The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany (1 Viewer)

[Bergjon12]

I would like at this time to apologize to all concerned for being sometimes obtuse. There are several posts on this thread made by others that I have found genuinely difficult to understand, and of course some I have disagreed with. Sometimes I should have provided more comprehensive replies. It's a way of foruming (is that a word) that I have formed over the years, that it may be time to unlearn. Thanks to all who have contributed to this thread.

 

[Bergjon12]

The fundamental aim of the air campaign against Germany 1942-45 was to knock G out of the war using airpower alone, sooner than it would be by more conventional methods.

Many would say that this was impossible to achieve, but that is immaterial for the purposes of this discussion.

The question is, was the strategy actually used the optimal one, or nearly so?

I happen to think severe mistakes were made.

One of these is unescorted daylight bombing. High losses result, and an embarrassing economic aid to German airplane production.

Another is a lack of focus. Was oil the target? Was it ball bearings? Was it coal? Was it rail? Was it civilians? Targeting all of these is unlikely to result in choking off a bottleneck.

I think it is better to select targets that allow escort all the way and to annihilate selected cities, rather than inflict scattered, easily repaired damage.

Does anyone think that is a less effective strategy than the historical one?

 

[z42]

The fundamental aim of the air campaign against Germany 1942-45 was to knock G out of the war using airpower alone, sooner than it would be by more conventional methods.

Many would say that this was impossible to achieve, but that is immaterial for the purposes of this discussion.

I don't think it's immaterial. I'd imagine the choice of what to target would be drastically affected by whether you believe you can win by airpower alone.

The question is, was the strategy actually used the optimal one, or nearly so?

I happen to think severe mistakes were made.

Yes, in retrospect we can certainly say so. Maybe it wasn't so clear at the time. And those dastardly Germans didn't telegraph back reporting what works and what doesn't either.

One of these is unescorted daylight bombing. High losses result, and an embarrassing economic aid to German airplane production.

Yes, I do think we can fault the generals for not changing approach quickly enough once they got their noses bloodied a couple of times.

As for aiding enemy aircraft production, did this actually happen? I recall Germans used slightly different aluminum alloys than the Allies. It might not be as simple as throwing an airplane wreck into a melting furnace and stamping out new sheet metal?

Another is a lack of focus. Was oil the target? Was it ball bearings? Was it coal? Was it rail? Was it civilians? Targeting all of these is unlikely to result in choking off a bottleneck.

I think it is better to select targets that allow escort all the way and to annihilate selected cities, rather than inflict scattered, easily repaired damage.

Does anyone think that is a less effective strategy than the historical one?

As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate. I believe there were pre war studies identifying bottleneck resources, which did identify liquid fuels as one such critical resource. But how sure can you be at the time that this is the one critical resource that would quickly bring the German war machine to its knees? Are you prepared to sacrifice thousands of your airmen based on this hypothesis?

 

[ggiumarra]

See EwenS's link. That where i retreived the data a long-long time ago. The whole listing was offered in .csv format and i imported it into excel and started filtering.

The MkV's TROP are not included in the numbers , this would account for +/- 1250 airframes more for the Mk-V series
Here the list with the basic filtering, you can play with it by yourself and check the numbers (personally, production numbers aren't important for me, but the operational assignments and the distrubution numbers) :

Oh thanks so much for that! I guess we are to take the "production" date (though it seems closer to a factory acceptance date, which is different, but close enough, and really probably more meaningful than a straight production date now that I think of it) from the first date listed in the rightmost column? Seems fairly straightforward to parse the assignments in that column into its own table and then all sorts of useful data could be queried (I do databases professionally ).

 

[bada]

Oh thanks so much for that! I guess we are to take the "production" date (though it seems closer to a factory acceptance date, which is different, but close enough, and really probably more meaningful than a straight production date now that I think of it) from the first date listed in the rightmost column?

Yes, indeed, The first date in the right column is the "production date", you'll have a FF (first flight) or a MU (Maintenance unit, where some equipment was put in the airframe).

Seems fairly straightforward to parse the assignments in that column into its own table and then all sorts of useful data could be queried (I do databases professionally ).

Actually, it's really shitty to parse the data from the last column, i do it manually, it's time consuming but what-ever
I work with 10days period (it simplify the data and the stats and also because when i started doing this, there was not enough columns in excel to do it day per day, it was long time ago)


Ps: we're totally OT here
It gives something like that:

 

[Bergjon12]

I don't think it's immaterial. I'd imagine the choice of what to target would be drastically affected by whether you believe you can win by airpower alone.

