The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany

[MikeMeech]

That's good, because strafing at night will be lucky to hit anything but the ground. Not sure how much this will contribute to grinding down the LW, but I can be relatively sure it won't prevent the LW from making the defensive response I posted above.

Night strafing calls for electronics from the 1960s to actually hit much of anything.

To actual see an air field at night, during a high speed low level flight and target it is extremely difficult. Strafing the runways doesn't count. You have to hit parked aircraft and ground vehicles and structures.

Hi
The RAF started Night Intruder operations with Hurricanes in December 1940, flying over the Channel to catch the German bombers as they returned to their bases catching them when the flare path was lit. This type of operation continued throughout the war using aircraft such as the Blenheim, Havoc and Mosquito. The latter undertaking Night Intruder and Night Ranger operations. The former mission was generally against a particular target the latter was the Mosquito flying over an area and attacking anything see be it enemy aircraft, airfields, trains, road transport, searchlights and AA Batteries etc. (The Luftwaffe did undertake some Intruder operations against Britain, but compared with the RAF they were very small scale).
It should also be noted the the RFC/RAF carried out similar operations over German lines during WW1 (See 'The Annals of 100 Squadron' for detailed information of that squadron's work during 1917/18). FE.2bs usually dropping bombs from 2000 ft down to 50 ft., attacking airfields, trains, railway infrastructure, transport, ammo dumps and artillery batteries that were firing at night, also searchlights and AA. No. 151 Squadron flying Camels undertook 'intruder' operations against German airfields during 1918 again against returning German bombers.
So all sorts of targets could be found and attacked successfully by night, depending on the weather of course, from WW1 through WW2, this is all well documented.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Flying over airfields or other installations at 100-120mph is a bit different than doing it at 300mph.
A lot of the 1940 British intruder missions depended on flying around a known German airfield and waiting for the German bomber trying to land turning on it's landing lights or having the ground crew light up the landing light/torches.

This is rather different than trying to attack stationary objects on the ground in the dark at high speeds.
A lot depends on ambient light, like phase of the moon and clouds.
Doing some raids to keep your enemy "honest" a few times a month is rather different than destroying entire bases making them unusable as daytime fighter bases

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So all sorts of targets could be found and attacked successfully by night, depending on the weather of course, from WW1 through WW2, this is all well documented.

Mike

I'm not saying it couldn't be done. I'm pointing out that it would be a remarkably inefficient use of resources. There's a big difference between following bombers back to base and shooting them down while on approach to lit runways, and successfully targeting a plane sitting on the ground in a low-contrast dark environment when your relative speed is 300 mph rather than 150 mph.

 

[bada]

Operation Spotter/Quarter (the second being the RAF name) 16 Spitfires were loaded on the Cape Hawke which departed Britain 10 February 1942, arriving Gibraltar 23 February. February 1942 exports of Spitfires to Mediterranean official total 16. HMS Eagle first fly off attempt sailed 27 February returning the next day due to defects in the Spitfire long range fuel tanks. HMS Eagle sailed on 6 March and the fly off was on the 7th. 15 Spitfires, all arrived. HMS Eagle returned to Gibraltar on the 8th. Spitfire serials AB262, AB264, AB329 to AB338, AB341, AB343, AB344, AB346 but AB333 unserviceable, to operation Picket, total 15. Some Ju52 were sighted during the flight and a couple of the Spitfires took a look.

Next came Operation Picket/Scantling, 16 Spitfires were loaded on the Queen Victoria which departed Britain 4 March, arriving Gibraltar 14 March. March 1942 exports of Spitfires to Mediterranean official total 16. Operation Picket, which became Picket I when some of the navigation aircraft did not appear, HMS Eagle sailed on 20 March, probably with 16 Spitfires on board, and the fly off was on the 21st, 9 Spitfires, all arrived, the fleet returning to Gibraltar on the 23rd. Operation Picket II, HMS Eagle sailed on 27 March, 7 or 8 Spitfires on board, 7 were flown off on the 29th. This left 1 Spitfire in Gibraltar, being AB500, the only one of the Queen Victoria shipment that lasted past 9 May, the date of Operation Bowery, the next delivery of Spitfires to Malta from Gibraltar. Spitfire Serials, "Picket I", AB333, AB340, AB342, AB454, BP844, BP845, BP846, BP849, BP850, "Picket II" AB263, AB347, AB348, AB418, AB419, AB420, AB451. Picket I aircraft are those reported as being part of the operation and/or on Malta before Picket II on March 29.

