The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany

[Bergjon12]

and as soon as the Germans work out you are only attacking one area they will move all their defences there and your losses will skyrocket.

No they won't, or at most for a short time. It's the LW that is going to be annihilated, and after that it's going to be a breeze.

 

[Bergjon12]

The Spitfire VIII, 90 gallon external tank, 20,000 feet fast cruise combat radius about 300 miles allowing for reserves. Early P-47D under similar conditions would need a 108 gallon tank to make the radius. At 315 mph the P-47B was calculated to use 123 gallons per hour, at 280 mph 73 gallons both at 16,000 feet.

Etc

Thank you for this information, we are continually blessed.

For a campaign such as this, allied fighter bases would of course bee placed as far forward as possible.

Norwich to Munster: 271 miles.
Dover to Bonn: 254 miles.

Fast cruise is not required when escorting bombers, the most efficient speed is what is called for.

The Spitfire is well and truly in the picture, Leigh-Mallory's evasions notwithstanding.

 

[Bergjon12]

RAF was free to order the Whirlwind to be something like the Fw 187+ (ie. a long-range performer). Or/and that a long-range performer is made around two Merlins or Hercules engines. However, under the doctrine of the day, even a Hurricane with drop tanks in 1938 was not gonna fly. But Botha, 1000-1500 of extra Batlles, Defiant - these were green-lit, no worries.
Blenheim - yes, use two engines and two propellers for 450 kg of bombs??

AAF was busy to out-Defiant the Defiant with the Airacuda, instead of specifying a long-range fighter. They were free to order both P-38 and P-43 to be fitted with drop tanks from day one. Ditto for the P-47. Same for the Mustang for the AAF needs, instead of trying to ignore it out.
One needs 1942 engines for 1942, but not for 1939-40. As seen by Japanese and, less well, by Germans.


So make them more useful by installing a proper drop tank facility from day one, so once they are abroad, they can make a really lasting impact by killing the Axis airforces hundreds of miles away,

Well said, somebody gets me.

If we assume we can devise a strategy that dispenses with harmful preconceptions, we can assume that people can be minded not to reject drop tanks, which is what happened, through sheer pig-headedness.

 

[swampyankee]

Obviously, any bombing strategy would have worked better if the Manhattan Project had succeeded sooner, say early 1943.

 

[Elan Vital]

They could hope they could fly over in time of war but they sure could not plan on it. Turns out they couldn't even plan on promised French air bases. Many had seen little or no improvement since WW I.

That's interesting, do you have documents about basing plans?

 

[Shortround6]

Fast cruise is not required when escorting bombers, the most efficient speed is what is called for.

This is false.
It takes several minutes for a fighter flying at 'most efficient' speed to accelerate to combat speed (doesn't have to be max speed but somewhere close).
If the escorting fighters are bounced at 'most efficient' speed by enemy fighters flying at high speed they are sitting ducks at worst and rather ineffective (not able to stop the defending fighters from attacking the bombers) at best.
This is why the American escorts 'cruised' at around 315mph and flew a fishtail or snake pattern over/near the bombers. This snake flight path also hurt range but the higher speed improved response to attacking German fighters.

As peoples "plans" change in time (1939-41?) speeds can be adjust somewhat but also remember that some of the escort doctrine was paid for in blood by earlier experiences.

 

[Bergjon12]

This is false.
It takes several minutes for a fighter flying at 'most efficient' speed to accelerate to combat speed (doesn't have to be max speed but somewhere close).
If the escorting fighters are bounced at 'most efficient' speed by enemy fighters flying at high speed they are sitting ducks at worst and rather ineffective (not able to stop the defending fighters from attacking the bombers) at best.
This is why the American escorts 'cruised' at around 315mph and flew a fishtail or snake pattern over/near the bombers. This snake flight path also hurt range but the higher speed improved response to attacking German fighters.

As peoples "plans" change in time (1939-41?) speeds can be adjust somewhat but also remember that some of the escort doctrine was paid for in blood by earlier experiences.

This is going to be a very dense air battle. German fighters are not going to appear over the channel or the low countries, which is most of the cruising distance. Comparisons with escort missions deep into Germany miss the mark.

