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Naval War Staff has ordered that passenger ships in enemy convoy be attacked. U 33 sailed for a minelaying operation north of the Foreland. U 25 and U 34 were ordered to make a situation report. I must know whether the French Admiralty's claim concerns one of these boats. It might of course be U 40, but she could not answer, as presumably her transmitter is out of order (see 22.10). After going into the question of keeping losses down again, I have decided only to order the boats to keep a sufficient distance in gun actions, and not to go all out. I do not think it necessary or justifiable to restrict the use of guns further, e.g.
a) to order the boats to avoid all gun actions, i.e. to leave the enemy as soon as opposition is encountered, or
b) to renounce the use of guns altogether.
Commanding officers must be required not to go all out for the enemy, but to keep at a range which makes it impossible for the enemy to use his guns effectively, or to break off the action if they are faced with superior guns.
U 31 reported: "Operation carried out". (Loch Ewe). U 37's report of experiences off Gibraltar received:
1) Patrol by Q ships, motor vessels and a/c. Cooperation between these.
2) Air patrol in the area Cape Spartel, Trafalgar, St. Vincent Larache. Hunts apparently only with hydrophones, no location.
3) Traffic: ships making 9 knots and over are routed independently, more than 10 miles south of the usual steamer routes.
This report gives valuable information for the operation of U 25, U 26 and U 53, which are to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean.
A conference was held between B.d.U. and the General Staff of the G.A.F. on the problem of getting more information on the Channel.The G.A.F. agreed to fly an extensive photographic reconnaissance of the whole Dover-Calais area. It remains to be seen whether pictures taken of the surface of the sea from such a height can provide any practical clues as to mines and net barrages and other details of navigational importance. The only experiences are of much smaller sea areas. I am of the opinion however, that every means of reconnaissance must be used. Even if the results cannot be analyzed accurately from a navigational standpoint, they will still be of great value.
Situation reports received from U 25 and U 34, thus the French Admiralty's claim can only refer to U 40, whose radio is apparently out of action. It is not at all impossible however, that the reports are connected with the loss of U 16 off Dover (see F.O. U/B West's War Log). U 25 has only observed slight neutral single-ship traffic and torpedo boats or patrolling destroyers.
U 34 sank a steamer from a convoy off the west entrance to the Channel, torpedoed 3 others, but could not observe results owing to anti-S/M activity. She is returning because of a crack in the inner compensating tank.
U 31 entered port. She encountered no patrol off Loch Ewe. There is however, a net barrage in the bay, in which the boat was entangled for some time, as she did not see the flat buoys until too late. There was a hospital ship inside, but nothing else. As it did not seem possible to get inside, the boat laid the mines across the entrance to the bay at the minimum safety distance. The position of the mines is excellent. Success seems certain, but it is doubtful if we shall hear anything about it.
U 25 reported a convoy northwest of Finisterre. This is the second convoy reported within a few days in this area, fairly close to the coast. This too was steering a main course to the north. It is remarkable that all the 4 convoys reported so far have been north-bound. South-bound traffic apparently keeps further to the west.
The problem of torpedo failures is unfortunately still far from being solved. U 25 reports 4 failures at one stopped ship, shots at short range. The Torpedo Inspectorate's instructions were observed. There is therefore no longer any doubt that the Torpedo Inspectorate themselves do not understand the matter. At present torpedoes cannot be fired with non-contact firing units, as this has led to premature detonation. Their depth setting has to be 2 meters less than the draught of their target. There depth may not be less than 3 meters, as otherwise there may be surface runners in which especially the engines of the G7a may be damaged. Exact instructions are given for setting the safety range and these are observed. Nevertheless at least 30% of the torpedoes are duds. They either do not detonate at all or they detonate in the wrong place. There does not seem to be any sense in issuing new instructions to the boats as they never lead to the desired results. The Commanding Officers must be losing confidence in their torpedoes. In the end their fighting spirit will suffer. The torpedo failure problem is at present the most urgent of all the problems of U-boat warfare.