Next came the USS Wasp operations. And so on, through to-

Malta: War Diary reports non carrier borne Spitfire fighter arrivals as 2 from Gibraltar 25 October 1942, 5 from Gibraltar 6 November, 3 from Gibraltar 8 November, 2 from Gibraltar 13 November, 1 from Gibraltar 14 November, 2 from Gibraltar 20 November, total 15. Plus 1 from Algiers-Bone 21 November and 1 from Benina 1 December. So as of the final third of November Middle East Spitfires were able to fly direct to Malta and by early 1943 the arrivals included some mark IX. Malta the Spitfire Year reports the 25 October Spitfires delivered were mark Vc, flown by Flt Lt John Henry Bateman Burgess and Flt Sgt L.G. Pow RCAF, 2 machine guns retained for self defence and 15 more were sent with EP724 lost 14 November, so a total of 17. The book A History of the Mediterranean Air War Volume 2 reports probably around 19 November, Squadron Leader Adrian Warburton flew a Spitfire fighter from Gibraltar to Malta, shooting down a Ju88 on the way. The British Aircraft Export Report says 15 Spitfire Fighters did the journey, all arriving, 2 in week ending 30 October, 10 in Week ending 6 November and 3 in week ending 20 November. No idea of serials and plenty of Spitfires in Gibraltar to choose from.

PR Spitfires for overseas regularly flew Britain to Gibraltar, then to Malta, either staying or going to the Middle East and further.

Firestorms anytime were rare, if you decide around 2,700 short tons as a guide to make them, then do 2,000 bomber raids in 1942.

Yes, I am sure you think the Luftwaffe can loan you the bombers to make the numbers, with all the advantages of short range to target.

Excellent the world can do with more comedy relief.

A spitfire with ferry tank (fixed, not droppable) is just a target, it couldn't maneuvre with it, it was draggy and the CoG was on the limit. if they were bounced they would finish quickly in the water. They got lucky they didn't met the LW. Between the eco mode and the combat mode, it's approx 3x the fuel consumption. There is a reason the spit never was able to go deep into germany, the spit had to stop at the border if the pilot wanted to get back home. Even the Poney with it's "big rear tank" was a flying iron until the rear tank was empty, it was strictly forbidden to execute any combat maneuvre. PR's are a different breed, they accounted for their speed to elude enemy fighters and were as clean (and polished) as possible...and flew high.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Just top give a flavour of target types for Mosquito night intruder/Rangers, stats. from '2 Group RAF, A complete History 1936-1945' by Bowyer:

Also an example of what 100 Group Mosquito squadrons were doing (August 1944) from 'Confound and Destroy' by Martin Streetly:

Plus a sample page of No. 100 Sqns. activities during WW1, for comparison, from 'The Annals of 100 Squadron' by Major C. Gordon Burge:

I hope that is of interest.
Mike

 

[Bergjon12]

yadda yadda

Excellent the world can do with more comedy relief.

Listen Dave, this conversation can serve no purpose any longer.

I know what you are. Let's just leave it at that.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Listen Dave, this conversation can serve no purpose any longer.

I know what you are. Let's just leave it at that.

You have people who disagree with your what-if scheme, and put up rational grounds supporting their disagreement.

 

[ThomasP]

I was going to mention the use of flares for the night time intruder missions, but one of the pages MikeMeech posted upthread shows the use of them. Basically, if there was not enough natural light to do the job they would drop illumination/reconnaissance flares in order to provide enough light to allow targeting - this included over the airfields if necessary.