It is the aim. Get with the program sort of thing.

 

[Bergjon12]

Yes, in retrospect we can certainly say so. Maybe it wasn't so clear at the time. And those dastardly Germans didn't telegraph back reporting what works and what doesn't either.

That just isn't cricket.

As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate. I believe there were pre war studies identifying bottleneck resources, which did identify liquid fuels as one such critical resource. But how sure can you be at the time that this is the one critical resource that would quickly bring the German war machine to its knees? Are you prepared to sacrifice thousands of your airmen based on this hypothesis?

Harris called these things panacea, not that I necessarily agree. I am of two minds on the oil issue, it is a more difficult snake to pin down than aluminum IMO.

 

[Bergjon12]

I'm proposing the B-25 to attack and suppress AA batteries. The guns can be fired from any altitude, since gravity is a thing.

Does anyone know when the 8-gun nose was first available?

 

[Bergjon12]

As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate.

(Leaving the AAA aside for the moment to be addressed later)

The above, which several have indeed forwarded, is a fallacy for the following reasons:

Proposition A: - A short range campaign as I have outlined is going to target NW Germany with a limit on a line running roughly from Hamburg to Strasbourg. To be effective, the LW MUST intercept the bombers on this line or in practice, somewhat earlier. That is the only chance they get to attack the bomber formations. They will also be forced to contend with escorting fighters. Attacking the bombers on the return journey is not a realistic option in an area saturated with opposing fighters. LW basing is forced more forward than otherwise making them more vulnerable.

Proposition B: - Deep penetration, unescorted raids into all or most areas of Germany. Here the LW has the OPTION of concentrating, if that is indeed a boon, for a defense on the H-S line as in prop A. They can also opt to distribute the fighter strength more widely within Germany. They can CHOOSE to defer attacking the bombers for later, when they are well and truly clear of any escort, and they have the option of attacking the same bomber formation again and again on the way to the target, and they have the option of attacking them again and again on the return journey, especially stragglers.

Prop B retains ALL the advantages which prop A may give to the LW. In addition, prop B gives other distinct advantages to the LW. The major advantage of prop A for the allies is of course full escort for all bomber formations, which will grind down the LW in a relatively short time. There is no advantage given to the LW by prop A which is not also present in prop B.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Spitfire figures came from cross checking
RAF Contract Cards.
National Archives file AIR 19/524 has monthly military aircraft production for the UK from January 1933 to September 1945.
National Archives file AIR 8/278 covers production from September 1939 to December 1940 inclusive
National Archives file AVIA 46/146 report on time to peak production.
National Archives file AVIA 10/315 is the MAP Weekly Statistical Bulletin November 1941 to June 1942

The National Aerospace Library at Farnborough has a copy of the Ministry of Supply report, Rate of attainment of peak output after first delivery, report no 5. 11/313.

The MAP Monthly Statistical Bulletins provide detailed production data by version from March 1942 to December 1945

Vickers document MS412 which gives monthly Spitfire production by version and factory for both Supermarine and Castle Bromwich, though it does not match the official production figures until mid 1943.

(from message 138)
ME: Another it will be all right on the night, not much need for rehearsals, the training and actual experience to get the bomb concentrations in time and space to have a chance of creating major lasting damage.

Bergjon12: There are other targets as well.

So the strategy of waiting, building up, to then strike decisive blows without doing much to gain experience works really well because there are other targets, except the whole idea is to strike only a small number of targets for decisive results. Name the other targets.

ME: Interesting as the 8th Air Force operations 1943/44 meant the Luftwaffe day fighter force was denied its usual rest period, setting it up for the losses later in 1944.

Bergjon12: I'm sorry, but I reject this logic, that to keep attacking with unfavorable prospects is a sound strategy. It was unsound on the western front in WW1 and it was unsound in WW2.

That no doubt explains why it worked in 1943/44. Fully escorted raids, using radar to bomb as needed.


ME: Yes they do, Germany can be defended Kammhuber style, push through/saturate that and no more interceptions. The size of Germany meant defending fighters started to carry drop tanks in order to have the range to intercept.

Bergjon12: I think your logic is backwards. What you are describing is the LW exploiting the chances for second bites at the apple offered by deep penetration missions, opportunities which would not exist under a short range strategy.

I think your logic is backwards. What you are describing is the LW exploiting the chances for every operational fighter to overwhelm raids on the small part of Germany being attacked, opportunities not offered by deep penetration missions, opportunities which would not exist under a long range strategy. German fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt did not have the range to intercept raids on Hamburg, the allies only attacking part of Germany within 300 or so miles of Britain enables every Luftwaffe fighter a base within intercept distance.

