Underappreciated Aircraft of WWII

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Regarding "boiler plate" for armor in F4Fs, they also had SS tanks that polluted the gasoline and sometimes stopped up fuel lines and the pilot's survival kit sometimes included meat cleavers and kitchen knives from the ship's galley. In spite of that, based on what I have read online here and based on "The First Team" the F4Fs coped much better with the IJN's fighters than did the other allied fighters in the 1942 time frame.

It helped that they wadded in after the first full round of fighting (some of the feedback did filter to them), and that their engagement level in 42 was limited. Most importantly though, thx mainly to their squadron leaders (like Thach) who emphasised gunnery, they were a well trained bunch.
 
Joe,

My problem is we can't seem to pin a reason on WHY performance of the Hurricane was so bad (assuming your figures are correct). Given that the Hurricane was at least as fast and manoeuverable as the Mohawk, why did it apparently do so badly?
KR
Mark

It was a bit of a mystery, so much so that the RAF itself investgated the matter. They sent Wg Cmdr Paul Richey to India and he filed a pretty damning report in May of 43. In his view the primary culprit was improper tactics. He saw no technical reason why similar results could not be produced in Hurricanes that were being seen in other similar aircraft of the time (like the P40). His report though was hotly disputed by local RAF chiefs who basically took a "thank you very much, but we bloody well know how to fly and fight" stance.

Personally, I think Richey was closer to the mark than those disgruntled commanders will admit. The Hurricane could be effective and was at times. In Greece for example prior to the Crete phase The Hurricane portion of the RAF was holding 4.6:1 edge over the 109E(3 lost in trade for 14 x 109). By the end of the whole campaign their lead had shrunk down to 1.5:1, (12 for 18 )

Initially, the Hurr's were competetive against the Luft in North Africa maintaining almost 1:1 but this fell off as time went by. Tactics and experience played a large part here as well, followed later by mission profile. Hurricanes got majorly spanked over Malta but they were fighting a small but very elite Staffel that largely picked and chose when they fought using aggressive Freie Jagd tactics while initially the Hurricane pilots were a gaggle of mostly inexperienced pilots (7/JG26 scored an amazing 35:0 in a five month deployment period at the beginning of 41). The problem became such that a local C/O officially requested that more experienced ones be sent vs. the green drafts they were getting. The RAF system seemed to be more willing to throw them raw. Same plane....some very disparate results.

It was notable that even Spit pilots had problems with the 43 despite the tech superiority of their mounts, an aspect not readily apparant in the "numbers" but described in the pages of BS. (21 traded for 38 kills)
 
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I agree that P-36/Hawk 75A is underrated, it did good service in Europe, being the most effective fighter of French AF in 1939-40, did very well in Finnish AF in 41-42 after which it became progressively more handicapped against new Soviet fighters and Airacobras but could still survive thanks to it very good horizontal manoeuvrability and in Burma could hold its own against Ki-43s, which was in fact a dangerous opponent, another underrated fighter.

On Hawk 75A vs Hurricane, Now its odd that RAF used Hurri as escort fighter instead of longer ranged Hawk, maybe Hawk was too slow, Finns had that problem when Hawks escorted high flying Blenheim photo recon planes. But Hawk 75A-4/Mohawk IV was faster than Finnish AF Hawks, especially at higher altitudes.

Finns thought that Hawk was clearly better fighter than Hurricane Mk I, but Finns used 87 oct fuel, but RAE report from April 1940 concluded that "In a dogfight at 250mph the Curtiss (read Hawk 75A) is superior to the Spitfire…" Also Hawk's aileron control was better than that of Spitfire, especially at higher speeds.