NOTE the "NO. OF FLARES DROPPED" column in the first table posted by MikeMeech.

Without knowing how many missions there were - or the actual ORB - it is impossible to say how many missions used flares, but clear and mostly clear nights with moonlight only occur about 20%(?) of the year in northern France and somewhat less than that in northern Germany.

 

[Acheron]

In addition to targeting fuel refineries, I'd also work on rail depots. I know they're easier to repair. But you slow down internal communications, force a decision about workforce deployment, cut into steel output. and maybe seed both targets with delayed-action cluster bombs to keep the repair crews on their toes.

A book I read ("The wheel stop turning"? I don't remember exactly) claimed that German marshalling yards would have made a worthwhile target.

I do not understand the idea of attacking airfields in this scenario. It serves well as the opening stage of a manoeuvre-type operation (especially Barbarossa) to hurt an enemy air force when it is not yet properly prepared and thus vulnerable an also reduce the enemy's air forces capability in the decisive first weeks of the fight. But in an attrition-style operation, airfields seem poor targets to me, at least in WWII, where aircraft where able to operate from fields. The Battle of Britain was an attrition operation, how effective were the LWs attacks on the airfields? And what did the RAF do to counter them an what couldn't it do, like dispersing, replacement fields, etc?

 

[EwenS]

A book I read ("The wheel stop turning"? I don't remember exactly) claimed that German marshalling yards would have made a worthwhile target.

I do not understand the idea of attacking airfields in this scenario. It serves well as the opening stage of a manoeuvre-type operation (especially Barbarossa) to hurt an enemy air force when it is not yet properly prepared and thus vulnerable an also reduce the enemy's air forces capability in the decisive first weeks of the fight. But in an attrition-style operation, airfields seem poor targets to me, at least in WWII, where aircraft where able to operate from fields. The Battle of Britain was an attrition operation, how effective were the LWs attacks on the airfields? And what did the RAF do to counter them an what couldn't it do, like dispersing, replacement fields, etc?

Airfields are difficult targets to put out of action permanently especially if there are repair resources on hand and a motivated workforce to carry out repairs. BoB, Malta and the Sakishima Gunto demonstrate that. But they have facilities that are not so easy to repair, like hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps, damage to which can cause a useful amount of disruption. Destroying enemy aircraft on the ground before they can participate is useful. Keeping enemy personnel awake at night in bomb shelters unable to fix damaged aircraft for the next day's operations also serves a purpose.

Switching operations to alternative grass landing grounds is all well and good during the summer months in Europe. It doesn't work nearly so well from autumn through late spring when rain soaked fields cut up easily thus preventing operations and resulting in damaged aircraft so adding to the repair burden on the ground crews. And you assume that there are grass fields to move to. Try doing that in the Far East is nowhere near as easy.

While it works for lightweight fighters it is not so good for heavier bombers, which continued to grow in weight as the war went on. Bomber Command operations were hampered in the winter of 1940/41 due to the state of many of its grass airfields. There was a reason for the move to concrete runways as well as investigations into alternative launch methods of heavy bombers, like

RATOG - Trials with a Stirling at Farnborough around 1941
Catapult launch - Trials with Manchester at Farnborough in 1940.

It was the late 1930s before RAF stations began to get concrete runways. Scampton was still a grass field in 1943.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Just top give a flavour of target types for Mosquito night intruder/Rangers, stats. from '2 Group RAF, A complete History 1936-1945' by Bowyer:
View attachment 828575
View attachment 828576
Also an example of what 100 Group Mosquito squadrons were doing (August 1944) from 'Confound and Destroy' by Martin Streetly:
View attachment 828577
Plus a sample page of No. 100 Sqns. activities during WW1, for comparison, from 'The Annals of 100 Squadron' by Major C. Gordon Burge:
View attachment 828578
I hope that is of interest.
Mike

Hi
In continuation of the last bit of the above post. the book 'The Sowreys' by Graham Pitchfork', page 47, has mention of the No. 100 Sqn. raids of the 3/4th May 1917:

The raids of 29/30 May and 31 May/1 June mentioned above are detailed below in a couple of pages from 'The Annals of 100 Squadron':

Just to give information on how night attacks organized during WW1, to compare with what went on during WW2 with 'better' equipment.

