MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
Everyone knows that both sides in WWII tended to overclaim kills, sometimes to an absurd degree.
In a new book I just got, "They Flew Hurricanes" there is an example of how confusing the situation can be.
On 11 May 1940 five Hurricanes of No. 1 Sqdrn RAF intercepted thirty Do17's escorted by 15 BF-110's over France. The Do-17's ran for home but the BF-110's stayed to fight. In the resultant combat one Hurricane was lost during a head on pass with a BF-110; the RAF pilot bailed out and survived,
French villagers reported seeing six BF-110's fall nearby and the remains of four more were located as well. This total of 10 wrecks exactly matched the RAF pilot's claims of nine definite kills and one probable.
Postwar Luftwaffe records showed they only lost two BF-110's. That kind of discrepancy was not unusual.
It seems that the Luftwaffe accounted for their losses so that "War Flights" was one category, "War Support Flights" was another category, and "Non-combat losses" was a third. War Support Flights would be missions such as air-sea rescue missions, but postwar analysts tended to conclude those were not actual combat losses even though the aircraft really were shot down.
The Germans also tended to not simply count losses but do so on a percentage basis. An aircraft shot down into the sea or over enemy territory was a 100% loss. A Luftwaffe airplane shot down over German occupied territory was was counted as salvageable and might be only a 20% loss. Postwar researchers only counted a loss if the Germans had said it was an 80% loss. Obviously if a German airplane had been hit and bellied in on a German airfield the fighter pilot who saw it go down would have called it a kill, while the Germans might have had it flying in a few days and called it only a 20% loss.
All that does not explain the huge difference between RAF and German versions of the "facts" on the battle on 11 May 1940, and such cases were not unusual.
In a new book I just got, "They Flew Hurricanes" there is an example of how confusing the situation can be.
On 11 May 1940 five Hurricanes of No. 1 Sqdrn RAF intercepted thirty Do17's escorted by 15 BF-110's over France. The Do-17's ran for home but the BF-110's stayed to fight. In the resultant combat one Hurricane was lost during a head on pass with a BF-110; the RAF pilot bailed out and survived,
French villagers reported seeing six BF-110's fall nearby and the remains of four more were located as well. This total of 10 wrecks exactly matched the RAF pilot's claims of nine definite kills and one probable.
Postwar Luftwaffe records showed they only lost two BF-110's. That kind of discrepancy was not unusual.
It seems that the Luftwaffe accounted for their losses so that "War Flights" was one category, "War Support Flights" was another category, and "Non-combat losses" was a third. War Support Flights would be missions such as air-sea rescue missions, but postwar analysts tended to conclude those were not actual combat losses even though the aircraft really were shot down.
The Germans also tended to not simply count losses but do so on a percentage basis. An aircraft shot down into the sea or over enemy territory was a 100% loss. A Luftwaffe airplane shot down over German occupied territory was was counted as salvageable and might be only a 20% loss. Postwar researchers only counted a loss if the Germans had said it was an 80% loss. Obviously if a German airplane had been hit and bellied in on a German airfield the fighter pilot who saw it go down would have called it a kill, while the Germans might have had it flying in a few days and called it only a 20% loss.
All that does not explain the huge difference between RAF and German versions of the "facts" on the battle on 11 May 1940, and such cases were not unusual.