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Possibly I am misunderstanding you, but the above makes no sense reDo you understand why I used the word "almost"?
Also I must point out, not just to you, that using the historical evidence of the problems facing deep, unescorted missions is a weak argument against the viability of short, escorted missions.
The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway. It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s. Therefore, fighter endurance is to be prioritized, with the bombers leading. The YB-40 could even be viable in this scenario.
German radar will be tacking allied raids well out to sea unless jamming technologies can be deployed.When attacking the NW only, the attackers MUST be engaged over the Ruhr, approximately. So the deep penetration strategy gives the defender more options. If one interception fails, another can be mustered. With a NW strategy, airfields MUST be concentrated near the NW, making them more vulnerable.
Another major problem with this logic is that we WANT LW fighters to engage. We DON'T want to avoid them, bc they will be running into escort fighters and thus can be destroyed in a relatively short time. That is a major part of the plan.
The short answer is no, the airspace needed per base means plenty of them will be back from the coastFor a campaign such as this, allied fighter bases would of course bee placed as far forward as possible.
Norwich to Munster: 271 miles.
Dover to Bonn: 254 miles.
Fighters at economic speed in a war zone are either targets or spectators unless they are lucky.Fast cruise is not required when escorting bombers, the most efficient speed is what is called for.
No, the first number is percentage loss of 8th AF mostly B-17 credited with attacking a target in Germany, the second is the cumulative percentage bombers missing to the end of the month for bombers credited with attacking a target in Germany.The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway. It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s. Therefore, fighter endurance is to be prioritized, with the bombers leading. The YB-40 could even be viable in this scenario.
Name the Luftwaffe airbases in Netherlands/Belgium/France that were catered to the moon in 1942/43, how big a percentage that was of airbases available, and how long the stayed out of action, hint start at around 0.The Germans are going to base their fighters in Belgium are they? They are welcome to it, to get their bases cratered to the moon by medium bombers and tactical aircraft.
M4 losses in ETOBtw I claim Patton as a supporter - if he had been in planes instead of tanks.
I am simply proposing the same tactics that the USAAF did use once they got rid of their preconceptions that escort fighters should be glued to the bombers - as Thumpalumpacus already pointed out.re
Possibly I am misunderstanding you, but the above makes no sense re
??
Either the fighters are going to be escorting the bombers and thereby keeping the bomber losses to acceptable levels - or they are not going to be escorting the bombers and the bombers are going to take unacceptable losses.
Excuse me, the word I used is "nearly". My mistake.Also, I cannot find anywhere that you used the word "almost" on the immediate or previous page re this subject?
I am simply proposing the same tactics that the USAAF did use once they got rid of their preconceptions that escort fighters should be glued to the bombers - as Thumpalumpacus already pointed out.
Of course the bombers became the bait. That didn't happen until Jan-Apr 1944, once American fighter doctrine and equipment changed; and the B-40 was dismissed from service as unusable due to weight differentials on the return flight.
For your pleasure.re
Are you referring to the following?
There seems to be a misunderstanding here. I believe Thumpalumpacus statement refers to the change in doctrine and equipment after the US decided that the unescorted bomber mission was not acceptable, and after 8th AF had the numbers of fighters with the needed range to escort the bombers for most of the route - either continuous or in relay - which did not become possible until early-1944.
I cannot find any reference by Thumpalumpacus to the fighters being "glued" to the bombers or other words implying such. Possibly I am missing the wording?
