The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany

[ThomasP]

re

Do you understand why I used the word "almost"?

Also I must point out, not just to you, that using the historical evidence of the problems facing deep, unescorted missions is a weak argument against the viability of short, escorted missions.

Possibly I am misunderstanding you, but the above makes no sense re

The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway. It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s. Therefore, fighter endurance is to be prioritized, with the bombers leading. The YB-40 could even be viable in this scenario.

??

Either the fighters are going to be escorting the bombers and thereby keeping the bomber losses to acceptable levels - or they are not going to be escorting the bombers and the bombers are going to take unacceptable losses. The YB-40s will not help in either case.

Also, I cannot find anywhere that you used the word "almost" on the immediate or previous page re this subject?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Giving either side 1944 abilities significantly changes things.

When attacking the NW only, the attackers MUST be engaged over the Ruhr, approximately. So the deep penetration strategy gives the defender more options. If one interception fails, another can be mustered. With a NW strategy, airfields MUST be concentrated near the NW, making them more vulnerable.

Another major problem with this logic is that we WANT LW fighters to engage. We DON'T want to avoid them, bc they will be running into escort fighters and thus can be destroyed in a relatively short time. That is a major part of the plan.

German radar will be tacking allied raids well out to sea unless jamming technologies can be deployed.

The larger the target area the more dispersed the defences have to be and the larger the number of fighters out of range of a given attack. Before going any further when is the date of these operations I am assuming 1942 and 1943, name the 6 more Hamburgs, or at least several cities that will be heavily attacked and their distances from allied bases. How many day and how many night raids? Definition of deep raid, versus average distance to selected targets in North West Germany. To inflict a major defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighter force requires much of it to be engaged, so how many allied fighters can operate over Germany?

The Luftwaffe single day fighter force had 1,324 aircraft in operational units on 3 January 1942, still about that by the end of the year after reaching a peak of around 1,500 in September, then reaching over 1,700 end 1943. The twin engine force had 94 aircraft on 3 January 1942, over 300 mid year, down to around 100 end year, built back up to over 300 by end 1943. The Luftwaffe night fighter force had 265 aircraft in operational units on 3 January 1942, rising to over 400 by the end of the year, and reaching over 600 end 1943, the personnel are available to switch to day fighters if there is no major night effort.

During 1942 and 1943 Fighter Command operated around 1,000 +/-100 Spitfires in units depending on the date, the 8th AF had 3 operational P-47 groups as of 13 April 1943, 4 in mid August, 6 in mid September, 7 mid October plus a P-38 group.

Arthur Harris Despatch on War Operations published what I call the acreage table, 69 German urban areas, pre war population of around 23 million people, covering 102,745 acres, 49% of the areas classified as destroyed in 370 raids, with some help from the USAAF. No German city was abandoned.

Area destroyed top 5 by population, Berlin 33.09% (24 attacks), Hannover (16 attacks) 60.22%, Leipzig 19.64% (3 attacks), Hamburg (17 attacks) 74.54%, Cologne (22 attacks) 61.35%, 10,626,000 total population, 16,763 acres destroyed. The 1942 to 1945 bomb tonnages were, in order, 44,155 tons, 13,657 tons, 6,162.9 tons, 19,963.8 tons, 31,266.4 tons, total 115,205.5 tons. Bomber Command dropped 157,457 tons of bombs in 1943, the 8th AF 42,370 long tons, total just under 200,000 tons. Bomber Command managed 136,433 tons on Germany, the 8th AF around 25,000 tons

Top 5 area destroyed and population Wuppertal-Elberfeld 93.65% 409,000 (Population includes Elberfeld), Wurzburg 88.47% 101,000, Bochum 83.13% 315,000, Remscheid 82.38% 80,000, Pforzheim 82.89% 101,000, 2,409 acres destroyed. Bochum had 6 raids, the others 1 each.

Multiply the area destroyed by the population to give an idea of people bombed out and the top 5 become Hannover 1,921,092, Berlin 1,403,993, Hamburg 841,828, Cologne 464,449, Wuppertal-Elberfeld 383,025 (Population includes Elberfeld), using this measure around 11,500,000 people bombed out, around a sixth the pre war population, from all 370 attacks.

Bomber Command managed to create 4 firestorms during WWII, Hamburg and Kassel in 1943, Dresden and Pforzheim in 1945, given the different definitions of firestorm some will subtract, others will add to this.

For a campaign such as this, allied fighter bases would of course bee placed as far forward as possible.

