Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Shortround6]

P-51D was a heavy bird. With about a (max) 1,500 hp engine. Six guns with 380 rounds each. That's not lightly armed. 2,000 lbs heavier than a Spitfire Mk IX or a Bf 109G-6.

The P-51D was heavy, however it had about 1590hp military at 8500ft in low blower, not WEP. It had 1370hp at 21,400ft.
The P-51B/C with 4 guns and the earlier V-1650-3 engines were good for 1490hp at 13,750ft in low gear and 1210hp at 25,800ft.
From AHT and other sources may differ and maybe correct. Again, this is Military power and NOT WEP.

Two slow firing 12.7mm plus maybe two 7.7mm guns in the wing was enough to shoot down quite a few Allied aircraft.

Then two slow firing 12.7mm guns and four fast firing .303s or .30s should have been able to shoot down quite a few Axis aircraft and not need six .50 cal guns

Putting the .50 cals in the US planes probably wasn't such a head-scratcher,

In 1940 there may have been justification. see below.

The P-40 was right on the edge of being overloaded, largely depending on the engine power. At 1,000 or 1,100 HP and 8,500 lbs, it was too heavy with the six guns. When they adjusted the power rating to more like 1,300 or 1,400 hp, six guns wasn't such a burden, though they still had the performance ceiling problem above a bout 12,000 ft.

There was no edge about it. The P-40 was overloaded. At 6780lbs a P-40 (no letter) with 370lbs of guns and ammo and 720lbs of fuel (120 US gallons) and the -33 Allison means you are heavier than Hurricane or Spitfire (or 109). The weights are from the "Official Summary of Characteristics" but they aren't quite telling the truth.
By the time you get to the P-40B the "Official Summary of Characteristics" shows a gross weight of 7326lbs (Performance is for a weight of 6835lbs. Go figure?)
Fuel is still 720lbs (120 us gal) but guns and ammo is up to 600lbs and there is 93lbs of armor and there is some sort of self sealing/protection on the fuel tank/s. You do have the option of not filling the ammunition bins.

History is a bit murky here on the .50 cal in 1940. At the Beginning of 1940 the guns cycled at no better than 600rpm and that was unsynchronized. When synchronized they were between 400 and 500rpm.
I Have seen no documents or letters or memos as to why the F4F went to 6 guns or why the P-40E went to 6 guns or why other planes in in 1940 were given the battery of guns they were given.
What we do know is that by the end of 1940 or at some point in early 1941 they had figured out how to get the .50 cal guns to fire at around 800rpm, at least unsynchronized and the actual need for 6 and 8 gun batteries diminished, at least from a theoretical rate of fire point of view. British were having trouble getting the .50 cal guns in Tomahawks to fire at all in the spring of 1941. More guns meant a better chance of something firing? US ordnance is rather quiet.
Now during 1940 the US also changed the ammo and tweaked the bullet weight a little bit and the velocity a lot. When this ammo actually shows up is subject to question. The British never changed their specification for the ammo (about 2500fps) on any ammo they actually bought or ordered. They were perfectly fine taking the later US spec ammo (2880fps?), When the US got the high velocity stuff is subject to question but I assume (with all the risk that entails) it was before combat really got hot in 1942. What was in the Philippines or other places in Dec 1941 I have no idea.

In the summer of 1940 is when the P-40 really porks up. That is when they start making the decisions that result in the P-40D and P-40E. Remember, summer of 1940, 100 octane fuel was 100 octane, not 125 or 100/130. plain old 100 octane.
By the time the first P-40D rolls out the door the design weight is over 7800lbs, This is for four .50 cal MGs and 1000 round of ammo. (250rpg) it is also for a 180lb pilot (pilot lost 20lbs since flying the P-40B) and 120 US gallons of fuel.
Now part of the "porking up" was that in overload condition the P-40D was supposed to hold 2460 rounds of ammo for the four guns, (an increase of 438lb) an extra 25.5 gallons of fuel in the rear tank, a 52 gallon drop tank with oil to match and six 20lb bombs. and few other items that brought the weight to 8777lbs. Granted nobody was considering combat maneuvers with that load but the -39 engine of 1150hp at around 12,000ft was being asked to move a lot weight even at 7800lbs.
P-40E with 6 guns was carrying 1410 rounds but there was room in the ammo boxes for 1870 rounds.

I can understand there being some confusion as to expected rates of fire in 1940/early 1941 and how many guns maybe needed. There may even be some arguments as to how long you need to fire the guns for but anybody who had lifted 100 rounds of .50 cal ammo should have been under no illusion as to what they were asking the P-40D & E to do. It is spelled out in the pilots manual, over 1000lbs of guns, ammo and miscellaneous equipment for the wing guns in over load condition.

At least on the F4F when they went for four guns to six they cut the ammo from 430 rpg to 240 rpg.

 

[Shortround6]

When they adjusted the power rating to more like 1,300 or 1,400 hp, six guns wasn't such a burden, though they still had the performance ceiling problem above a bout 12,000 ft.

