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U 43 reported from the area southwest of Ireland that the weather was so bad that she could take no offensive action. According to metrological observations it is not likely to improve in the near future and conditions are much quieter on the Portuguese coast; U 41, 43 and 49 have therefore been ordered to proceed on to position "ROT". U 53 reported a convoy west of Gibraltar. During the last few days Radio Intelligence Service has provided some very useful reports on convoys, no action could be taken as there were no boats in the areas concerned. Today several more reports were received on which the boats may in fact be able to act. Reports of enemy surface forces have also now reached such a degree of accuracy that they are of practical value, which was only seldom the case to begin with. It is however, desirable that they be confined to hard facts, without any inferences from individual radio stations; those inferences make it more difficult to sift the material. Reports can only be evaluated by a unit which is adequately informed on the whole situation and can take all factors into account. It would be much easer for the operational units to make use of the material if it were sifted by a central department and passed on by them to units concerned. It would be necessary of course to work very quickly; comprehensive and connected situation reports are of less value than a collection of connected reports and dependent operations.
A radio message from U 45, intercepted by another boat on 14th October, has now reached B.d.U. It was not received here.
"B.d.U. from U 45: 3 large darkened steamers, 15 knots, sunk. Am chasing a 4th steamer 3366 to 3355 BRT."
This is the last news of this boat. At any rate the enemy paid dearly for her loss.
Radio intelligence reports have provided the following information on the whereabouts of the British battlefleet:
1) the fast battleships and battlecruisers and several a/c carriers are not in home waters, but on special operations (chasing pocket battleships or escorting particularly valuable convoys from Canada).
2) The major part of the remaining battleships apparently use mainly the Firth of Clyde as anchorage.
The question of a U-boat action here against the English fleet has been considered and the following conclusions:
a) U-boats cannot attack the anchorages themselves. The ships are laying in a long, fairly narrow strip of water, the only access to which is closed by a boom.
b) It would be quite possible for U-boats to penetrate into the wider part of the Firth, as far as the boom. There is a shallow position here, exactly on the main route, where mines could be laid. This operation must be carried out as soon as possible. There is a good chance of catching large warships. It will however, be necessary to use mines of greater explosive effect than the TMB, as these cannot be guaranteed to sink if laid at this depth. Then setting must be sufficiently coarse for them not to be exploded by the many merchant vessels which ply in these waters. The operation cannot be carried out until the mines have been manufactured.
c) If the fleet sails north from the Clyde, it will be bound by navigational considerations. U-boats might operate with success along their route.The only question is: when will the fleet sail? As long as it has nothing to do off the entrance to the North Sea, this is entirely uncertain. It must therefore be forced to go to sea at a certain time. This can only be effected by operations by our own battleships. The operation of a lot of U-boats against the Home Fleet in the Firth of Clyde therefore only promises to be worthwhile if it is carried out in cooperation with our own surface forces.
Group Command informs that Naval War Staff have agreed to operations of battleships beyond the line Shetlands-Norway, as long as the British Fleet is in the Clyde and that such an operation is being planned for the next days. It appears however, that it is impossible to postponed this even for a few days, which would be necessary to prepare the U-boats and get them to their positions. If it could only have been postponed for 4 days a total of 11 U-boats would have been available. On the date fixed on the other hand only 3-4 boats can be sent.
A similar operation will therefore have to be planned for a later date. If it is planned long enough in advance, the rest of the U-boat war will not suffer to any extent. The date must be chosen to fit in with the sailing times of the U-boats, so that they will only have to be kept back for a few days and at the worst if the operation falls through, they can go on to their operations areas for the war against merchant shipping.
(signed): Donitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
U 47 sailed for her operations area in accordance with Operations Order No. 11. The next boats to be ready for operations will be:
U 31 and U 35 18 November, U , 25, 36 and 48 and on 20 November. I intend to send U 31 and 35 to the sea area south of Ireland and to allow them considerable freedom of action there. They must be able to approach the coast or move further out to sea according to weather conditions and patrol. Cooperation will only be possible to a limited extent and will probably be confined to an exchange of individual reports rather than shadowing for any length of time. At first U 28 and 29 will be in the same area. U 48 is a boat with wide radius of action. She is therefore to operate west of Spain and Portugal, where U 47 will also be and possibly U 49. This area has 2 great advantages:
1) The weather is better here in the winter than it is further north.
2) There is less patrol, especially air patrol. If there is any air activity at all it must be very slight. The traffic situation is very favorable.
U 53 has apparently lost the convoy which she reported on the 15th for good. Her last report said that she had been driven off by a/c with bombs. It was a small convoy of 7 ships. As the boat is now west of Gibraltar and her operations area is east of Gibraltar, she has presumably started on her return passage.
C-in-C Home Fleet is in the area north and northwest of Scotland. U 29 is approximately north of the Shetlands. She has been informed. U 53 reported another convoy off Lisbon, 18 ships in 4 columns, 5 destroyers escorting. Speed 7-8 knots, main course north. It is clearly the same convoy that the Radio Intelligence Service picked up on 16 November and fixed several times. It is valuable to have the radio intelligence report confirmed by the U-boat. If reports continue to be as accurate and to arrive in such good time they will be of great use in the conduct of the war. U 41 and U 43 are still very far north. It is known from experience that it is too early to order them to operate against this convoy yet; but they are proceeding south and should be on a level with it in 2 days time. U 53 is shadowing and reporting at intervals of several hours Order received from Naval War Staff to the effect that unrestricted action can be taken against passenger ships which are seen to be armed. As most passenger ships are already armed, this will mean a great step forward.
