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Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop In Rome for conversations with Mussolini and Count Ciano.
The Russians are advancing despite strong Finnish resistance. Negotiations under Swedish mediation are now said to have
commenced officially. Russian conditions:
Cession on lease of Hangoe peninsula.
Cession of islands in the Gulf of Finland.
Cession of the Karelian Isthmus, including
the north coast of Lake Ladoga.
No concession of Petsamo.
Italy' s attitude has undergone a change insofar as she is now also calling upon Finland to submit and to accept the Russian
peace conditions
Anglo-Italian coal negotiations not yet concluded. Germany is to make an effort to increase the export of coal to Italy overland by all available means so that Italy becomes almost independent of Great Britain for coal supplies.
The French and British press demand the immediate extension of the war to Scandinavia.
The Finnish Foreign Minister Informs the Swiss Ambassador that if the Russian demands are excessive the Finnish Government
will request immediate official aid from the Western Powers. This help had been definitely assured without regard to the forcible extension of the war to the northern area.
Commander in Chief, Navy emphasizes his conviction that the occupation of Norway by Great Britain might possibly decide the war against Germany and that "Weseruebung" must therefore be regarded as urgent. Further, he informs the Fuehrer of the special difficulties which the character of the operations involves for the Navy . The return of the naval forces after the execution of the landing must be regarded as the most difficult operation of the whole "Weserubung".
Nothing to report.
Official assumption of Russo-Finnlsh peace negotiations. Prime Minister Ryti In Moscow. The Western Powers are making desperate efforts to interrupt the negotiations by sudden most pressing offers of aid to Finland. According to an official statement made by Chamberlain, the British and French Governments have informed Finland that they are ready to help her jointly and Immediately
with all the means in their power, if she requests this aid.
The reports as a whole definitely Indicate the possibility of a directly imminent large-scale action "by the Western Powers in Norway. The enemy has without doubt been making preparations for a landing in Norway and may have them finished on 11 March.
His strategic aim is the complete cuttlng-off of Germany's ore imports from Scandinavia by occupying the north Norwegian ore ports, the central Norwegian ports of Bergen and Stavanger and the northern Swedish ore region and also, by extending pressure
to Sweden, the complete cessation of further deliveries of ore from Sweden. The enemy sees no possibility of winning the war
in the European theater. He regards the extension of the war to the Scandinavian area, to cut off German ore imports, as an urgent strategic necessity. The operation must be carried out soon , for the following reasons: Finland's precarious position, which furnishes him with a pretext; the expected and feared German offensive in the west; the ice situation in the Baltic Sea and entrances to the Baltic, which is still hampering German operations at present. The striking concentration on 10/11 March of British heavy forces In Scapa, which is still greatly endangered from the air, combined with other reports received, makes a landing
operation in Norway by a Franco-British Expeditionary Corps, with the aid of the entire British Home Fleet, seem perfectly possible already in the week from 11-16 March.
U 28 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation in the main position in accordance with Operations Order No. 22.
Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group West receive the following directive (Ski. I op 287/40):
1. As defense against any British plans, submarines provided in accordance .with B.d.U. Gkdos. 0086 Chefs (Operational Order North Sea - Atlantic No.l) under 1 and 2 are to operate off the two ports (Narvik and Trond^eim) at once . U n 31 n , "43", "44",
n 65 n are to be disposed off Bergen and Stavanger for the present
2. Unseen approach and disposition, radio silence.
3. Assignment: Attack and report on possible British troop transports and warships which are about to effect landings in these ports. No operations against merchant shipping.
4. Our own operational plans can be expected to materialize at a date within the operational endurance of the boats. Supplies for the boats at both places in the north are provided in our own operation.
U 38 and U 52 have been allocated operations areas on the Norwegian coast. (see Appendix 1 to War Log).
U 31 did not return from her trial runs in the Schilling Roads. Search showed that she had sunk near Black Buoy No. 12, after an attack by an English A/C. (Details of this accident are set out in Appendix 2 to War Log). It is particularly regrettable that a boat should have been lost by enemy action in the immediate vicinity of her own base, inside our own barrage defenses. Losses of this kind should be avoidable. This is the second time that an enemy A/C has flown very low over the Schilling Roads and attacked U-boats. We must have sufficient AA defenses for the approach route on the Jade so that at least the enemy is prevented from flying low undisturbed. B.d.U. has made demands accordingly.