Actually the performance ceiling problem kicked in lower. At 12,000ft you were down to the original 1150-1200hp power limit (depending on RAM) the 1400hp power level was a lot lower, like around 5,000-6000ft and you can draw a line on a graph for the power in-between.
Aside from intake manifold and/or backfire screens the -73 engine is going to give the same power at the same altitudes as the -39 engine or the -33 engine (although the weaker -33 engine would be gambling more on staying together. The -39 was rated at 56in at some point.
All the really high power levels by P-40s were done at really low levels.

 

[33k in the air]

Which is a good bit more than the ammunition carried in a P-40.

The P-51B only carried 1,260 rounds total for its four guns.

As to the P-40, from I recall, the normal load for the six-gun P-40F was 235 rounds per gun, or 1,410 rounds total. But it could be overloaded to 312/291/240 rounds, respectively, for the three guns in each wing, raising the total to 1,686 rounds. The P40D with four guns could carry 615 rounds for each, or 2,460 in total. Going from four to six guns certainly seemed to cut down on the maximum ammo load.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The P-51D was heavy, however it had about 1590hp military at 8500ft in low blower, not WEP. It had 1370hp at 21,400ft.
The P-51B/C with 4 guns and the earlier V-1650-3 engines were good for 1490hp at 13,750ft in low gear and 1210hp at 25,800ft.
From AHT and other sources may differ and maybe correct. Again, this is Military power and NOT WEP.

Then two slow firing 12.7mm guns and four fast firing .303s or .30s should have been able to shoot down quite a few Axis aircraft and not need six .50 cal guns

If you are referring to the Tomahawk, on the one hand, it did not have the performance of an MC.202. But on the other hand, they actually did shoot down quite a few Axis aircraft with them. Both in China and in North Africa

In the summer of 1940 is when the P-40 really porks up. That is when they start making the decisions that result in the P-40D and P-40E. Remember, summer of 1940, 100 octane fuel was 100 octane, not 125 or 100/130. plain old 100 octane.
By the time the first P-40D rolls out the door the design weight is over 7800lbs, This is for four .50 cal MGs and 1000 round of ammo. (250rpg) it is also for a 180lb pilot (pilot lost 20lbs since flying the P-40B) and 120 US gallons of fuel.
Now part of the "porking up" was that in overload condition the P-40D was supposed to hold 2460 rounds of ammo for the four guns, (an increase of 438lb) an extra 25.5 gallons of fuel in the rear tank, a 52 gallon drop tank with oil to match and six 20lb bombs. and few other items that brought the weight to 8777lbs. Granted nobody was considering combat maneuvers with that load but the -39 engine of 1150hp at around 12,000ft was being asked to move a lot weight even at 7800lbs.
P-40E with 6 guns was carrying 1410 rounds but there was room in the ammo boxes for 1870 rounds.

And yet, P-40Es definitely shot down a ton of enemy aircraft. Even before they worked out how to increase the boost so they were getting more HP.

Once they did, they had 1470 hp when they needed it, which was enough to move all those guns around well enough. If they were willing to bend the rules (and take a risk) they could have 1,600 hp or more. As we know.

I can understand there being some confusion as to expected rates of fire in 1940/early 1941 and how many guns maybe needed. There may even be some arguments as to how long you need to fire the guns for but anybody who had lifted 100 rounds of .50 cal ammo should have been under no illusion as to what they were asking the P-40D & E to do. It is spelled out in the pilots manual, over 1000lbs of guns, ammo and miscellaneous equipment for the wing guns in over load condition.

At least on the F4F when they went for four guns to six they cut the ammo from 430 rpg to 240 rpg.

Maybe they were just looking at the steadily increasing power of engines over time

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The P-51B only carried 1,260 rounds total for its four guns.

As to the P-40, from I recall, the normal load for the six-gun P-40F was 235 rounds per gun, or 1,410 rounds total. But it could be overloaded to 312/291/240 rounds, respectively, for the three guns in each wing, raising the total to 1,686 rounds. The P40D with four guns could carry 615 rounds for each, or 2,460 in total. Going from four to six guns certainly seemed to cut down on the maximum ammo load.

My understanding is that the normal load carried, at least in the Med, was in the 270 -230 rounds range. One of the many small weight saving measures. Of course this was up to the individual unit and even individual pilot in some cases.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Actually the performance ceiling problem kicked in lower. At 12,000ft you were down to the original 1150-1200hp power limit (depending on RAM) the 1400hp power level was a lot lower, like around 5,000-6000ft and you can draw a line on a graph for the power in-between.
Aside from intake manifold and/or backfire screens the -73 engine is going to give the same power at the same altitudes as the -39 engine or the -33 engine (although the weaker -33 engine would be gambling more on staying together. The -39 was rated at 56in at some point.
All the really high power levels by P-40s were done at really low levels.

Well, that actually depends on the P-40. And I guess on atmospheric conditions and so on.

