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The fundamental aim of the air campaign against Germany 1942-45 was to knock G out of the war using airpower alone, sooner than it would be by more conventional methods.
Many would say that this was impossible to achieve, but that is immaterial for the purposes of this discussion.
The question is, was the strategy actually used the optimal one, or nearly so?
I happen to think severe mistakes were made.
One of these is unescorted daylight bombing. High losses result, and an embarrassing economic aid to German airplane production.
Another is a lack of focus. Was oil the target? Was it ball bearings? Was it coal? Was it rail? Was it civilians? Targeting all of these is unlikely to result in choking off a bottleneck.
I think it is better to select targets that allow escort all the way and to annihilate selected cities, rather than inflict scattered, easily repaired damage.
Does anyone think that is a less effective strategy than the historical one?
See EwenS's link. That where i retreived the data a long-long time ago. The whole listing was offered in .csv format and i imported it into excel and started filtering.
The MkV's TROP are not included in the numbers , this would account for +/- 1250 airframes more for the Mk-V series
Here the list with the basic filtering, you can play with it by yourself and check the numbers(personally, production numbers aren't important for me, but the operational assignments and the distrubution numbers) :
Yes, indeed, The first date in the right column is the "production date", you'll have a FF (first flight) or a MU (Maintenance unit, where some equipment was put in the airframe).Oh thanks so much for that! I guess we are to take the "production" date (though it seems closer to a factory acceptance date, which is different, but close enough, and really probably more meaningful than a straight production date now that I think of it) from the first date listed in the rightmost column?
Actually, it's really shitty to parse the data from the last column, i do it manually, it's time consuming but what-everSeems fairly straightforward to parse the assignments in that column into its own table and then all sorts of useful data could be queried (I do databases professionally).
I don't think it's immaterial. I'd imagine the choice of what to target would be drastically affected by whether you believe you can win by airpower alone.
Yes, in retrospect we can certainly say so. Maybe it wasn't so clear at the time. And those dastardly Germans didn't telegraph back reporting what works and what doesn't either.
As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate. I believe there were pre war studies identifying bottleneck resources, which did identify liquid fuels as one such critical resource. But how sure can you be at the time that this is the one critical resource that would quickly bring the German war machine to its knees? Are you prepared to sacrifice thousands of your airmen based on this hypothesis?
(Leaving the AAA aside for the moment to be addressed later)As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate.
Actually it was not to knock out Germany by airpower alone, it was to weaken it.The fundamental aim of the air campaign against Germany 1942-45 was to knock G out of the war using airpower alone, sooner than it would be by more conventional methods.
Everyone agrees big mistakes were made, starting with the Luftwaffe in 1940.The question is, was the strategy actually used the optimal one, or nearly so? I happen to think severe mistakes were made. One of these is unescorted daylight bombing. High losses result,
Was it U-boats, V-weapons, invasion support, pushing the Italians closer to surrender in 1943? Plenty of competing interests, even today people suggest electricity etc. as the one true target. Coal was never tried, it was much better sector than oil. 8th Air Force targets, Aircraft engineering and bearings 1 attack, 229 tons, bearings 21 attacks 4,740.1 tons of bombs, does this qualify for a sustained campaign? The 1943 raids reported 531 attacking, 101 lost, the 1944 raids 1,510 attacking, 80 lost.Another is a lack of focus. Was oil the target? Was it ball bearings? Was it coal? Was it rail? Was it civilians? Targeting all of these is unlikely to result in choking off a bottleneck.
So name a city that was annihilated in WW2. Almost all air raid damage was repairable and usually quickly, see above, Speer used electricity consumption to monitor recovery. What cities in Germany were available to attack and at what time. Given the continual call for escorts it seems the night bombers are ruled out, so no "select target" raids until towards the end of 1943, when the USAAF finally had the bomb lift comparable to the Hamburg attack as well as the escortsI think it is better to select targets that allow escort all the way and to annihilate selected cities, rather than inflict scattered, easily repaired damage.
Most of the known universe. The plan requires allied 1944 capabilities, numbers and quality but in 1943 or 1942, is still unclear about day or night or both raids. Or something like the USN, after decoding the IJN Midway plan agreeing it is such a good one that the USN will follow the IJN version, not the USN one. The Luftwaffe buys the rope, makes a noose, steps on a chair to fix the noose, puts the noose around its neck then kicks the chair away.Does anyone think that is a less effective strategy than the historical one?
Before we had Luftwaffe bases cratered to the moon by allied light and mediums who now have a separate role as flak suppressors, as the plan is to concentrate on a small part of Germany the Luftwaffe can set up bases about the distance covered when climbing to combat altitude, 50 to 100 miles, beyond allied escort range, leaving only flak within allied escort range to suppress.I'm proposing the B-25 to attack and suppress AA batteries. The guns can be fired from any altitude, since gravity is a thing.
