VLR B-24 Liberators and the Mid-Atlantic Gap

[Snautzer01]

you are selling books,

only 10% on average of the ships were lost.

Churchill and better his commanders thought otherwise.

One can not build ships fast enough to cover the losses. Not only that but cargo, very needed cargo... Not to raise war but to survive.
Often forgotten is how UK was dependent on goods from the empire. Now cut off. With Japan going at it and those submarines it was a strangle hold untill broken.
If the Dutch merchant fleet had not chosen to be on allied side it would have been very very gloomy.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Everybody agrees more anti submarine aircraft were needed, reinforced by the ineffective bombing raids, but how many? With all the information available today if it is not possible to give a well agreed answer what chance someone in 1941? Start with what is the optimal number of aircraft simultaneously patrolling around a convoy and any extra required if within range of enemy bombers, similar for barrier patrols, not only where but how often each area is searched in a given time period. Should there be more patrols at night than day? Part of the answer is it depends on U-boats present, aircraft were the quickest way to help ships under threat, more U-boats in the area, the more aircraft sent, if they were available.

They had a system that worked. They knew why it worked. It should have worked better with (maybe not a lot) with better armament, better ranged aircraft (compared to WW I) and with better signals (1939 radios).

They were doing it, firstly the overall anti submarine effort totals from the Coastal Command Summary. Which gives total hours flown in 1940 as 135,357

Year	Sorties	Hours	Hr/Sortie
1939​	3178​	12834​	4.04​
1940​	19457​	78002​	4.01​
1941​	18254​	95135​	5.21​
1942​	18319​	129669​	7.08​
1943​	24431​	222897​	9.12​
1944​	29260​	272619​	9.32​
1945​	10123​	92810​	9.17​
Total	123022​	903966​	7.35​

Next Air 15/789 monthly reports for 1940, hours, Patrol = offensive and security, May 1940 Convoy hours given as 2,830 hours but that makes grand total incorrect, of course the hours flown do not match the summary ones. The allocations are backed up from reports by people like Clay Blair about the safety of convoys

Month	recon	a/sub	Patrol	Convoy	Other	Total
Jan-40​	1863​	1990​	0​	2180​	465​	6498​
Feb-40​	1572​	2187​	0​	1817​	509​	6085​
Mar-40​	1818​	2606​	172​	4543​	531​	9670​
Apr-40​	2740​	2298​	427​	4975​	750​	11190​
May-40​	2930​	2553​	0​	5830​	2386​	13699​
Jun-40​	3596​	2823​	496​	6628​	2475​	16018​
Jul-40​	5121​	2020​	454​	5850​	1768​	15213​
Aug-40​	3516​	1363​	662​	6700​	1435​	13676​
Sep-40​	3544​	1729​	677​	5986​	1851​	13787​
Oct-40​	2606​	1811​	459​	5700​	1282​	11858​
Nov-40​	2467​	1468​	499​	4316​	1703​	10453​
Dec-40​	1865​	839​	478​	3064​	1836​	8082​
Total	33638​	23687​	4324​	57589​	16991​	136229​

But the strategy in 1938-39-40 was to bomb the U boats in the yards/docks and let the RN sort out the ones at sea while the BC stopped the supply of new boats.

The strategy in 1939 was avoid all out bombing, in 1940 survival, in 1941 more bomb the economy to stop overall production.

Bomber Command. 1939/40 no U-boat bombings from 14,731 tons dropped, the top 10 being Airfields 1,817 tons, Port Areas 1,748 tons Ships, 1,539 tons, Marshalling Yards 1,512 tons, Industrial Areas 1,411, Roads 983 tons, Oil/Synthetic 830 tons, Troops 809 tons, Rail Lines 774 tons, Oil Refineries 677 tons. Not the most strategic air force.

1941 U-boat bombing 72 tons, ship yards 2,042 tons out of 35,548 tons dropped

BC	UB/Base	UB/Pens	UB/Slips	UB/Yards	UB/Yards & City	Total
1942​	0​	0​	63​	1166​	294​	1524​
1943​	0​	324​	0​	0​	0​	324​
1944​	85​	2578​	0​	0​	0​	2663​
1945​	0​	393​	0​	10304​	0​	10697​
Total	85​	3295​	63​	11470​	294​	15207​

8th Air Force. All bomb data in short tons, rounded to nearest ton, entrance = lock gates and port area.