Naval War Staff informed me that U 25 could not be supplied on the Spanish coast, as Spain had recently made political difficulties. Supply could only be arranged in Farrol in a case of extreme necessity. I have decided not to send the boat there, in order to have this possibility in hand for really urgent cases. I am not surprised at this development; I always regarded this matter as very uncertain.
U.49's operational readiness will be delayed a few days. U 47 also will not be ready until very late, not before the middle of November. There is a choice between letting the boats sail alone at long intervals or keeping the first ones back until they can all operate together. I have decided on the latter course, because I would like for once to have several boats out and off Gibraltar. So far such an operation has been planned, but never carried out, as events took a different turn. But the attack on the convoy by U 37, 46 and 48 opened up possibilities which I want to see used to the full. If this is successful there will be every justification for holding boats back.
U.26 reported that she had passed 450 north. The other 2 boats of this wave (U 25 and U 53) will be kept in their operations areas for about another 3 days in order to give U 26 enough time in hand to carry out her operation.
Naval War Staff requested B.d.U to go into the question of attacking England's timber imports from north Russian ports. These imports are regarded as of great importance.
I had in any case planned to operate U 36 against those timber transports in the area east of North Cape. I think that chances of success are good in this area, but nevertheless I cannot decide further until I get information of the situation from this operation.
Naval War Staff also informed me at the same time that there was a chance of setting up a "Base North". I think everything possible should be done to get this matter cleared up.
The advantages of a base in the north are:
1) The much better position for attacking the north Russia-England convoy routes.
2) The safe approach route, loading well away from England through deep water.
The disadvantages are:
1) A lengthening of the approach route by about 300 miles.
2) Lack of suitable dock and repair facilities and the difficulty of supplying material overland.
As long as boats can pass through the North Sea without running too great a risk or losing too much time, a base in the north would only be important for attacking timber transports from the north Russian ports. But if at any time the disadvantage of the longer route should outweigh the increasing dangers of a passage through the North Sea, the Northern Base would assume very great importance.
It cannot be foreseen how long the timber transports will continue, but it is justifiable to assume that they will either stop soon or else the political conditions for this base will become void.
The base would also have to have reliable radio communication with the boats and with home. As a large-scale undertaking cannot be kept secret for long, there would have to be military protection from the first in order to prevent surprise coups by the enemy.
A proposal has been worked out on these lines and sent to Naval War Staff.
18th to 23rd November have been submitted to Naval War Staff as target dates for the first supply in the Northern base for U 36.
U 25 reported that she was returning as the crosspiece of her forward torpedo hatch had broken. She might not be capable of diving if depth charged. The Commanding Officer has therefore acted correctly. His position is northwest of Cape Finisterre.
Naval War Staff informed me that 10 German steamers would be ready to sail from Vigo about the middle of November and requested that they be given U-boat protection on their way home in as far as possible. This is a task for which the U-boat is imperfectly suited. If she is forced to dive, which is always the case if a/c appear, she cannot maintain the speed of the steamers. They will have to stop, or else contact will be lost. The U-boat is not very effective against destroyers as it is. Also on escort duty, starting from Vigo means that afterwards the boat or boats cannot be used elsewhere as their fuel stocks will be exhausted. While the value of the escort is doubtful the disadvantage for the U-boat war as a whole would be considerable. I must therefore advise against a close escort. Remote protection will be available if the steamers sail at such times as there are U-boats in the vicinity (position "ROT") in accordance with operations Plan No. 11. These times will be communicated to Naval War Staff for onward transmission to the steamers.
U 25 reported a convoy, apparently making for the Channel on a northeast course. There were no further shadower's reports.
U 53 was ordered to continue her passage south, as U 26 must be by now far enough ahead to carry out her minelaying operation. The "City of Flint", once taken in prize by the "Deutschland", has been detained in Bergen. The prize crew is said to have been interned there and the prize ship herself released. As the Naval War Staff attaches great importance to her recapture, U 34, U 37 and U 46 on their return passage, have been ordered to take such action as their fuel stocks permit. .