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The ARK ROYAL has probably been in Portsmouth since 13 Feb. and will go into dock there. The RENOWN and EXETER are in Plymouth, where Mr. Churchill went on board the EXETER to offer congratulations Several destroyers have been sent from Gibraltar to the Huelva area to search for German merchantmen reported there. They aresupported by air reconnaissance from Gibraltar.
The supply ship ALTMARK is proceeding southwards through Norwegian territorial waters. Ship has been detected by the enemy. According to radio monitoring, Admiralty has informed naval authorities and in particular the cruiser GLASGOW and the submarines SEAL, TRIAD and ORZEL about a report from Tromsoe stating that a large German tanker of about 10,000 tons, painted black, passed a spot in the Tromsoe area at 1215 on 12 Feb. Previous instructions for the voyage remain unchanged, since the ship
seems to run less risk inside territorial waters than outside. The Embassy, Naval Attache and Consulates were informed some time ago about the ship's character and the fact that she carries prisoners, also that it is imperative for the ALTMARK, which so far as the Norwegian Government is concerned is a "Government Ship", to complete her passage without delay or hindrance.
As there are enemy anti-submarine forces patrolling off the southwest corner of Norway near Lindesnes, Group West has ordered the ALTMARK" not to leave Norwegian territorial waters directly off Lindesnes but to wait till near Kristiansand.
At Sea 15 February 1940"Ark Royal", "Renown" and "Exeter" have arrived at the Channel ports. U 37 therefore required new orders. She was ordered to proceed to the west coast of Spain with U 26 and to act there as tactical leader of the group U 26, U 37, U 50, U 53, U 54 and perhaps later also U 41.
According to a radio intelligence report a convoy is to be west of Porto on 17.2 and the nearest boats, U 26, U 37 and U 53 will will first be operated against this. U 29 has been kept off the North Channel because of the "Nordmark" operation which is to take place within the next days. (see F.O. U/B West's War Log see special entry below).
U 53 reported that she had sunk 30,000 tons.
In the forenoon British reconnaissance planes were over the Heligoland Bight several times. One Blenheim plane was shot down by fighters, . Intensive air reconnaissance over the North Sea, At 1115 the Admiralty sent a priority radio signal to all sea and
shore command stations. At 1340 our air reconnaissance sighted six enemy destroyers on easterly course north of our declared area. At 1400 radio monitoring detected the cruiser ARETHUSA and destroyers of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, according to radio
bearings off Lindesnes. At 1318 (1630) the cruiser received a message that the supply ship ALTMARK had been sighted by a reconnaissance plane, 1500 Report from the ALTMARK, off Egeroe, that she had sighted a cruiser of the AURORA class and five destroyers. 1900 British destroyers forced the ALTMARK inshore. The INTREPID tried to come alongside.
0230 The Commanding Officer of the ARETHUSA reported that the destroyer COSSACK was lying alongside the ALTMARK and that
he was about to return to Rosyth with his group. The submarine SEAL remaining in the Joessing area for the meantime. 0400 C in C Home Fleet ordered the task force HOOD and WARSPITE to return to the Clyde. It is quite dear fraa the. Admiralty orders and the steps taken by British forces that the operation against the supply ship ALTMARK was carefully planned and direoted with the clear object of using all available means and if necessary violating Norwegian territorial waters, in order to capture the ALTMARK or to board her and free the prisoners.
According to a report from the Embassy in Oslo, the supply ship ALTMARK entered the fortified area of Bergen on 14 Feb. and was to have been searched. After the Ambassador had intervened, pointing out her character as a government ship flying the Reich Service Flag, the ship was released early on 16 Feb. without examination and continued her voyage unhindered. Forenoon: The ALTMARK was instructed by Group West not to cross the Skagerrak until she reaohed the line Arendal - Hlrshals. At 1400 radio monitoring detected the cruiser ARETHUSA and destroyers of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, according to a bearing in the area west of Lindesnes. The cruiser was informed at 1318 that the ALTMARK had been sighted by a reconnaissance plane. Almost simultaneously our air reconnaissance sighted six British destroyers north of the declared area. A flight of bombers from the 10th Air Corps was sent to attack the destroyers.
It seems more and more likely that U 33 has been lost. Several radio intelligence reports show that she was in action with an English minesweeper and then surrendered. Assistance was requested to rescue survivors. The English authorities assumed that mines had been laid. This is not improbable, as these events took place in the early morning hours. The boat would certainly not have chosen this time to penetrate into the Clyde and she then at latest would have been on her way out. If she really did lay the mines, the high price paid will have been worth it.
The German Ambassador in Oslo made a very sharp protest against the violation of Norwegian neutrality by the British destroyer COSSACK during the attack on the supply ship ALTMARK. Readiness measures in Belgium. Restrictions of leave for Army personnel. Rumors of imminent mobilization. Russian advance on the Karelian isthmus. The Finnish Foreign Minister has denied reports that Finland has requested the Western Powers for help. The Swedish Government is standing by its refusal to grant Finland any large scale active military support.