The flight chart for the P-40F allows for WEP at 4,500 ft and 12,000 ft. (and military rating for 1,240 hp at 11,500 ft / 1,129 at 18,500 ft)
The P-40N flight chart allows for WEP at 7,500 ft (no ram), or 10,000 ft with ram. One Australian test showed full throttle height for a P-40N in level flight at 9,200 ft.

More importantly, a pilot flying any type of P-40 could get down to the thicker air in very short order, and then find himself with an advantage over his opponent. In the P-40K the rated WEP is 1550 hp at 60" Hg and 3,000 RPM. On the flight chart. That's plenty of push to either get away or turn the tables, as they quite often did. And as we know an E can push that hard as well (and we know they did- and far beyond that)

Success in air combat often came down to being able to get away when it wasn't going well. That was one of the big advantages of the Mustang too. I think it's the main reason for the difference in outcomes between the Hurricane and the Kittyhawk in North Africa. That and a fast roll rate and dive acceleration.

 

[Shortround6]

If you are referring to the Tomahawk, on the one hand, it did not have the performance of an MC.202. But on the other hand, they actually did shoot down quite a few Axis aircraft with them. Both in China and in North Africa



And yet, P-40Es definitely shot down a ton of enemy aircraft. Even before they worked out how to increase the boost so they were getting more HP.

Once they did, they had 1470 hp when they needed it, which was enough to move all those guns around well enough. If they were willing to bend the rules (and take a risk) they could have 1,600 hp or more. As we know.



Maybe they were just looking at the steadily increasing power of engines over time

I give up.
the P-40 could have won the war on it's own.

No need for Spitfires in NA or P-38s or any other US fighters.

Just wait for the Germans to come down to under 10,000ft.
Having 1600hp at 3,000ft means you don't have to worry about what anybody was doing at 20,000ft.

 

[WARSPITER]

The real question is whether the air assets were decisive at Alamein.

Perhaps it would be best to define the extent of the decisiveness. Decisive at some points of the battle, decisive at all points ?
Decisive in strangling supply and keeping heads down ?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Extra notes. Hurricane export figures in 1941/42, early on some for the Middle East diverted to Malaya, Burma and India, later some meant for India diverted to Middle East. Bostons, in addition to the imports in 1941 there was a diversion of around 40 A-20C from shipments to the USSR in mid 1942 which helped enable their use at Alamein.

Yes. You are struggling with verifiable data and some basic concepts simultaneously. I think you should pick a different hill to die on.

I am not on a hill, you are looking up from the hole.

No. Wrong across the board. First "tail shot off" - you asked how could an aircraft land with it's tail shot off? As if Shores made it up. I posted a photograph of an aircraft of that same exact type, which had landed with it's tail (partly) shot off.

Anybody else noting the usual difference between the handling of an aircraft with its tail shot off versus partly shot off?

I was trying to help you understand what the RAAF unit was reporting. For your benefit as I knew exactly what they meant and I suspect 99% of people reading the post already understood exactly what they meant.

I looked up the unit records, they say tail damage, Shores reports tail shot off. I was trying to help you what the RAAF unit was reporting and it was not tail shot off. I even told where to look up the actual squadron records.

I took a quick total of the Shores loss lists, versus the air force ones I reported, however after hitting 8 February 1942 and its defend to death interpretation I decided not to put in the time to tally the Shores list by type etc. and then compare. Seems no one else is interested either.

So what?

The point about a working rear area system is that this will influence what level of damage will result in an aircraft being removed from a unit and that for intensive operations these removals will probably go up to help the unit do operations rather than repairing damage. Aircraft carriers are known to practice an extreme version of this.

You are definitely the problem here. 100%. Not Shores or his sources (basically the RAAF data, as the tail damaged aircraft was with 3 RAAF),

No actually, I have already noted I expect the Shores list to be good, but it has a mixture of lost and damaged which means it is much less likely to be accurate if damaged aircraft are included in any analysis and it has language problems at times when deciding if an aircraft was truly lost, I also noted your use of the material and am pointing out the problems with that. Your photographs show you counted as lost an aircraft that landed with tail damage, back in service within 3 days. So clearly that must be the criteria for losses on both sides. As stated I showed where to look up the original squadron records and I am still wondering how tail damage became tail shot off.

The second fact that you are struggling with here is the idea that the Allies reported three confirmed and four probable victories, but didn't actually get any.

Once again, I asked whether you believed all the allied fighter pilots totally missed, given what damage an allied plane took to be considered lost and once again no answer, just a defective questioner label. My conclusion is Shores list is considered too important to note its limitations. We are stuck with your interpretation of Shores' interpretation of the records and your opinion the information on damaged aircraft is complete enough or at least even handed enough, even for those lightly damaged, repaired by unit, back in a couple of days. Simply, no.

Your assumption on error or conspiracy without even ever seeing the book seems very unfounded to me. Your persistence in insisting something is amiss is, while not unusual in such discussions, not very much to your credit here IMO.

I thought it was obvious I had a copy of the book, by reporting the duplicated entry, typing both versions in a message, plus being able to trace the aircraft mentioned to see what the Air Force records I have copies of say about them, that required the serials.