8th AF	UB/Base	UB/entrance	UB/Facilities	UB/Pens	UB/Yards	Total
1942​	0​	0​	0​	8​	0​	8​
1943​	0​	301​	81​	1609​	4335​	6325​
1944​	314​	0​	0​	0​	4393​	4707​
1945​	0​	0​	0​	0​	8298​	8298​
Total	314​	301​	81​	2111​	17025​	19832​

Both rather end loaded, the 8th dropped 2,859 short tons on U-boat targets in January and February 1944, then none March to June inclusive.

One of the things to remember is how few U-boats were available for the first two years of the war, their abilities and the circumstances made them very efficient, to be repeated in 1942 off the Americas it means there were not a lot of U-boats passing through the barrier patrol areas and they generally transited the northern one only on their first patrol. Then comes selling barrier patrol success in U-boats not spotted as they had to stay submerged. At least daylight only convoy patrols could force U-boats to break contact even with slow convoys. Barrier patrols needed radar equipped aircraft to become really effective, into 1941 and even later the number of radar sets, their weight and drag limited the suitable aircraft, as does the need for lights for night attacks. Radar carrying aircraft around convoys completes their protection.

All the above would be enhanced if the aircraft and ships could quickly talk to each other. Forming more convoys earlier required the understanding weakly protected convoys were usually better than independent sailings. More aircraft would encourage more convoys.

So how many aircraft? Of what types? How does this vary according to number of U-boats, convoys and threats from air attack? How about flexibility, quickly moving bases according to threats, what advantage several Coastal Command Squadrons moving to the US in early 1942, pairing with similar USAAF/USN units and doing patrols.

Things like Operation Torch, troop movements and Arctic convoys all drew escorts away from the trade convoys, so what allowance for these generally increasingly larger operations?

The UK Statistical Digest notes by value UK imports went up during the war, exports halved. When it comes to tonnages the disruption of trade routes needs to be taken into account.

imports "declined from a prewar average of more than 50 million deadweight tons to 42 million in 1940 and 31 million in 1941. In 1942, despite desperate efforts to arrest the decline and increased assistance from the United States, they fell to 23 million."

British War Economy, page 432

"How near did the United Kingdom really come to the point of danger, where supplies of food and raw materials would have been inadequate to feed the population and keep the war factories working, unless shipping had been quickly diverted from military operations? It will not be possible to give a convincing answer to this question until more research has been done; but some evidence which is already available suggests that the country was not quite so close to the margin of danger as the War Cabinet at that time believed. The estimates of minimum import requirements on which the War Cabinet based its policy were themselves based on calculations of minimum stock levels and the rate of consumption of imported commodities. Looking back, it would seem that the calculations under both heads were too sombre. For example, in the first report of the Shipping Committee, the net consumption in 1942 of importable food was put at 12.4 million tons and of raw materials at 15.1 million tons; but in fact, the actual realised figures were 11.4 million tons for food and 13.3 million tons for materials. Similar discrepancies occurred between the forecasts and the statistical facts for the later war years. In the estimates for food there was perhaps considerable justification for a fair margin of error, since the Ministry of Food had always to allow for the vagaries of the weather and the possibility of bad home harvest. There was less justification for the erroneous estimates of raw material consumption; indeed, the inaccuracies of the Ministry of Production's forecasts serve as a reminder of the limitations of wartime planning even in its later stages.

These overestimates of consumption managed that the United Kingdom managed quite well in 1942 and the early months of 1943 with a volume of imports lower than the stipulated minimum. If it should also be proved that the estimates of minimum stock levels were in some degree inflated, the conclusion would be that the British could in this period have maintained an unimpaired war effort at an even lower level of imports: alternatively, that they could have gone on longer than the Government believed at the low rate of imports actually achieved. To some extent, the estimates of consumption hang together; if the former were inflated, then it followed that minimum stock levels, calculated on the basis of so many weeks' supply, were also overestimated."