Escort fighter tactics
[edit]
Doolittle's major influence on the European air war occurred late in 1943—and primarily after he took command of the Eighth Air Force on January 6, 1944[30]—when he changed the policy of requiring escorting fighters to remain with their bombers at all times. Instead, he permitted escort fighters to fly far ahead of the bombers' combat box formations, allowing them to freely engage the German fighters lying in wait for the bombers. Throughout most of 1944, this tactic negated the effectiveness of the twin-engined Zerstörergeschwader heavy fighter wings and single-engined Sturmgruppen of heavily armed Fw 190As by clearing the Luftwaffe's bomber destroyers from ahead of the bomber formations. After the bombers had hit their targets, the American fighters were free to strafe German airfields, transportation, and other "targets of opportunity" on their return flight to base. These tasks were initially performed with Lockheed P-38 Lightnings and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts through the end of 1943. They were progressively replaced with the long-ranged North American P-51 Mustangs as the spring of 1944 wore on.[31][32]
I like your style.Personally I feel the best course of action in the start of 1943 was to get every available Spitfire MkIX and fit it with rear tanks, leading edge fuel bladders and a 90G drop tank, likewise every P47 and use them to bomb the Ruhr, forget fancy, have the P47's take off first and go as far as they can, on the return hit the deck for targets of opportunity and relay the Spits from there, a MkIX with 75G in the rear, burn the top 42G off first then drop tank on fast cruise, if they are bounced they can engage as normal once the DT is jettisoned if not they have plenty of fuel to cover the Ruhr, spend all of '43 bombing it to oblivion.
HiBoth UK and USA were more than capable of making long-range fighters in great quantities already in the late 1930s/very early 1940s, yet that didn't happened because there was no such doctrine in either RAF or AAF. Nobody prevented the AAF to order the P-47s to have a workable drop tank installation from day one, or that RAF orders all the Spitfires to have the rear tank installed + drop tanks. Long range day fighters allow for the daylight bombing.
FAA trashed the Italian fleet in 1940 using flare-dropping Swordfishes to illuminate the pin-point targets. RAF introduced flares as means of marking the target in 1943 at 1st?
My point is that there were the ways to improve the odds for the bombers to hit the targets, however the institutional inertia was a thing.
Was he always late to the fight?although some samples were ready to go to France on 5 November 1918, one of the instigators of the project was going to take them out personally when he returned from leave on that date, that man was a certain Major Leigh-Mallory, OC No. 8 Squadron.
Mike
Thank you again.The RAF used a wide variety of pyrotechnics to mark targets through the war, this included the 4.5" parachute recce flares to illuminate the whole target area and then use their bombsights if they spotted the target, although as in daylight cloud could cause problems. The first makeshift incendiary target markers, the 250-lb 'Red Blob' and 2,700-lb 'Pink Pansy' appear to have been used around August/September 1942.
HiWas he always late to the fight?
You seem to be suggesting that German fighters would fly through, under, over or past the bomber stream in the hope of being able to tangle with some fighters. That is a strategy we welcome.
By flying deep, unescorted missions. That is sort of my central point.
As you say, unescorted. These are escorted missions.
I don't understand the point of this paragraph.
re
Are you referring to the following?
There seems to be a misunderstanding here. I believe Thumpalumpacus statement refers to the change in doctrine and equipment after the US decided that the unescorted bomber mission was not acceptable, and after 8th AF had the numbers of fighters with the needed range to escort the bombers for most of the route - either continuous or in relay - which did not become possible until early-1944.
I cannot find any reference by Thumpalumpacus to the fighters being "glued" to the bombers or other words implying such. Possibly I am missing the wording?
HiThank you again.
With the eyes a bit towards the possible night targeting devices, it is unfortunate that flares were not incorporated in the RAF arsenal already in 1941, if not by the time ww2 started.
1. How were you suggesting the LW fighters got behind the bombers to threaten the allied fighters? Not from the north. Not from the east. From the south perhaps, from NE France. That hole is easily plugged with non-drop tank fighters.I'm not sure what gave you that impression, but this is clearly a misreading. The Germans only tangled with the escorts when they had to.
And you don't think the Germans will take countermeasures to address your suggested changes in operations? The Kammhuber line works against short-range raids too, ditto LW fighters.
I was referring to attrition, which I thought was clear from the fact that I mentioned earlier in my reply "six or seven" sorties.
Escorted missions still suffered losses that, in 1942, simply couldn't be replaced by the Americans.
The point is that it wasn't until 1944 that the bombers became the bait.
I am so glad to learn thisYou may not like him for WW2 reasons but he cannot be denigrated for what he achieved during WW1!
Mike
The larger the target area the more dispersed the defences have to be and the larger the number of fighters out of range of a given attack.
The short answer is no, the airspace needed per base means plenty of them will be back from the coast