The conclusion of the Russo-Finnish peace negotiations is regarded as imminent. According to various reports, Norway and Sweden are exercising'strong pressure on Finland to accept the Russian conditions, although all the Scandinavian countries feel that they are very severe. In Scandinavia there is growing recognition of the fact that Great Britain's offer of aid to Finland was made only in her own interests and she intended to Include the Scandinavian countries in her plans. Furthermore, the Norwegian Foreign Minister informed our Ambassador that so far the Western Powers had made no official demand regarding right of way through Norway. 0ne never knows, however, what Great Britain will be so foolish as to do next. The Finnish Government's decision to commence negotiations for peace with Moscow is said to have been reached after the Swedish refusal to allow foreign troop transports to pass. Daladier made a statement in the Chamber of Deputies about French aid for Finland. From the beginning of December to date Prance has sent 145 planes, 496 guns, 5,000 machine guns and a large quantity of ammunition. France is also ready to send men. The decision about intervention was taken on 5 Feb. French troops of the Expeditionary Corps have been assembled for embarkation since 26 Feb. A considerable number of ships has been retained in two large ports on the Channel and Atlantic coasts and is ready to sail, but so far no direct official appeal has been made by Finland to France or Great Britain. They are still awaiting this. This appeal from Finland is necessary, because the Swedish and Norwegian Governments are opposing the passage of Allied troops through their territories with all their power. An appeal from Finland would have immediate effects. The reports received by Naval Staff and present suppositions about the plans of the Western Powers are fully confirmed by Daladier's statement. We must now definitely expect that:
1. When there is an ostensible pretext for their action, the Western Powers have definitely decided to violate Norwegian neutrality and land troops in Norwegian ports.
2. Expeditionary troops are already in readiness to embark in Great Britain and France and preliminary work for the landing is actually finished, including the readiness of the British naval forces necessary to protect the crossing.
Conference on the Situation with Chief a Naval Staff
Special Items
I. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on state of preparedness for "Weseruebung":
a) Ice conditions in the Baltic still do not permit any movement of naval forces or of the steamers required for the sea transport units.
b) The following are now ready for action according to a report from Commanding Admiral, West:
1. In the North Sea : GNEISENAU, SCHARNHORST, HIPPER, KARLSRUHE, BREMSE, 10 destroyers, 4 boats of the 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.
2. In the Baltic : (Passsage to ports of departure dependent, however, on the ice situation) LUTZOW, KOLN, EMDEN, KOENIGSBERG, TSINGTAU.
3. Probable time required by vessels still frozen- in in the Baltic after their arrival in the North Sea: CARL PETERS, DIETER VON ROEDER, ERICH G1ESE, HERMAN KTJENNE, HANS LUEDEMANN, KONDOR, ALBATROS - 5 days each, depending on the result of the trial runs. 6 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla - 3 days. 4 boats of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla - 2 days.
4. Commanding Admiral, West reckons from previous experience that not more than ten destroyers will be in full operational readiness for "Weseruebung" from 20 March and also expects breakdowns through engine trouble on a long run at high speeds.
Naval Staff cannot completely concur with this lamentably low estimate regarding the destroyers, since if "Weseruebung" proceeds normally the speeds required from the destroyers will on no account make excessive claims on them. If there are breakdowns, only limitations of speed and not total breakdowns are to be reckoned with; this will, of course, render the execution of "Weserubung" to schedule more difficult, but will not have a decisively prejudicial effect.
II. The subject of Fleet forces remaining for a long period in the northern area Is discussed in a conversation between General Keitel and Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. In a conversation with the Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering urged that naval forces be left In the ports until the Air Force is in a position to use strong forces to control the sea area to be traversed on the return trip, so that the risk of the return passage would be greatly lessened. Naval Staff must on principle decline to accept other than naval strategic and operational principles for the return trip of the naval forces. Support for the return trip from the strongest possible formations of the Air Force is naturally most desirable and necessary; it would, however, be incorrect to rely on such support being definitely available, since the weather and unforeseen difficulties and incidents might make Air Force operations doubtful just when they are urgently required to support the naval forces.
Air Force General Staff is again consulted on this subject and the number of air forces actually available in the northern area ascertained. Their strength - according to information available to date 3 squadrons on W-Day and 3 bomber groups and 1 Stuka group to be moved up later - must be described as hardly adequate in view of the extent of the assignment, and it still seems doubtful whether large-scale operations by these air forces will be possible at all in view of operation n Gelb n which is to follow.
U 32 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation. (Operations Order No. 26). This minefield closes the gap left beside the field laid by U 30 and is therefore likely to produce good results.
U-29 entered port. She carried out her minelaying operation (Operations Order No. 22) very well, and in addition sank by torpedo:
1) Darkened steamer about 5,000 tons
2) S.S. "Pacific Reliance" 6,717 tons
3) S.S. "San Florentino" 12,842 tons
24,559 tons
The Fuehrer has ordered that preparations for "Weseruebung" are not to be carried out with extreme haste since the situation has altered because of the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish peace, but are to be accomplished quietly with special regard to secrecy.