ME: The larger the target area the more dispersed the defences have to be and the larger the number of fighters out of range of a given attack.

Bergjon12: No they don't. They offer the defense multiple chances to oppose an attack.

So how do fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt intercept raids on Hamburg and vice versa?

ME: Every seen a map of 8th Air Force fighter bases? Anyway just add more airfields to the construction list in 1942/43 as the system tries to cope with expansion of existing bases for larger aircraft and the arrivals of the 8th then 9th Air Forces.

Bergjon12: Let's not forget that shorter missions means bomber bases can be moved further back, creating space for more forward fighter bases.

Ever seen a map of 8th Air Force bomber bases?

ME: You mean you do not know that? Your whole idea is you can arrange escorted missions with low enough loss rates to enable continual operations. So what are the numbers? What does escorted all the way to target mean in terms of numbers of fighters to number of bombers? All we are being given is a bunch of assumptions about a force that will be initially outnumbered and generally flying fighters with lower performance than the defenders will do great things but only when the European weather is clear enough for visual bombing, concentrating on a sub section of enemy territory, which by the way is another limit, Germany is big enough to have visual weather in parts and non visual in others.

Bergjon12: Those numbers are on the way, for sure. I'm just waiting for my promised staff numbers.

Right, you have the absolute confidence of having no evidence to contradict you because you have no evidence at all.

ME: To put it another way, if allied airpower could do as much in 1942/43 as being claimed,

Bergjon12: What exactly has been claimed?

If you do not know then tell whoever is posting in your name to stop.

ME: However we are really talking about a fixed conclusion, one that near totally ignores reality.

Bergjon12: What conclusion is that?

Your conclusion, I can understand if you wish to deny it.

(Message 140)
On Spitfire range not being good enough to make Germany

Bergjon12: Now this is clearly false. Spitfires with drop tanks were fielded as early as March 1942.

So what size external tanks, and what is the maximum radius a Spitfire V can enter combat and still have enough fuel to make it home, including fuel reserves, the Spitfire IX had an even shorter range, no matter how much external fuel it had to stay within around 160 miles of base.

Bergjon12: I'm only asking for one or two firestorms in 1942. Anything more is gravy.

There were a total of 4 firestorms created by the RAF in Europe during the war from thousands of raids.

Hamburg 27/28 July 1943, 1,259.2 short tons of HE, 1,409.2 short tons of incendiary, total 2,668.4, the first firestorm (Bomber Command 850 aircraft with crews)

The 1,000 bomber raids in 1942, using aircraft from training units, Coastal Command etc. as well as regular bomber units who were rested in order to build up strength.

Cologne, 30 May, 597.6, 1,100.2 total 1,697.8 (Bomber Command 591 aircraft with crews, up from around 400 a week earlier)
Essen, 1 June, 523.8, 972.3 total 1,496.1 (Bomber Command 569 aircraft with crews)
Bremen, 25 June, 504.0, 780.6 total 1,284.6 (Bomber Command 523 aircraft with crews, up from well under 400 a week earlier and back to 360 on 3 July)

On average in 1942 Bomber Command managed 4,250 short tons of bombs a month, or about 1.6 Hamburg fire storm raids per month or 19 for the year, as long as no other target was bombed.

Firestorms anytime were rare, if you decide around 2,700 short tons as a guide to make them, then do 2,000 bomber raids in 1942.

Bomber Command reached its mid point for bombs dropped on Germany end September 1944, that is after 5 years/60 months of operations, then dropped as many bombs again in 7 months. For the 8th Air Force the mid point was mid November 1944, that is around 28 months of operations, then as much again in around 5 months. Showing the increase in bombing power coupled with the reduction in targets outside of Germany. It also meant the repair crews were overwhelmed meaning the, as usual, mostly repairable bomb damage could not be fixed in any timely manner leading to significant production losses.

Either 27/28 October or 31 October/1 November 1944 night strikes hit the Ruhoel (Bottrup-Welheim) high compressor house with 3 4,000 lb and 8 1,000 lb bombs, destroying it, rendering the plant out of action for the rest of the war, a rare result. Leuna, after 22 raids the USSBS thought it could recover to around 70% capacity in a couple of months, surveys of other German targets and Ploesti confirmed a few weeks to months of peace would enable restoration of most production. In 1940 3 Whitleys carrying 3.5 tons of bombs were considered enough to do real damage to the Wessling oil plant, in 1944 it was 200 aircraft with 1,000 tons of bombs.