Now what you need to do is explain the thought processes involved in coming to the conclusion I did not have the book, add where the conspiracy and assumptions about my assumptions came from.

Your claim of how much impact the US 105mm SPG had on Alamein being made with no idea of the number of guns or amount of combat seen put a big hole in your information free pass supply and an even bigger one in the opinion free pass supply as far as I am concerned, the amount of contradictory material you ignore is also a problem. The way opinions are piled up high enough to support a sign saying fact is not convincing. As the data I uploaded shows I am using air force documents at times, not filtered through the writing and publishing processes a book goes through.

I'd say watch the video. I'm not going to comment on possible Canadian bias,

I asked for your definition of what offensive and defensive is in your statement, I did not say bias by the way.

I just went up to my bookshelf to count. I have nine books on the ground war in North Africa, not counting Osprey Military books.

An extensive collection.

putting the DAF on the "umbrella" mission almost got the Army annihilated during Operation Battleaxe, and switching back to CAS (thanks to a directive to "Concentrate on ground strafing" in Jun 1941) is what saved the retreating army from total annihilation.

So which of the books support your claim?

No. In 1942 the British were operating mainly Boston Mk III, with IV and V coming later, and Baltimore III (later IIIA, IV and V).

Boston IV/V = A20-J/K, A-20 J acceptances from November 1943, first deliveries for Britain January 1944, A-20K 1 in March 1944 then production from June, first deliveries for Britain September 1944. So much later for these versions.

Bostons with 12 SAAF squadron from January 1942, bombing operations from March, including night operations and 24 squadron from November 1941, bombing operations from February 1942. According to their abbreviated histories.

Mark I and II were the bulk of the Desert Air Force Baltimore strength in 1942. I mislead myself about which version introduced turrets by failing to note the performance specifications of the mark III were accompanied by a drawing of a mark I. Baltimore I and II accepted June 1941 to January 1942, Baltimore III January to June 1942, IIIa from August 1942. The first 150, the mark I and II, were without turrets, imports passed that mark in April 1942. If I read the import documents correctly the Baltimores came by ship around the cape until switched to being flown direct starting in December 1942. I also understand the British built turrets were delivered to the Middle East for fitting. Note the time it took to ship, assemble and start to deliver the Baltimores to squadrons, plus the time it took to train the crews, at the extreme, June 1941 in the US to first operations in May 1942. Baltimore squadrons

21 Squadron SAAF Baltimore, no mark given, from February 1942 but the abbreviated history has in training until October 1942.
52 Squadron III Jan 43
55 Squadron II May 42 to Dec 42, III Oct 42
69 Squadron I/II June 42, III Apr 43
162 Squadron II Sep 42, III Jan 44
203 Squadron I/II Aug 42, III Dec 42
223 Squadron I Jan 42, II March 42, III Jul 42, the III replaced the I and II.
454 Squadron III Feb 43
As of end October 1942 there were 6 squadrons, one with unknown marks, one with mark III, one with a mixture of I, II and III.

The Boston III was lightly armed with two dorsal and one ventral .303, but had a maximum speed of 338 mph at 12,500 ft., vs. Blenheim IV of 266 mph at 11,800 ft. That is over 70 mph faster than a Blenheim and trust me, that does make a difference.

Good to know you can try to patronise. By the way an extra 40 mph also makes a difference. Meantime the lower Boston speed I quoted is wrong, it has its origins in the 1940/41 testing where the RAF was unable to reproduce US performance figures.

As for the Baltimore, I can see in Shores (sorry) that 21 SAAF lost a Baltimore III AH141 on Oct 27, and 233 Sqn RAF lost a Baltimore III AG959 on Oct 28

Why the sorry, apart from trying to use late October losses to describe what happened earlier?

To complete Baltimore production, the IV stated in December 1942 with 1 acceptance for the month and the V in June 1943, again 1 acceptance for the month.

This version of the Baltimore (version III) had a Boulton Paul power turret with quad .303 machine guns. These were ordered in 1940 I don't know when they arrived. But they were flying at the time of second El Alamein.

See above

 

[Mike Williams]

As to knowing my P-40's, I've been research this type for 30 years so I would hope I know enough to be dangerous (only type I research) and at last count I have 15,000 plus archives files from around the world on the aircraft, Pilots log book copies, operation records, Combat reports, the odd photo or 20 etc , but there's always stuff you don't know, so discussions like this are awesome in pointing you in new directions to look for data

At the start of the 2nd Battle of El Alamain 450, 112, 250 was fully equipped with Kittyhawk III's, 260 SQN was on Kittyhawk II's, 3 RAAF was flying Kittyhawk Is, with a single Kittyhawk III, but by the end of the battle were flying a mix of Kittyhawk I and Kittyhawk II's (the single III was off unit by this time), and both 2 and 4 SQN (SAAF) on Kittyhawk I. During El Alamain the 11 Squadrons equipped with P-40's were assigned were bomber escort, Armed Recce, Long ranged Strafing attacks and Fighter bomber operations. As to the P-40M, there's a mix up in the usage, the biggest user of the M model was the Russians, followed by the USAAF (not a couple, actually over 120 aircraft (over 1/6th the production run), served in CBI, CENTPAC and home based). The detail of Squadron strengths comes from DAF opsums July-Nov 1942 and is just lumped together to show that those Units had a mix of P-40's without breaking out who has what (its done by wing - hence it states Kittyhawk I/II/III)

Post #38 - The 57th FG was fully equipped with P-40F, the K models did not appear in the 57th FG until late Nov 1942

Post #55 - The first SAAF SQN to receive P-40K's was 2 SQN - and they were not happy with them at all.......lots of Maintenance and engine issues (most second hand) all were K models (mix of long and short tailed), 5 SAAF on the other hand operated both K and M models when they re-equipped.