Juha
 
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I tend to agreed that the Hurricane and Wildcat were comparable, I don't believe there was much to choose between in quality of aircrew but I do wonder if the Senior RAF staff were fighting a different war then the one they had . IMHO I feel the RAF tactics must have been flawed . I can't back this up with stats as some can but age and a 45 yr interest gotta count for something :lol:
 
It was a bit of a mystery, so much so that the RAF itself investgated the matter. They sent Wg Cmdr Paul Richey to India and he filed a pretty damning report in May of 43. In his view the primary culprit was improper tactics. He saw no technical reason why similar results could not be produced in Hurricanes that were being seen in other similar aircraft of the time (like the P40). His report though was hotly disputed by local RAF chiefs who basically took a "thank you very much, but we bloody well know how to fly and fight" stance.

It certainly could not have been firepower as the Hurricane II had twice the number of machine guns, neither speed. The Hurricane II was faster and had a better supercharger. I also exclude the vulnerability of the engine cooling system as an explanatio, after all the Hurricane was a big success as a fighter-bomber.

This raises one question however: Why were the RAF Hawk suadrons doing so much better than the Hurricane squadrons from the very same RAF? Isn´t everybody supposed to train and fight alike? Well, at least everybody in one theater of operations.
 
Nikademus, I agree with your conclusion with the exception that it was not Thach or Flatley or any other squadron commander but rather the USN that insisted on pilots being trained to a very high standard with a lot of emphasis on gunnery, including full deflection shooting. This issue has been debated ad infinitum on this forum but I believe that the pilots trained by the USN prior to Pearl harbor were as well trained as any in the world. After the war began for the US, the training syllabus was streamlined for the USN but they still had superior training before being sent into combat. That may very well explain some of the success of the Wildcat against the Japanese. The tactics devised by USN and Marine commanders like Jimmy Thach also played a major role. Actually, from what I have read, tactics and training under Claire Chennault may have accounted for much of the success of the AVG during the period January, 1942 to July, 1942.
 
Nikademus, I agree with your conclusion with the exception that it was not Thach or Flatley or any other squadron commander but rather the USN that insisted on pilots being trained to a very high standard with a lot of emphasis on gunnery, including full deflection shooting. This issue has been debated ad infinitum on this forum but I believe that the pilots trained by the USN prior to Pearl harbor were as well trained as any in the world. After the war began for the US, the training syllabus was streamlined for the USN but they still had superior training before being sent into combat. That may very well explain some of the success of the Wildcat against the Japanese. The tactics devised by USN and Marine commanders like Jimmy Thach also played a major role. Actually, from what I have read, tactics and training under Claire Chennault may have accounted for much of the success of the AVG during the period January, 1942 to July, 1942.
once again I dispute the indvidual skills of USN pilots being better then any one elses this crap about superior gunnery skills slays me
 
I didn't include tactics in my last post because, logically, the same tactics ought to have been employed across the Command. That said, I believe RAF squadron commanders were afforded a fair degree of latitude in how they organised and trained their units. Photos of Buffalos flying over Singapore show they were still using 3-aircraft vic formations in late 1941 - and these were squadrons led by officers with extensive Battle of Britain experience. By late 1941, close-formation vics had largely been replaced by the battle pair in virtually all other operational theatres. Perhaps leadership, training and tactics at the unit level do form part of the answer but it still doesn't seem sufficient for me - there would have to be a consistent run of good leaders and tacticians for the 2 Mohawk units and an even worse run of poor leaders and tacticians within the Hurrican force for this single issue to have primacy, and that seems just too far removed from the realms of probability.
 
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Nikademus, I agree with your conclusion with the exception that it was not Thach or Flatley or any other squadron commander but rather the USN that insisted on pilots being trained to a very high standard with a lot of emphasis on gunnery, including full deflection shooting. 1942.

Hi,

The situation described in Lundstrom did not come about till late 1942 whereby Deflection shooting received emphasis in the Training Command. Prior to that, DS and enhanced gunnery training was taught at the operational unit level as headed by C/O's such as Thatch.
 
