Underappreciated Aircraft of WWII

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Re: Mohawk v Hurricane record in Burma, on the details I counted in "Air War Burma" collision in combat, crashlanding, belly landing, etc on both sides as loss (as I do as standard). I just double checked it, 8 Type 1's (one a 'force land' but pilot died of wounds, I infer probable w/o), v. 7 Mohawks (one of which might have been an operational loss) in around 10 encounters.

But has anyone else studied statistics? Assume my counts are correct for the moment. Assume the number of kills and losses for both Mohawk and Hurricane v Type 1 is a flip of a fair coin, on average 1 heads (a kill) for every tails (a loss). 8 heads, 7 tails in 15 flips is then, obviously, quite a likely outcome if the underlying true probability is 1:1. But 12 heads and 55 tails in 67 flips OTOH is almost impossible to achieve by chance if the underlying probability is really 1:1, .000005%. The chance of even 24 or less heads (43 or more tails) in 67 flips, is only 1.3%, if the underlying probability is 1:1

By the same token if the real 'coin' is 4 times more likely to come up tails, ie 20% likely to come up heads, 12 and 55 is a pretty likely outcome, but 8 or more heads in 15 flips is only .05% likely.

So we can reject at a high level of confidence that the Hurricane and Mohawk chances of success were really the same but statistical noise, per se, made them appear that different. Even in that small a sample the difference is too big to be explained by statistical noise. OTOH we can't (and I didn't) say the Mohawk was 4 times as effective, because *some* of the difference could be explained by statistical noise. Systematic differences in the circumstances of Hurricane v Mohawk combats, not statistical noise per se, could explain the difference if it was the case, but I just don't see that in the book: it was basically similar operations v the same Japanese fighter units at the same time. Or, the Mowhawk pilots might have been better (though from the same AF, same time), etc... but it seems at that point we're grasping for straws to avoid the simplest conclusion from those results: the Hawk was at least as effective a fighter as the Hurricane. And that's what the larger sample in BoF also indicates v Bf109E (23:38 for Hawk, 74:151 for Hurricane, "Battle of France Then and Now"), but it's not AFAIK the general reputation of the Hawk.

Joe
 
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OTOH we can't (and I didn't) say the Mohawk was 4 times as effective...the Hawk was at least as effective a fighter as the Hurricane. And that's what the larger sample in BoF also indicates v Bf109E (23:38 for Hawk, 74:151 for Hurricane, "Battle of France Then and Now"), but it's not AFAIK the general reputation of the Hawk

Joe,

I entirely agree with the statements I've selected from your above posting. I thought you were inferring that the Mohawk was that much more effective than the Hurricane. I was obviously mistaken. Like you, I believe the general reputation of the Mohawk is poorer than the aircraft deserves.

Cheers,
Mark
 
One thing also worth throwing into the Mohawk and Hurricane mix was the relative positions of the airfields. The Mohawks were at Agartala whereas a number of Hurricane squadrons were forward-deployed to Chittagong. Don't know what impact that has on the figures but up-threat is typcially a more dangerous place to be.
 
Shore's point was that while the plane was very good, it was not a super-plane and that the pilots were just as much the reason for success as the machine (along with a superior operational plan). It was the same for the Germans during Barbarossa. Shores considered the British to be somewhat better off than the Dutch given they had a smattering of experirenced pilots however an important cavet to it was that this exp could in some cases hurt them as they were used to having a turning edge over their opponents. I'm not sure i'd agree that their Buffalos were "worse" than the Dutch B-339's. They were more weighted down but this was a facet much appreciated and commented on by more than a few Commonwealth pilots. Armor saves lives.

I concur with what you say about the pilots and the Japanese planning. The engines of the RAF Buffalos were not working right. In a climb they overheated so fast that a full power climb was not possible and the actual climb rate was at least twice of the one on paper. The Dutch planes had engines that worked like they were supposed to.
 
OK, I give up, how was a German MG/ff cannon better than a Japanese type 99-1 cannon?


And the fact that no other fighter at the time could have performed the mission at all is ignored completely.