Mike

 

[tomo pauk]

A spitfire with ferry tank (fixed, not droppable) is just a target, it couldn't maneuvre with it, it was draggy and the CoG was on the limit. if they were bounced they would finish quickly in the water. They got lucky they didn't met the LW.

Spitfire's external tanks were droppable, up to an including the 170 gal blister tank.

There is a reason the spit never was able to go deep into germany, the spit had to stop at the border if the pilot wanted to get back home. Even the Poney with it's "big rear tank" was a flying iron until the rear tank was empty, it was strictly forbidden to execute any combat maneuvre.

The main reason why Spitfires were short-range escorts was that the internal fuel quantity remained the same basically for all not-Mk.VII/VIII Merlin fighter versions. Reason why that was so was the institutional myopia and inertia, that, despite Spitfires being also used in MTO and SE Asia, failed to evaluate and appreciate the role of a long-range fighter.
Once that was overcame - mid/late 1944 - these Spitfires were being outfitted with extra fuel tanks behind the pilot, and with the bigger 'main' tankage.

That every Spitfire was not outfitted with at least the 30-ish gal rear tank was on the Air Ministry/RAF.

 

[MIflyer]

Odd to use magnesium in brakes as it is not just flammable but prone to thermal shock -

The brakes calipers on my Ercoupe - a modification using more modern technology - are MG. In fact you can get them made in AL, in order to reduce the corrosion for Ag aircraft, but they cost significantly more.

 

[tomo pauk]

FWIW, here is an article by Calum Douglas, debating - among other stuff - the merits of fuel targets as priority.

 

[swampyankee]

I suspect that many of the pre-ww2 bombing advocates were less than familiar with the insides of a machine shop, especially one that mass-produced biggish things. I remember reading (and I can't provide a source; it was many years ago) that most ww2-era machine tools (lathes, milling machines, presses, etc) would not be significantly damaged by a 250 lb bomb exploding 12 feet away. The machine tools are mostly made of cast iron or cast steel, sized to minimize deflections, and bolted to a thick reinforced concrete floor.

In other words, destroying a factory's machinery is hard. Putting a factory out of business for a short time by destroying the building is comparatively easy (and the rain may be more likely to damage the machinery than the bombs), but the most vulnerable component is likely the people who operate the machinery.

 

[Shortround6]

There were 3 British studies of bomb effects before the mid 30s. Two were from WW I where the British studied the effects of the German bombs dropped on Britain by the Zeppelins and large fixed wing bombers. The 2nd study was by teams of officers (granted not many or large teams) that study bomb damage in Germany after the armistice. The 3rd study was done in 'tribal territories' to asses the effects of bombing policy at that time. Some of the officers were rather thorough in describing crater size, distance from structure walls, thickness and type of construction and even extent of cracking/damage to walls a number of feet from the impact.
Actually bombing doctrine/policy sometimes did not agree with the effects as reported.

 

[Nick]