Post #67 - Of an interesting note 3 SQN managed to swap its Kittyhawk III's for Kittyhawk II's from 260 SQN in Dec 1942. 260 SQN had started to get Kittyhawk III's so rather than both squadrons flying a mix, the two CO's agreed to swap the 4 Kittyhawk III's that 3 SQN had for 4 Kittyhawk II's.

Post #197 - Don't forget that Tomahawks were also used for TACR in North Africa - 208 SQN and 40 SAAF both used them late in 1942

I hope that helps with some further understanding on the Tomahawk/Kittyhawks.........if anyone is looking for a particular day or aircraft let me know (only Tomahawks/Kittyhawk thou).

Buz

For clarification, which Middle East squadrons used P-40 types from roughly October 1942 to December 1942?

An Allison Division memo regarding Service Use of High Power Outputs on Allison V-1710 Engines notes that units in the Middle East were resetting boost controls to 66" Hg. (18 lbs./sq.in.). I am curious to know if there is any supporting evidence from Operations Record Books, Sortie Reports, Combat Reports, Unit Histories, Engineering Section Reports, etc. showing use of 66" Hg. boost on P-40s during the Oct. - Dec. 1942 period preceding the Allison memo. Have you seen anything along these lines? Thanks.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I give up.
the P-40 could have won the war on it's own.

There is considerable daylight between 'the P-40 was overloaded with a garbage truck full of guns and dead meat to Axis fighters' vs. 'P-40 wins the war by itself'.

No need for Spitfires in NA or P-38s or any other US fighters.

Just wait for the Germans to come down to under 10,000ft.
Having 1600hp at 3,000ft means you don't have to worry about what anybody was doing at 20,000ft.

No, being able to escape helped, but it really wasn't enough against Bf 109F or G. As I've pointed out many times, it was really the P-40F which could still perform reasonably well at 20,000 ft which made a significant difference, along with the Spitfire and later the P-38 (though as we know, the P-38s had a bit more trouble initially).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The real question is whether the air assets were decisive at Alamein.

Perhaps it would be best to define the extent of the decisiveness. Decisive at some points of the battle, decisive at all points ?
Decisive in strangling supply and keeping heads down ?

My hope was to start getting into the data, but since apparently not even Christopher Shores is admissible around here as a source any more, I'm not sure how you move forward.

The data is actually there. It's just a matter of pointing it out. But we can't agree on the most basic preliminary concepts (like sometimes pilots overclaimed a lot, or the idea that a plane that crash landed is shot down, even if only temporarily)

 

[WARSPITER]

What I was wanting to know was in what way are we looking at this. If we are looking at the decisive contribution
made by stopping the Axis air power then maybe that would be a good place to start.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Anybody else noting the usual difference between the handling of an aircraft with its tail shot off versus partly shot off?

"Partly" shot off was what I see in that photo, which I'm sure is of a different aircraft. "Tail shot off" comes from records used by Shores. Do you think he made it up? I agree the aircraft in the photo probably made a proper (not 'crash') landing because it's sitting on it's wheels. But I posted that only as an example that an aircraft could land with it's tail 'shot off', and that this is the kind of (quite common) damage probably being referred to by somebody with 3 RAAF. I wasn't claiming or pretending it was the same aircraft.

I looked up the unit records, they say tail damage, Shores reports tail shot off. I was trying to help you what the RAAF unit was reporting and it was not tail shot off. I even told where to look up the actual squadron records.

Again, do you think he made it up? Or the more obvious answer - there is more than one record or note about this aircraft and this incident. Maybe the mechanic or repair facility that fixed it, maybe the wing command staff, the pilot or crew chief of the aircraft. The one you are looking at obviously isn't precisely the same one Shores used but obviously describes the same incident and condition.

I took a quick total of the Shores loss lists, versus the air force ones I reported, however after hitting 8 February 1942 and its defend to death interpretation I decided not to put in the time to tally the Shores list by type etc. and then compare. Seems no one else is interested either.

If you have the numbers, post them. I encouraged you to do that right out of the gate. Just state your criteria and use the same criteria for both sides, I think you will find the same ratio of about 3-1 in favor of the Axis in the range of dates I used.

The point about a working rear area system is that this will influence what level of damage will result in an aircraft being removed from a unit and that for intensive operations these removals will probably go up to help the unit do operations rather than repairing damage. Aircraft carriers are known to practice an extreme version of this.