U 31 and 35 sailed for their operations area in accordance with Operations Order No. 13. U 53 continued to shadow the convoy. If contact is maintained it may be possible to bring up U 41 and 43. The last 24 hours prove that it can be maintained. U 41 and 43 have been ordered to operate against the convoy. U 31 had to enter port again because of engine trouble.
Contact with the convoy was lost after it altered course, shortly before first light, just at the critical moment. By afternoon the other boats could have been there. Enemy destroyers drove U 53 off. Although this was very regrettable, the C.O.'s achievement in shadowing for 36 hours must be recognized.
At 1330 the boat had made contact again however. The others should have been in the vicinity. It must be taken into account that they have been in operations areas in the north for several days in bad weather. Considerable errors in E.P. were to be expected. U 53 was therefore ordered to make beacon signals. The danger of her being D/F'd was small; it would have been impossible from shore and unlikely from the convoy. At 1820 contact was lost again, but only an hour later U 41 sighted the convoy. It had come off; a second boat had been brought up to the convoy. Soon U 53 was also there again. The boat's error in EP was about 6-8 miles; this is not much. Nothing was heard of U 43, but this does not necessarily mean that she was not there. She had no cause to report, as the enemy was under constant observation.
After a long silence U 26 reported from west of Gibraltar. She has not carried out the minelay. U 49 reported a premature detonation with the adapted pistol. This is so far an isolated case and no judgment can be made.
U 55 lost the convoy when it altered course. U 41 was still there however, and made beacon signals. It is odd that there is no news of sinkings yet after such a long pursuit. U 55 attacked and heard 2 explosions. It must be assumed that U 41 also attacked. No failures have been reported. Probably the boats have not been able to observe results after firing. Perhaps the enemy is purposely not making any losses known, as has happened before. If he has had losses however, he should by now have strengthened the escort and sent out a/c. The convoy is only 200 miles away from the French coast. As it is so near the coast it will not be possible to attack it for much longer. Boats taking part will have to have new operating areas. Nothing is known so far of U 43 and U 49. According to a French report, a German U-boat is said to have been sunk. Both boats have been ordered to report their positions and intentions. Later U 43 made a radio message. She was ahead of the convoy, but not yet in sight of it and was waiting for daylight to make an attack.
ArrivalsU 49 did not report until much later. She was damaged by D/C's, and her bow torpedo gear unserviceable. As she has only one stern torpedo left serviceable, she has been ordered to return. U 41's gyro is temporarily out of action due to D/C's. The attack on the convoy must be regarded as ended. The boats have been given a new operations area between 50 and 480 north, east of 120 west. The disposition originally planned cannot be carried out now as U 49 has to return home and the other boats have only a limited amount of fuel left. U 53 reported that she was starting on her return passage. U 31 and U 48 sailed, for the first time with anti-mine escort through the declared area. In connection with a large-scale operation by our own battleships U 35, U 47 and U 33 have been kept back in the area west of the Orkneys. According to a sighting report, not entirely reliable, from an a/c, the Home Fleet is supposed to be in Scapa.
It is the first of many victories for Lt. Wick." . . . As the French did not cross the German border very often, my wingman and I decided for once to visit them. A tailwind from the east helped us on our way. Near Nancy I suddenly saw a gaggle of aircraft at an altitude of some 6000 metres. Realizing immediately that they were not German, we began to circle. Two aircraft detached themselves from the bunch above and swooped down on us. Now I could recognize them - Curtiss fighters.
We dived away and, just as we had anticipated, the two Frenchmen dived after us. I went into a climbing turn with one of the Frenchmen right on my tail. I can still clearly remember how I could see his red, white and blue roundels when I looked behind me. At first, the sight of them was rather exciting, particularly as the Frenchman was firing away with everything he had. But then the realization that somebody is behind you and shooting at you is very unpleasant.
I pushed the nose down again and, with my superior speed, quickly lost him. When my Frenchman was no longer to be seen, I looked up to my left to find the others. Not a thing in sight. I glanced up to my right and could hardly believe my eyes. I was staring straight at four radial engines all spouting little red flames. A ridiculous thought flashed through my mind - 'are they really allowed to shoot at me like that?'
But then I was all concentration. Should I try to get away again? No! Now's the time to tackle them. One has got to go down. Clenching my teeth, I hauled the stick and rudder to the right and turned into them.
By the time I had completed my turn the first had already shot past me. The second was right behind him, and this one I attacked head-on. It was a nasty moment looking straight down his blazing gun barrels, but we were too close to score any hits. He zoomed over my head and now the third was almost on top of me.
I maneuvered my aircraft slightly to get him nicely lined up in my sights, aiming and firing just as I had been taught at fighter training school. With my first shots I saw some pieces of metal fly off the Frenchman. Then both his wings buckled and gave way.
Close behind him the fourth Curtiss was also firing at me, but I was not hit. The first pair were now climbing again. I followed suit so that they could not catch me. I was getting low on fuel and it was time to head for home. My wingman, who had returned to base safe and sound, had lost me after the first dive in all the twisting and turning."
U 38 lay off Westfjord for a few days. The weather was very bad and the boat observed no traffic. In accordance with orders she reported that she was proceeding north.