Britain did not come as close to danger as thought so at the time, the safety margins were thinning out to where a bad year for agriculture would create major problems. Arable land had gone from 12 million to 17.4 million acres, the 1943 wheat crop was 3,435,000 tons, but the 1945 one was 2,174,000 tons. While 1,705,000 tons of US food arrived in 1943. For a series of 15 main food stuffs (Wheat, Barley, Oats, Mixed corn, Rye (grain), Potatoes, Sugar beet, Beans, Peas, Turnips and swedes, Mangolds, Hops, Mustard (seed), Fruit, Vegetables) Britain increased output from the per war average of 28,500,000 tons to 42,546,000 tons in 1943 but down to 40,759,000 tons in 1944 and 40,473,000 tons in 1945. In Great Britain the cattle herd went up by 10%, Sheep down 25%, pigs and poultry down 50% each, fish consumption per capita halved until late in the war. In 1942/43 Britain was relying on reasonable growing seasons in Britain.

The RN started WWII with a nominal strength of 107 new, 79 old destroyers and 32 sea/ocean going anti submarine ships, total 218 plus the French fleet. In December 1940 it was 90 new, 71 old, 50 ex US and 18 Hunt class destroyers, plus 64 escorts, total 247, the building program kicked delivered in 1941 so December strength was 88 new, 66 old, 47 ex US and 44 Hunt class destroyers, plus 224 escorts, total 471. Figures include those under repair, refit etc. Losses to the above ships were 3 in 1939, 42 in 1940 and 33 in 1941, including 48 modern destroyers, it took until July 1943 before the modern destroyer strength regained its September 1939 figure.

By end 1942 the above categories had 503 ships, end 1943 it was 685 ships, end 1944 it was 818. Escort carrier strength as of December 1941 to 1944 were 1, 7, 35, 40.

The battle fleet started with 15 battleships, 6 carriers and 64 cruisers, end 1944 it was 14 battleships (including several in reserve), 9 carriers and 60 cruisers (including those in reserve). This excludes Free French, Dutch, Greek etc. ships under RN control but not RN ships manned by allies.

German passive sonar was better than allied and could usually detect ships beyond U-boat visible horizon, with limitations on bearings.

 

[yulzari]

Everybody agrees more anti submarine aircraft were needed, reinforced by the ineffective bombing raids, but how many? With all the information available today if it is not possible to give a well agreed answer what chance someone in 1941? Start with what is the optimal number of aircraft simultaneously patrolling around a convoy and any extra required if within range of enemy bombers, similar for barrier patrols, not only where but how often each area is searched in a given time period. Should there be more patrols at night than day? Part of the answer is it depends on U-boats present, aircraft were the quickest way to help ships under threat, more U-boats in the area, the more aircraft sent, if they were available.

They were doing it, firstly the overall anti submarine effort totals from the Coastal Command Summary. Which gives total hours flown in 1940 as 135,357

Year	Sorties	Hours	Hr/Sortie
1939​	3178​	12834​	4.04​
1940​	19457​	78002​	4.01​
1941​	18254​	95135​	5.21​
1942​	18319​	129669​	7.08​
1943​	24431​	222897​	9.12​
1944​	29260​	272619​	9.32​
1945​	10123​	92810​	9.17​
Total	123022​	903966​	7.35​

Next Air 15/789 monthly reports for 1940, hours, Patrol = offensive and security, May 1940 Convoy hours given as 2,830 hours but that makes grand total incorrect, of course the hours flown do not match the summary ones. The allocations are backed up from reports by people like Clay Blair about the safety of convoys

Month	recon	a/sub	Patrol	Convoy	Other	Total
Jan-40​	1863​	1990​	0​	2180​	465​	6498​
Feb-40​	1572​	2187​	0​	1817​	509​	6085​
Mar-40​	1818​	2606​	172​	4543​	531​	9670​
Apr-40​	2740​	2298​	427​	4975​	750​	11190​
May-40​	2930​	2553​	0​	5830​	2386​	13699​
Jun-40​	3596​	2823​	496​	6628​	2475​	16018​
Jul-40​	5121​	2020​	454​	5850​	1768​	15213​
Aug-40​	3516​	1363​	662​	6700​	1435​	13676​
Sep-40​	3544​	1729​	677​	5986​	1851​	13787​
Oct-40​	2606​	1811​	459​	5700​	1282​	11858​
Nov-40​	2467​	1468​	499​	4316​	1703​	10453​
Dec-40​	1865​	839​	478​	3064​	1836​	8082​
Total	33638​	23687​	4324​	57589​	16991​	136229​

The strategy in 1939 was avoid all out bombing, in 1940 survival, in 1941 more bomb the economy to stop overall production.