No actually, I have already noted I expect the Shores list to be good, but it has a mixture of lost and damaged which means it is much less likely to be accurate if damaged aircraft are included in any analysis and it has language problems at times when deciding if an aircraft was truly lost, I also noted your use of the material and am pointing out the problems with that. Your photographs show you counted as lost an aircraft that landed with tail damage, back in service within 3 days. So clearly that must be the criteria for losses on both sides. As stated I showed where to look up the original squadron records and I am still wondering how tail damage became tail shot off.

I don't know how many times I have to point this out, especially since you say you have the book. Shores never said anything about being 'lost' - he said 'crash landed at the base, tail shot off'. Which I seriously doubt he invented or embellished!

The idea of counting 'crash landed' in a tally of shot down aircraft was a decision that I made for purposes of determining air superiority, and which I explained in post 108 when I posted Shores loss data for Feb 8 - 25 May 1942. And whether you count that aircraft on that day or not, (or any 'crash landed' aircraft) it's clear the Germans were dominant (the Allies lost five 'shot down' vs zero for the Axis). Like I said before, if you want to make your own tally with your own preferred criteria, feel free. I believe that trying to assess how long a damaged aircraft is out of action and if / when it ever goes back into action is too large of a task for something like this forum discussion. Maybe if you were writing an academic paper or a book.

Once again, I asked whether you believed all the allied fighter pilots totally missed, given what damage an allied plane took to be considered lost and once again no answer, just a defective questioner label.

Really? I thought it was pretty obvious. Let me be even clearer. Yes, I believe ALL THE ALLIED FIGHTER PILOTS TOTALLY MISSED on that day. The Allied planes that crash landed which I counted as 'lost', were 'lost' by my clearly stated criteria simply because it was listed as 'crash-landed' rather than 'landed'. Because that is the criteria I decided to use (not Shores). The key factor here being the aircraft was no longer able to fly as the result of enemy action. The amount of damage is irrelevant. You can have an aircraft hit by 20 cannon shells and practically shredded, but made it back to base and was able to land. Even if it could never fly again, you can't say it was 'shot down'. But if one rifle caliber bullet or a single shell fragment punctured the radiator or oil tank and caused the engine to seize up, and the plane crashes or crash-lands, then it's 'shot down'.

My conclusion is Shores list is considered too important to note its limitations. We are stuck with your interpretation of Shores' interpretation of the records and your opinion the information on damaged aircraft is complete enough or at least even handed enough, even for those lightly damaged, repaired by unit, back in a couple of days. Simply, no.

It's the shot down part I was counting here, not the extent of damage. Although I also counted heavily (or more than 60% by the German criteria) damaged as well. If you want to count up months of data you have to pick some easily measurable criteria and stick with that. I have yet to see any evidence from any of your posts that Shores missed any records of German fighters shot down or damaged on that day. Did you find some?

I thought it was obvious I had a copy of the book, by reporting the duplicated entry, typing both versions in a message, plus being able to trace the aircraft mentioned to see what the Air Force records I have copies of say about them, that required the serials.

Now what you need to do is explain the thought processes involved in coming to the conclusion I did not have the book, add where the conspiracy and assumptions about my assumptions came from.

I asked for your definition of what offensive and defensive is in your statement, I did not say bias by the way.

In post 216, you said: "we have a Canadian historian highlighting the Canadian input." This seems to me to imply bias.

You feel that Shores isn't honest and seem to me to be implying that he has a pro Axis bias or that he embellishes data.

You cast plenty of aspersions against me over minor errors in my posts that I've acknowledged when pointed out, but you have made just as many errors, even gone way out on a limb on some of them, and don't admit it when it's pointed out to you.

You even seem to imply in several of your posts some kind of bias by historians against the ground commanders or the ground war in favor of air power.

I see a lot of conspiratorial insinuations and complaints when there is no way to overturn the data.

Your claim of how much impact the US 105mm SPG had on Alamein being made with no idea of the number of guns or amount of combat seen put a big hole in your information free pass supply and an even bigger one in the opinion free pass supply as far as I am concerned, the amount of contradictory material you ignore is also a problem. The way opinions are piled up high enough to support a sign saying fact is not convincing. As the data I uploaded shows I am using air force documents at times, not filtered through the writing and publishing processes a book goes through.

I'm not sure precisely how important the M7s were at El Alamein but I do think an SP gun is different from a towed artillery gun, and the M7 is clearly much better than a 25 pounder. I would like to look into the data if we ever get to that point.

Boston IV/V = A20-J/K, A-20 J acceptances from November 1943, first deliveries for Britain January 1944, A-20K 1 in March 1944 then production from June, first deliveries for Britain September 1944. So much later for these versions.

Bostons with 12 SAAF squadron from January 1942, bombing operations from March, including night operations and 24 squadron from November 1941, bombing operations from February 1942. According to their abbreviated histories.

