USAAF replaces RAF in Battle of France 1940

[MikeMeech]

For this scenario the RAF is replaced by the USAAF to fight alongside the French Air Force in the Battle of France during 1940. The USAAF can only have the aircraft types and models they actually had, so no 'magical' moving later types and models forward in time to serve in 1940 in adequate numbers. The US manufacturing capability would be as it was at the time. Examples of the types available would be Curtiss P-36, Serversky P-35, Northrop A-17, North American O-47, Douglas B-18 and early model B-17 (hand held MG not turrets) or any other types that meet the criteria (so no P-38, P-39, P-40 etc).
How would the USAAF stood up to the Luftwaffe of the period, would they have performed better, same or worse with their equipment and doctrine of the period than the RAF?

Mike

 

[Snautzer01]

Depends if strategy is the same or different. Quite a difference in thinking.

 

[MikeMeech]

Depends if strategy is the same or different. Quite a difference in thinking.

Hi

The USAAF has replaced the RAF, therefore the USA has replaced the British in this scenario and they would be supporting an American Expeditionary Force. The French would still be the dominant partner, as they were in reality, therefore the French would be determining 'Strategy'. So in the 'scenario' Battle of France how do members think the US equipment and their tactical doctrine (for air to air fighting, ground support, bombing etc) of the period perform against the (actual) German forces of the period?
I hope that is clearer.

Mike

 

[fastmongrel]

Britain was very much the junior partner to France and followed French strategy. Would the US be happy being under French overall control.

If the US is simply going to slot into the British place with identical numbers of resources then I can't see any difference to the result apart from there is no Dunkirk.

 

[MIflyer]

Depends heavily on whether the USAAC (USAAF did not exist yet) had any of the expertise it would acquire later.

An often unrecognized factor is that prior to the creation of the USAAF in 1941, it was an AIR CORPS, like the Signal Corps or tank corps. As such, the USAAC was intended to serve the needs of the "Queen of Battle", the infantry. A GHQ Air Force would be employed for classic airpower purposes, but it was only a subset of the Air Corps. Creation of the USAAF oriented the force toward airpower, but even at the time of Operation Torch, things were still something of a mess. In addition, it was well into WWII before the USAAF recognized that direct coordination with the ground forces was essential.

Circa 1940 the USAAC was horrified at the idea of a Forward Air Controller. How could some Private on the ground be allowed to tell airplanes where to bomb?

While the USAAC was much more of a tactical air force than was the RAF (which was focused more on bombing enemy cities to win the war), its organization, tactics, coordination/communciations and basic bureaucratic concepts were badly deficient.

 

[MikeMeech]

Depends heavily on whether the USAAC (USAAF did not exist yet) had any of the expertise it would acquire later.

An often unrecognized factor is that prior to the creation of the USAAF in 1941, it was an AIR CORPS, like the Signal Corps or tank corps. As such, the USAAC was intended to serve the needs of the "Queen of Battle", the infantry. A GHQ Air Force would be employed for classic airpower purposes, but it was only a subset of the Air Corps. Creation of the USAAF oriented the force toward airpower, but even at the time of Operation Torch, things were still something of a mess. In addition, it was well into WWII before the USAAF recognized that direct coordination with the ground forces was essential.

Circa 1940 the USAAC was horrified at the idea of a Forward Air Controller. How could some Private on the ground be allowed to tell airplanes where to bomb?

While the USAAC was much more of a tactical air force than was the RAF (which was focused more on bombing enemy cities to win the war), its organization, tactics, coordination/communciations and basic bureaucratic concepts were badly deficient.