So no allied day fighter escorts with the necessary 400+ mile range until the final quarter of 1943.Proposition A: - A short range campaign as I have outlined is going to target NW Germany with a limit on a line running roughly from Hamburg to Strasbourg.
Based on strength returns the saturation will be Luftwaffe not allied while the attackers have to cover high altitude heavies and lower altitude mediums.They will also be forced to contend with escorting fighters. Attacking the bombers on the return journey is not a realistic option in an area saturated with opposing fighters.
Like the climb distance to altitude beyond allied fighter range?LW basing is forced more forward than otherwise making them more vulnerable.
So the fighters defending Hamburg can make it to Schweinfurt? How long?Proposition B: - Deep penetration, unescorted raids into all or most areas of Germany. Here the LW has the OPTION of concentrating,
So dispersal aids concentration.They can also opt to distribute the fighter strength more widely within Germany.
How long to allied heavy day bombers spend in German airspace? How long does it take for a German fighter to launch, attack, land, refuel and rearm, launch and attack? The bombers are moving at about 240mph. How much is again and again?They can CHOOSE to defer attacking the bombers for later, when they are well and truly clear of any escort, and they have the option of attacking the same bomber formation again and again on the way to the target, and they have the option of attacking them again and again on the return journey, especially stragglers.
Now look, this is sophistry. Every attack is going to gain experience. If trial runs are called for, other targets exist. I am not going to name them because you know perfectly well that there is a wealth of targets of every description in the area I have indicated.So the strategy of waiting, building up, to then strike decisive blows without doing much to gain experience works really well because there are other targets, except the whole idea is to strike only a small number of targets for decisive results. Name the other targets.
This logic is faulty. If you do something that doesn't work, repeatedly, and then do something that does work, it does not follow that the first enabled the second. Fully escorted raids work. They get through, they decimate the opposition. Unescorted raids don't work. They incur excessive casualties and don't harm the opposition enough. The success of escorted raids is not evidence for the alleged soundness of unescorted raids.ME: Interesting as the 8th Air Force operations 1943/44 meant the Luftwaffe day fighter force was denied its usual rest period, setting it up for the losses later in 1944.
Bergjon12: I'm sorry, but I reject this logic, that to keep attacking with unfavorable prospects is a sound strategy. It was unsound on the western front in WW1 and it was unsound in WW2.
That no doubt explains why it worked in 1943/44. Fully escorted raids, using radar to bomb as needed.
ME: Yes they do, Germany can be defended Kammhuber style, push through/saturate that and no more interceptions. The size of Germany meant defending fighters started to carry drop tanks in order to have the range to intercept.
Bergjon12: I think your logic is backwards. What you are describing is the LW exploiting the chances for second bites at the apple offered by deep penetration missions, opportunities which would not exist under a short range strategy.
I think your logic is backwards. What you are describing is the LW exploiting the chances for every operational fighter to overwhelm raids on the small part of Germany being attacked, opportunities not offered by deep penetration missions, opportunities which would not exist under a long range strategy. German fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt did not have the range to intercept raids on Hamburg, the allies only attacking part of Germany within 300 or so miles of Britain enables every Luftwaffe fighter a base within intercept distance.
So how do fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt intercept raids on Hamburg and vice versa?
I don't think contributions of this type are helpful.Ever seen a map of 8th Air Force bomber bases?
I am referring to the ferry operation to Malta.(Message 140)
On Spitfire range not being good enough to make Germany
Bergjon12: Now this is clearly false. Spitfires with drop tanks were fielded as early as March 1942.
So what size external tanks, and what is the maximum radius a Spitfire V can enter combat and still have enough fuel to make it home, including fuel reserves, the Spitfire IX had an even shorter range, no matter how much external fuel it had to stay within around 160 miles of base.
That's good advice. I will.Firestorms anytime were rare, if you decide around 2,700 short tons as a guide to make them, then do 2,000 bomber raids in 1942.
I'm proposing the B-25 to attack and suppress AA batteries. The guns can be fired from any altitude, since gravity is a thing.
Does anyone know when the 8-gun nose was first available?
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I favor night strafing by Mosquito.One of the things most often overlooked in what-ifs is the fact that the enemy will respond in the manner most suitable to his own objectives. Assuming otherwise usually invalidates the what-if.
In the above scenario, the Germans could simply bring their fighter-bases near but behind NW Germany, and reply upon radar warning in order to scramble interceptors in time to achieve altitude and location. Being as these bases would be deeper, hitting them with those very busy medium bombers would probably not be on the cards.
I favor night strafing by Mosquito.