The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway. It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s. Therefore, fighter endurance is to be prioritized, with the bombers leading. The YB-40 could even be viable in this scenario.

 

[Shortround6]

That's interesting, do you have documents about basing plans?

Not Specific but but at least one book claims that not only were the British bases used for the Battles/Lysanders/Hurricanes in a poor state, (bad drainage and lack of buildings) but that the proposed bomber airfields were not really ready for use. Same problems, poor drainage, poor field maintenance like mowing, rutting. Shelter was mostly by tent.
Couple this with the French forbidding the British to conduct actual bombing operations (leaflets were OK) from French soil during the 'phony' war and problems with basing bomber offensive strategy in conjunction with a nominal ally is problem.

 

[Shortround6]

This is going to be a very dense air battle. German fighters are not going to appear over the channel or the low countries, which is most of the cruising distance. Comparisons with escort missions deep into Germany miss the mark.

The British Radar could pick up German formations over France during the BoB.
I doubt that the Germans were all that many months behind the Germans.

Dover to Bonn: 254 miles.

Out of that 254 miles nearly 200 miles is over German held territory.

Now for the 1938-40 bomber strategy and Belgium being Neutral the distance is roughly 360 miles from Folkestone to Bonn.

Granted more is over over water but having to stay out of Dutch Air space means it is roughly 355 miles from Harwich to Munster.

Granted the Germans do not have radar in the neutral countries.

After June 1940 it is just about 100 miles from the coast to Munster.

An awful lot depends on when. By 1943 both the Americans and British were trying to use feints and misdirection rather than brute force only.

 

[Bergjon12]

The British Radar could pick up German formations over France during the BoB.
I doubt that the Germans were all that many months behind the Germans.

Out of that 254 miles nearly 200 miles is over German held territory.

Now for the 1938-40 bomber strategy and Belgium being Neutral the distance is roughly 360 miles from Folkestone to Bonn.

Granted more is over over water but having to stay out of Dutch Air space means it is roughly 355 miles from Harwich to Munster.

Granted the Germans do not have radar in the neutral countries.

After June 1940 it is just about 100 miles from the coast to Munster.

An awful lot depends on when. By 1943 both the Americans and British were trying to use feints and misdirection rather than brute force only.

This is not a radar issue.

The Germans are going to base their fighters in Belgium are they? They are welcome to it, to get their bases cratered to the moon by medium bombers and tactical aircraft.

And just to make things clear, we're talking about 1942-?. The aim is to destroy Germany by January 1944.

 

[Bergjon12]

Btw I claim Patton as a supporter - if he had been in planes instead of tanks.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'll say again, this is a pre-invasion strategy. The object it not to create an advance for ground forces, it is to destroy Germany.

Speer estimated that 6 x Hamburg43 would knock Germany out of the war. That's what we're going for.

Concentration is key. Dropping 1000 bombs on one city creates much greater disruption than 100 bombs each on 10 cities. A city has a great deal of self-generation capability. To be taken out of the picture a city must be de-functioned, so the population leaves.

Before the invasion, both 8th AF and Bomber Command had serious issues avoiding crippling losses. They also didn't have the numbers to carpet-bomb as you suggest.

I'm unconvinced.

This is going to be a very dense air battle. German fighters are not going to appear over the channel or the low countries, which is most of the cruising distance. Comparisons with escort missions deep into Germany miss the mark.

You're not wanting to fly at 180 mph over the Low Countries. Aside from flak, German fighters do indeed sortie for intercepts over Holland and Belgium; Middlebrook documents this in his book covering 1st Schweinfurt.

The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway.

I've got serious reservations about this claim. Unescorted raids suffered 20% losses max, perhaps 8-14% on average. You can self-defend that for six or seven sorties (optimistically) before the bomber force must be stood down for replacements, repairs, and maintenance -- and that's not even considering the morale of the bomber crews who under this paradigm would last maybe 15 missions tops without incredible luck.

It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s. Therefore, fighter endurance is to be prioritized, with the bombers leading. The YB-40 could even be viable in this scenario.

Of course the bombers became the bait. That didn't happen until Jan-Apr 1944, once American fighter doctrine and equipment changed; and the B-40 was dismissed from service as unusable due to weight differentials on the return flight.

