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Depends if strategy is the same or different. Quite a difference in thinking.
Depends heavily on whether the USAAC (USAAF did not exist yet) had any of the expertise it would acquire later.
An often unrecognized factor is that prior to the creation of the USAAF in 1941, it was an AIR CORPS, like the Signal Corps or tank corps. As such, the USAAC was intended to serve the needs of the "Queen of Battle", the infantry. A GHQ Air Force would be employed for classic airpower purposes, but it was only a subset of the Air Corps. Creation of the USAAF oriented the force toward airpower, but even at the time of Operation Torch, things were still something of a mess. In addition, it was well into WWII before the USAAF recognized that direct coordination with the ground forces was essential.
Circa 1940 the USAAC was horrified at the idea of a Forward Air Controller. How could some Private on the ground be allowed to tell airplanes where to bomb?
While the USAAC was much more of a tactical air force than was the RAF (which was focused more on bombing enemy cities to win the war), its organization, tactics, coordination/communciations and basic bureaucratic concepts were badly deficient.
The French Hawk 75 accounted for more German aircraft than any other aircraft in French service, during the Battle of France.the P-36 in French Air Force service is supposed to have done 'well' compared with other French fighters, but both types are not superior in overall performance to the Hurricane, so again probably would have had difficulty with the Bf 109.
This is a good read Close air support - WikipediaDepends heavily on whether the USAAC (USAAF did not exist yet) had any of the expertise it would acquire later.
An often unrecognized factor is that prior to the creation of the USAAF in 1941, it was an AIR CORPS, like the Signal Corps or tank corps. As such, the USAAC was intended to serve the needs of the "Queen of Battle", the infantry. A GHQ Air Force would be employed for classic airpower purposes, but it was only a subset of the Air Corps. Creation of the USAAF oriented the force toward airpower, but even at the time of Operation Torch, things were still something of a mess. In addition, it was well into WWII before the USAAF recognized that direct coordination with the ground forces was essential.
Circa 1940 the USAAC was horrified at the idea of a Forward Air Controller. How could some Private on the ground be allowed to tell airplanes where to bomb?
While the USAAC was much more of a tactical air force than was the RAF (which was focused more on bombing enemy cities to win the war), its organization, tactics, coordination/communciations and basic bureaucratic concepts were badly deficient.
The French Hawk 75 accounted for more German aircraft than any other aircraft in French service, during the Battle of France.
In regards to the Douglas B-18, it was based on the DC-2 and would be quite capable of low-level attack.
Additionally, the B-17 was in service with the AAC by 1938, so there's no reason why it wouldn't be available.
The Curtiss A-12 would be instrumental for ground attack, but like the Ju87, would need adequete air cover.
If I could add to the comment on the B17B. When the RAF first used the B17C it was the US advisors who were telling the RAF that the B17C wasn't ready for combatHi
The Douglas B-18 could carry a heavy bomb load (for the period) but was larger and slower than a Blenheim so would probably suffered even more from German Flak and fighters than that did.
The Curtiss A-12 had basically the same armament as the Northrop A-17 but was much slower, it was slower than the RAF's Hawker Hector bi-pane army co-operation aeroplane that was used in the real Battle of France as well as the much faster Lysander, so the A-12 may have been even less survivable.
Yes, the B-17 was in service by 1938, however, the latest version prior to the start of the BoF was the B-17B, first flying on 27 June, 1939 the batch of 39 aircraft delivered by the end of March 1940. Even if Boeing could double or triple their production during that time it would not be many aircraft to make much of an impact.
So far it appears that the USAAC had aircraft mainly 'inferior' to what the RAF failed with.
Mike
was first used by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno
The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.
As far as aircraft, the Martin 167 Maryland did fight in the Battle of France and probably was the best light bomber available to either the French or the British, being well liked by the crews. A US embargo on the airplanes kept them from getting to France earlier. The Hawk 75 probably was the most successful of all the French fighters, if inferior to the Hurricane in many respects.
View attachment 618212View attachment 618214
Discussed in the link.The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.
As far as aircraft, the Martin 167 Maryland did fight in the Battle of France and probably was the best light bomber available to either the French or the British, being well liked by the crews. A US embargo on the airplanes kept them from getting to France earlier. The Hawk 75 probably was the most successful of all the French fighters, if inferior to the Hurricane in many respects.
View attachment 618212View attachment 618214
The USAAF Air Commandos in the CBI used direct communication between the CAS aircraft ad the ground troops and in fact the P-51A's were equipped with HF radios compatible with the ground forces comm equipment. The RAF leadership in that theater thought that CAS aircraft did not need to talk to ground troops and they were equipped with VHF radios that could not communicate with the grounds troops.