No I don't. That is why I didn't say "...to knock them out"Airfields are notoriously difficult to put out of action. Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was hit in one night in Oct 42 by 973 14" battleship shells. Two days later, Henderson was back to launching regular, albeit diminished, combat operations. That was on an island at the end of a long logistical chain.
If they could recover that quickly under those circumstances, do you think realistically that you can knock out multiple LW bases that are much closer to resources like spare aircraft and repair equipment using strafing attacks alone?
As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate. I believe there were pre war studies identifying bottleneck resources, which did identify liquid fuels as one such critical resource. But how sure can you be at the time that this is the one critical resource that would quickly bring the German war machine to its knees? Are you prepared to sacrifice thousands of your airmen based on this hypothesis?
As for aiding enemy aircraft production, did this actually happen? I recall Germans used slightly different aluminum alloys than the Allies. It might not be as simple as throwing an airplane wreck into a melting furnace and stamping out new sheet metal?
No I don't. That is why I didn't say "...to knock them out"
No, it's an additional contribution to grind down the LW.
Then stop doing it.Now look, this is sophistry.
Ah yes, the attackers will strike an unspecified number of targets, of an unspecified type, at unspecified locations, at unspecified times (day, night, year) for an unspecified trial period, with an unspecified number of aircraft which will enable them to gain all the experience the need to step straight up and regularly "annihilate" city size targets plus destroy any defending fighter force, with acceptable friendly losses. To the point the defenders surrender.Every attack is going to gain experience. If trial runs are called for, other targets exist. I am not going to name them because you know perfectly well that there is a wealth of targets of every description in the area I have indicated.
Yes, we know but you keep repeating something that doesn't work. The USAAF 1943/44 raids worked, they had escorts, they forced the Jagdwaffe to fight over winter.This logic is faulty.
The USAAF 1943/44 raids worked, they had escorts, but these have ben redefined as not having escorts.If you do something that doesn't work, repeatedly, and then do something that does work, it does not follow that the first enabled the second. Fully escorted raids work. They get through, they decimate the opposition. Unescorted raids don't work. They incur excessive casualties and don't harm the opposition enough. The success of escorted raids is not evidence for the alleged soundness of unescorted raids.
The strength of allied fighters in Britain 1942 and 1943 has been posted, the number of Luftwaffe fighters available also, including things like the number of sorties done in October 1943. Now provide the sourced strength figures that show the allies had many more fighters in Britain than the Germans had available 1942 to 1943, then the sourced figures for the much smaller number of allied fighters able to make Germany and engage in combat for the same time period.The LW is only able to attempt to overwhelm raids because they are unescorted and long range. The long range strategy is giving them that chance. A short range, fully escorted raid cannot be realistically overwhelmed, even if you concentrate against it. Allied fighter availability is much greater than the German.
Then name them, along with the timings, like warning time, launch time, cruise time plus ranges.There are interception points for raids against these two targets that can be served from the same location,
It is never necessary to intercept a raid near its target, but smart planners choose bomber routes that minimise the number of hostile interceptors within range, unless in the USAAF situation in the second half of 1944, flying direct routes to make it easier for the Luftwaffe to intercept, but that cost as it gave more warning about what target was going to be hit, enabling passive defences to be fully deployed, cutting bomb damage. Things like target weather forecasts in plain language were another clue, this did up the average accuracy while again telling the Germans what was likely to happen.It is not necessary to intercept a long range raid near its target.
Yes factual material is a problem when fiction is preferred.I don't think contributions of this type are helpful.
A friend thanks you for a new story for their Spitfire the wonder weapon file. Quite a good laugh. Also it was 600 or 700 miles at economic cruise without a combat allowance. They had to travel at that speed so the 4 Blenheims provided for navigation purposes (plus 4 reserves) flown from Gibraltar at half hour intervals could stay with the fighters. It was a 4 hour flight, dog leg, staying over water to avoid axis aircraft, not quite contested airspace like over Europe The Spitfires needed a service after arrival to make them combat worthy. You do understand the extra navigation training and aids needed for single crew aircraft to operate at long range? You do understand the difference between external ferry and combat tanks? You do understand the different chances of being tracked and intercepted over Europe versus over the Mediterranean?I am referring to the ferry operation to Malta.
On 7 March 1942, 15 Mk Vs carrying 90 imp gal (410 L; 110 US gal) fuel tanks under their bellies took off from HMS Eagle off the coast of Algeria on a 600-mile (970 km) flight to Malta.
600 mile ferry range (at least) through contested airspace. That is plenty to reach most targets in tier 1.
Yes, I am sure you think the Luftwaffe can loan you the bombers to make the numbers, with all the advantages of short range to target.That's good advice. I will.
Excellent the world can do with more comedy relief.More to follow.