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Reports from British military circles mention the possibility that Chamberlain may be replaced by Churchill as Prime Minister in the spring and Eden may take over at the Admiralty.
Air recon over the Dogger Bank sighted numerous neutral ships and some unidentified fishing vessels. Air combats with British planes were unsuccessful. Our own fighters drove off enemy recon planes flying in formations of three. 1 Wellington was shot down north of Norderney.
.Gp West reported plans for the next BB operation as follows:
1. Plan 1. Since the BBs will not be ready for action again till- 25 Feb., interpose operation "Wikinger" with a DD flotilla.
2. At a date after 25 Feb., to be fixed in accordance with radio monitoring reports, the BBs, ADMIRAL HIPPER and 6-8 DDs to carry out a combined sortie into the area North Scotland - Southwest Norway during the early morning.
a. BBs to thrust on from there as the situation permits, with no limitations as to time and area. Assignment: To inflict all possible damage on the enemy, concentrating on convoys and CAs. Attack on enemy patrols near the Shetlands, Orkneys and Fair Isle Passage permitted. ADMIRAL HIPPER to take part as Commanding Admiral, Naval Forces, West sees fit.
b. Other forces to operate against merchant shipping for one day on the sea route Scotland - Southwest Norway, then to return and be ready to pick up the battleships
c. 4 DDs are to be held in reserve to pick up the BBs in case the forces under (b) cannot sail again in time.
3. No special UBoat dispositions will be made
4. The order for the operation will be given with the keyword "Schleswig".
Gp West's directive was in complete accord with the plans and views of Naval Staff, and met with Chief, Naval Staffs
entire approval. DesFlot 1 (6 destroyers) put to sea for operation "Wikinger". Assignment: To make a surprise attack on the enemy trawlers suspected to be on the Dogger Bank, if possible to capture them; to seize suspicious neutral vessels. Outward passage after dark via route 1. At 2018, signal from Commander, DesFlot1: "The LEBERECHT MAASS sank in grid square 6954, lower left quadrant. 1 (This spot lies on route 1 more than ten miles from our own nearest minefields in the declared area). At 2050, further signal from DesFlot 1: "The MAX SCHULTZ also missing. Probably submarine". Gp West left it to the Commander's discretion to break off the operation and at 2215 informed the flotilla that PV "803 M had been sent to search for survivors. DesFlot 1 called off the operation and' put in to Wilhelmshaven in the early hours of 23 Feb. Close investigation should reveal the full facts about the loss of the 2 DDs Pending the result of an examination of route 1 for enemy mines, it is at present assumed that both DDs were torped by an enemy sub
The depth of mistrust between DKM and the LW is palpable in this incident.While the moon is reasonably favorable, 10th FX has been carrying out night attacks on merchant shipping between the Thames and the Firth of Forth. No successes observed in various attacks. The 26KG attacks on the British coast and also the following incident: "About 2000 spotted armed, darkened steamer of 3,000 to 4,000 tons, course 300°, near Terschelllng Bank. Several attacks were made from 1,300 meters One hit was scored on the forecastle, two hit's amidships, ship caught fire and sank No further observations due to darkness Light anti-aircraft and machine gunfire from the ship. (Margin note: Is this the sinking of the LEBERECHT MAASS and MAX SCHULTZ?").
The attack on a steamer near Terschelllng Bank is -most regrettable and contravenes the regulations issued to the LW for the conduct' of war on merchant shipping. Air attacks at sea are permitted only in a strip 30 miles wide along the British coast. Closer investigation has been ordered.
About 0032 a He 111- approaching the island of Borkum from the west was .taken as British and shot down by our naval AA guns. Investigation is in progress.
Russo-Finnish conflict: Further Russian successes on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland's military leaders consider that foreign help so far has been inadequate.
Well-informed German circles in Helsinki report the arrival to date of the following foreign contingents for Finland: 8,000 Swedes, 500 Norwegians, 500 Danes, 300 Canadians. A further 600 Canadians and 5,000 Hungarians are expected. Press reports also state that 5,000 Italians are still to come. The Finns have declined the offer of Polish soldiers and airmen from France,
Conference between Commander In Chief. Navy and the Fuehrer at 1030. Points raised at discussion .
1. Situation in the Baltic Sea: Examined the question of the line fixing the limit for German attacks on merchant shipping at 20° E.