Ok, it was the ammo actually. The so-called Minengeschoss increased the muzzle velocity from to 700 m/s or so. The cannons of early Zeros had a lower muzzle velocity. Apparently so low even the very skilled IJN pilots found it hard to hit another plane.(see "Shattered Sword")
 
I believe that the A6M at Midway was handicapped by only 60 rounds per cannon, not by inability to hit with the cannon, according to "Shattered Sword" In the A6M, the Japanese sacrifised armor and SS tanks for range, speed, climb and maneuverability. The late 1940, 1941 A6M had similar armament to the 109 and most "experts" rate it as one of the best fighters in the world at that time. The fact that it could do what it did off a carrier was a surprise to the world and enabled the IJN to accomplish almost unbelievable feats. A well handled Zeke, with two 50 cals, two 20 mms, more ammo, armored and with protected tanks, was still a formidable adversary in 1944-45. Quite a feat for a flimsy contraption.
 
thats correct. (60 rounds per cannon) The A6M had to be designed as light as possible due to the limitation at the time on engine power (950hp) To be fair too....at the time (1940), most other contemporary fighter designs also did not have armor or self sealers, including the F4F. Ironically, the carrier based F4F would go into it's first battle equipped with makeshift boiler plate as "armor" due to the upgrade kits not yet being installed!

IIRC, the Zero's designer, Jiro Horikoshi wrote in his book "Zero!" that it should be assumed anyway that any fighter deployed would have at most, a two year window where it would operate competetively. He further pointed out that ideally, one should be working on a sucessor design even as the current fighter design deploys for mainline service. The state of the Japanese air industry however retarded this effort and the Zero ended up fighting well past it's prime.

On Midway, I've always suspected that part of the reason why Thach scored such a great success with his 3 surviving wingmates was that at the time the Zeros on CAP had mostly or entirely exhausted their cannon ammo on the attacking bombers.
 
One should not confuse a bad design with bad details. Or confuse bad design with customer interference.

later Zeros increase ammo capacity for the cannon with larger drums and then with a belt feed. later versions also had thicker wing skins for increased dive speeds.
Neither the thicker wing skins or the larger drum require much of a technological or design break through.
The Later model engine provided enough power for the summer of 1942.
Customer refused the suggestion of changing to the Kinsei engine. While shortening the range this engine might have allowed for either higher performance or the same performance (except for turning) with increased protection. Since a later version of the engine was fitted in 1945 it shouldn't have been impossible to fit an earlier 1300hp version earlier in the war.
Nakajima's inability to increase power of the Sakae engine in a timely fashion is one of the reasons the Zero fell behind so quickly.
 
One thing also worth throwing into the Mohawk and Hurricane mix was the relative positions of the airfields. The Mohawks were at Agartala whereas a number of Hurricane squadrons were forward-deployed to Chittagong. Don't know what impact that has on the figures but up-threat is typcially a more dangerous place to be.

Also, I think the Mohawk ended up in roles that led it to air combat less often. For instance, I don't think the Mohawks got bomber escort jobs, or were specifically put in the interceptor role. More ground interdiction. I could be wrong, but I think that was the gyst of what I read in "Bloody Shambles" (great series, btw).
 
That was my thought, too, Tim but I could be wrong. The Mohawk fleet was one-sixth to one-third of the Hurricane force (depending on when you look at the ORBAT) and they were based further to the rear, so even if used in interception roles they had more time to climb to height than the forward-deployed Hurricanes. I still think statistical analysis is problematic because of the tactical variables that make such a huge difference on the outcome of combat.
 
Again I just don't see that difference in Mohawk v Hurricane ops in 1943 in Burma. Most missions of both a/c were interceptions of escorted bombers or patrols over frontlines...and anyway the usual story (for example to explain away poor performance of Spitfire v Zero at Darwin) is to say inteception of escorted bombers is the tough mission, not escorting your own bombers! Now that seems to be changing to explain Hurricane v Mohawk. With all due respect and all in good fun guys, the bias to find the 'silver lining' for Brit planes can get kind of obvious at times. :)

In their most disastrous combat in the PTO, Hurricanes were caught at low altitude in the first raid on Ceylon by Japanese carrier planes in April *1942*, and lost IIRC 19 while shooting down 1 Zero. But here we're talking about engagements in Burma v the Japanese Army in*1943*, and none of those combats involved Hurricanes just taking off ambushed by Japanese a/c. The Hurricane interceptions of Japanese Army and Navy a/c raids v. Calcutta December 5 1943 are included in the numbers I gave (the kills by Type 1's are that is, there were also 3 Hurricane kills by Zeroes without loss which aren't included) but the rest are in operations over the front in Burma not really so different than Mohawk operations.