Unlike every other sector attacked the allies received regular feedback on the oil attacks, mainly via the Luftwaffe signals about its fuel situation, and probably signals by the navy and army.

Arthur Harris concluded the problems of actually doing significant, lasting damage to a specific key sector of a war economy as big as Germany's was not possible, starting with humans coming up with ways around shortages, area bombing would damage plenty of key areas along with housing etc. resulting in loss of general production due to the dislocation of work forces, heavy bombers could usually hit a city so few bombs would be classified as wasted, Schweinfurt was a small city at best. Harris turned out to be incorrect but it took a lot more air effort than envisaged even in 1943 plus new technologies, area bombing was the long way home, if the air force was losing the air fights the bomb damage was usually not worth the losses, if the air force was winning then area bombing damage was useful, more so if the enemy was worried about other damage.

There were around 150 German oil plants, Leuna and Poelitz were about 33% of Hydrogenation production, seven plants 80% and 10 plants 96% of Hydrogenation production. German natural oil refinery capacity was 3,000,000 tons per year and were running at 50 to 66% capacity in the 1940 to 1943 period. The synthetic oil plants required very high temperatures and pressures, that made them quite tough. Even standard oil refinery machinery was, along with things like machine tools, more durable that the airmen thought.

The fundamental aim of the air campaign against Germany 1942-45 was to knock G out of the war using airpower alone, sooner than it would be by more conventional methods.

Actually it was not to knock out Germany by airpower alone, it was to weaken it.

The question is, was the strategy actually used the optimal one, or nearly so? I happen to think severe mistakes were made. One of these is unescorted daylight bombing. High losses result,

Everyone agrees big mistakes were made, starting with the Luftwaffe in 1940.

Another is a lack of focus. Was oil the target? Was it ball bearings? Was it coal? Was it rail? Was it civilians? Targeting all of these is unlikely to result in choking off a bottleneck.

Was it U-boats, V-weapons, invasion support, pushing the Italians closer to surrender in 1943? Plenty of competing interests, even today people suggest electricity etc. as the one true target. Coal was never tried, it was much better sector than oil. 8th Air Force targets, Aircraft engineering and bearings 1 attack, 229 tons, bearings 21 attacks 4,740.1 tons of bombs, does this qualify for a sustained campaign? The 1943 raids reported 531 attacking, 101 lost, the 1944 raids 1,510 attacking, 80 lost.

I think it is better to select targets that allow escort all the way and to annihilate selected cities, rather than inflict scattered, easily repaired damage.

So name a city that was annihilated in WW2. Almost all air raid damage was repairable and usually quickly, see above, Speer used electricity consumption to monitor recovery. What cities in Germany were available to attack and at what time. Given the continual call for escorts it seems the night bombers are ruled out, so no "select target" raids until towards the end of 1943, when the USAAF finally had the bomb lift comparable to the Hamburg attack as well as the escorts

Does anyone think that is a less effective strategy than the historical one?

Most of the known universe. The plan requires allied 1944 capabilities, numbers and quality but in 1943 or 1942, is still unclear about day or night or both raids. Or something like the USN, after decoding the IJN Midway plan agreeing it is such a good one that the USN will follow the IJN version, not the USN one. The Luftwaffe buys the rope, makes a noose, steps on a chair to fix the noose, puts the noose around its neck then kicks the chair away.

In 1943 USAAF ETO fighters claimed 451 kills, of which 281 were in the final 3 months, in the first 4 months it was 1,431 in the air or about 4 times the rate of the final quarter of 1943 and it was the loss rate that really hurt. In 1943 the USAAF fighters did 24,501 effective sorties, January to April 1944 49,996 or about 6 times the 1943 rate.

In October 1943 the ETO USAAF reports 2,888 effective fighter sorties, Jagdkorps I 3,840 day fighter sorties.

I'm proposing the B-25 to attack and suppress AA batteries. The guns can be fired from any altitude, since gravity is a thing.

Before we had Luftwaffe bases cratered to the moon by allied light and mediums who now have a separate role as flak suppressors, as the plan is to concentrate on a small part of Germany the Luftwaffe can set up bases about the distance covered when climbing to combat altitude, 50 to 100 miles, beyond allied escort range, leaving only flak within allied escort range to suppress.

Flak batteries assigned to Luftflotte 3,

29 January 1943 189 heavy, 271 light
15 June 1943 206 heavy, 292 light
26 November 1943 224 heavy, 331 light.
23 May 1944 349 heavy, 407 light.