2. Situation in the North Sea: Battleship operations, mining of the east coast.
3. Submarine war: Successes, losses, intensification. The Fuehrer consented to full offensive action against darkened passenger steamers setting only navigation lights. The Fuehrer agreed to return two British commanders taken prisoner in exchange for two submarine commanders.
4. Aerial minelaying: Chief, Naval Staff presented Naval Staff's viewpoint and informed the Fuehrer of the Navy's plans .
5. The Fuehrer refused to allow submarines to take part in operation "Halifax".
6. The Fuehrer will not permit submarine warfare in the Mediterranean until he has the Duce's consent.
7. Operation "Weseruebung".
8. The Fuehrer was in complete agreement with the purchase of the Estonian submarines.
9. The Russian treaty.
Destroyer losses during operation "Wikinger": First brief report received from Group West, Commander, DesFlot 1 reported:
"About 1915 on 22 Feb. in the course of operation "Wikinger" the rear ships fired on a shadowing plane grid square 6954 lower left quadrant. We turned about on hearing explosions. MAASS requested help. A fresh explosion split her amidships and she sank. Soon afterwards another explosion and submarine report from the KOELDTER. The SCHULTZ missing from then on. Proceeded
out of danger zone, operation broken off. Sixty men saved from the MAASS, one man missing from the KOELLNER."
the following supplementary order has been issued for the conduct of the war on merchant shipping:
In the area sanctioned for submarine action against darkened ships, passenger ships which show no neutral markings and at night carry no lights -other than navigation lights are to be treated as enemy armed passenger ships. Submarines are permitted full
offensive action at once against such ships.
Ice conditions still do not permit an estimation of the dates of readiness of the next boats. It is to be expected however, that U 30, U 34, U 38 and U 52 will be ready by the end of February and U 43, U 47, U 49, U 46 and U 51 at about the same time at the beginning of March. A special operation had originally been planned for U 38 and U 43, but it has been postponed by C-in-C Navy for political reasons. Then it was intended to operate these boats in the Mediterranean in the Cape Bon sea area. This project also had to be abandoned on the orders of C-in-C Navy, for political reasons. I now intend to form an attacking group with the boats which will be ready at about the same time, i.e. U 43, U 46, U 47, U 49 and U 51. Its main task will be to intercept a convoy in the area of greatest convoy traffic. If this succeeds I think it will have better results than would the same amount of single-ship tonnage sunk. It is also necessary to get experience of controlled U-boat operations in good time, so that, when more boats are available, there will be a clear idea of the best way of conducting such operations. The subsidiary task for this group will be to rake the sea area north and northwest of Scotland for warships which have often been reported there. U 30 and U 34 cannot join this group as their radius of action is too small. They are to operate west of the Channel. This is a good area, but cooperation is difficult as it is so close to the coast. The boats will have to operate individually in the main. They can therefore sail as soon as they are ready and need not wait for one another. U 52 is a new boat. She is to make her first patrol alone in areas which are less strongly patrolled. U-38 will probably be the first boat ready and first to go to the area west of Portugal. She may later join the attacking group.
During the period from 1 Jan. to 15 Feb. the following arrived from Norway (Ministry of Economics report):
53 ships with approximately 360,000 tons of iron ore
26 ships with miscellaneous cargoes (herrings, train oil etc.)
The following coded radio message was broadcast to shipping: "Steer towards Norwegian coast before dawn. Beware of British
forces outside the fiords. Signed: Naval Staff ."
U 32 sailed for her operations area, but had to enter port again on the same day because of a trace of oil. U 48 entered port. She carried out her minelaying operation quickly and well, and also sank:
1. Dutch S.S. Burgerdyk 6,853 tons
2. English S.S. Sultan Star 12,306 tons
3. Dutch tanker Den Haag 8,971 tons
4. Enemy steamer of about 6,000 tons
34,130 tons
She has now sunk a total of 16 ships, 114,510 tons, in 4 patrols. Her sinking figures are the highest at present. She has done excellent work, especially as her last patrol was a mining as well as torpedo operation. Successes from the minelay are not yet known, but can certainly be expected, and will have to be added to the figures sunk given above. With regard to the C.O.'s decision to pursue the convoy instead of taking up the "Ark Royal" position, it is a fact that he did not act in accordance with orders. But in view of the impression which he had, he only realized late that he had done wrong. I have therefore omitted to take any further action.
