" rather than a "winning strategy".

Do we know that for certain?

 

[swampyankee]

Do we know that for certain?

It would be impossible to answer any such counterfactual for certain.

 

[MiTasol]

Hi

Details from BBSU Report, reference the "Top Priority Objectives" and what type of targets were bombed:
RAF Bomber Command:
View attachment 826610
VIIIth USAAF:
View attachment 826611
XVth USAAF:
View attachment 826612
Concentrating on one target type throughout the war, whatever the war situation was, would more likely be a "losing strategy" rather than a "winning strategy".
German Oil Stats:
View attachment 826613
This is in thousands of metric tons.

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

Interesting charts as it shows the RAF almost ignored attacking aircraft targets, despite the LW almost eliminating the RAF as a fighting force in early 40. Only 2.94% of RAF bombs were on aircraft targets for the whole war.

In comparison the VIIIth USAAF dropped 21.87% of its bombs on those targets and the XVth USAAF 18.04.

All three concentrated on transportation.

 

[tomo pauk]

It would be impossible to answer any such counterfactual for certain.

That was kinda my point.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Neither Bomber Command nor the USAAF had the technology to accurately hit industrial targets. Lindeman all but acknowledged this when he proposed the real purpose of strategic bombing was to "dehouse" the enemy workforce. Dehouseing civilians doesn't kill enemy solders.

Patrick Blackett wrote: "if the Allied air effort had been used more intelligently, if more aircraft had been supplied for the Battle of the Atlantic and to support the land fighting in Africa and later in France, if the bombing of Germany had been carried out with the attrition of enemy defences in mind rather than razing cities to the ground, I believe the war could have been won half a year or even a year earlier."

Wars are won by killing enemy solders, plain and simple. GEN Marshall directed GEN Eisenhower to: "You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces…" If more industrial output had been used for tactical aircraft perhaps the German Army may have been destroyed sooner and the War ended sooner, but this is wise long after the events.

A good read is the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Reports. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Po...B_0020_SPANGRUD_STRATEGIC_BOMBING_SURVEYS.pdf

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Also, I just found and am watching this short video pertinent to our discussion, supported by documentation:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlGY-JsWms4

 

[pinehilljoe]

This is an excerpt from a lecture series by Professor of History Thomas Childers of U-Penn. This is his view of the Bombing Campaign. The complete lecture series is available The Great Courses who holds the copyright.

I found the CDs at the local library.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Overlord failing was unthinkable, all plans had to err on the side of caution, it would take a lot to reduce the French rail system to where it could move less to Normandy per day than the allies could land there by ship.

The army does not run on aviation fuel, the USSBS indicates German petroleum products peaked at over 700,000 tonnes in March 1944, down to around 685,000 tonnes in April, 605,000 tonnes in May, 400,000 tons in June, further steep declines to 265,000 tons in September, then another halving November/December. Aviation fuel, which effectively means the hydrogenation plants, peak about 180,000 tonnes in March 1944, to 170,000 tonnes in May, 100,000 tonnes in May, under 30,000 tonnes in July. The above is read from a USSBS graph, Speer reports aviation fuel 175,000 tons in April, 156,000 tons in May, 53,000 tons in June, 29,000 tons 1 to 28 July, 12,000 tons in August, 9,400 tons in September, 18,000 tons in October, 41,000 tons in November, 23,000 tons in December.

Bomber Command was heading for a defeat in early 1944, heavy bomber loss percentage for attacks on Germany went above 5% end 1943 and went above 6% in January 1944 and apart from April, stayed above 5% until July. Accuracy for targets in Germany was around 55% end 1943, went to 60% in April 1944, 70% in August, aircraft with crews 879 in November 1943 and 1,132 in May 1944 then 1,245 in August 1944 so 70/55 times 1,245/879, Bomber Command was about 80% more effective in August 1944.

Only counting the 8th Air Force fighters ignores the contribution of the 9th Air Force for a start, November 1943, 1,621 USAAF fighters in Britain (including reserves) with 231 Mustangs, end April 1944 it was 3,685 including 950 Mustangs. From Richard Davis figures, 8th Air Force percentage of attacking bomber losses, raids on Germany November 1943 to April 1944, 3.85, 3.58, 4.61, 4.23, 4.41, 5.03. 8th Air Force total bombs dropped November 1943, 6,416.8 tons, May 1944 36,007 tons. The following is the May to October 1944 bomb tonnage on oil targets / the November 1943 to April 1944 bombs on Germany / November 1943 to April 1944 total bombs dropped.
2872.9 / 5383.5 / 6416.8
4966.1 / 8893.7 /11734.5
6880.5 / 8287.8 / 11679.2
9390.1 / 13065.8 / 18339.4
7638.7 / 14641 / 21046.6
5112.2 / 15274.7 / 24931.3

Starting oil earlier at the historical intensity should make predicting the target for the day easier and up losses.