Norwich to Munster: 271 miles.
Dover to Bonn: 254 miles.

The short answer is no, the airspace needed per base means plenty of them will be back from the coast

Fast cruise is not required when escorting bombers, the most efficient speed is what is called for.

Fighters at economic speed in a war zone are either targets or spectators unless they are lucky.

The allied fighters are not going to be there to prevent attacks on the bombers, which are nearly able to defend themselves alone anyway. It's more that the bombers are bait, especially the sturdy B17s. Therefore, fighter endurance is to be prioritized, with the bombers leading. The YB-40 could even be viable in this scenario.

No, the first number is percentage loss of 8th AF mostly B-17 credited with attacking a target in Germany, the second is the cumulative percentage bombers missing to the end of the month for bombers credited with attacking a target in Germany.
Jan-43 / 1.82 / 1.82
Feb-43 / 8.23 / 11.65
Mar-43 / 6.48 / 5.08
Apr-43 / 8.46 / 15.09
May-43 / 7.08 / 5.9
Jun-43 / 7.93 / 9.07
Jul-43 / 8.65 / 10.1
Aug-43 / 9.81 / 15.23
Sep-43 / 9.55 / 7.62
Oct-43 / 9.53 / 9.48
Nov-43 / 7.93 / 3.85
Dec-43 / 6.51 / 3.58

And in order to inflict a larger loss on the Luftwaffe more of its fighter force needs to be present.

Richard Davis figures, short tons / bombers attacking / bombers missing
26.5 / 8 / 0 Alsleben
185.5 / 106 / 18 Anklam
52.3 / 20 / 0 Aurich
16 / 8 / 0 Baden-Baden
2.5 / 1 / 0 Beeststorzwagg
267 / 117 / 23 Bochum/Vereinigte Stahl
243.2 / 106 / 2 Bonn
5433.2 / 2041 / 107 Bremen
263 / 106 / 16 Bremen/Borgward
253.8 / 102 / 4 Bremen/Deschimag
130 / 44 / 3 Bremen/Deutsche
81 / 33 / 1 Bremen/Weser
2 / 1 / 0 Bremerhaven
2.5 / 1 / 0 Buhl
190.4 / 69 / 0 Coesfeld
4 / 2 / 0 Cologne
75 / 30 / 0 Cuxhaven
50.3 / 23 / 2 Danzig
2 / 1 / 0 Dortmund
3 / 1 / 0 Dulmen
293 / 135 / 8 Duren
2 / 1 / 0 Dusseldorf
3129.3 / 1140 / 32 Emden
111 / 45 / 5 Emden/Nordseewerke
5 / 3 / 0 Emmerich
49.7 / 18 / 0 Esens
144.8 / 61 / 0 Flensberg
90.8 / 40 / 4 Frankfurt-am-Main
219.3 / 78 / 4 Frankfurt-am-Main/Heddern
495.2 / 232 / 5 Gelsenkirchen
123.2 / 49 / 2 Gelsenkirchen/Buer
114.2 / 47 / 1 Gelsenkirchen/Nordstern
0 / 14 / 0 Germany
2.8 / 1 / 0 Haltern
264.8 / 116 / 2 Hamburg
156 / 68 / 12 Hamburg/Blohm & Voss
126.2 / 54 / 2 Hamburg/Howald
40 / 16 / 5 Hamm
25 / 9 / 0 Hannover
95.8 / 42 / 10 Hannover/Gummiwerke
118 / 51 / 6 Hannover/Nordhafen
35 / 14 / 3 Heide
2.5 / 1 / 0 Heilbronn
277.2 / 117 / 7 Heligoland
420 / 182 / 16 Huls
2.5 / 1 / 0 Jevres
6 / 2 / 0 Juist
45 / 18 / 3 Juist Island
30.6 / 17 / 2 Karlsruhe
7 / 3 / 0 Kassel
351 / 143 / 13 Kassel/Bettenhausen/Fieseler
87 / 37 / 6 Kassel/Waldau/Fieseler
21.7 / 18 / 3 Kiel
277 / 111 / 22 Kiel/Deutsche
113 / 48 / 2 Kiel/Deutsche/Krupp
94.9 / 42 / 2 Kiel/Kriegsmarine
1412.1 / 582 / 17 Kiel/Krupp
42.1 / 16 / 0 Langerooge
1394 / 653 / 23 Ludwigshafen/I. G. Farben
7 / 4 / 0 Mannheim
217.9 / 96 / 2 Marienburg
5.1 / 3 / 0 Meppen
1344.6 / 554 / 17 Misc., Ge
5 / 2 / 0 Munich
1168.1 / 500 / 42 Munster
1.5 / 1 / 0 Neumunster
6 / 2 / 0 Norden
28 / 11 / 0 Nordholz
4.8 / 2 / 0 Ochtelbur
119 / 51 / 13 Offenburg
39.8 / 20 / 3 Oldenburg
62.9 / 28 / 15 Oschersleben/AGO Flugzugwerke
541.3 / 218 / 17 Osnabruck
40 / 16 / 0 Recklinghausen
2 / 1 / 0 Rees
298.8 / 126 / 24 Regensburg/Ober-Traubling
48 / 20 / 0 Renderath
44.8 / 18 / 0 Rerik/West
9.5 / 5 / 0 Rheine
2.5 / 1 / 0 Rossbach
8.4 / 4 / 0 Saarbrucken
103.8 / 47 / 0 Saarbrucken/Sarreguemines
168.8 / 67 / 2 Saarlautern
278.7 / 135 / 19 Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher
322.1 / 139 / 39 Schweinfurt/VKF 1
307.2 / 137 / 38 Schweinfurt/VKF 2
42.7 / 17 / 1 Siegburg
934.2 / 340 / 26 Solingen
112.5 / 46 / 10 Stuttgart
15 / 6 / 0 Terschelling
416.1 / 161 / 10 Vegesack
2 / 1 / 0 Vlieland
4.5 / 2 / 0 Wangerooge Island
129 / 54 / 4 Warnemunde/Heinkel
4 / 2 / 0 Wasselone
3 / 1 / 0 Wermelskirchen
125 / 54 / 0 Wesel
37.5 / 15 / 3 Wesermunde
3 / 1 / 0 Wessermunde
5 / 2 / 0 Wetrup
46 / 16 / 1 Wiesbaden
2612.2 / 1005 / 36 Wilhelmshaven
27185.2 / 10976 / 715 Total