Bomber Command. 1939/40 no U-boat bombings from 14,731 tons dropped, the top 10 being Airfields 1,817 tons, Port Areas 1,748 tons Ships, 1,539 tons, Marshalling Yards 1,512 tons, Industrial Areas 1,411, Roads 983 tons, Oil/Synthetic 830 tons, Troops 809 tons, Rail Lines 774 tons, Oil Refineries 677 tons. Not the most strategic air force.

1941 U-boat bombing 72 tons, ship yards 2,042 tons out of 35,548 tons dropped

BC	UB/Base	UB/Pens	UB/Slips	UB/Yards	UB/Yards & City	Total
1942​	0​	0​	63​	1166​	294​	1524​
1943​	0​	324​	0​	0​	0​	324​
1944​	85​	2578​	0​	0​	0​	2663​
1945​	0​	393​	0​	10304​	0​	10697​
Total	85​	3295​	63​	11470​	294​	15207​

8th Air Force. All bomb data in short tons, rounded to nearest ton, entrance = lock gates and port area.

8th AF	UB/Base	UB/entrance	UB/Facilities	UB/Pens	UB/Yards	Total
1942​	0​	0​	0​	8​	0​	8​
1943​	0​	301​	81​	1609​	4335​	6325​
1944​	314​	0​	0​	0​	4393​	4707​
1945​	0​	0​	0​	0​	8298​	8298​
Total	314​	301​	81​	2111​	17025​	19832​

Both rather end loaded, the 8th dropped 2,859 short tons on U-boat targets in January and February 1944, then none March to June inclusive.

One of the things to remember is how few U-boats were available for the first two years of the war, their abilities and the circumstances made them very efficient, to be repeated in 1942 off the Americas it means there were not a lot of U-boats passing through the barrier patrol areas and they generally transited the northern one only on their first patrol. Then comes selling barrier patrol success in U-boats not spotted as they had to stay submerged. At least daylight only convoy patrols could force U-boats to break contact even with slow convoys. Barrier patrols needed radar equipped aircraft to become really effective, into 1941 and even later the number of radar sets, their weight and drag limited the suitable aircraft, as does the need for lights for night attacks. Radar carrying aircraft around convoys completes their protection.

All the above would be enhanced if the aircraft and ships could quickly talk to each other. Forming more convoys earlier required the understanding weakly protected convoys were usually better than independent sailings. More aircraft would encourage more convoys.

So how many aircraft? Of what types? How does this vary according to number of U-boats, convoys and threats from air attack? How about flexibility, quickly moving bases according to threats, what advantage several Coastal Command Squadrons moving to the US in early 1942, pairing with similar USAAF/USN units and doing patrols.

Things like Operation Torch, troop movements and Arctic convoys all drew escorts away from the trade convoys, so what allowance for these generally increasingly larger operations?

The UK Statistical Digest notes by value UK imports went up during the war, exports halved. When it comes to tonnages the disruption of trade routes needs to be taken into account.

imports "declined from a prewar average of more than 50 million deadweight tons to 42 million in 1940 and 31 million in 1941. In 1942, despite desperate efforts to arrest the decline and increased assistance from the United States, they fell to 23 million."

British War Economy, page 432

"How near did the United Kingdom really come to the point of danger, where supplies of food and raw materials would have been inadequate to feed the population and keep the war factories working, unless shipping had been quickly diverted from military operations? It will not be possible to give a convincing answer to this question until more research has been done; but some evidence which is already available suggests that the country was not quite so close to the margin of danger as the War Cabinet at that time believed. The estimates of minimum import requirements on which the War Cabinet based its policy were themselves based on calculations of minimum stock levels and the rate of consumption of imported commodities. Looking back, it would seem that the calculations under both heads were too sombre. For example, in the first report of the Shipping Committee, the net consumption in 1942 of importable food was put at 12.4 million tons and of raw materials at 15.1 million tons; but in fact, the actual realised figures were 11.4 million tons for food and 13.3 million tons for materials. Similar discrepancies occurred between the forecasts and the statistical facts for the later war years. In the estimates for food there was perhaps considerable justification for a fair margin of error, since the Ministry of Food had always to allow for the vagaries of the weather and the possibility of bad home harvest. There was less justification for the erroneous estimates of raw material consumption; indeed, the inaccuracies of the Ministry of Production's forecasts serve as a reminder of the limitations of wartime planning even in its later stages.