An interesting if somewhat heated discussion. The growing daylight offensive bij the Eigtht AF not only bound a growing number of LW day fighters to the west, but also night fighters. The strain on pilots and ground personnel increased very much thereby denying air support to the German army fighting on the eastern front. The idea that short penetrations would be much less costly may seem sensible, but it would not bind such large German forces in fighters and flak in the western part of Europe.
Another idea was leaving deep penetrations to a Mosquito force makes sense. But through an enormous effort the British aircraft industry was geared up to produce increasing numbers of Halifaxes and Lancasters. And the subsequent training of aircrew. I cannot see how such a complex process could be altered in a short term bij focusing on deploying many more Mosquito's. The bomber offensive was in progress and couldn't be stopped. The public, nor the allies would understand such a pause.
Considering the cost in aircrew, BC lost approximately 55.800 crew from 1939 till 1945. That is in almost six years. Compare that to the first day at the Somme. 58.000 casualties with about 20.000 killed. In just one day!
Then often is said that the Thunderclap bombings were unnecessary because the war was almost won. The war ended only after the Red Army conquered Berlin in May 1945. They lost around 80.000 men in that fierce battle. The Reich kept fighting untill the bitter end. In that light the decision to keep up the bombing offensive was justified, I believe.
74 % of the weight of bombs dropped by BC was delivered after 1st Jan 1944. I made a list of targets where No 405 Sqn RCAF of the Pathfinder Force was sent. From the last dramatic attack on Berlin in March 1944 this squadron lead the way for Bomber Command to 47 cities till VE Day. But in the same period 183 other specific targets ranging from tactical attacks in the Normandy Bridgehead to transport infrastructure, to coastal batteries, to synthetic oil plants.
All in all the idea that BC targeted civillian targets is overstated. In that final year of the war the great majority of targets was aimed at the vital infrastructure and industries. The civillian losses of circa 750.000 people in Germany were great, but dwindle in comparison to the around ten million people that were mudered in the Reich or perished from want.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The bombing campaign against European Axis oil supplies could not have started much earlier than it did, even ignoring Overlord. Until around Q2/44 the allies lacked the bomb lift plus had not achieved the sort of superiority needed to cope with the elevated loss rates that occur when you become more predictable, like concentrating on a sector of the economy.

Martin Sorge in the Other Price of Hitler's war claims 410,000 civilians killed and "hundreds of thousands" missing. The 410,000 figure appears to be German civilians killed, then add 23,000 police and civilians working in the military, 32,000 foreign workers and PoWs plus 128,000 displaced persons, total 593,000. Using the 1937 borders definition of Germany. This total is from the post war investigations of the German Statistical Office, located at Wiesbaden.

With regards to the Bomber Command dead, a better comparison is to 21st Army Group, which appears to have taken a similar level of fatalities while the US army had around 122,000 dead in Europe June 1944 to May 1945, plus another 344,000 wounded. You can see why the air commanders were really interested in ending the war without large scale ground combat. (Note it could be in the US Army figures include USAAF) The February to April 1945 combat cost the US Army 133,681 casualties including 29,569 dead.

Also from early 1944 onwards Bomber Command Main Force often attacked multiple targets in a night, particularly to support Overlord but also as its strength grew and to confuse the defences.

On 13 February 1945 the RAF effectively did three raids, the first against Dresden was rated as a moderate success thanks to the cloud, three hours later the cloud had cleared and the attack was made in clear conditions with devastating results, meantime in Bohlen, around 60 miles away, the RAF attack on the oil refinery there was so badly affected by 10/10 cloud and icing at 15,000 feet apparently they never bothered to do a post raid reconnaissance, it was considered such a failure. There was not a great deal you need to change for Dresden to escape that night. Operation Thunderclap was something ordered by the allied command, hence the way the USAAF bombed Dresden as well. Harris was quite happy to bomb cities, but he had become risk averse after the Battle of Berlin so he raised objections about attacking a target so deep inside Germany. The official target for the night was the City and Rail Facilities and the night bombing did badly damage the Altstadt marshalling yards, while doing much more damage to the residential areas.

The 8th Air Force had previously bombed Dresden on 16 January 1945, some 138 bombers, around 350 tons of bombs.

When it comes to the bombers being after civilians they rarely bombed cities outside of Germany, when looking at the percentages consider that in 1942 about 75% of Bomber Command's effort was against Germany, 87% in 1943, 52.5% in 1944 and 98% in 1945. Data is Bomber Command declared city raids bomb tonnages as a percentage of total effort. Plus the percentage of bomb loads that were incendiaries from the Richard Davis figures, only available from 1942 and which exclude some of the bombs dropped when raids became scattered.