Which ones qualify for North West Germany and which ones for deep penetration? Remember to add the bomber write offs, on combat missions in 1943 the 8th Air Force had 866 B-17 missing and another 128 write offs

The Germans are going to base their fighters in Belgium are they? They are welcome to it, to get their bases cratered to the moon by medium bombers and tactical aircraft.

Name the Luftwaffe airbases in Netherlands/Belgium/France that were catered to the moon in 1942/43, how big a percentage that was of airbases available, and how long the stayed out of action, hint start at around 0.

When Bomber Command handed over 2 Group to the 2nd Tactical Air force is consisted of 21 (Ven), 88 (Bos), 98 (Mit), 107 (Bos), 180 (Mit), 226 (Bos), [320 (Mit)], [342 (Bos)], 464 (Ven), 487 (Ven) sqns, 2 GCflt, 1482 BG flt, 1508 BATflt, 1515 BATflt, with the units in [] non operational and after losing 105, 139 sqns with Mosquito. Boston, Mitchell, Ventura, meantime the 8th Air Force had 1 B-26 group become operational in mid may, the second in mid July, a third end July and a fourth mid August, handing them to the 9th Air Force in mid October.

Btw I claim Patton as a supporter - if he had been in planes instead of tanks.

M4 losses in ETO
Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.01 to 0.24%, First 29%, Third 28.5%, Ninth 38%.
Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.25 to 0.49%, First 19%, Third 18%, Ninth 16%.
Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.5 to 0.99%, First 32%, Third 39%, Ninth 19%.
Percentage of time where the daily losses were 1% or more First 13%, Third 12%, Ninth 5%.
Remembering 1st Army had to fight out of Normandy (around 25% of total losses), plus was hit by the Ardennes offensive, over another 15% of total losses

 

[Bergjon12]

re

Possibly I am misunderstanding you, but the above makes no sense re


??

Either the fighters are going to be escorting the bombers and thereby keeping the bomber losses to acceptable levels - or they are not going to be escorting the bombers and the bombers are going to take unacceptable losses.

I am simply proposing the same tactics that the USAAF did use once they got rid of their preconceptions that escort fighters should be glued to the bombers - as Thumpalumpacus already pointed out.

 

[Bergjon12]

Also, I cannot find anywhere that you used the word "almost" on the immediate or previous page re this subject?

Excuse me, the word I used is "nearly". My mistake.