These overestimates of consumption managed that the United Kingdom managed quite well in 1942 and the early months of 1943 with a volume of imports lower than the stipulated minimum. If it should also be proved that the estimates of minimum stock levels were in some degree inflated, the conclusion would be that the British could in this period have maintained an unimpaired war effort at an even lower level of imports: alternatively, that they could have gone on longer than the Government believed at the low rate of imports actually achieved. To some extent, the estimates of consumption hang together; if the former were inflated, then it followed that minimum stock levels, calculated on the basis of so many weeks' supply, were also overestimated."

Britain did not come as close to danger as thought so at the time, the safety margins were thinning out to where a bad year for agriculture would create major problems. Arable land had gone from 12 million to 17.4 million acres, the 1943 wheat crop was 3,435,000 tons, but the 1945 one was 2,174,000 tons. While 1,705,000 tons of US food arrived in 1943. For a series of 15 main food stuffs (Wheat, Barley, Oats, Mixed corn, Rye (grain), Potatoes, Sugar beet, Beans, Peas, Turnips and swedes, Mangolds, Hops, Mustard (seed), Fruit, Vegetables) Britain increased output from the per war average of 28,500,000 tons to 42,546,000 tons in 1943 but down to 40,759,000 tons in 1944 and 40,473,000 tons in 1945. In Great Britain the cattle herd went up by 10%, Sheep down 25%, pigs and poultry down 50% each, fish consumption per capita halved until late in the war. In 1942/43 Britain was relying on reasonable growing seasons in Britain.

The RN started WWII with a nominal strength of 107 new, 79 old destroyers and 32 sea/ocean going anti submarine ships, total 218 plus the French fleet. In December 1940 it was 90 new, 71 old, 50 ex US and 18 Hunt class destroyers, plus 64 escorts, total 247, the building program kicked delivered in 1941 so December strength was 88 new, 66 old, 47 ex US and 44 Hunt class destroyers, plus 224 escorts, total 471. Figures include those under repair, refit etc. Losses to the above ships were 3 in 1939, 42 in 1940 and 33 in 1941, including 48 modern destroyers, it took until July 1943 before the modern destroyer strength regained its September 1939 figure.

By end 1942 the above categories had 503 ships, end 1943 it was 685 ships, end 1944 it was 818. Escort carrier strength as of December 1941 to 1944 were 1, 7, 35, 40.

The battle fleet started with 15 battleships, 6 carriers and 64 cruisers, end 1944 it was 14 battleships (including several in reserve), 9 carriers and 60 cruisers (including those in reserve). This excludes Free French, Dutch, Greek etc. ships under RN control but not RN ships manned by allies.

German passive sonar was better than allied and could usually detect ships beyond U-boat visible horizon, with limitations on bearings.

It is interesting to compare this with 1947. During the war there were US supplies of grains and other food stocks to supplement domesticly grown food. A soon as the war ended these supplies ended. These vital food supplies had to be paid for with US dollars but there negligible US dollars left after they had all been spent buying vital supplies well before the USA was forced into the war. Thus civilian rations were cut further post war than during the war and the incredibly long lasting and cold winter/spring decimated crops and the following flooding across the country when the thaw occurred made this even worse. 1947 brought Britain even closer to malnutrition than during the war. It is fortunate that the wartime weather allowed for good domestic food crops.

The disposal of POWs was torn between sending them to Canada to avoid diverting domestic food supplies to maintain POWs against needing them to replace farm workers called up into the armed forces. POWs were retained until the end of 1948 still contributing to farm production. By then they had had finished clearing bomb site rubble. One should note that the Geneva Convention required that POWs should be fed with the same rate of rations as the capturing nation's own troops. Thus POWs received notably more rations than the civilian public. It was a common practice, when inviting POWs to join a family for dinner (many were free to do so, more housed than imprisoned) to expect the POWs to bring along extra food from their superior rations to supplement the family's rations as they were better fed. It was a known thing for the surplus food bins of US bases in the UK sent out for pig feed etc. to be first covertly sorted for food that could be considered fit for covert eating or raided by children.

My point is that the wartime minimum calculations for future planning wisely assumed the possibility of a bad harvest. Hence the moat of the Tower of London made the Tower a net food producer beyond the needs of the staff and families living there from the extensive vegetable gardens dug there.