The lack of H2X sets limited the amount of bombing the 8th Air Force could do late 1943 into early 1944, coupled with good weather reserved for strikes on occupied countries. Overlord commitments saw the trend, 8th Air Force % of bombs on Germany November 1943 to April 1944, 83.90, 75.79, 70.96, 71.24, 69.56, 61.27

The 8th Air Force dropped 237 tons of bombs on Gelsenkirchen/Buer and Nordstern on 5 November 1943, on 30 December it was 1,394.0 tons on Ludwigshafen/I. G. Farben, on 7 January 1944 another 980.4 tons, Dollbergen oil refinery 128.5 tons on 3 March, few people seem to have noticed, Spaatz believed in the oil plan and so waited until good weather before doing the 12 May raids, with 1,383.6 tons of bombs on 5 synthetic oil refineries, he had permission to try them for days to weeks before.

No one disputes switching to oil some of the missions done end 1943 and early 1944 would be a win for the allies, obtaining the May 1944 on production effects results would not happen without more bombs being dropped given bomber accuracy, lack of forces, weather and the defences would make any systematic attempt at oil targets unsustainable, while giving the Germans 6 more months to increase active and passive defences.

The use of heavy bombers as a super break through artillery barrage was quite effective, essentially destroying the ability to resist for troops under the bomb carpet. One Bomber Command and one 8th Air Force raid per day, in conjunction with a limited ground attack (sort of like 1918 not trying for that breakthrough), 2 German divisions a day heavily hurt, times 20 days in June, don't knock it until you have tried it.

Since Germany was not going to surrender to airpower alone an invasion of France was required, to do so in the second half of 1943 would basically require all allied amphibious lift, none available for elsewhere, the belief the U-boats would be defeated before the invasion really required lots of supplies and assuming it could cope with the German forces used at Kursk. More amphibious shipping could have enabled Overlord a month or two earlier with greater weather risks while still enabling Pacific and Mediterranean operations, taking the approaches to Antwerp immediately around another month saved. There are plenty of statements about ending the war earlier if only, ignoring the time needed to provide the trained, equipped forces needed, backed by working supply lines. The tanker situation in mid 1943 would cause fuel problems.

This is what would be behind a US Army 1943 Operation Overlord - Shipping to England. It took until mid 1943 for the US Army to work out and put in place a standard set of mandatory labels for cargo, what was in it and who it was for, standard manifests followed in 1944. The failure to do this in 1942 had caused considerable angst. In mid 1942 an example given was one ship 30% of the cargo had no markings, 25% no addressee and just general description, e.g. Quartermaster. This was compounded by the lack of shipping, resulting in loading to capacity with what was on the docks, and the shortage of army equipment, leading to piecemeal arrivals of equipment on the docks. In September 1942 the equipment of 1 infantry regiment was sent to England split up between 55 ships.

The result was although the equipment was in England for the US troops already in England allocated to Torch some of the equipment had to be sent a second or even third time because it became lost somewhere in England. This was a major issue in 1942 as equipment that could have been training troops in the US was simply "lost" for the time. The lack of equipment and shipping space meant the troops had to give up their equipment 30 days before the voyage to be packed and it took 80 to 120 days longer than the troops to arrive in the UK. By mid 1942 the idea of "preshipment", excess stocks for later use, was mooted and put into practice in 1943. This had the advantages of using port capacity in England in 1943, that troops could be issued equipment on arrival, that troops posted overseas could wait until the last minute to give up equipment to another unit before moving. Note preshipment was not for everything and troops still moved with a significant amount of their own equipment. Some 2,427,628 measurement tons of preshipment cargo was sent to England in 1943, another 1,863,629 measurement tons in the first 5 months of 1944.

British Bombing Survey Unit has 3,218 tons of bombs dropped by the 8th Air Force from start of operations to 21 January 1943, the USAAF Statistical Digest says 2,452 tons including jettisoned bombs to end January, Richard Davis says 2,044.2 tons dropped on targets to 21 January, 2,314 tons to end January 1943, Davis breakdown to 21 January 1943,

330.3 A/F
161.8 A/I
286.1 Loco/Wks
153.6 M/Y
136.5 P/A
54.5 Shipyard
192.7 Steel & Eng
55 T/O
673.7 UB/Pens

Things do get better, BBSU wartime 8th Air Force tonnage 702,927, USAAF Statistical Digest 714,719 (including 25,335 tons jettisoned and unidentified), Davis 686,933.3 on targets. For wartime tonnage on airfields, BBSU 85,005, Digest 82,691, Davis 81,803.5 plus 126 tons on A/F & Signals Depot and 53.5 tons on A/F (Dummy)

January to October 1944 the 15th Air Force reports jettisoning 16,777 tons of bombs while dropping 182,194 tons on targets, total 198,971 tons, the Statistical Digest says 201,386 tons of bombs dropped. Davis says 182,344.8 tons dropped on targets.