 

[ThomasP]

re

I am simply proposing the same tactics that the USAAF did use once they got rid of their preconceptions that escort fighters should be glued to the bombers - as Thumpalumpacus already pointed out.

Are you referring to the following?

Of course the bombers became the bait. That didn't happen until Jan-Apr 1944, once American fighter doctrine and equipment changed; and the B-40 was dismissed from service as unusable due to weight differentials on the return flight.

There seems to be a misunderstanding here. I believe Thumpalumpacus statement refers to the change in doctrine and equipment after the US decided that the unescorted bomber mission was not acceptable, and after 8th AF had the numbers of fighters with the needed range to escort the bombers for most of the route - either continuous or in relay - which did not become possible until early-1944.

I cannot find any reference by Thumpalumpacus to the fighters being "glued" to the bombers or other words implying such. Possibly I am missing the wording?

 

[PAT303]

Personally I feel the best course of action in the start of 1943 was to get every available Spitfire MkIX and fit it with rear tanks, leading edge fuel bladders and a 90G drop tank, likewise every P47 and use them to bomb the Ruhr, forget fancy, have the P47's take off first and go as far as they can, on the return hit the deck for targets of opportunity and relay the Spits from there, a MkIX with 75G in the rear, burn the top 42G off first then drop tank on fast cruise, if they are bounced they can engage as normal once the DT is jettisoned if not they have plenty of fuel to cover the Ruhr, spend all of '43 bombing it to oblivion.

 

[Bergjon12]

re


Are you referring to the following?


There seems to be a misunderstanding here. I believe Thumpalumpacus statement refers to the change in doctrine and equipment after the US decided that the unescorted bomber mission was not acceptable, and after 8th AF had the numbers of fighters with the needed range to escort the bombers for most of the route - either continuous or in relay - which did not become possible until early-1944.

I cannot find any reference by Thumpalumpacus to the fighters being "glued" to the bombers or other words implying such. Possibly I am missing the wording?

For your pleasure.

Jimmy Doolittle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Escort fighter tactics

[edit]
Doolittle's major influence on the European air war occurred late in 1943—and primarily after he took command of the Eighth Air Force on January 6, 1944[30]​—when he changed the policy of requiring escorting fighters to remain with their bombers at all times. Instead, he permitted escort fighters to fly far ahead of the bombers' combat box formations, allowing them to freely engage the German fighters lying in wait for the bombers. Throughout most of 1944, this tactic negated the effectiveness of the twin-engined Zerstörergeschwader heavy fighter wings and single-engined Sturmgruppen of heavily armed Fw 190As by clearing the Luftwaffe's bomber destroyers from ahead of the bomber formations. After the bombers had hit their targets, the American fighters were free to strafe German airfields, transportation, and other "targets of opportunity" on their return flight to base. These tasks were initially performed with Lockheed P-38 Lightnings and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts through the end of 1943. They were progressively replaced with the long-ranged North American P-51 Mustangs as the spring of 1944 wore on.[31]​[32]​

 

[Bergjon12]

Personally I feel the best course of action in the start of 1943 was to get every available Spitfire MkIX and fit it with rear tanks, leading edge fuel bladders and a 90G drop tank, likewise every P47 and use them to bomb the Ruhr, forget fancy, have the P47's take off first and go as far as they can, on the return hit the deck for targets of opportunity and relay the Spits from there, a MkIX with 75G in the rear, burn the top 42G off first then drop tank on fast cruise, if they are bounced they can engage as normal once the DT is jettisoned if not they have plenty of fuel to cover the Ruhr, spend all of '43 bombing it to oblivion.

I like your style.

Will you allow the bombers to participate, just so everyone can win a prize?

 

[MikeMeech]

Both UK and USA were more than capable of making long-range fighters in great quantities already in the late 1930s/very early 1940s, yet that didn't happened because there was no such doctrine in either RAF or AAF. Nobody prevented the AAF to order the P-47s to have a workable drop tank installation from day one, or that RAF orders all the Spitfires to have the rear tank installed + drop tanks. Long range day fighters allow for the daylight bombing.
FAA trashed the Italian fleet in 1940 using flare-dropping Swordfishes to illuminate the pin-point targets. RAF introduced flares as means of marking the target in 1943 at 1st?

My point is that there were the ways to improve the odds for the bombers to hit the targets, however the institutional inertia was a thing.