Month	%towns	%incendiary
Dec-40​	13.81​
Jan-41​	12.48​
Feb-41​	35.85​
Mar-41​	41.06​
Apr-41​	40.57​
May-41​	53.16​
Jun-41​	49.61​
Jul-41​	30.75​
Aug-41​	33.26​
Sep-41​	33.3​
Oct-41​	30.5​
Nov-41​	55.69​
Dec-41​	38.85​
Jan-42​	37.22​	6.76​
Feb-42​	28.19​	0.00​
Mar-42​	63.96​	20.87​
Apr-42​	60.16​	31.78​
May-42​	73.69​	49.43​
Jun-42​	88.93​	62.15​
Jul-42​	82.38​	33.97​
Aug-42​	91.98​	41.83​
Sep-42​	93.94​	47.79​
Oct-42​	82.02​	53.88​
Nov-42​	70.16​	46.65​
Dec-42​	92​	54.52​
Jan-43​	67.32​	52.53​
Feb-43​	57.75​	52.95​
Mar-43​	62.37​	48.42​
Apr-43​	79.33​	42.96​
May-43​	92.14​	44.14​
Jun-43​	91.34​	45.88​
Jul-43​	95.66​	46.92​
Aug-43​	77.79​	45.71​
Sep-43​	81.23​	46.10​
Oct-43​	95.12​	48.80​
Nov-43​	86.49​	45.27​
Dec-43​	94.71​	47.38​
Jan-44​	89.9​	40.99​
Feb-44​	96.17​	46.96​
Mar-44​	70.24​	39.80​
Apr-44​	35.82​	20.82​
May-44​	14.49​	7.67​
Jun-44​	1.24​	0.65​
Jul-44​	16.65​	2.84​
Aug-44​	15.46​	9.95​
Sep-44​	23.82​	13.32​
Oct-44​	69.02​	17.19​
Nov-44​	52.23​	9.38​
Dec-44​	34.11​	10.55​
Jan-45​	36.24​	14.33​
Feb-45​	47.7​	26.16​
Mar-45​	44.77​	15.07​
Apr-45​	6.64​	1.30​
May-45​	18.69​	1.22​
1940​	1.05​
1941​	38.92​
1942​	78.22​	42.27​
1943​	83.49​	46.81​
1944​	35.14​	13.37​
1945​	36.58​	15.11​
Total	45.1​	20.84​

As already noted to effectively destroy many machine tools starting a fire was the way to go, or heavy HE bombs. Throughout the war the air forces expanded the definition of flyable weather faster than that of accurate bombing weather. In the last 4 months of 1944 the 8th Air force reported 14% of its bombs were dropped in good to fair visibility and 50% in 8/10 cloud or thicker (35% in 10/10 cloud), which made them city strikes. The USSBS European Theatre report 62, Weather factors in combat bombardment operations in the European Theater target weather table on page 8 notes for around two thirds of non visual bombing the weather was in the "blind" category, 8/10 clouds or worse. The following table is 2/3 percentage of non visual bombing by the 8th // Bomber Command percentage of effort against cities.

Jun-44 25.6 // 1.24
Jul-44 27.7 // 16.65
Aug-44 5.1 // 15.46
Sep-44 37.2 // 23.82
Oct-44 51.4 // 69.02
Nov-44 58.3 // 52.23
Dec-44 43.5 // 34.11
Jan-45 45.2 // 36.24
Feb-45 49.9 // 47.7
Mar-45 37.7 // 44.77
Apr-45 14.2 // 18.69

In December 1944 23.6% and in February 1945 69.6% of Bomber Command city strikes are listed as attacks on the "City and Railway Facilities", including the Dresden raid. Bomber Command strikes sent out after a specific target but encountering weather too bad to carry out that strike are usually recorded as doing city strikes, not a strike against the original target. By this stage of the war the amount of damage being done meant city strikes became economically effective as even minor damage enough to hinder or halt production meant long delays before repairs could be done. Earlier in the war the damage did little to the economy as it was usually quickly repaired or in non important areas.