 

[tomo pauk]

Neither Bomber Command nor the USAAF had the technology to accurately hit industrial targets. Lindeman all but acknowledged this when he proposed the real purpose of strategic bombing was to "dehouse" the enemy workforce. Dehouseing civilians doesn't kill enemy solders.

Industrial targets were hit many times. From the aero engine factories, tank/AFV factories and indeed oil targets.
Just because there was no great accuracy, bombers (and bombs) still came in. Further, there is nothing to prevent greater effort in training and developing of optical and electronics aids. Even the humble flares as used by FAA would've been a boon for the night bombing, but problem with that idea was that it was developed in the late 1930s by an entity that was not true & pure RAF.

Patrick Blackett wrote: "if the Allied air effort had been used more intelligently, if more aircraft had been supplied for the Battle of the Atlantic and to support the land fighting in Africa and later in France, if the bombing of Germany had been carried out with the attrition of enemy defences in mind rather than razing cities to the ground, I believe the war could have been won half a year or even a year earlier."

Unless WAllies are not deep in France by, say, August-September of 1943, there is no way that the war can end by May of 1944. Especially with LW being with full stocks of fuel and their aircraft manned with the pilots that have full set of flying hours as the WAllied pilots, and not just a half - or worse - as it was the case historically.
The historical Normandy landings were supported by hordes of bombers and light bombers as-is.

Wars are won by killing enemy solders, plain and simple. GEN Marshall directed GEN Eisenhower to: "You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces…" If more industrial output had been used for tactical aircraft perhaps the German Army may have been destroyed sooner and the War ended sooner, but this is wise long after the events.

Idea of winning the war by killing the enemy soldiers is simple, but execution of that idea might not be. Luftwaffe will not be lured to fight above France in 1943 in a major way as the Allied planners might've wished. For the WAllies, to defeat Germany is to defeat Luftwaffe 1st, and Heer 2nd.
US, UK and many other entered the continent of Europe in Summer of 1943, by the same time of 1944 they barely captured half of Italy. That is despite having an overwhelming support by both tactical and strategical air units.

US & UK not embarking on the strategic air offensive would've released hundreds of Flak crews to go to either frontlines of production lines, it would've freed the manufacturing capacity to make more field and anti tank guns and the ammo. It would've meant that there is no dip in German industrial production due to the bombing, fear of bombing, lack of manpower and lack of energy. It would've also meant that Germany has enough of fuel, nitrates, methyl and ethyl alcohol and whatnot for the needs of LW, Heer, ammo production and for civilian needs.

 

[Shortround6]

So.

The strategy (such as it was) against Germany in WW2 was less successful than it might have been.

What would have been the optimal strategy or elements thereof?

Assume the same resources available.

Fight!

There is a huge amount of things that need to sorted out here.
Just picking on the British here (US made a lot of mistakes of their own and were over 2 years late so they had 2-3 years to learn and sometimes didn't).

Most Air Forces were flying around in La-La land.
Their bombers would always find the target.
Their bombers would hit the target (mostly).
Their bombs once they hit, would destroy the targets.

Turns out that this was mostly untrue to different degrees.
Now until you can fix these 3 problems any discussion of target selection is rather moot.
We have not even gotten to points of defensive fire/loss rates and so on. If you not even hitting the right cities the loss rates per mission are also rather moot except to draw off enemy fighters and AA guns.

If you want to destroy heavy machinery and/or a lot of oil refining equipment you need big bombs. Very few Air Forces actually tested their bombs against actual buildings or industrial plants before the war. So in the early part of the war (or even 1942/43) the bombers were using bombs that were not very effective against certain targets. Dropping a lot of 250lb bombs increased the chances of hits but the smaller bombs didn't do as much damage and had a smaller blast radius.

Now in both the British and American Air forces there was a large element of "empire building" going on. In both forces the "bomber" Generals wanted to prove that the Air Force was a dominate weapon/force fully the equal of the Navy and Army and deserving of equal (or larger share) of the budget and and equal number of flag rank officers. They can't do that if they are seen as a "supporting force" like ASW. They have to be able to claim that the air force significantly affected the enemies ability to wage war.
Target selection and/or panacea target selection/campaigns should always be looked at with that in mind. May not be 100% but just keep it in mind.
Now a lot of decisions were made in ignorance. Testing in peace time was expensive. So a lot of officers were basically guessing in the first few years of the war.