VVS Vs. RAF

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OR, you send up a plane with bombs that can conduct recainassance then blow it up while it's still there!
 
I believe, the SU advanced in strategical bombers only because of the avaiability of the nuke in post war times. By the way they did, they never cut off the lines of the specialized GA planes (Il10-il-28-MiG-27-Su-25). In opposition to this, they concentrated more on the GA role for their fighters, too (Mig-15 dsch).
The avaiability of the I-153 is perhaps overstressed by the statistics. The number given must be much lower, but I am not sure in howfar. A number between 1.800 and 2.100 seems to be plausible in 1941. Production lines for the I-153 have been closed in 1940. The most numerous plane of the VVS/PVO is the I-16 in 1941. While I do conduct still some search, 7.000 planes have been produced (the last of them came out in 1942) and a number between 2.800 and 3.500 deployed seems to be plausible for mid 1941.
I also concluded my looks into early soviet Radar tech (thanks to documents provided by E. A. Avramovich/Tartu) and there is quite a lot of evidence that the soviets also mastered radar but never evolved to a very high degree (like Britain):
The soviet scientist P.K. Ostschenko theoritcly prooved the value of Radar for the PVO as early as jule 1934. In october 1934 Tuchatschevski asked S.W. Kirow for support in order to produce 5 experiamental radar stations (allowing a theoritcal detection range of 200 Km at 10.000m). Problems of the insufficient developed soviet electronical industriess delayed the first unit RUS-1 to 1939. Two of these stations have been involved in the Finno-Soviet war of 1940. Operational used brought some tactical problems to daylight: Rus-1 only allowed a detection of range and direction but not the altitude, speed, heading and number of planes. Exchange with german documents eventually lead to the Rus-2 stations, which entered service in late 1940. These units succesfully could detect up to 120 Km distance (similar to the early german Freya-stations) the altitude, approx. number
and heading of planes. At mid 1941 28 Rus-2 stations have been deployed to PVO-sites like Moscow, Leningrad, Charkov, Baku and Odessa. Other stations have been deployed at Wjasma and Rshev.In late 1941, with increasing Luftwaffe sorties against Moscow these stations coworked with the 7th and 6th PVO air regiment.
I wouldn´t be too sure in the unability of VVS/PVO nightime sorties, esspeccially in 1941, since a total of 4,9% of their interception sorties are nighttime (most PVO) at the end of ww2, in 1945 the average nighttime sortie was above 42% of all VVS/PVO sorties. Even without airborne radar.
 
Well possible. If the Luftwaffe shifts to the nightime, the PVO (more than the VVS) would adopt in their tactics to counter them.
Another interesting point is that the strategical bomber force of the SU, while equipped with obsolete TB-3 had some precision capabilities with underwing mounted bomb equipped I-16, which succeeded in destroying key bridges in the early phase of combat.
 
The Russians though never really needed a Strategic bombing force in WW2, they needed to beat the Germans back off of there own turn and the British and the US were doing it for them.
 
The Luftwaffe were never developing night offensive technology, it was always to counter the British offensive campaign. The Soviet Union would have to do the same as the Germans as the British would block, jam and scramble any Soviet radar.

The night interceptions by the PVO were lucky if anything, as I say the Luftwaffe did not have effective offensive night capabilities. There's a big difference between intercepting blind He-111 with Bf-110 escort with your RADAR intact and intcepting Lancasters with NF Mosquitos with blocked RADAR.
 
It wasn't an offensive element, is what I was saying. It was purely on the defensive against the British night offensive campaign.
 
Glider >> I did not say there were no mobile radars used, even Japanese had some mobile radar technology at the end of war. I sat none of the countries put in to wide use powerful enough mobile radar platform. By powerful I mean range and ability to measure height.

DerAdlerIstGelandet >> as you sad, that was just project. Was it ever used in combat?

Here is for example site about Japanese Radar Equipment in WWII:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/radar.htm

It is at exelent page about Imperial Japanese Navy:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm ...recomending.
 
Arras no it was never used in combat. I was just posting it showing that the idea for a AWACS type plane was in the works. The United States actually tookt he idea and used it for there AWACS.
 
How stupid!
 
You quote all of that to post 2 words?! And that in a thread that hasn't seen a posting in over a year.

If you have an argument to make, then make it. Otherwise keep reading and familiarize yourself with the site before spouting off.
 
The Soviets did not have to face the full might of the luftwaffe particularly during the later part of the war when German fighters were defending the homeland from bombers. I will try to find some stats on German losses by theatre.
 
different doctrines folks.
most action of ww2 was undertaken on the ground (and oceans).
soviet doctrine sacrificed VVS to ground support, and Red Army scored sensible results. VVS not was engaged too much against enemy AFs, unless ground OPs required that.
so LW hunters enjoyed scores, Wehrmacht enjoyed loses, Red Army enjoyed (hard and bloody, but decisive) victories and VVS heavily suffered from hunters in favour of army success.
in case of SU vs UK opposition (with another geographical situation), doctrine will be quite different.
i'm almost sure in it, because national socialism and international socialism are somehow similar and could invent similar decisions.

at least TB-7(Pe-8) for heavy bombing, MiG-3 for altitude fights, Pe-3 for long ranges were ready-to-use projects (though required some refining). Pe-8 gave it's AM-35A in favour of massive production of AM-38 for Il-2. MiG-3 was powered with AM-35A too. anyways, Pe-8 etalon 1943 received M-82 engines, and MiG-3 received 2xShVAK in late 1941, Pe-3 much actively provided far-sea air cover. but both AM-35A users fade out because they were outside of doctrines of eastern front.

as for airborne radar, it was symmetrical: LW did not have strong night bombing power, SU had relaxed experiments with airborne radars. had LW strong force, SU would develop airborne radars more actively. so far, gneis-1 airborne radar was ready in early 1941, and gneis-2 in late 1941. gneis-2 was installed to pe-2. the problem was a carrier: in 1943 SU understood that A-20 was more convenient for radar than pe-2/3.

p.s.about rus-1 redut-n: detection ranges was 120-250km, and during Leningrad siege radar stations alarmed 642 air warnings which broken several major raids to city and port. some radars imho were used at frontlines too.
 


Fhew! This man has to be the most peculiar germanophiliac I've ever met! Hey, Germany lost the war in 1945, try to move on ok...
 

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