Mark I and II were the bulk of the Desert Air Force Baltimore strength in 1942. I mislead myself about which version introduced turrets by failing to note the performance specifications of the mark III were accompanied by a drawing of a mark I. Baltimore I and II accepted June 1941 to January 1942, Baltimore III January to June 1942, IIIa from August 1942. The first 150, the mark I and II, were without turrets, imports passed that mark in April 1942. If I read the import documents correctly the Baltimores came by ship around the cape until switched to being flown direct starting in December 1942. I also understand the British built turrets were delivered to the Middle East for fitting. Note the time it took to ship, assemble and start to deliver the Baltimores to squadrons, plus the time it took to train the crews, at the extreme, June 1941 in the US to first operations in May 1942. Baltimore squadrons

21 Squadron SAAF Baltimore, no mark given, from February 1942 but the abbreviated history has in training until October 1942.
52 Squadron III Jan 43
55 Squadron II May 42 to Dec 42, III Oct 42
69 Squadron I/II June 42, III Apr 43
162 Squadron II Sep 42, III Jan 44
203 Squadron I/II Aug 42, III Dec 42
223 Squadron I Jan 42, II March 42, III Jul 42, the III replaced the I and II.
454 Squadron III Feb 43
As of end October 1942 there were 6 squadrons, one with unknown marks, one with mark III, one with a mixture of I, II and III.

So what? Boston III and Baltimore III were both in action at El Alamein, which is something you seem to be trying to evade. Both were markedly superior bombers than the Blenheim IV, were considerably faster, carried more bombs and the Baltimore III had much better armament to boot. You just don't want to admit you were wrong.

Good to know you can try to patronise. By the way an extra 40 mph also makes a difference. Meantime the lower Boston speed I quoted is wrong, it has its origins in the 1940/41 testing where the RAF was unable to reproduce US performance figures.

Yes it does. I certainly never said otherwise. But the 70 mph speed difference of the Boston certainly enhanced it's defense a bit more, which is probably why they got the extra guns onto the Baltimore a bit earlier.

Why the sorry, apart from trying to use late October losses to describe what happened earlier?

To complete Baltimore production, the IV stated in December 1942 with 1 acceptance for the month and the V in June 1943, again 1 acceptance for the month.


See above

I used late October losses because I opened the book at random looking for dates during the second El Alamein period and those were the first two losses I found, from two different squadrons which I deem sufficient to make the rather obvious point. They didn't lose a lot of bombers at that point which is actually very salient to the original point I was making about effective bomber escort.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

What I was wanting to know was in what way are we looking at this. If we are looking at the decisive contribution
made by stopping the Axis air power then maybe that would be a good place to start.

Yes I think the data does show that, and it's also acknowledged by Rommel himself in a couple of the book excerpts that people posted to the thread.

I think you can see the following:

the Axis close air support was blocked from having the kind of impact it had in previous battles. 'The Stuka is dead in range of land based fighters' to paraphrase Tedder's notes after the battle.
the Axis aircraft were mostly unable to carry out long range strikes against Allied targets (though they did nearly wreck the Malta convoys)
the Allied air strikes had a significant impact on Axis shipping
the Allied air strikes had a significant impact on Axis port facilities
the Allied air strikes had a significant impact on Axis truck transport and rear supply depots
the Allied air strikes had a significant impact on Axis airfields (destroying much larger numbers of Axis aircraft while bombing fields than ever before)
the Allied fighter aircraft took a much heavier toll on Axis fighter aircraft than previously (during October 1942, it was about 1-1 instead of 3-1 in favor of the Axis)

I think already on this basis, due to the effects on Axis supply and the blunting of Axis air attacks alone, we can say that Allied air power was indeed decisive.

The big remaining question is precisely how much impact did the Allied close air support have on the German and Italian land units at the front line. This I would like to explore if we ever get past the above points. I'd particularly like to clarify the following:

How many heavy AA / AT guns did the Allied bombers and fighter bombers take out (I think there is already evidence in some of the book excerpts posted that they eliminated a lot of them, but I'd like to get into detail)
How many Axis tanks and other crew served weapons (artillery, lighter AT guns etc.) did the Allied air strikes destroy
How many ongoing battles did Allied air strikes affect (were specific Axis thrusts blunted by air strikes, were specific Allied breakthroughs made possible by them)

I have secondary literature such as unit histories which make this claim, but I'd like to cross check this with Axis data.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I do think the Allied repair and recovery operations were important. But I think for fighter pilots especially, who largely bore the brunt of the air war in North Africa, the odds of being shot down were a bigger factor.

Both sides had their problems. The Axis pilots felt like they were outnumbered, never had enough planes, enough supplies, or enough fuel.
The Allies felt like the odds were 3-1 or 4-1 against them in air combat most of the time, which only began to change consistently from mid 1942.

I'm sure the Allied pilots were glad that they were likely to have a replacement aircraft if and when they made it back to base after being shot down (or crash landing). But of the two anxieties, I think the issue of being shot down was the more stressful. This is what in fact ended up breaking J.G. 27 in late 1942 once they started to feel it a bit.