1. Russo-Finnish Conflict: The Soviet advance on the Karelian Isthmus continues amid heavy fighting. According to reports
from Great Britain, the seriousness of Finland 's situation is making the Western Powers more willing to send her auxiliary
troops.
2. Agent reports speak of imminent military action by British forces along the north coast of Norway.
3. The Folkething rejected the Danish National Socialist motion proposing that Denmark should leave the League of Nations,
declare absolute neutrality and approach Germany to mediate in the Finnish conflict.
4. Under Secretary of State Sumner tfelles is in Rome for talks with Ciano and Mussolini.
ArrivalsU 26 reported that she was starting on her return passage. No news has been received of U 41. She did not turn up for supply "Cata". She should have reported if she had been prevented from carrying out the supply operation. She cannot yet be presumed lost for certain, but her loss is likely.
On grounds of the reports so far received from Group West on the loss of the destroyers, Chief, Naval Staff gave orders for the following statement to be transmitted to Commanding Admiral, Group West:
"Irrespective of the results of further inquiries by the special commission, I wish to state that the 1st Destroyer Flotilla should have been informed about the mission to be undertaken by 26th Bomber Wing and 10th Air Corps should have been informed earlier about the destroyer operation. In future each arm must be adequately briefed on the other's operations and this exchange of information is to take place well beforehand. Chief, Naval Staff."
With great regret Naval Staff postponed the battleship sortie until 29 Feb. owing to the destroyers state of readiness.
The Fuehrer's decision on the time for beginning aerial minelaying was received by telephone from Armed Forces High
Command, After consideration of the opposing viewpoints of Chief, Naval Staff and Commander in Chief, Air Force the
Fuehrer has decided that the Navy must wait until the Air Force is ready to use the aerial mine.
U 32 and U 38 left for their operations areas in accordance with Operations Orders No. 26 and 29.
Group West informed us by teletype that a further postponement of operation "Schleswig" is necessary, since its execution
later than 29 Feb. would wipe out the minelaying operations scheduled for after 4 March, as the destroyers concerned would very probably be undergoing repairs. The Group considers the mining operations more promising and therefore wishes to abandon operation "Schleswig" until this assignment is co/pleted. It may, in the Group's opinion, be necessary to postpone "Schleswig" even further should it fall too close to the sailing date of the Atlantic ships, as its possible repercussions might greatly prejudice their chances of a successful breakthrough.
In contrast to the Group, Naval Staff regards the execution of the battleship operation as the more urgent , since, with the enemy situation favoring us, a: successful attack against the Norway - Great Britain convoy traffic could be of decisive military and political importance. Psychological reasons also render it desirable to send the battleships on a fresh sortie at an early date. Moreover Naval Staff believes that even if the minelaying operation by the destroyers is canceled, the southeast coast of England
can still be mined by destroyers, S Bootes and planes during the March new moon period. Naval Staff agrees with the latter part of the Group* s teletype which expresses misgivings as to the advisability of a battleship operation shortly before the Atlantic forces are due to sail.
2. Group West also requested confirmation that the two submarines which are to assist the auxiliary cruisers (Ship "16" and Ship "36") on their breakthrough south of Iceland would likewise be available for the LUTZOW and her supply ship. Naval Staff refuses to permit such an operation. Direct cooperation from submarines can only furnish effective support for the slow auxiliary cruisers, not however for the LUTZOW and the supply ship. Their speed is their best guarantee of a successful breakthrough and the employment of submarines would only be a hindrance.
3. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on operational order for Ship "36" (Lt. Cdr. Weyher) Chief, Naval Staff gave his consent.
4. Directive received from Armed Forces High Command on "immediate Operation Gelb", i.e. keyword orders in the case of an enemy penetration into Belgium (see Armed Forces High Command directive) .
U 53 has been ordered to report her position. Since she reported her intention to reload torpedoes on the Irish coast, nothing has been heard of her. It is possible that she started on her return passage without reporting and has now been in the North Sea for some time. Operations control must know where she is. U 37 entered port. She sank:
1) Tanker about 6,000 tons, 2) Steamer in Zone A about 7,000 tons, 3) Steamer in Zone B about 4,500 tons, 4) Patrol vessel
(unknown tonnage), 5) Steamer in Zone B about 6,500 tons, 6) Steamer 7,000 tons, 7)Steamer about 8,000 tons, 8) Tanker
6,000 tons. 45,000 tons in total.