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I

This raises one question however: Why were the RAF Hawk suadrons doing so much better than the Hurricane squadrons from the very same RAF? Isn´t everybody supposed to train and fight alike? Well, at least everybody in one theater of operations.

Given that a mere two RAF squadrons flew the Mohawk in Burma, 5 and 155 squadron that they scored closer to a 1:1 situation in their limited battles, to me does not denote better performance by default. The overall ratio for Hurricanes in Burma is poor for the entire campaign but does not exclude instances of better tactical exchanges.

for example on 11/20/42 155 squadron Mohawks got the bounce on some 64th Sentai Ki-43's while escorting a Blenheim strike on Akyab. The Ki-43's were at the time providing top cover for a convoy and had attempted to attack the bombers. The 155 escort attacked them from above while they were focused on the bombers and shot down one of the Ki-43's. In return however the Ki-43's shot down two of the Mohawks. Overall I'm showing only 14 Mohawks in total lost in Burma. Compared to the 198 Hurricanes lost, or the 80 Spitfire, that indicates a very light level of engagement in comparison when taking into account the entire Burma campaign. As such I would not draw any long ranging conclusions regarding comparisons of effectiveness.
 
The Dutch planes had engines that worked like they were supposed to.
Nope, the B-339C's had G-105A engines, just like the British, they were left-overs from an order for Dorniers. The B-339D had second hand G-205A engines of 1200hp, taken from TWA a/c. They were old and had fuel probems at altitude. The B-339-23 had R-1280-G2 engines, 1000 hp, which were old KLM DC3 engines. The B-339-23 was seriously underpowered, the B-339C in a lesser degree as well. The B-339D had the right horsepowers but was unreliable.
 
Different roles for the Mohawk vs Hurricane should not affect the claim/loss ratio, just the number of aerial combats per sortie. Hurricanes might have flown a greater ratio of escort/interception missions, but they did fighter bomber work as well.

Johnnie Johnson was surprised when he took over 144 Wing to find that they were still flying in the 3 plane vic, and they were pretty reluctant to try his four plane formation. This was in March of 1943!

Heres an interesting post about the Burma Mohawks: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/p36-mohawks-vs-jaf-2922.html
 
Again, statistics may provide a way of comparing figures but it doesn't tell us why things happened. An excellent aircraft flown by well-trained pilots will perform better than a mediocre aircraft flown by inexperienced pilots. However, life is more complex. You get inexperienced pilots in excellent aircraft (eg the Zero in 1943-44), you get excellent aircraft with excellent pilots being overwhelmed by other factors (eg Me262 in 1944-45). You also get mediocre aircraft doing very well when flown by experienced pilots (eg the Finns and their Buffalos). The challenge for the topic we're currently debating in this thread, the relative performance of the Mohawk and Hurricane, definitely falls into the complex category because, as has been pointed out by Joe, the pilot factor should have been a constant. Given that the 2 aircraft had similar aerodynamic performance, indeed the Hurricane probably had the edge in speed and manoeuverability, we need to determine why the Mohawk had such a better kill/loss ratio than the Hurricane.
 
Hello Buffnut
Quote:" indeed the Hurricane probably had the edge in … manoeuverability"

On what you based your claim? Finns definitely thought that Hawk 75A-1 was better dogfighter than Hurricane Mk I. British (RAE) concluded that Hawk 75A-1 was better dogfighter than Spitfire Mk I. French Hawk 75As did better against Bf 109Es than RAF Hurricane Mk Is during the Battle of France in 1940 and then we have Burma where, even if Mohawk IVs participated rather few combats against Type 1, Mohawks did better than Hurricanes against Oscars. Hurricane was faster but there were most probably some areas where Hawk was better otherwise it is difficult to explain why Hawk did constantly better than Hurricane.