Hi
At Taranto the air dropped Illumination Flares were used to silhouette the ship targets, just like the illumination shells used by warships, or similar shells used on the battlefield to illuminate the enemy from behind. David Hobbs in his book 'Taranto' has a good map, on pages 72-73, that shows how they were deployed, part of map below:

The RAF used a wide variety of pyrotechnics to mark targets through the war, this included the 4.5" parachute recce flares to illuminate the whole target area and then use their bombsights if they spotted the target, although as in daylight cloud could cause problems. The first makeshift incendiary target markers, the 250-lb 'Red Blob' and 2,700-lb 'Pink Pansy' appear to have been used around August/September 1942. There was a continual development of markers (40 different types between 1942 and 1945, both ground and sky markers) one of the main reasons being the Germans trying to 'Spoof' the bomber stream by using their own similar devices. Markers are covered quite well in 'Despatch on War Operations' by Harris, 'Section IX, page104, and 'Bombs Gone' by MacBean & Hogben, from page 108.
The RAF was involved during WW1 in the development of 'target markers' in this case during air co-operation with tanks, the marker to be mainly used to mark the location of anti-tank guns during daylight. There were some problems trying to get the devices to work in the manner required (a July 1918 requirement), although some samples were ready to go to France on 5 November 1918, one of the instigators of the project was going to take them out personally when he returned from leave on that date, that man was a certain Major Leigh-Mallory, OC No. 8 Squadron.

Mike

 

[Bergjon12]

although some samples were ready to go to France on 5 November 1918, one of the instigators of the project was going to take them out personally when he returned from leave on that date, that man was a certain Major Leigh-Mallory, OC No. 8 Squadron.

Mike

Was he always late to the fight?

 

[tomo pauk]

The RAF used a wide variety of pyrotechnics to mark targets through the war, this included the 4.5" parachute recce flares to illuminate the whole target area and then use their bombsights if they spotted the target, although as in daylight cloud could cause problems. The first makeshift incendiary target markers, the 250-lb 'Red Blob' and 2,700-lb 'Pink Pansy' appear to have been used around August/September 1942.

Thank you again.
With the eyes a bit towards the possible night targeting devices, it is unfortunate that flares were not incorporated in the RAF arsenal already in 1941, if not by the time ww2 started.

 

[MikeMeech]

Was he always late to the fight?

Hi
No, you are obviously unaware of his career during WW1. He was posted to France during 1916 to No. 5 Sqn., he later took command of No. 8 Sqn., at the age of 26, in November 1917. During 1918 he worked closely with the Tank Corps on air/tank co-operation, he actually wrote the 'book' on it, probably he was the most advanced thinker on the subject of any nation. During the battle of Hamel on the 4th July 1918 he flew as an observer in one of the squadron's aeroplanes so he could see first hand how their devised tactics worked in battle and if they needed modification. You may not like him for WW2 reasons but he cannot be denigrated for what he achieved during WW1!

Mike

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You seem to be suggesting that German fighters would fly through, under, over or past the bomber stream in the hope of being able to tangle with some fighters. That is a strategy we welcome.

I'm not sure what gave you that impression, but this is clearly a misreading. The Germans only tangled with the escorts when they had to.

By flying deep, unescorted missions. That is sort of my central point.

And you don't think the Germans will take countermeasures to address your suggested changes in operations? The Kammhuber line works against short-range raids too, ditto LW fighters.

Excuse me?

Bombing of Cologne in World War II - Wikipedia

Bombing of Hamburg in World War II - Wikipedia

I was referring to attrition, which I thought was clear from the fact that I mentioned earlier in my reply "six or seven" sorties.

As you say, unescorted. These are escorted missions.

Escorted missions still suffered losses that, in 1942, simply couldn't be replaced by the Americans.

I don't understand the point of this paragraph.

The point is that it wasn't until 1944 that the bombers became the bait.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

re


Are you referring to the following?


There seems to be a misunderstanding here. I believe Thumpalumpacus statement refers to the change in doctrine and equipment after the US decided that the unescorted bomber mission was not acceptable, and after 8th AF had the numbers of fighters with the needed range to escort the bombers for most of the route - either continuous or in relay - which did not become possible until early-1944.

I cannot find any reference by Thumpalumpacus to the fighters being "glued" to the bombers or other words implying such. Possibly I am missing the wording?

Yeah, my point is that the doctrine and equipment had to change before the Americans seized air superiority and then supremacy. The fighters were restricted in 1943, under Eaker, compared to Doolittle's change in operations and approach.