Submarine U "13" is disposed off Joessing Fiord to protect the ALTMARK and patrol the entrance. By decree of the Fuehrer, Norwegian neutrality is to be strictly observed. Propaganda is primarily directed against Great Britain, emphasizing her gross breach of neutrality and stressing the ALTMARK's character as an unarmed merchantman.
The submarines which were temporarily moved on account of the ALTMARK events have been ordered to resume the positions for which they were originally scheduled. (Except submarine U "13").
U 37 reported a convoy in southwest Biscay on a southwesterly course. She pursued it for some hours and lost it again towards evening. U 53 sighted the convoy reported by the Radio Intelligence Service and was shadowing.
Early on 18 Feb. the BCs GNEISENAU, SCHARNHORST, CA HIPPER and eight DDs sailed for a sortie into the Shetlands - Bergen. Commanding Admiral plan: Surprise sortie with the BCs, the HIPPER and three destroyers type 36 against enemy convoy traffic between Norway and the Shetlands, destruction of merchant ships belonging to or sailing for the enemy, also their escorts. Further- more the heavy ships 1 appearance in the northern North Sea should draw enemy home forces putting to sea towards our submarines in waiting disposition.
DDs are to complement the heavy ships sortie by carrying out operations against merchant shipping in the eastern Skagerrak. The BCs advance proceeded according to plan on 18 Feb, Radio monitoring did not detect any striking radio traffic and it seems that the enemy has failed to notice anything. Naval Staff thinks that enemy situation and the expected convoy traffic afford good prospects for the operation.
Air recon by Commander, Naval Air, West and 10th Air Corps as far as 61° N has not produced any reports on the enemy. Our own submarines in the Orkneys - Shetlands area, which sent some reports on enemy ships and convoys," have been allocated new attack positions appropriate to the enemy movements detected. The ZENKER, one of the destroyers participating in the operation, has had to commence the return trip. At about 1100 armed enemy reconnaissance planes unsuccessfully attacked the 6th MSW Flot.
U 37 came up to the convoy reported by U 53. Apparently 2 ships were sunk. Then U 53 lost contact. Meanwhile the boats had used so many torpedoes that they had to reload from the upper deck containers. Both tried to do this, independently of one another, off the Spanish coast. Neither succeeded owing to strong patrol. They started on their return passage and reported their intention of trying again off the Irish coast. U 37 reported 43,000 tons sunk. here is no information on U 26. She was operating against the same convoy and must therefore be in the same sea area. She was ordered to go to operations area "ROT" and to report. Information was received overland that U 41 did not turn up for supply "GATA". She may have been delayed a day. U 28 sailed in accordance with Operations Order (illegible).
For the attack on the West, the forces will be divided by the line Liège to Charleroi across Belgium and Luxembourg. Forces north of this line will break through Belgian defences, counter any threats to the Ruhr, and take on the strongest Anglo-French forces. Forces south of the line will cross the Meuse river between Dinant and Sedan, and advance towards the Somme estuary. The airborne attack on the fortresses of the Low Countries is kept as they are because it is believed they were not compromised during the Mechelen disaster."The objective. . . is to deny Holland and Belgium to the English by swiftly occupying them; to defeat, by an attack through Belgium and Luxembourg territory, the largest possible forces of the Anglo-French Army, and thereby to pave the way for the destruction of the military strength of the enemy."
"…from the first hour I informed Finland that she unfortunately could not count on military intervention from Sweden."
Thanks to exhaustive radio monitoring and the excellent work of the deciphering service, which has at present very largely broken down the enemy radio codes, Naval Staff and Group West have a clear and almost complete picture of the disposition of enemy forces in the North Sea area
Early on 19 Feb. the British heavy forces were still in west coast ports. In the 'afternoon the RODNEY, WARSPITE and HOOD sail, from the Clyde to the Shetlands area to act as remote convoy escort. A partially decoded teletype revealed that an apparently important convoy must await the arrival >f the heavy ships and not sail until 20 Feb, During the forenoon of 19 Feb. however, we could not be absolutely certain as to what convoys were actually passing through the Shetlands - Norway area.
From convoy reports on the morning of 19 Feb, the prospects of success at first seemed to be extremely favorable for our battleships. Available reports showed that the convoy "O.N, 14", protected by the ARETHUSA, EDINBURGH, CAIRO, five destroyers and one submarine, was 50 miles off the Orkneys at 0200 and should therefore have been in the waters between the Shetlands and Norway at 1000.
It was assumed that the Commanding Admiral was already operating against this convoy, as information on the situation was constantly being transmitted to him by Group West. Further reports about the enemy indicated that a convoy had put in to Kirkwall. Our original assumption that there were two separate convoys was unfortunately not confirmed. During the forenoon it was ascertained that the only convoy to be expected today was not to sail for Norway as yet. It was either still being assembled or
was to be held in Kirkwall. The one prospective target for the battleships was thus kept out of their clutches for the day's operations.
U 26 reported. She is returning to her old operations area south of Ireland, as she is short of fuel.