Hi

Yes, I do realise it was the USAAC not the USAAF, however, it does not actually make a difference to the 'scenario' for as you say it was a more 'tactical' air force than the RAF. The RAF has been criticised for not being more tactically orientated in the Battle of France or have aircraft designs 'fit for that purpose'. So in theory the USAAC with its more tactical doctrine should be better equipped than the RAF for this particular task. The RAF used the Westland Lysander for tactical observation (which has been criticised), the USAAC used the North American O-47, not much real difference in overall performance. Another example is the use of the RAF of Fairey Battles to attack German units on the ground also targets like bridges, which it had, allegedly, 'inadequate' weaponry or training for. Presumably the USAAC would have used an optimised 'attack' aeroplane for these tasks such as the Northrop A-17, which was smaller than the Battle (also slightly slower) but had four .30s in the wings instead of a single .303 on the Battle, however, it only carried four 100 lb bombs instead of the four 250 lb bombs of the Battle, so presumably more inadequate against tanks let alone bridges. The main US bomber of the period the Douglas B-18 is more of a Vickers Wellington type bomber than a Bristol Blenheim so unlikely to be used on low level ground attack mission I suspect.
Another aspect is keeping the Luftwaffe fighters away from the USAAC's attack and observation aircraft, were the P-35 and P-36 adequate for this task (alongside their air fighting tactics of the time), the P-36 in French Air Force service is supposed to have done 'well' compared with other French fighters, but both types are not superior in overall performance to the Hurricane, so again probably would have had difficulty with the Bf 109.
The question again is what do others think the performance of the USAAC, with its then 'tactical doctrine' with its expertise of the time (not expertise gained later) and the equipment it would have been equipped with, would have been against the German attack? This could then be judged against what the RAF actually did or did not achieve in the real world 1940.

Mike

 

[fastmongrel]

Did the US Infantry have radios and observers trained to call in air support. I think that is the advantage the Luftwaffe had. Swap Stukas for the Battle or the A17 and I think the allied result is the same. The Germans had that precious experience in Spain and Poland.

 

[GrauGeist]

the P-36 in French Air Force service is supposed to have done 'well' compared with other French fighters, but both types are not superior in overall performance to the Hurricane, so again probably would have had difficulty with the Bf 109.

The French Hawk 75 accounted for more German aircraft than any other aircraft in French service, during the Battle of France.

In regards to the Douglas B-18, it was based on the DC-2 and would be quite capable of low-level attack.
Additionally, the B-17 was in service with the AAC by 1938, so there's no reason why it wouldn't be available.

The Curtiss A-12 would be instrumental for ground attack, but like the Ju87, would need adequete air cover.

 

[tomo pauk]

Any Allied air-service or airforce that we'd like to see perform better than RAF did it historically during the BoF will need to field a substantial number of modern aircraft, not just to cater for Luftwaffe, but also to cater for failings of the AdA (and those were numerous and acute). All while having the good grasp on modern air war. So if USAAC/AAF can deploy thousands of combat aircraft, cover the airports with AA guns, connect their assets in an effective force, then yes - it can make a difference.
OTOH, if the numbers deployed by Americans are similar to what RAF deployed, and used without a workable & robust fighter escort and fighter + AAA defensive scheme, the outcome is same - France is defeated as it was historically so, and USA is sent packing across the pond.

 

[GrauGeist]

Agreed, Tomo.
The RAF in France may have been capable, but they were under French authority, which contributed considerably to their demise.

The majority of French Aircraft losses weren't in combat, but instead, caught on the ground.
Their command and control was sorely lacking and I can't see the AAC doing any better because of this issue.

 

[pbehn]

Depends heavily on whether the USAAC (USAAF did not exist yet) had any of the expertise it would acquire later.

An often unrecognized factor is that prior to the creation of the USAAF in 1941, it was an AIR CORPS, like the Signal Corps or tank corps. As such, the USAAC was intended to serve the needs of the "Queen of Battle", the infantry. A GHQ Air Force would be employed for classic airpower purposes, but it was only a subset of the Air Corps. Creation of the USAAF oriented the force toward airpower, but even at the time of Operation Torch, things were still something of a mess. In addition, it was well into WWII before the USAAF recognized that direct coordination with the ground forces was essential.

Circa 1940 the USAAC was horrified at the idea of a Forward Air Controller. How could some Private on the ground be allowed to tell airplanes where to bomb?