It is reported USSR air raid casualties were comparable to Germany's including Hamburg like death tolls in the bombings of Stalingrad before the Heer arrived. Large settlements had shelter networks and warning systems, smaller settlements had few to none. Every settlement has tactical value starting with the buildings, sleeping on the floor is better than in the dirt. Add most settlements were in tactical locations, the high ground, the pass, the ford, the cross roads etc. before adding improvements like bridges, rail stations and/or a siding and so on. For most of the smaller ones the day(s) the bombers arrived were without warning, it meant what the western air force called tactical strikes on settlements tended to kill more people per ton of bombs dropped. As did strikes on axis occupied territory if the population turned out to watch the bombers as the flew overhead towards assumed other targets.

 

[swampyankee]

An interesting if somewhat heated discussion. The growing daylight offensive bij the Eigtht AF not only bound a growing number of LW day fighters to the west, but also night fighters. The strain on pilots and ground personnel increased very much thereby denying air support to the German army fighting on the eastern front. The idea that short penetrations would be much less costly may seem sensible, but it would not bind such large German forces in fighters and flak in the western part of Europe.
Another idea was leaving deep penetrations to a Mosquito force makes sense. But through an enormous effort the British aircraft industry was geared up to produce increasing numbers of Halifaxes and Lancasters. And the subsequent training of aircrew. I cannot see how such a complex process could be altered in a short term bij focusing on deploying many more Mosquito's. The bomber offensive was in progress and couldn't be stopped. The public, nor the allies would understand such a pause.
Considering the cost in aircrew, BC lost approximately 55.800 crew from 1939 till 1945. That is in almost six years. Compare that to the first day at the Somme. 58.000 casualties with about 20.000 killed. In just one day!
Then often is said that the Thunderclap bombings were unnecessary because the war was almost won. The war ended only after the Red Army conquered Berlin in May 1945. They lost around 80.000 men in that fierce battle. The Reich kept fighting untill the bitter end. In that light the decision to keep up the bombing offensive was justified, I believe.
74 % of the weight of bombs dropped by BC was delivered after 1st Jan 1944. I made a list of targets where No 405 Sqn RCAF of the Pathfinder Force was sent. From the last dramatic attack on Berlin in March 1944 this squadron lead the way for Bomber Command to 47 cities till VE Day. But in the same period 183 other specific targets ranging from tactical attacks in the Normandy Bridgehead to transport infrastructure, to coastal batteries, to synthetic oil plants.
All in all the idea that BC targeted civillian targets is overstated. In that final year of the war the great majority of targets was aimed at the vital infrastructure and industries. The civillian losses of circa 750.000 people in Germany were great, but dwindle in comparison to the around ten million people that were mudered in the Reich or perished from want.

According to Statista and the US WW2 Museum (Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans), about 60-67% of all WW2 deaths were civilians, with about 80% of the total deaths (civilian and military) from Allied countries. Leaving aside the USSR, where civilian deaths may be conflated with issues like the collectivization of Ukraine, and China, which had a civil war going on simultaneously with WW2, Poland had 5.4 million civilian deaths. Germany had about 2.2 million. Total Allied civilian deaths in Europe were about 7 times the Axis civilian deaths, and I'm excluding the USSR's civilian deaths. In Europe, total Axis civilian deaths were less than the civilian deaths in Poland.


I don't want to undervalue the loss of civilian life in the Axis countries. It was, however, much smaller than the loss of civilian life in Allied countries and those occupied by Germany and the other Axis powers.

 

[tomo pauk]

The bombing campaign against European Axis oil supplies could not have started much earlier than it did, even ignoring Overlord. Until around Q2/44 the allies lacked the bomb lift plus had not achieved the sort of superiority needed to cope with the elevated loss rates that occur when you become more predictable, like concentrating on a sector of the economy.

The bombing campaign against the European Axis oil supplies could have certainly started much earlier, talk September of 1939.
But neither French nor British governments were allowing it.