As for the Reich flak defences,
13 January 1943 659 heavy and 558 light/medium
15 June 1943 1,089 and 738
8 January 1944 1,402 and 721
8 March 1944 1,431 and 581.

many of which can be moved into the area of Germany being attacked.

Bomber Command first operational Mosquitoes appeared on 1 June 1942, it was not until mid December before the daily number of Mosquito plus crew consistently went into double figures.

Proposition A: - A short range campaign as I have outlined is going to target NW Germany with a limit on a line running roughly from Hamburg to Strasbourg.

So no allied day fighter escorts with the necessary 400+ mile range until the final quarter of 1943.

They will also be forced to contend with escorting fighters. Attacking the bombers on the return journey is not a realistic option in an area saturated with opposing fighters.

Based on strength returns the saturation will be Luftwaffe not allied while the attackers have to cover high altitude heavies and lower altitude mediums.

LW basing is forced more forward than otherwise making them more vulnerable.

Like the climb distance to altitude beyond allied fighter range?

Proposition B: - Deep penetration, unescorted raids into all or most areas of Germany. Here the LW has the OPTION of concentrating,

So the fighters defending Hamburg can make it to Schweinfurt? How long?

They can also opt to distribute the fighter strength more widely within Germany.

So dispersal aids concentration.

They can CHOOSE to defer attacking the bombers for later, when they are well and truly clear of any escort, and they have the option of attacking the same bomber formation again and again on the way to the target, and they have the option of attacking them again and again on the return journey, especially stragglers.

How long to allied heavy day bombers spend in German airspace? How long does it take for a German fighter to launch, attack, land, refuel and rearm, launch and attack? The bombers are moving at about 240mph. How much is again and again?

The RAF assessment of the German situation in 1940 and 1941

21 September 1940 "evidence continues to accumulate that our sustained attacks against the enemy's railway and canal communications is having the anticipated effect of dislocating the enemy's supply system both in the industrial and strategical spheres".

15 January 1941, "the latest reports and analysis on Germany's oil position reveals that the Axis Powers will be passing through their most critical period as regards their oil resources during the next six months."

 

[Bergjon12]

Bergjon12: There are other targets as well.

So the strategy of waiting, building up, to then strike decisive blows without doing much to gain experience works really well because there are other targets, except the whole idea is to strike only a small number of targets for decisive results. Name the other targets.

Now look, this is sophistry. Every attack is going to gain experience. If trial runs are called for, other targets exist. I am not going to name them because you know perfectly well that there is a wealth of targets of every description in the area I have indicated.

ME: Interesting as the 8th Air Force operations 1943/44 meant the Luftwaffe day fighter force was denied its usual rest period, setting it up for the losses later in 1944.

Bergjon12: I'm sorry, but I reject this logic, that to keep attacking with unfavorable prospects is a sound strategy. It was unsound on the western front in WW1 and it was unsound in WW2.

That no doubt explains why it worked in 1943/44. Fully escorted raids, using radar to bomb as needed.

This logic is faulty. If you do something that doesn't work, repeatedly, and then do something that does work, it does not follow that the first enabled the second. Fully escorted raids work. They get through, they decimate the opposition. Unescorted raids don't work. They incur excessive casualties and don't harm the opposition enough. The success of escorted raids is not evidence for the alleged soundness of unescorted raids.

ME: Yes they do, Germany can be defended Kammhuber style, push through/saturate that and no more interceptions. The size of Germany meant defending fighters started to carry drop tanks in order to have the range to intercept.

Bergjon12: I think your logic is backwards. What you are describing is the LW exploiting the chances for second bites at the apple offered by deep penetration missions, opportunities which would not exist under a short range strategy.

I think your logic is backwards. What you are describing is the LW exploiting the chances for every operational fighter to overwhelm raids on the small part of Germany being attacked, opportunities not offered by deep penetration missions, opportunities which would not exist under a long range strategy. German fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt did not have the range to intercept raids on Hamburg, the allies only attacking part of Germany within 300 or so miles of Britain enables every Luftwaffe fighter a base within intercept distance.

The LW is only able to attempt to overwhelm raids because they are unescorted and long range. The long range strategy is giving them that chance. A short range, fully escorted raid cannot be realistically overwhelmed, even if you concentrate against it. Allied fighter availability is much greater than the German.

So how do fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt intercept raids on Hamburg and vice versa?

There are interception points for raids against these two targets that can be served from the same location, if that is what is called for. It is not necessary to intercept a long range raid near its target.

Ever seen a map of 8th Air Force bomber bases?

I don't think contributions of this type are helpful.