While the USAAC was much more of a tactical air force than was the RAF (which was focused more on bombing enemy cities to win the war), its organization, tactics, coordination/communciations and basic bureaucratic concepts were badly deficient.

This is a good read Close air support - Wikipedia
The use of forward air control to guide close air support (CAS)[11] aircraft, so as to ensure that their attack hits the intended target and not friendly troops, was first used by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno.[12] During the North African Campaign in 1941 the British Army and the Royal Air Force established Forward Air Support Links (FASL), a mobile air support system using ground vehicles. Light reconnaissance aircraft would observe enemy activity and report it by radio to the FASL which was attached at brigade level. The FASL was in communication (a two-way radio link known as a "tentacle") with the Air Support Control (ASC) Headquarters attached to the corps or armoured division which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields.[13][14] They also introduced the system of ground direction of air strikes by what was originally termed a "Mobile Fighter Controller" traveling with the forward troops. The controller rode in the "leading tank or armoured car" and directed a "cab rank" of aircraft above the battlefield.[15] This system of close co-operation first used by the Desert Air Force, was steadily refined and perfected, during the campaigns in Italy, Normandy and Germany.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Given the state of the USAAC at the time, I don't think it would have performed any better than the RAF did, and would not have made a material difference in the outcome.

 

[Glider]

Us fighters of the time were no match for the Hurricane used in France let alone the Spit 1 which whilst not used was available to be used. The US bombers didn't have an aircraft equal to the Wellington or even the Blenheim so I doubt that it would have gone well

 

[MikeMeech]

The French Hawk 75 accounted for more German aircraft than any other aircraft in French service, during the Battle of France.

In regards to the Douglas B-18, it was based on the DC-2 and would be quite capable of low-level attack.
Additionally, the B-17 was in service with the AAC by 1938, so there's no reason why it wouldn't be available.

The Curtiss A-12 would be instrumental for ground attack, but like the Ju87, would need adequete air cover.

Hi
The Douglas B-18 could carry a heavy bomb load (for the period) but was larger and slower than a Blenheim so would probably suffered even more from German Flak and fighters than that did.
The Curtiss A-12 had basically the same armament as the Northrop A-17 but was much slower, it was slower than the RAF's Hawker Hector bi-pane army co-operation aeroplane that was used in the real Battle of France as well as the much faster Lysander, so the A-12 may have been even less survivable.
Yes, the B-17 was in service by 1938, however, the latest version prior to the start of the BoF was the B-17B, first flying on 27 June, 1939 the batch of 39 aircraft delivered by the end of March 1940. Even if Boeing could double or triple their production during that time it would not be many aircraft to make much of an impact.

So far it appears that the USAAC had aircraft mainly 'inferior' to what the RAF failed with.

Mike

 

[Glider]

Hi
The Douglas B-18 could carry a heavy bomb load (for the period) but was larger and slower than a Blenheim so would probably suffered even more from German Flak and fighters than that did.
The Curtiss A-12 had basically the same armament as the Northrop A-17 but was much slower, it was slower than the RAF's Hawker Hector bi-pane army co-operation aeroplane that was used in the real Battle of France as well as the much faster Lysander, so the A-12 may have been even less survivable.
Yes, the B-17 was in service by 1938, however, the latest version prior to the start of the BoF was the B-17B, first flying on 27 June, 1939 the batch of 39 aircraft delivered by the end of March 1940. Even if Boeing could double or triple their production during that time it would not be many aircraft to make much of an impact.

So far it appears that the USAAC had aircraft mainly 'inferior' to what the RAF failed with.

Mike

If I could add to the comment on the B17B. When the RAF first used the B17C it was the US advisors who were telling the RAF that the B17C wasn't ready for combat

 

[MIflyer]

was first used by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno

The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.

As far as aircraft, the Martin 167 Maryland did fight in the Battle of France and probably was the best light bomber available to either the French or the British, being well liked by the crews. A US embargo on the airplanes kept them from getting to France earlier. The Hawk 75 probably was the most successful of all the French fighters, if inferior to the Hurricane in many respects.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.