Permission is granted, as requested by Group West, to Exchange the EMDEN for the KOENIGSBERG, since the war readiness of the EMDEN is only limited because of the cadets' state of training.
A directive is issued to the Groups (see "Weseruebung" file) on procedure during the outward trip and before "Wesertlme" (evasive movements if there are breakdowns and limitations of speed) as well as on distribution of destroyers for "Nienburg" and "Detmold".
Chief, Naval Staff again states the urgent necessity of the naval forces 1 speedy return after the "Weseruebung" landing in connection with the question of Air Force protection for the fleet.
4. The report of the committee investigating the events during the night of 22 Feb. leads Naval Staff to the conviction that the loss of the two destroyers MAX SCHULTZ and LEBERECHT MAASS was caused solely by bombs from our plane 1 HJM of the 4th Group of the 26th Bomber Wing. Inferences have been drawn from the unfortunate loss of the two destroyers.
Radio intelligence again succeeded in ascertaining the new disposition of British submarines by deciphering British radio messages and in making an extremely striking and important discovery: as opposed to former submarine disposition in the North Sea, on 13 March 15 British submarines in all, i.e. twice to three times as many boats as before, are in waiting position or approaching the Skagerrak area and operating north and northeast of our declared area and in the inner Heligoland Bight. Two more submarines are proceeding to the northeast from Rosyth. All the submarines at present available for the North Sea have therefore obviously gone
into action. The reason for this massed submarine operation can be seen only in the following possibilities, in connection with other information and enemy measures
1. This Is either a flank protection for the large-scale landing in Norway planned by the enemy, as a defense against German counter-attacks,
2. or the enemy is aware that Germany is making some sort of preparations and fears a German operation against the Norwegian area.
In the first case, this must be evaluated as a "hang fire" measure, for since peace has now been concluded between Russia and Finland Immediate action can hardly be expected from the enemy* We must wait and see whether the Admiralty will now recall the boats, some of which are still outward bound.
U 43 and U 44 sailed in accordance with Operations Order North Sea/Atlantic No. 1
"This is the most awful document I have ever had to sign. May the hand wither which is forced to sign such a paper."
Finns lose 26,662 killed and 41,692 wounded. Civilian casualties are 892 dead and 1,856 wounded. 65 seamen die in the Finnish merchant fleet. Soviet losses are 126,875 dead and 264,908 wounded, plus unknown numbers killed by NKVD behind Soviet lines and hospitalized with frostbite and other illnesses. The Finns kept remarkable records of their casualties, so these numbers are reliable. USSR on the other hand had no reliable records, so their casualty figure are at best SWAG (scientific wild-assed guess). In Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs he states that 1.5 million Red soldiers went into Finland and only half a million came out. Neither of these figures is correct and the answer is somewhere in the middle. The Gulf of Finland islands and the lands in Karelia (Isthmus and areas surrounding Lake Ladoga) and at Salla, given up by Finland in 1940, continue to be Soviet territory to this day. However, USSR formally renounced its lease on the Hanko Peninsula in the Paris peace treaty of 1947. The disparity in losses suggests to Allied and Axis observers that the effects of Stalin's officer purges have still not been overcome. This impression of inefficiency contributes to Hitler's decision to invade the USSR and makes the British and Americans a little reluctant to send supplies to the Soviets when the Germans do invade because they expect that the Germans will win quickly."A severe peace [has been concluded] which cedes Russia nearly all the battlefields we have drenched with our blood... The deeds you have accomplished will shine for centuries in the pages of our history."
"Whether they [the Germans] have some positive plan of their own [for Norway]… I cannot tell. It would seem to me astonishing if they have not".
The conclusion of the Russo-Flnnish peace is still the center of political events and world interest. Especially depressing impression in France , where Daladier»s policy has been sharply attacked and his position has been greatly shaken by the latest events.
Speaking on the radio the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koth, repudiated Daladier's assertion that Norway refused permission for troops to pass through. An official request was not made to Norway until late on the evening of 12 March when the peace treaty
had already been signed in Moscow. Koth also rejected reproaches that Norway was transgressing her neutrality In favor of Germany.
After her defeat, Finland was to find herself, friendless, isolated and vulnerable....On 12 March the Finnish Government asked Norway and Sweden whether their Governments would be prepared to investigate the possibility of establishing a defensive alliance of the three Nordic countries. Sweden and Norway have declared their fundamental readiness. (Such an alliance will probably come up against strong Russian resistance and break down under it. )
This decision was to have long reaching and important effects. Effectively keeping one oiler in reserve meant it was out of position and unable to assist at exactly the time she was needed.Conference on "Weserubung " :
Fuel supplies for the forces in the northern area seem to be assured by the prompt transfer of two tankers (JAN WELLEM, KATTEGAT) to n Nienburg w with 15,300 tons of fuel, since even when all ten destroyers have filled up completely there is
still two-thirds of the whole left for the battle- ships. Another tanker is to be transferred to "Detmold* for the HIPPER and four destroyers. There will also be an ample surplus here for possible battleship refuelling.