(Message 140)
On Spitfire range not being good enough to make Germany

Bergjon12: Now this is clearly false. Spitfires with drop tanks were fielded as early as March 1942.

So what size external tanks, and what is the maximum radius a Spitfire V can enter combat and still have enough fuel to make it home, including fuel reserves, the Spitfire IX had an even shorter range, no matter how much external fuel it had to stay within around 160 miles of base.

I am referring to the ferry operation to Malta.

On 7 March 1942, 15 Mk Vs carrying 90 imp gal (410 L; 110 US gal) fuel tanks under their bellies took off from HMS Eagle off the coast of Algeria on a 600-mile (970 km) flight to Malta.

Supermarine Spitfire - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

600 mile ferry range (at least) through contested airspace. That is plenty to reach most targets in tier 1.

Firestorms anytime were rare, if you decide around 2,700 short tons as a guide to make them, then do 2,000 bomber raids in 1942.

That's good advice. I will.

More to follow.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm proposing the B-25 to attack and suppress AA batteries. The guns can be fired from any altitude, since gravity is a thing.

Does anyone know when the 8-gun nose was first available?

View attachment 828346


View attachment 828349

1943 for field mods, 1944 for production models, TTBoMK.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

One of the things most often overlooked in what-ifs is the fact that the enemy will respond in the manner most suitable to his own objectives. Assuming otherwise usually invalidates the what-if.

In the above scenario, the Germans could simply bring their fighter-bases near but behind NW Germany, and reply upon radar warning in order to scramble interceptors in time to achieve altitude and location. Being as these bases would be deeper, hitting them with those very busy medium bombers would probably not be on the cards.

And again, German cities are not very prone to destruction by fire.

 

[Bergjon12]

One of the things most often overlooked in what-ifs is the fact that the enemy will respond in the manner most suitable to his own objectives. Assuming otherwise usually invalidates the what-if.

In the above scenario, the Germans could simply bring their fighter-bases near but behind NW Germany, and reply upon radar warning in order to scramble interceptors in time to achieve altitude and location. Being as these bases would be deeper, hitting them with those very busy medium bombers would probably not be on the cards.

I favor night strafing by Mosquito.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I favor night strafing by Mosquito.

Airfields are notoriously difficult to put out of action. Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was hit in one night in Oct 42 by 973 14" battleship shells. Two days later, Henderson was back to launching regular, albeit diminished, combat operations. That was on an island at the end of a long logistical chain.

If they could recover that quickly under those circumstances, do you think realistically that you can knock out multiple LW bases that are much closer to resources like spare aircraft and repair equipment using strafing attacks alone?

 

[Bergjon12]

Airfields are notoriously difficult to put out of action. Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was hit in one night in Oct 42 by 973 14" battleship shells. Two days later, Henderson was back to launching regular, albeit diminished, combat operations. That was on an island at the end of a long logistical chain.

If they could recover that quickly under those circumstances, do you think realistically that you can knock out multiple LW bases that are much closer to resources like spare aircraft and repair equipment using strafing attacks alone?

No I don't. That is why I didn't say "...to knock them out"

No, it's an additional contribution to grind down the LW.

 

[tomo pauk]

As mentioned before in the thread, focusing on fewer targets also allows the Germans to concentrate their defenses, thus increasing the loss rate. I believe there were pre war studies identifying bottleneck resources, which did identify liquid fuels as one such critical resource. But how sure can you be at the time that this is the one critical resource that would quickly bring the German war machine to its knees? Are you prepared to sacrifice thousands of your airmen based on this hypothesis?

Allies don't need to be too stubborn here. Attack the oil targets 4 days in the row, next day attack the aero engines, then 3 days the oil targets, then 2 days submarine pens, then 5 days oil targets etc.
Allies have had a good handle on where from Germany/European Axis can get stuff. They knew that, eg. aluminium can be gotten from several conquered and Axis countries, as well as by recycling. For oil - besides Germany, there was just Romania ( and Soviet Union before June 1941); no recycling.
Allies also knew how much the modern war machines are fuel-dependable, thus again have a good handle how much Germany et al will need to be using in order to stay competitive.

As for aiding enemy aircraft production, did this actually happen? I recall Germans used slightly different aluminum alloys than the Allies. It might not be as simple as throwing an airplane wreck into a melting furnace and stamping out new sheet metal?

Excerpt about Germans using the smelted aluminium was posted before in the thread. Quantities were huge.

 

[Shortround6]

The British had only two squadrons of Mosquitos operating as day bombers in 1942 and the 2nd squadron didn't start operations until Oct 1942.
Despite some very famous raids the two squadrons were transferred to night operations in the spring/summer of 1943 because of high losses.