An excellent patrol. The boat observed strong enemy patrols off the Spanish coast, which confirms the recent radio intelligence picture. This will have to be taken into consideration for later operations.
British Cabinet Ministers have appealed to British agriculture for an increase in production. The only way to win the war is to reduce imports. Britain's food supplies were described as inadequate. The Minister for Economic Warfare declared the blockade of Germany to be incomplete. Russian deliveries were breaking it. ' (Accumulation of tin and rubber in Russia for export to Germany). Necessity of tightening up trade agreements with the neutrals to cut out their transit trade to Germany.
According to (the OKW review) , certain spheres of Britain's war economy have begun to feel the pinch, but in no case is there any crisis so far .
The Belgian press has produced a report from political circles that Great Britain has decided not to respect neutral territorial waters any longer if a violation can prevent the passage of warships or contraband. Judging by this statement Great Britain will in future seize German merchantmen even when proceeding through Norwegian waters.
1100 Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Discussion on the LUTZOW's breakthrough. Naval Staff's viewpoint is that this should take place under cover of the battleship operation. The question will be discussed by Chief of Operations Branch in Wilhelmshaven.
2. The following directive is to be sent by teletype to Group West (with copy to Commanding Admiral, Submarines) . The
subject is the execution of operation "Schleswig" and the LUTZOW's breakthrough
3. To make the destroyer operations during the new moon period and the sailing dates for LUTZOW, Ship "16"
and Ship "36" the determining factors for the date of "Schleswig" would be tantamount to an indefinite postponement of this operation.
4. The sailing dates for the Atlantic forces cannot yet be fixed as they depend on the ice situation and state of training.
3. The results to be achieved by "Schleswig rt are just as important as the results of further minelaying by destroyers, especially now that our aerial war on the east coast trade is increasing the effectiveness of earlier mining. If operation "Schleswig" takes
place soon, time and material will still permit subsequent minelaying during the coming new moon period
4. For reasons detailed in 1 - 3 you are to aim at the execution of "Schleswig" as soon as possible and if necessary the minelaying operation planned for the Immediate future is to be ppstponed.
5. Forces of Commanding Admiral, Naval Forces, West are to cooperate in the breakthrough of LUTZOW and the other vessels. Endeavor to set up an attack disposition with submarines operating in Scottish
waters, as for "Nordmark".
6. No plans have been made for a special allocation of submarines for the LUTZOW and her supply ship. Their speed, which is their main advantage, does not permit close cooperation with submarines.
3. Chief, Naval Staff issued an order that vigorous anti- submarine activity is to be resumed as soon as the ice situation permits.
U 53 did not report. The order has been repeated.
Several new Gruppen are formed in preparation for the Invasion of France and the Low Countries. The III Gruppe of JG 52 is formed with Hptm. Wolf-Heinrich von Houwald as Gruppenkommandeur. JGr 101 resumes its original designation, ZG 1, and is re-equipped with Bf 110s. Hptm. Wolfgang Falck, to be known as "The Happy Falcon", of ZG 76 is made Gruppenkommandeur of I Gruppe and Major Hellmuth Reichardt is appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II Gruppe.The development of the situation in Scandinavia required the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. The part which the Navy and the Air Force will have to play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking forces.
In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the 'FALL WESERUBUNG' will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle, we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and Air Force, will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it. http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/10a.html
Anxiety as to the outcome of the Russo-Finnish conflict is growing in the Scandinavian countries. In Sweden Finland's
situation is described as increasingly serious. It is reported from German souroes in Sweden tha+. the Western Powers have lately
been exerting stronger pressure on Sweden in favor of more effective support for Finland. Great Britain is said to be threatening Sweden with economic reprisals. Further, the impression is gaining ground in Sweden that Great Britain Intends to land troops in Klrkenes in violation of Norwegian neutrality.
The danger of a large-scale Allied action in Scandinavia has come alarmingly close. Sweden will defend her territory by
force of arms, although the Government will try to avoid conflict if at all possible. The Swedes still seem to be hoping for German mediation in the Russo-Finnish conflict. On the one hand Sweden sees the danger of Russian pressure and fears that if Finland collapses the Russians will press forward behind the retreating Finns; on the other hand, however, the imminent possibility of Allied military intervention is causing the Swedish Government intense anxiety.