Juha
 
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i don't think that this is statistically true, JoeB explain this in 61st post

The 'statistical set' so to speak, is too small in Burma in regards to the Mohawk. The limited engagement gave a 1.5:1 edge to the Ki-43 over the Mohawks but expanded out, it might have been radically different. Its speculation at that point. Comparing the two planes vs. their primary opponent type, I don't see them performing radically different if pilot exp and tactics remain the same. The Hurricane's technical advantages in speed would be impacted signifigantly by how the plane was used in combat while the firepower edge is somewhat less important vs. the lightly built Ki-43 of which the Mohawk could bring down easier than say vs. a tougher opponent.

The Sitzkrieg period is interesting but not suprising to me. Overall i don't think there was much difference to choose betweenst the three. The ratios are fairly close for all of them except in the case of the D. The British in the pre-Blitzkrieg period only entered combat near the end and suffered a couple of bad bounces which gave the Germans an edge in the ratio.

losses (x/y)
H-75A:109D
(2:15)
H-75A:109E
13:15
Hurricane:109
(13:7)

For giggles,

MS-406:109D
4:3
MS-406:109E
24:10

So were French fighter pilots better trained? use better tactics or simply more aggressive? Shores considered the H-75A to be clearly superior to the 109D and a match for the 109E prior to it being armed with cannon. The Hurricanes present at the time were early Hurricanes of lesser performance vs. later models. A newer model Hurricane tested against a captured 109E showed the Hurr to have a Mnvr edge and a speed edge at near ground level. Above that the 109E captured the edge in speed. Another interesting comment Shores made was that the early experiences against these early model 109's gave the Western Allies a bit of a false sense of security vs. the 109, a security which would be rudely shattered later in the war (post France)

I see this issue as similar to the differing experiences of Commonwealth pilots using export P-40's vs. American pilots using P-40's, as well as the Soviet experience using P-39's vs. Western experiences.
 
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Hello Buffnut
Quote:" indeed the Hurricane probably had the edge in … manoeuverability"

On what you based your claim? Finns definitely thought that Hawk 75A-1 was better dogfighter than Hurricane Mk I. British (RAE) concluded that Hawk 75A-1 was better dogfighter than Spitfire Mk I. French Hawk 75As did better against Bf 109Es than RAF Hurricane Mk Is during the Battle of France in 1940 and then we have Burma where, even if Mohawk IVs participated rather few combats against Type 1, Mohawks did better than Hurricanes against Oscars. Hurricane was faster but there were most probably some areas where Hawk was better otherwise it is difficult to explain why Hawk did constantly better than Hurricane.

Juha

Juha,

I did say the Hurricane "probably had the edge" - ie I wasn't stating as fact. I was postulating. I was also suggesting that neither aircraft had a huge advantage over the other - their aerodynamic performance was, on balance, broadly similar.

Agree there are areas where the Mohawk was better than the Hurricane. I just wonder if the aerodynamic performance advantage was so great that it explains Joe's statistical chasm between Hurricane and Mohawk operational performance.

KR
Mark
 
The 'statistical set' so to speak, is too small in Burma in regards to the Mohawk.

The Hurricanes present at the time were early Hurricanes of lesser performance vs. later models.

can you demostrate your point (statiscal set to o small)?

same it's true for hawk 75, mohawk IV was a later model of hawk 75 in France
 
Hi,

the succes of a plane type always depends to the tactical situation and the performence of the oponents.

Vs the japanese planes the P40 had the big advantage of a higher dive speed and "highspeed" manouverability.
The P40 was one of the best rolling WWII planes!!

The better turn manouverability of the Hurri vs the P40 didnt matter much vs the Ki43 or Zero, both was even more manouverable and while the Hurri wasnt able to dive away.

Vs the 109 both was in trouble, specialy vs 109F and G´s, while the P40 again could make successfull high speed attacks and evasive manouvers, while the hurri just could turn.

Speed and "high speed" manouverability was most important, and afaik still is, for a good fighter.

In this case i mean speeds between 300 and 600km/h IAS, not speeds close to or above the critical speed.

Greetings,

Knegel
 

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