U 25 entered port. She sank 1) Armed merchant ship about 5,000 tons, 2) Norwegian Enid 1,440 tons (attempted to escape), 3) Escorted steamer (Pajala?) 6,873 tons 4) Norwegian Sonja 2,977 tons (contraband), 5) S.S. Armanistan (English) 6,805 tons, 6) Steamer in Zone A 5,000 tons. (Total) 27,795 tons. She was also the first boat to supply under "Moro". C.O.'s report on this: Enemy patrol vessels immediately outside territorial waters. Careful, effective preparations had been made at the place of supply. No difficulty in supplying without being noticed. No moon essential.
"Nordmark" operations completed. U 29 has been ordered to continue on her passage.
Report by the Chief, Operations Branch on the course of the battleship operation as far as is known. In srite of very favorable
conditions to our deep regret the operation has been concluded without success. The Chief, Naval Staff has given orders for it
to be repeated in the very near future. A relevant directive is to be issued to the Group.
The operation has been uneventful. No contact was made with the enemy. On the return trip an enemy submarine was sighted
40 miles north of our declared area and forced to submerge by depth charges. (Formation reported as "cruiser and destroyers"
by the submarine. Report passed on to the submarines SALMON and SUNFISH).
On his return the Commanding Admiral made the following brief report:
1. Operation "Nordmark" carried out.
2. Assembly of formation in Wangeroog roads probably spotted by a British plane the night before sailing.
3. Sailing on first day of operation probably unobserved.
4. On the second day operated without result on a suspected northern convoy from morning till evening. Operation ended according to plan as there was no evidence to give promise of success on 20 Feb. and the destroyers were short of fuel.
5. Traffic sighted: apart from fishing vessels, one Norwegian steamer in ballast near Viking Bank, easterly course, one tanker on easterly course entering territorial waters near Stadtlandet. (Report from ship's plane).
6. At 0145 on 20 Feb. in grid square 3736 enemy submarine on starboard bow of the leading ship forced to submerge and attacked with nine depth charges by HEIDKAMP. Success not confirmed.
Naval Staff feels that the battleships' unsuccessful sortie and the Commanding Admiral's report are unsatisfactory. In Naval Staff's
opinion the enemy situation was sufficiently clear. The definite news of the sailing of an apparently important convoy from Kirkwall on 20 Feb. seemed to- give promise of success. As the British forces did not sail from the Clyde until the afternoon on 19 Feb. , they could not have reached the operational area of our battleships in time. The Commanding Admiral could reckon on surprising the enemy. To break off the operation and thus fail to exploit a period when the enemy situation seemed especially favorable was therefore not in accordance with the viewpoint of Naval Staff nor of Group West.
At Sea 20 February 1940Nothing to report.
Reports of the appearance of British forces in Northern Waters are becoming more frequent. One of these states that a British
cruiser squadron has been sighted in the vicinity of Petsamo. Numerous British warships are reported to be operating along
the north coast of Norway, There is a report that an aircraft carrier has been sighted.
Complete and definite confirmation of these reports, which have been received several times lately, is not possible as yet. In
Naval Staff's opinion, however, there is no doubt of the fact that British forces have appeared in north Norwegian and, in Northern
Waters. Various reasons might account for the dispatch of these forces. For Naval Staff the possibilities are as follows:
1, Various reports of an alleged German base in the Murmansk area (North Base) have produced disquiet in Great Britain. The
forces operating along the Norwegian coast have orders to find out the actual situation and take action against German merchant .
raiders or supply vessels wishing to enter the base.
2, The forces in Northern Waters are directing their operations against the German pocket battleships and auxiliary cruisers which,
according to British Admiralty calculations, should be putting out into the Atlantic in the near future. The British forces are at
the same time patrolling the northern sea area in search of the German merchantmen which, judging by their sailing reports,
should be arriving soon from overseas, .
3, For a long time the British Admiralty and Ministry of Economic Warfare have been convinced of the necessity of stopping
German ore imports from Norway. Following the ALTMAEK episode further British violations of neutrality aimed at stopping the
ore traffic are within the bounds of possibility. Even if such a thing seems hardly likely at present, we still have to reckon
with the possibility that one day Great Britain will no longer respect Norwegian territorial waters at all and take action
against German ore shipments. With this thought in mind one might possibly consider the movements of British forces as preparatory
measures.
4. The appearance'of British forces can possibly also be considered as a strong demonstration against Russia intended to
relieve the Finns, This is the Russian view. The ultimate aim could be to bring over important transports to help Finland , '
in which case an aircraft carrier might possibly be used to transport fighter planes , which could then take off directly
into Finnish territory.
Which of the above possibilities comes nearest to the actual facts is not yet clear. In Naval Staff T s opinion the chances
are that the British forces are patrolling the northern sea area against German merchantmen and raiders putting to sea and at the
same time carrying out reconnaissance for operations against North Base and for bringing over important transports to Finland,
A British military occupation of Norway aimed at the capture of the Norwegian ore port of Narvik or even the northern Swedish ore
region, or a landing in Petsamo to give Finland active help, are at the moment considered highly unlikely by Naval Staff,
Nothing to report.