As long as the harvests were adequate some planned food shipping could be freed for war materials but it would not take long for a bad harvest to force them back to shipping food. Other items of emergency planning also had impacts raising the planned import estimates such as the progress of the war in the Mediterranean. Whilst the Mediterranean was impassable to convoys the ships had to take the much longer Cape route so the number of voyages available is reduced. If the convoys could transit via the Suez Canal if let them carry out more voyages so more could be used on the short run across the Atlantic.

As a former Emergency Planning Officer I can appreciate why the minimum requirement estimates routinely exceeded the actual needs. It had to allow for feasibly possible worst case situations. Had the been a winter like 1947 in, say, 1942 far more of the available shipping would have to traverse the North Atlantic simply to feed the nation. Would that impact possible military actions until 1943? The minimum estimates were very correct in allowing for reasonably possible situations.

 

[MIflyer]

Churchill and better his commanders thought otherwise.

Yep, well, the prospect of staving to death tends to focus the mind wonderfully.

 

[MIflyer]

I have a book in my collection, Aggressors: Patrol Aircraft Vs. Submarine that has artwork of a B-24A Liberator Mk 1, AM929, of 120 Sqdrn, flown by Sqdrn Ldr Terrence Bulloch, among others, that was the top scoring aircraft against U-boats, being credited with sinking four as well as sharing in the kill of another and damaged a number of others in addition to forcing quite a few to submerge.

So if AM929 is the top scoring sub killer of all time, which aircraft type was the top scoring U-boat killer of WW2? And note that even if the U-boats were not normally operating in the mid-Atlantic, they had to transit that area to reach the US coast, and they certainly did not do that submerged.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I have a book in my collection, Aggressors: Patrol Aircraft Vs. Submarine that has artwork of a B-24A Liberator Mk 1, AM929, of 120 Sqdrn, flown by Sqdrn Ldr Terrence Bulloch, among others, that was the top scoring aircraft against U-boats, being credited with sinking four as well as sharing in the kill of another and damaged a number of others in addition to forcing quite a few to submerge.

So if AM929 is the top scoring sub killer of all time, which aircraft type was the top scoring U-boat killer of WW2? And note that even if the U-boats were not normally operating in the mid-Atlantic, they had to transit that area to reach the US coast, and they certainly did not do that submerged.

B-24

Boeing B-24 Liberator - Aircraft - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Third, the air dropped acoustic homing torpedo, which sank a U-boat on its very first action, also giving the USN the honor of being the very first military to use guided missiles in combat. The effort had the substantial additional benefit of showing the USN that there were people who could design, develop, and build torpedoes a hell of a lot better than those idiots at the USN-operated RI torpedo Factory.

Not quite. An RAF Liberator damaged U-456 with a Mark 24 on 13 May 13. It was sunk by RN surface units the next day. On that same day (14th) a USN PBY sank U-357 or 640.

 

[EwenS]

And note that even if the U-boats were not normally operating in the mid-Atlantic, they had to transit that area to reach the US coast, and they certainly did not do that submerged.

The longest continuous underwater voyage by a U-boat was 68 days by U978 during a patrol from Norway to the English Channel and back again between Oct & Dec 1944.

Patrol of German U-boat U-978 from 9 Oct 1944 to 16 Dec 1944 - Kriegsmarine U-boat patrols - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. Over 40.000 pages on the officers, the boats, technology and the Allied efforts to counter the U-boat threat.

www.uboat.net

The next longest was by U-977 at 66 days during part of her voyage to South America between May & Aug 1945.

The Type VIIC U-boat U-977 - German U-boats of WWII - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. Over 40.000 pages on the officers, the boats, technology and the Allied efforts to counter the U-boat threat.

www.uboat.net

 

[WATU]

Food supply to the UK. I recommend "The Taste of War" by Lizzie Bellingham. Well-researched with copious notes and sources. There were pressures with types of food and the diet became bland but always overall in adequate supply. The lack of flavouring e.g. onions was depressing but there was enough food throughout the war. Bellingham says on P 103 "..at no point in the war did [the Battle of the Atlantic} threaten the British people with hunger, let alone starvation." She provides the evidence to back that up.

The Liberator allocation, in my view, was a mistake largely driven by Harris and Churchill in their drive to maximise the air offensive over Germany. A 10% reduction in Bomber Command could have doubled Coastal Command's LR and VLR fleet. The poor results being achieved over Germany were small returns compared with what more aircraft could have done around convoys and transit routes. However it is a hugely complicated story and does not lend itself to brief answers.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Liberator allocation, in my view, was a mistake largely driven by Harris and Churchill in their drive to maximise the air offensive over Germany. A 10% reduction in Bomber Command could have doubled Coastal Command's LR and VLR fleet. The poor results being achieved over Germany were small returns compared with what more aircraft could have done around convoys and transit routes. However it is a hugely complicated story and does not lend itself to brief answers.