 

[MikeMeech]

Thank you again.
With the eyes a bit towards the possible night targeting devices, it is unfortunate that flares were not incorporated in the RAF arsenal already in 1941, if not by the time ww2 started.

Hi
The flares were in "RAF arsenal" as the standard 33 lb 4.5 in Reconnaissance Flare, 33 in long and 4.5 in diameter, used for illumination purposes. When first used the aircraft dropping flares had to be followed up very quickly by bombers dropping incendiaries to give a 'marker', for those aircraft carrying heavier bomb loads. Early in the war the method would probably not worked too well as the relatively few aircraft available, would also be spread out in time, with very little concentration on target to undertake the three roles. BC later had a requirement to get a much larger bomber stream through the target area within 35 minutes (an attempt to 'swamp' the defences).

Mike

 

[Bergjon12]

I'm not sure what gave you that impression, but this is clearly a misreading. The Germans only tangled with the escorts when they had to.

And you don't think the Germans will take countermeasures to address your suggested changes in operations? The Kammhuber line works against short-range raids too, ditto LW fighters.

I was referring to attrition, which I thought was clear from the fact that I mentioned earlier in my reply "six or seven" sorties.

Escorted missions still suffered losses that, in 1942, simply couldn't be replaced by the Americans.

The point is that it wasn't until 1944 that the bombers became the bait.

1. How were you suggesting the LW fighters got behind the bombers to threaten the allied fighters? Not from the north. Not from the east. From the south perhaps, from NE France. That hole is easily plugged with non-drop tank fighters.

2. Such as what countermeasures?

3. You said in essence that the allies didn't have the planes for city-destroying raids before June 1944. That is obviously false.

4. What is your basis for saying this?

5. Perhaps we are at cross purposes here. The basis of this discussion is about what could be done differently than what actually happened.

 

[Bergjon12]

You may not like him for WW2 reasons but he cannot be denigrated for what he achieved during WW1!

Mike

I am so glad to learn this

 

[Bergjon12]

Top 20 German cities in 1939 by population:

• Berlin - 4,338,756
• Hamburg - 1,929,976
• Munich (München) - 1,711,877
• Cologne (Köln) - 829,318
• Leipzig - 772,221
• Dresden - 707,365
• Essen - 666,743
• Frankfurt am Main - 630,216
• Dortmund - 629,565
• Düsseldorf - 553,464
• Stuttgart - 542,261
• Breslau (now Wrocław, Poland) - 541,410
• Hanover (Hannover) - 470,950
• Nuremberg (Nürnberg) - 458,429
• Duisburg - 434,646
• Chemnitz - 423,383
• Bochum - 401,672
• Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) - 372,164
• Mannheim - 354,109
• Gelsenkirchen - 337,645

Obviously, several of these are out of reach of a NW escort strategy. Another thing we notice is that "Hamburg x 6" is not possible in terms of individual cities - there aren't enough cities with a population close to Hamburg's. So being too literal would be a mistake.

Cities on this list that should be targeted for de-functioning are:

Tier 1:

Cologne
Essen
Frankfurt
Dortmund
Dusseldorf
Duisburg
Bochum
Gelsenkirchen
and Ruhr valley more generally


Tier 2:

Hamburg
Stuttgart
Hannover
Mannheim

Tier 3:
Munich
Nuremberg

This is not a complete list.

At the completion of each 'tier' battle the LW has been progressively and dramatically weakened, making each further step easier. The annihilation of Munich without escort might become feasible. The completion of these goals approximates Speer's "Hx6" conclusion, although that should only be seen as a yardstick, not gospel.

"The No D'ing around rule": Each major city is a candidate for a firestorm. For this reason, no minor attacks should be directed at any such city, so as to preserve all combustible materials within that city. Air assets should be preserved through winter months by reduced tempo, so that a maximum effort can be made in summer, for the best chance for a firestorm. One or more such attempts should be possible in the summer of '42, several in the summer of '43. Spring should be the time for maximum fighter effort, to reduce the LW for the crucial summer months.

 

[Bergjon12]

The larger the target area the more dispersed the defences have to be and the larger the number of fighters out of range of a given attack.

(There's a lot to unpack, as the man said.)

No they don't. Deeper penetration gives the defence more options, not more obligations. All of Germany can be defended on a given line running NNE.

 

[Bergjon12]

The short answer is no, the airspace needed per base means plenty of them will be back from the coast

Fighter bases WILL be placed as far forward as possible. Just how far forward IS possible in a given case is another matter.

Note that Norwich is not on the coast.