The question of putting the supply ship DITHMARSCKEN into service as a further supply vessel and as a transport for "Weseruebung" is closely connected with Naval Staff's plans for warfare in the Atlantic which, in Naval Staff's view, should be kept in mlnd in spite of "Weseruebung". The DITHMARSCKEN is therefore principally scheduled as a reserve supply ship for the LUTZOW, and if the necessity arises will still be available as a transport for "Weserubung "
(Note 30m is refering to the water depth).Preliminary regulations have been framed for the AA protection of all U-boats entering and leaving port and on trials. A minesweeper or patrol vessel will accompany every U-boat in the area which is particularly dangerous (outside the protection of
Wilhelmshaven as far as the 30 meter line).
Radio monitoring intercepts two very important items, which permit conclusions regarding British preparations for the occupation of Norway or the despatch of troops for Finland:
1. The British submarine disposition in the North Sea off the Skagerrak and in the Heligoland Bight is dispersed. On 15 March some of the boats are again on return passage to their ports of departure. It may be concluded from this discovery that the
operations planned have been postponed because of the unexpected Finnish peace.
2. Further, the deciphering service succeeds in partially deciphering an order about "Plsn R 3" (see radiogram War Diary, Part B, V, 122) sent at 1437 on 14 March from the Admiralty to Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, Station Commanders, Portsmouth, Scapa, Plymouth, Nore and Clyde, also to the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, from which the following is deduced:
a) The measures for troop embarkations on a large scale have been taken and completed. The transports are ready and organized. Some of the troops have embarked, the others are ready to embark. The transports are obviously to proceed northwards from west coast Channel ports.
b) The transports are assigned new alerts (48 hours, 96 hours, 80 hours) in 8 transitional order which is probably in force until the political situation is clarified. The movements of the cruiser GALA'TTSA (sic) with Commander, 2nd Cruiser Squadron and of the cruiser AURORA are connected with the transports. Both messages indicate postponement of British measures for the present.
No complete abandonment of the Norway operation, the basic plans for which can no longer be doubted, can be detected
from the messages. German deliberations and preparations for operations must take this fact into account.
U 41 and U 53 declared missing with effect from 15.3.
"Finland, as well as the whole of Western civilization, is still in the greatest danger, and no one can say what tomorrow may bring. We believe that by choosing peace we have acted in the best way for the moment."
Rumors of a Government crisis in France and Great Britain, as the result of violent criticism of previous inactive warfare, differences of opinion between Chamberlain and Churchill and also between Daladier and Reynaud. The Chamberlain Government is reproached with inactivity and lack of initiative.
The 10th Air Corps carried out the attack on Scapa that has been planned for several days. After weather reconnaissance there
was an offensive sortie against the Orkneys, carried out by
18 Ju 88 f s and 16 He 111*3 (5 planes broke off the assignment
prematurely because of technical trouble) .
The Fleet units lying in Scapa were attacked between 1950 and 2010, the airfields at Kirkwall, Stromness and Earthouse
between 2000 and 2040.
Results as per Air Force reports ;
2 hits on a battleship
1 hit on a battleship or battle cruiser
1 hit on a battle cruiser
1 hit on a heavy cruiser
2 bombs dropped in the immediate vicinity of further battleships, so that damage is assumed.
For operation and orders for the Atlantic boats, except U 28 and U 32, which are still on their way back, see Appendix 1 to B.d.U.'s War Log.
The Pan-American President has made a protest to the British Government on behalf of the 21 American republics regarding
the violation of the American neutrality zone in connection with the scuttling of the German steamer WAKAMA on 12 Feb.
Radio monitoring intercepts various convoy movements.
A British press report maintains that neutrals, especially Norwegian and even Italian steamers, are now joining British
convoys to an increasing extent.
France :
French vessels are informed that there was a German submarine about 25 miles north of Land's End at 1300. French naval
circles are saying that there is proof of the sinking of two German submarines during the past few days. Report is untrue.
Reconnaissance by the 10th Air Corps sighted two submarines off the British coast, and off the Firth of Forth one cruiser
(probably the EFFINGHAM) and one minelayer of about 4,000 tons. According to an agent's report, British naval vessels are
patrolling on the route Vardoe-Bear Island-Iceland.
Nothing to report