As far as aircraft, the Martin 167 Maryland did fight in the Battle of France and probably was the best light bomber available to either the French or the British, being well liked by the crews. A US embargo on the airplanes kept them from getting to France earlier. The Hawk 75 probably was the most successful of all the French fighters, if inferior to the Hurricane in many respects.

View attachment 618212View attachment 618214

Good lord, the turret on the last one is huge.

 

[pbehn]

The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.

As far as aircraft, the Martin 167 Maryland did fight in the Battle of France and probably was the best light bomber available to either the French or the British, being well liked by the crews. A US embargo on the airplanes kept them from getting to France earlier. The Hawk 75 probably was the most successful of all the French fighters, if inferior to the Hurricane in many respects.

View attachment 618212View attachment 618214

Discussed in the link.

 

[Shortround6]

Historically the USAAC in the fall of 1939 and into the summer of 1940 didn't have very many planes in service and some of the ones in service were out of production.
Other production was already earmarked for France.
US grabs the Martin Marylands?
Better armed US expeditionary force.
France has several squadrons operating what?
There is no net gain for the allied (France/America) forces.
Same for what ever number of DB-7 the French got. Larger US expeditionary force means the French fly more obsolete planes of their own for little or no gain in total force effectiveness.
British didn't order that many planes from the US until the Battle of France was well underway. British had Guaranteed a number of French orders and/or took over any outstanding French orders when France fell.

US grabs the Seversky/Republic EP-106s from Sweden?
There were only 77 P-35s built for the US.
210 P36s.

How many Hurricanes went to France?

For the US production.
Republic never built more than 15 planes in one month in 1940.
Brewster never built more than 24 planes in one month in 1940 except Dec
Grumman built no F4Fs until July, Maybe they could start building F3F biplanes?

Basically Curtiss was the only viable source of monoplane fighter planes for the US in late 39 and early 40.

The BEF air component was
5 squadrons of Hurricanes and two of Gladiators, re-equipping with Hurricanes by May.
4 squadrons of Blenheims.
5 Squadrons of Lysanders.

The AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) had based in France (for use against Germany just in case the French changed their minds)
10 Squadrons of Battles
2 squadrons of Blenheims
2 squadrons of Hurricanes, a 3rd was added on May 11th.

In England, ready to support the the first elements or fly in to supplement them should air field space be found were
4 squadrons of Blenheims
2 squadrons of Whitleys.


Can the US field a similar force (small as it was) without stripping most of the aircraft from the United States?

 

[MikeMeech]

The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.

Hi

I have read this information before, but the details of what is meant by the statement is usually not mentioned. If it is supposed to mean HF was 'better' than VHF for communications with the ground 'troops' then it is not true as the ETO, MTO and PTO as well as the CBI all went over to using VHF. Indeed No. 1 Air Commando during OP Thursday were communicating with the RAF teams on the ground with the Chindits. It was also being used in the Arakan other parts of the Theatre. The RAF teams during the war had both VHF and HF sets on the ground to contact aircraft and ground formations as did the US teams. This is a bit 'off topic' but I shall give one example from the South West Pacific (at the end of 1943 beginning of 1944):
"Immediate communications between air support personnel on the ground and striking aircraft was infrequent and sporadic, but possible. The very high frequency radios (VHF) coming into the theater, however, were to improve significantly those communications." (source 'American Experience in the Southwest Pacific' by Joe Gray Taylor, p.218 of 'Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support' US Government (Office of Air Force History USAF), 1990.)

HF replaced by VHF as the latter was better. If this topic requires discussion then I would suggest a new topic in 'reality' rather than 'What if'. If there is interest I shall supply more information.

Back on topic it appears the US equipment and doctrine would probably not work better than the reality, also it is unlikely that if the British had bought the available US air support types they would probably made little difference and may have performed worse than the RAF types used.

Thanks all
Mike