Your perception of Liberator allocation is at fault here; the Liberator was not used in large numbers by Bomber Command until 1943/1944 and even then in the Far East, not in the European Theatre. A small number of Liberator Is and IIs had been used in North Africa but the largest British operator in the first couple of years of the war was Coastal Command, which ordered large numbers of the type unhindered by Harris' influence. Harris was happy for Halifaxes to go to Coastal Command because he didn't like the type, but the only "restriction" he imposed was that no Lancasters should go to Coastal Command.

 

[WATU]

Your perception of Liberator allocation is at fault here; the Liberator was not used in large numbers by Bomber Command until 1943/1944 and even then in the Far East, not in the European Theatre. A small number of Liberator Is and IIs had been used in North Africa but the largest British operator in the first couple of years of the war was Coastal Command, which ordered large numbers of the type unhindered by Harris' influence. Harris was happy for Halifaxes to go to Coastal Command because he didn't like the type, but the only "restriction" he imposed was that no Lancasters should go to Coastal Command.

You have a point but as I said the topic does not lend itself to easy answers so I should probably have avoided a one paragraph comment. I don't have the time to go through events in date order to do it justice.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Patrick Blackett had argued a city in Germany would not know the difference between 1000 planes and 900 planes bombing it. But an additional 100 planes patrolling the Bay of Biscay would have been a game changer.

 

[WATU]

He did indeed. I read that in Budiansky's book yesterday. That is the problem, ther are so many quotes and dates. The truth is compex.

 

[nuuumannn]

That is the problem, ther are so many quotes and dates. The truth is compex.

It is but the reality is quite different to what you are suggesting. As you can see from this thread, the U boat threat differed at different times of the war. The availability of U boats was not a constant, so simply stating "we should'a had more patrol aircraft and the war would'a been shorter" is like saying, we should'a just killed Hitler as a baby. It is pointless because it doesn't take into consideration the very thing you are mentioning here - the complexity of the issue. Don't forget that the U boat threat was almost certainly hindered in the first year of the war because of terrible German torpedoes, and then, as people have mentioned here, it was quite a localised conflict until the USA joined the war. Simply speaking, the need for VLR aircraft wasn't the same in 1940 as it was in 1942, for example.

The other thing here is priorities based on perception at the time. We look at things quite differently to the way in which they were looked at by the people making the decisions at the highest levels back then because we have the benefit of hindsight. It's like that silly argument that the British should have used Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers; there was no way this could have happened at all without the benefit of hindsight - and a whole lot of things that didn't happen happening and a whole lot of things that did happen, not happening that we can only see because we have the internet and they didn't in 1940. Who was to state that bombing German and French targets was of a lesser priority than hunting U boats at the time? The guys making the decisions simply could not have known any different based on what they understood at the time, so again, how could they have known what you or any post-war author knows?

In the war against the U boats a lot had to happen to reach the point in 1943 when the threat no longer was as great as it was even a year earlier. It wasn't just the availability of VLR aircraft, such things as Ultra decrypts, the development of centimetric radar, the necessity for the protection of the GIUK Gap, the production of freighters, escort carriers, corvettes, Leigh Lights etc had to happen. A lot of moving pieces have to be put into place before the U boat threat can be brought under control. Simply offering long range bombers as maritime patrol aircraft doesn't do much good without that centimetric radar, or without the benefit of Ultra and so on.

 

[Snautzer01]

I think nuuumannn makes sensible arguments.

I have trouble with this:

Who was to state that bombing German and French targets was of a lesser priority than hunting U boats at the time?

They knew. WW1 .

 

[nuuumannn]

I think nuuumannn makes sensible arguments.



They knew. WW1 .

So, what happened between WW1 and WW2? The Treaty of Versailles? German disarmament? German rearmament? the Nazis, "Peace in our Time"? Did the British or anyone else know in 1935 or 1939 even that this was exactly what the Germans were going to do again? How many U boats did Germany have in 1939 when the war broke out? Did the British have an exact figure of how many there were? Was there sufficient number for the Germans to to launch such a campaign in 1939? How could anyone have predicted, before the war, just what or how much the Wehrmacht was going to be capable of during the war? A conflict that while everyone saw it coming, no one predicted just how it might play out?