And for further context on Burma1943, Hurricane 12:55 v Type1, Mohawk 8:7, USAAF P-40's in 1943 v Burma/Thailand based Type 1's (though some of the P40's were based in southern China) was 21:7*. That of the P-51A and P-38 in 1943 in Burma OTOH was a surpisingly mediocre 6+ kills of Japanese fighters (there could be a few missing Japanese losses of Type 2 and Type 2 two seat units, 'Tojo' and 'Nick', in this case, which is not true in the other cases) for 8 P-51A and 2 P-38 losses most or all to air combat. Those were long range escorts of B-24's v Rangoon in November 1943, outnumbered by the interceptors and far from home if any trouble. But the Hurricane is still the outlier and again I think it's grasping at straws to try to explain that by different mission profile than Mohawk, wasn't that different.

*1942 record of Hurricane v Type 1 was 7:26, 1942 record of (AVG) P-40's was 11:3; most AVG fighter opponents were Type 97's of course, but the Type 1's were mainly of the 64th Regiment, the unit most commonly met in Burma by all the a/c discussed above throughout 1942 and 1943, though along with others.

Joe
 
I read Mohawks over Burma and what surprised me was the actual lack of air to air combat, IIRC most of their work was interdicting barges and ground transportation . The Mohawks were in rough shaope for lack of spares and one comment intrigued me was the use of a wobble pump was constantly req'd over FL200
 
I feel that had the British employed the Mohawk to the degree they did the Hurricane, it's losses probably would have been comprable over time given it's lack of armor though this was somewhat compensated for by the radial engine. Veteran Ki-43 drivers aimed for the radiators of Hurricanes knowing that a coolant leak would most likely result in the loss of the plane.
 
The RAF used Hawks as "regular" fighters from mid-42 onwards, sometime in 43 the Hurricanes took over as the main fighter and the Hawks were used as fighter-bombers, with emphasis on bombers. Furthermore both sides stopped air raids during the monsoon periode and last but not least the RAF had rather few bases in the eastern parts of India early in the war. The Hurricane was probably closer to the action in larger numbers. Speaking of action, the Brits spend the rest of 42 licking their wounds, the first limited ground offensive was conducted sometime in 43. Maybe the Hawks saw less action for these reasons?
 
Regarding "boiler plate" for armor in F4Fs, they also had SS tanks that polluted the gasoline and sometimes stopped up fuel lines and the pilot's survival kit sometimes included meat cleavers and kitchen knives from the ship's galley. In spite of that, based on what I have read online here and based on "The First Team" the F4Fs coped much better with the IJN's fighters than did the other allied fighters in the 1942 time frame.
 
Regarding "boiler plate" for armor in F4Fs, they also had SS tanks that polluted the gasoline and sometimes stopped up fuel lines and the pilot's survival kit sometimes included meat cleavers and kitchen knives from the ship's galley. In spite of that, based on what I have read online here and based on "The First Team" the F4Fs coped much better with the IJN's fighters than did the other allied fighters in the 1942 time frame.

Couldn't agree more ren. Got no problem with a fighter that has a 6.9:1 kill ratio, regardless of the opposition!

TO
 
With all due respect and all in good fun guys, the bias to find the 'silver lining' for Brit planes can get kind of obvious at times.

Joe,

My problem is we can't seem to pin a reason on WHY performance of the Hurricane was so bad (assuming your figures are correct). Given that the Hurricane was at least as fast and manoeuverable as the Mohawk, why did it apparently do so badly? Was it lack of armament punch which resulted in many Japanese aircraft escaping damaged but not destroyed? Can it all be attributed to vulnerability of the engine cooling system? Was it a fundamental structural issue? If your stats are correct, then there has to be some underlying reason for the huge discrepancy. Relative aircraft performance (Hurri vs Mohawk vs P-40) doesn't provide the answer because none were particularly stellar performers by 1942 standards. So what was it? If we could identify the cause, we'd probably negate much of the debate.

KR
Mark
 

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