 

[Buz101]

For clarification, which Middle East squadrons used P-40 types from roughly October 1942 to December 1942?

An Allison Division memo regarding Service Use of High Power Outputs on Allison V-1710 Engines notes that units in the Middle East were resetting boost controls to 66" Hg. (18 lbs./sq.in.). I am curious to know if there is any supporting evidence from Operations Record Books, Sortie Reports, Combat Reports, Unit Histories, Engineering Section Reports, etc. showing use of 66" Hg. boost on P-40s during the Oct. - Dec. 1942 period preceding the Allison memo. Have you seen anything along these lines? Thanks.

Mike

The Squadron's using the P-40 were 112, 250, 260, 450, 3RAAF, 2SAAF, 4 SAAF and 5SAAF (only Tomahawk SQN), plus the 3 USAAF ones, there were also a couple of TACR Units (208 and 40 SAAF) who had Tomahawks, but off the top of my head I cannot remember the dates (it was around these period). I'll take a look through the records tonight for you.

Buz

 

[Mike Williams]

Mike

The Squadron's using the P-40 were 112, 250, 260, 450, 3RAAF, 2SAAF, 4 SAAF and 5SAAF (only Tomahawk SQN), plus the 3 USAAF ones, there were also a couple of TACR Units (208 and 40 SAAF) who had Tomahawks, but off the top of my head I cannot remember the dates (it was around these period). I'll take a look through the records tonight for you.

Buz

Thank you Buz!

 

[Buz101]

"Partly" shot off was what I see in that photo, which I'm sure is of a different aircraft. "Tail shot off" comes from records used by Shores. Do you think he made it up? I agree the aircraft in the photo probably made a proper (not 'crash') landing because it's sitting on it's wheels. But I posted that only as an example that an aircraft could land with it's tail 'shot off', and that this is the kind of (quite common) damage probably being referred to by somebody with 3 RAAF. I wasn't claiming or pretending it was the same aircraft.

If interested the photo of the aircraft you posted was FT928 OK-L a Kittyhawk IV flown by SQNLDR Doyle of 450 SQN. The damage came from AA fire and the incident was the 18th April 1945 - The ORB states "......... the CO was very badly shot up and did a magnificent job in returning safely to base with two holes in the fuel tanks, one main plane root shattered and empennage tractically (think this is supposed to be practically) shot away". This was reported in the records as CAT 2, the aircraft was later repaired and returned to the SQN as the clipped-wing Kittyhawk. I suppose understanding the verbology in the ORB's is helpful here, Shot away means parts loose (smaller parts missing) and/or well ventilated but still attached, Shot off far more terminal.

For the aircraft on the 8th Feb , I believe Chris used the verbage from the 540 (Summary of events) which states "The Tail plane of SGT Curtis' machine was shot away and he returned to Gambut", the 541 (Detail of Work Carried Out) is far clearer and stats "SGT Curtis; a/c received a damage tailplane and he returned to Gambut" (both the 540 and 541 are parts of the ORB).

A thought to the loss criteria for the Desert Air Force - could always use the CAT system that most of the ORB's used. Might take a little extra work, but that would make it easier, logical, factual and easy to obtain/work out (just a thought). From the ORB's these were normally logged as 3 Categories (not the official CAT system which was much more convoluted), basically CAT 1 - Repairable at Unit (normally repaired within 24hours), CAT 2 - Repairable at MU/BU (repairable 2-5 days normally although if border line could be a few weeks), or CAT III - Write Off (some CAT III's were brought back on charge after extensive repairs but the SQN would never know this). In my experience most SQN ORB's and OPSUMS use this method as do the Form 78's (for the Middle East aircraft (Aircraft record card)), the Form 1180 (accident reports), as do the WG ORB's and a number of other publications and records (also makes far easier tracking).

I assume (I know bad), that the Luftwaffe used a similar scheme with their % of damage, at a certain % the aircraft would be out of the fight and only repairable by a repair element not the Unit. I have very limited Luftwaffe data, but just in case I'll have a look for any data on the 8th. As to the ground losses you are interested in, this may in fact be incredibly difficult to accurately portray, as you have the front moving, and anything not removed would have been lost, so how was it reported???. I'm not even going to speculate here, not my field of expertise, someone with far more understanding of German records, and loss reporting will need to answer me thinks

Buz

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

"Partly" shot off was what I see in that photo, which I'm sure is of a different aircraft. "Tail shot off" comes from records used by Shores. Do you think he made it up? I agree the aircraft in the photo probably made a proper (not 'crash') landing because it's sitting on it's wheels. But I posted that only as an example that an aircraft could land with it's tail 'shot off', and that this is the kind of (quite common) damage probably being referred to by somebody with 3 RAAF. I wasn't claiming or pretending it was the same aircraft.

Bill, there's a difference between "tail shot off" and "tail shot up", c',mon now. If your tail is "shot off", a three-pointer ain't going to give the pic you posted in reply. If your tail is "shot off" you're getting one hell of a prang. The plane in your pic clearly had a controlled landing, but the tail is still clearly on.

In short, this is a form of equivocation.