See, you're projecting because of what you know from the past - "the benefit of hindsight". Without the benefit of knowing what you know, there is no way that the British Air Ministry in 1939 or even a year later could have known that German U boats were going to be as great a threat as it was by 1942. In 1939 the priority was different to what it was in 1940, 1941, 1942 etc, etc, let alone before the war. What about the Germans themselves? Their priorities constantly changed during the war, let alone before it. If Operation Seelowe went ahead and succeeded, was there a need for a large number of U boats instead of a bigger surface fleet, which is what Hitler wanted to begin with? See, it was impossible to know, even with the knowledge of the Great War, exactly what was going to happen once the shooting started.

 

[Snautzer01]

So, what happened between WW1 and WW2? The Treaty of Versailles? German disarmament? German rearmament? the Nazis, "Peace in our Time"? Did the British or anyone else know in 1935 or 1939 even that this was exactly what the Germans were going to do again? How many U boats did Germany have in 1939 when the war broke out? Did the British have an exact figure of how many there were? Was there sufficient number for the Germans to to launch such a campaign in 1939? How could anyone have predicted, before the war, just what or how much the Wehrmacht was going to be capable of during the war? A conflict that while everyone saw it coming, no one predicted just how it might play out?

See, you're projecting because of what you know from the past - "the benefit of hindsight". Without the benefit of knowing what you know, there is no way that the British Air Ministry in 1939 or even a year later could have known that German U boats were going to be as great a threat as it was by 1942. In 1939 the priority was different to what it was in 1940, 1941, 1942 etc, etc, let alone before the war. What about the Germans themselves? Their priorities constantly changed during the war, let alone before it. If Operation Seelowe went ahead and succeeded, was there a need for a large number of U boats instead of a bigger surface fleet, which is what Hitler wanted to begin with? See, it was impossible to know, even with the knowledge of the Great War, exactly what was going to happen once the shooting started.

No. They did know about german subs. Not projecting, just facts. P
As is that subs almost strangled blighty. Again.
Churchill umong others made it very clear.

 

[nuuumannn]

No. They did know about german subs. Not projecting, just facts. P
As is that subs almost strangled blighty. Again.
Churchill umong others made it very clear.

Again, you're projecting what you know against what actually happened. Yes the British knew but they simply weren't as great a threat (text added). You are forgetting that before the war the Fuhrer did not intend on relying solely on U boats to bring Britain to its knees. He wanted a surface fleet to do that, not just the U boats, so that renders your logic untenable. A vastly greater amount of effort was put into building surface units - the Deutschlands, the Scharnhorsts, the Bismarcks, all took priority and by consequence, on the outbreak of war, the British began raids against German ports. The German surface fleet was neutralised slowly but surely over the course of time, but until this reality dawned on the Germans, the U boats were not the main priority - they only became so once the surface fleet began to suffer losses. Do you honestly think the Germans planned for the River Plate action, the loss of the Bismarck and the Channel Dash just so they could build more U boats? Once again, there was no way that anyone could have predicted these things would happen. The British did focus their effort in the right direction and again so when the U boats actually became a threat, the Admiral Graf Spee was scuttled, the Bismarck sunk, the Gneisenau never left port as a combat unit again after the Channel Dash and the Scharnhorst was sunk and Tirpitz bottled up in Norway beyond repair until it was sunk. That was the British priority from the very first day of the war - Churchill said that, too. You should know this already. Your argument is without foundation.

 

[SaparotRob]

Wasn't Churchill quoted as saying "the only thing that kept me awake was the U-boat threat" or words to that effect?

 

[nuuumannn]

Wasn't Churchill quoted as saying "the only thing that kept me awake was the U-boat threat" or words to that effect?

Yup, but not in 1939, or 1940 for that matter. The main priority was the surface fleet. Again how could he have known that back then? The British had no idea how many U boats the Germans had or where they were at any given time until Ultra really became effective from 1941/1942, they had to fly a Catalina for 13 hours to find the Bismarck. Everything they learned was based in scraps of intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft. It's not like Hitler was saying, "we're gonna get you guys with our subs, but only in a few years' time becoz our ships'll try first, so don't sink them!"