The Germans are going to base their fighters in Belgium are they? They are welcome to it, to get their bases cratered to the moon by medium bombers and tactical aircraft.

You need not base planes in Belgium to defend that airspace. Put the radars forward, put the LW jagd bases back, and perform intercepts like most other air forces of the time did. Probably going to have some flak in the area as well, as it's fairly dense with industry and picking one's way around hot-spots only give more time to arrange an intercept.

 

[ThomasP]

re

The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway. It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s.

??

The concept of the early- to late-war bombers being able to effectively defend themselves is a myth.

Neither the US or UK bombers were able to defend themselves during daylight missions. The raw statistics, immediate after-action reports, war-time analysis, and post-war analysis & conclusions by the USAF and RAF, all say this.

Post-war analysis of the aircraft numbers shot down (using Luftwaffe records of losses and matching them to USAAF claimed shoot downs by bombers) in the daylight bombing campaigns show a high rate of over-claiming - with a 1948 report concluding the actual rate to be about 10 claimed for every 1 actually shot down. The total numbers (of Luftwaffe fighters and USAAF bombers) lost in the various missions, along with the causes of most, are quite well documented.

In 1943 USAAF bombers losses were primarily due to to fighters, but by early-1945 bomber losses were primarily caused by flak due to the effectiveness of the USAAF escort fighters. The only reason the losses during the early raids (such as Schweinfurt) were not significantly higher is that the Germans had not yet developed and organized their defenses to anywhere near the level of early-1944.

Even the night-time missions by the RAF were only able to "defend themselves" in the early-war due to the lack of an effective Luftwaffe night fighter force. As the war progressed the Luftwaffe night fighters accounted for an increasingly larger percentage of Bomber Commands losses, until early- to mid-1944 when the bomber losses became slightly greater due to night fighters than to flak.

Incidentally, after-action analysis of the YB-40's effectiveness as an escort concluded that it offered no significant advantage as to defense of the formation, and was itself unacceptably vulnerable to attack due to its inability to stay with the bomber formation on the homebound legs. To be fair, the numbers of YB-40 built (25?) and missions flown (14?) were relatively small and duration of the testing (29 May thru 29 July 1943) was fairly short.

 

[Bergjon12]

Before the invasion, both 8th AF and Bomber Command had serious issues avoiding crippling losses.

By flying deep, unescorted missions. That is sort of my central point.

 

[Bergjon12]

They also didn't have the numbers to carpet-bomb as you suggest.

Excuse me?

Bombing of Cologne in World War II - Wikipedia

Bombing of Hamburg in World War II - Wikipedia

 

[Bergjon12]

You're not wanting to fly at 180 mph over the Low Countries. Aside from flak, German fighters do indeed sortie for intercepts over Holland and Belgium; Middlebrook documents this in his book covering 1st Schweinfurt.

That was in a different environment.

 

[Bergjon12]

I've got serious reservations about this claim. Unescorted raids suffered 20% losses max, perhaps 8-14% on average. You can self-defend that for six or seven sorties (optimistically) before the bomber force must be stood down for replacements, repairs, and maintenance -- and that's not even considering the morale of the bomber crews who under this paradigm would last maybe 15 missions tops without incredible luck.

As you say, unescorted. These are escorted missions.

 

[Bergjon12]

Of course the bombers became the bait. That didn't happen until Jan-Apr 1944, once American fighter doctrine and equipment changed; and the B-40 was dismissed from service as unusable due to weight differentials on the return flight.

I don't understand the point of this paragraph.

 

[Bergjon12]

You need not base planes in Belgium to defend that airspace. Put the radars forward, put the LW jagd bases back, and perform intercepts like most other air forces of the time did. Probably going to have some flak in the area as well, as it's fairly dense with industry and picking one's way around hot-spots only give more time to arrange an intercept.

You seem to be suggesting that German fighters would fly through, under, over or past the bomber stream in the hope of being able to tangle with some fighters. That is a strategy we welcome.

 

[Bergjon12]

??

The concept of the early- to late-war bombers being able to effectively defend themselves is a myth.

Yadda yadda.

Do you understand why I used the word "almost"?

Also I must point out, not just to you, that using the historical evidence of the problems facing deep, unescorted missions is a weak argument against the viability of short, escorted missions.