Using B-25s for low level raids over Europe would have been a disaster.
What the Japanese had for AA and what the Germans had for AA were two very, very different things.
British had given up using Medium Bomber low level attacks after Operation Oyster in Dec 1942.

From Wiki so............
" Being 70 mi (110 km) inland, Eindhoven was beyond the range of fighter escort.........The use of de Havilland Mosquitos was also considered but the Philips works was too large a target for the payload the Mosquitos available could carry."
They wound up using 47 Venturas, 36 A-20s and 10 Mosquitos. The raid was a success but they lost 15 aircraft which is not a sustainable rate. Especially when considering the 67 damaged (some were bird strikes).

During the war there were 78 squadrons that operated Mosquitos. Only 18 were bomber squadrons. There were 44 fighter bomber squadrons but not all at the same time(?).

Night strafing calls for electronics from the 1960s to actually hit much of anything.

To actual see an air field at night, during a high speed low level flight and target it is extremely difficult. Strafing the runways doesn't count. You have to hit parked aircraft and ground vehicles and structures.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

No I don't. That is why I didn't say "...to knock them out"

No, it's an additional contribution to grind down the LW.

That's good, because strafing at night will be lucky to hit anything but the ground. Not sure how much this will contribute to grinding down the LW, but I can be relatively sure it won't prevent the LW from making the defensive response I posted above.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Now look, this is sophistry.

Then stop doing it.

Every attack is going to gain experience. If trial runs are called for, other targets exist. I am not going to name them because you know perfectly well that there is a wealth of targets of every description in the area I have indicated.

Ah yes, the attackers will strike an unspecified number of targets, of an unspecified type, at unspecified locations, at unspecified times (day, night, year) for an unspecified trial period, with an unspecified number of aircraft which will enable them to gain all the experience the need to step straight up and regularly "annihilate" city size targets plus destroy any defending fighter force, with acceptable friendly losses. To the point the defenders surrender.

This logic is faulty.

Yes, we know but you keep repeating something that doesn't work. The USAAF 1943/44 raids worked, they had escorts, they forced the Jagdwaffe to fight over winter.

If you do something that doesn't work, repeatedly, and then do something that does work, it does not follow that the first enabled the second. Fully escorted raids work. They get through, they decimate the opposition. Unescorted raids don't work. They incur excessive casualties and don't harm the opposition enough. The success of escorted raids is not evidence for the alleged soundness of unescorted raids.

The USAAF 1943/44 raids worked, they had escorts, but these have ben redefined as not having escorts.

The LW is only able to attempt to overwhelm raids because they are unescorted and long range. The long range strategy is giving them that chance. A short range, fully escorted raid cannot be realistically overwhelmed, even if you concentrate against it. Allied fighter availability is much greater than the German.

The strength of allied fighters in Britain 1942 and 1943 has been posted, the number of Luftwaffe fighters available also, including things like the number of sorties done in October 1943. Now provide the sourced strength figures that show the allies had many more fighters in Britain than the Germans had available 1942 to 1943, then the sourced figures for the much smaller number of allied fighters able to make Germany and engage in combat for the same time period.

So how do fighters deployed to defend Schweinfurt intercept raids on Hamburg and vice versa?

There are interception points for raids against these two targets that can be served from the same location,

Then name them, along with the timings, like warning time, launch time, cruise time plus ranges.

It is not necessary to intercept a long range raid near its target.

It is never necessary to intercept a raid near its target, but smart planners choose bomber routes that minimise the number of hostile interceptors within range, unless in the USAAF situation in the second half of 1944, flying direct routes to make it easier for the Luftwaffe to intercept, but that cost as it gave more warning about what target was going to be hit, enabling passive defences to be fully deployed, cutting bomb damage. Things like target weather forecasts in plain language were another clue, this did up the average accuracy while again telling the Germans what was likely to happen.

Ever seen a map of 8th Air Force bomber bases?

I don't think contributions of this type are helpful.

Yes factual material is a problem when fiction is preferred.

So what size external tanks, and what is the maximum radius a Spitfire V can enter combat and still have enough fuel to make it home, including fuel reserves, the Spitfire IX had an even shorter range, no matter how much external fuel it had to stay within around 160 miles of base.

I am referring to the ferry operation to Malta.

On 7 March 1942, 15 Mk Vs carrying 90 imp gal (410 L; 110 US gal) fuel tanks under their bellies took off from HMS Eagle off the coast of Algeria on a 600-mile (970 km) flight to Malta.