An unconfirmed report from Great Britain speaks of the British Government's decision not to respect the limits of neutral territorial waters if an attack on warships or merchantmen carrying contraband is in question.
Naval Staff is following the course of events in the northern area very closely and continues to hold the view that the best
solution is the maintenance of the status quo under which ore traffic proceeds in safety through Norwegian territorial waters.
However every effort must be made to prevent Great Britain from occupying the Norwegian ore ports and the Swedish ore region and thus getting a hold on the Scandinavian area.
Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff
1, Operation "Sohleswig" cannot take place before March owing to the SCHARNHORST's temporary breakdown. If "Sohleswig" lasts till 7 Maroh, minelaying cannot possibly be carried out before 9 March at the earliest. Under these circumstances Group West, after weighing up the respective advantages of the planned operations, arrived at the conclusion that the minelaying would be the more effective.
Chief, Naval Staff declined to give a decision on this subject, pi nee (?) Group West was informed of our basic views in yesterday's teletype, which denoted the battleship operation as being of greater importance. For the rest we have to await the result of today's conference between Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff (Commander Wagner) and Group West .
No news of U 53. Otherwise nothing to report.
(signed): Donitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, stated In the Storting (29 Feb. 1940) that it would be a non-neutral act to stop Norwegian shipping to Great Britain. Maintenance of trade with Great Britain was of vital importance for Norway. The conclusion of the commercial treaty with Norway was greatly endangered by the reports current about Norwegian shipping losses and the anti-German reaction caused by them. In spite of this the treaty was favorably concluded. However, there are now fresh rumors also in Norway that the Western Powers will demand from Sweden and Norway right of way f or troops to Finland . The Norwegian Foreign Ministry, now states definitely that so far the Western Powers have undertaken no diplomatic steps In Oslo or Stockholm and that no enquiries on the subject have been received ." Both countries are adhering unconditionally to their neutrality and would oppose any attempt by the Western Powers to send troops through Norway and Sweden by all the means in their power .
Report on the Fuehrer's instructions for the immediate formation of an Operations Staff for M Weseruebung , Commanding General, 21st Corps, General von Falkenhorst, is appointed head of the Operations Staff, Chiefs of Staff are appointed for the individual preparations by the three Services, (Captain Krancke for the Navy). A further order states that the forces of the Army and Air
Force engaged in "Weseruebung" shall be subordinate to the augmented 21st Corps Headquarters. The preparations required
to be made by the Navy and the forces to be provided are summarized. (Preliminary w,ork, preparations, transports, supplies, escort, coastal defense, submarine chase). This directive thus represents OKW's first order to the Navy regarding preparations for "Weseruebung".
Tromsoe has been omitted in the allocation of ports, so that six destroyers can be moved to Narvik. The Navy and Luftwaffe are to bear the brunt of the first operation. The 1st Sea Transport Unit is to be brought up later, as soon as the situation in the ports is under control. A working Staff will be formed within Operations Division, which is to commence the necessary preliminary work as quickly as possible, since the Fuehrer will possibly demand the execution of the operation at short notice.
Available forces (readiness as regards materiel, operational use, escort), embarkation, crossing, penetration into the ports, securing the ports from attack by sea, first landward defenses. Swift establishment of operational freedom for naval forces, reinforcements, supplies, escort of reinforcements, defense of the Skagerrak by means of mine barrages, coastal organization, Coastal Defense Commanders, North and South, combined command? Organization at home, plans for equipment and for exploitation of the area.
After 2 March Great Britain will stop all German deliveries of coal by sea bound for Italy and subject them to the contraband control.
Great Britain has made an offer to Italy to deliver to her the total amount of coal she is receiving from Germany and to take products of Italian heavy industry and agriculture in exchange.
This measure will have the severest repercussions on Italian war economy and is barefaced blackmail of Italy, According to the latest report from the Naval Attache, she was given the choice between delivering products of her heavy industry (arms, planes) to Great Britain in exchange for British coal and receiving no more coal at all by sea. Mussolini's rejection of the plan with respect to Germany has now been taken by Great- Britain as a pretext for the measures announced.
.Nothing to report