Supermarine Spitfire - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

600 mile ferry range (at least) through contested airspace. That is plenty to reach most targets in tier 1.

A friend thanks you for a new story for their Spitfire the wonder weapon file. Quite a good laugh. Also it was 600 or 700 miles at economic cruise without a combat allowance. They had to travel at that speed so the 4 Blenheims provided for navigation purposes (plus 4 reserves) flown from Gibraltar at half hour intervals could stay with the fighters. It was a 4 hour flight, dog leg, staying over water to avoid axis aircraft, not quite contested airspace like over Europe The Spitfires needed a service after arrival to make them combat worthy. You do understand the extra navigation training and aids needed for single crew aircraft to operate at long range? You do understand the difference between external ferry and combat tanks? You do understand the different chances of being tracked and intercepted over Europe versus over the Mediterranean?

Once again what is the maximum radius a Spitfire V can enter combat and still have enough fuel to make it home, including fuel reserves?

Operation Spotter/Quarter (the second being the RAF name) 16 Spitfires were loaded on the Cape Hawke which departed Britain 10 February 1942, arriving Gibraltar 23 February. February 1942 exports of Spitfires to Mediterranean official total 16. HMS Eagle first fly off attempt sailed 27 February returning the next day due to defects in the Spitfire long range fuel tanks. HMS Eagle sailed on 6 March and the fly off was on the 7th. 15 Spitfires, all arrived. HMS Eagle returned to Gibraltar on the 8th. Spitfire serials AB262, AB264, AB329 to AB338, AB341, AB343, AB344, AB346 but AB333 unserviceable, to operation Picket, total 15. Some Ju52 were sighted during the flight and a couple of the Spitfires took a look.

Next came Operation Picket/Scantling, 16 Spitfires were loaded on the Queen Victoria which departed Britain 4 March, arriving Gibraltar 14 March. March 1942 exports of Spitfires to Mediterranean official total 16. Operation Picket, which became Picket I when some of the navigation aircraft did not appear, HMS Eagle sailed on 20 March, probably with 16 Spitfires on board, and the fly off was on the 21st, 9 Spitfires, all arrived, the fleet returning to Gibraltar on the 23rd. Operation Picket II, HMS Eagle sailed on 27 March, 7 or 8 Spitfires on board, 7 were flown off on the 29th. This left 1 Spitfire in Gibraltar, being AB500, the only one of the Queen Victoria shipment that lasted past 9 May, the date of Operation Bowery, the next delivery of Spitfires to Malta from Gibraltar. Spitfire Serials, "Picket I", AB333, AB340, AB342, AB454, BP844, BP845, BP846, BP849, BP850, "Picket II" AB263, AB347, AB348, AB418, AB419, AB420, AB451. Picket I aircraft are those reported as being part of the operation and/or on Malta before Picket II on March 29.

Next came the USS Wasp operations. And so on, through to-

Malta: War Diary reports non carrier borne Spitfire fighter arrivals as 2 from Gibraltar 25 October 1942, 5 from Gibraltar 6 November, 3 from Gibraltar 8 November, 2 from Gibraltar 13 November, 1 from Gibraltar 14 November, 2 from Gibraltar 20 November, total 15. Plus 1 from Algiers-Bone 21 November and 1 from Benina 1 December. So as of the final third of November Middle East Spitfires were able to fly direct to Malta and by early 1943 the arrivals included some mark IX. Malta the Spitfire Year reports the 25 October Spitfires delivered were mark Vc, flown by Flt Lt John Henry Bateman Burgess and Flt Sgt L.G. Pow RCAF, 2 machine guns retained for self defence and 15 more were sent with EP724 lost 14 November, so a total of 17. The book A History of the Mediterranean Air War Volume 2 reports probably around 19 November, Squadron Leader Adrian Warburton flew a Spitfire fighter from Gibraltar to Malta, shooting down a Ju88 on the way. The British Aircraft Export Report says 15 Spitfire Fighters did the journey, all arriving, 2 in week ending 30 October, 10 in Week ending 6 November and 3 in week ending 20 November. No idea of serials and plenty of Spitfires in Gibraltar to choose from.

PR Spitfires for overseas regularly flew Britain to Gibraltar, then to Malta, either staying or going to the Middle East and further.

Firestorms anytime were rare, if you decide around 2,700 short tons as a guide to make them, then do 2,000 bomber raids in 1942.

That's good advice. I will.

Yes, I am sure you think the Luftwaffe can loan you the bombers to make the numbers, with all the advantages of short range to target.

More to follow.

Excellent the world can do with more comedy relief.