Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein? (1 Viewer)

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Stuka's reputation was always a bit over blown in land battles.
If you are bombing tanks you are area bombing. You can fit several tanks in space of one Cruiser turret.
Same with dug in guns. A miss of several dozen yds from a gun pit may not destroy the gun (the crew may deaf forever) but a crew either laying on gun pit 'floor' or in separate slit trenches may live. In desert the ground was often rock not sand. Guns were often dispersed instead of clustered. shallow personal trenches were still common.
Scoring an identical hit on a Destroyer at sea might well sink it or at least cripple it. Cruisers are actually sizable targets.
A bombed Artillery battery is going to be disrupted. and out of action for while. Total destruction is rare.

I don't necessarily disagree with you, but it also doesn't matter as much as maybe it seems like it does.

I became aware of the significance of the Ju 87 from reading about tank battles. You have battles where the Allies have tanks like Matildas, CHAR 1Bis and SOMUA S.35 which are very difficult if not impossible for Axis tanks to knock out. On defense Axis can get these with side shots from light AT guns or frontal shots from heavy Flak 18 guns, as they quickly learned. But on attack (or counterattack), the Axis had a big problem in that their tank guns on say a Panzer Mk IIIf (37mm) can't cope with the armor on these tanks.

And there is also the situation which did occur sometimes where the Allies are making attacks and the Axis don't have any heavy 88 guns available or in the right positions. The solution was the Stuka.

Stuka strikes both destroyed and disrupted enemy tanks and AT guns etc. and that allowed the Axis tanks and infantry to move in, pass through the Allied lines and rout the opposition in the way tanks are designed to do. This was the winning formula in many of the early German victories.

Same with the tank formation. The formation is disrupted and sometimes not capable of either offensive or defensive action for some time, (a few hours or longer). A lot depends on actual human casualties and replacements of crew and soft vehicles.

Timing is key. This is also what the Anglo-American Allies did quite effectively sometimes both in North Africa and in Normandy / Belgium / Holland / Germany sometimes (although they also screwed it up sometimes too).

and this was dependent on time. The 109Fs didn't show up until almost 1942?

But you are forgetting that a Bf 109E (since April 1941?) can also outrun a Hurricane or a Tomahawk at altitude. Bf 110s and Ju 88s sometimes outran Hurricanes too in North Africa and around Malta, but had less luck against Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, and were basically doomed if caught by Spitfires.

MC 202s in North Africa also show up late. Months after they start showing up in Malta, and with typical Axis supply, they are often grounded due to lack of parts.
The Axis did fly recon missions, but when you only 1/2 to 1/4 the number you are not going to get good results and if you are using 109Fs and MC 202s you are not going very deep.

That is definitely true. Goes back to the limitation of fighter range for the Axis.

The Poor Hurricane pilots sometimes used drop tanks.

Yeah. Brave men.

 

[Shortround6]

Be careful of using book figures. Especially for the axis, the availability of drop tanks is not something they could guarantee.
The Tac Recon Hurricanes had cameras. It was not a good installation but they had them.
The next thing is what you do with the pictures, taking the pictures is only the 1st step.
You need to get them processed, printed, evaluated/interpreted and distributed to all interested parties. The British (short for commonwealth, for give me) started with one photo lab and one interpreter team and expanded over time. As they expanded they moved some of the teams forward.
The Axis had one lab and interpreter team for most of the campaign. And that got bombed once.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

On the CAS issue in general, I think there has been a see-saw of interpretations of the data on this which has become a bit of an overcorrection in recent years.

With good reason because the US military kind of has an over dependence on, and often an over-estimation of the efficacy of, air support. See Vietnam. The terrain makes a big difference, but there is also the factor (also a big factor with artillery) that if someone isn't directing the attack, it's very difficult to hit anything that you actually want to hit.

The nature of which is of course rapidly changing as we are entering the drone era.

But I've seen these analysis which say only 7% of the tanks destroyed at Falaise were killed by aerial rockets. But it doesn't matter how many out and out destroyed heavy tanks there are after the fighter bombers leave. As you say, what really happened is the unit got disrupted. They are stunned, dismayed, they did probably lose a few tanks, a lot of other vehicles, and they know they might be next. They are ineffective for at least a while. How much that matters depends largely on things like "are there Allied units nearby which can

 

[Shortround6]

Some of the Stukas reputation in France came from the already mentioned Char B1 tanks and the Char 2C

Most of which (out of ten, how many photos?) were "knocked out" on trains (1 or more) that were stopped by Stukas.
Most of them were not destroyed by Stukas. The crews could not get them off the flat cars and most of the destroyed ones were burned, destroyed by their own crews. Not the story the Germans put out
The Char B1 had a few problems of it's own, poorly trained crews, a complicated steering system that had to used to aim the gun( 0 degrees of traverse) and more than a tendency to breakdown leading to collisions with building and trees (and photo ops). Yes it was very dangerous to German troops.

But like many of the big German tanks at the end of the war, many broke down and were destroyed by their own crews.
Signal magazine often had a different take on things

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Some extracts from E R Hooton's book 'Eagle in Flames, The Fall of the Luftwaffe', reference North Africa (and Med), first the end of 1941:

And 1942:

Mike

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Some of this stuff seems kinda familiar. "From late June Jagdgruppen encountered stiffer opposition from Spitfire Vs and USAAF P-40F Warhawks which evolved tactics to counter the qualitative superiority of the Me 109F"

I would say Bf 109F and G by the time of Second El Alamein, as well as the oft forgotten and underrated MC 202. But this isn't very unlike what I said a bunch of times in here.

Also note he mentions during September JG 27 lost fourteen pilots including three of their 'experten'. He points out that the Germans lacked a long range strike force (though they were flying a fair number of 'convoy export sorties which increased in August. JG 77 were brought in but didn't do much better.

Interesting about how the Germans had 40 seaplanes tasked with stalking British subs in the Med.

He also gives us some numbers on both German and Italian aircraft

In late 1941, he says 181 German (with half serviceable = 90) and 450 Italian aircraft (with 2/3 serviceable - 300) vs. 650 Allied with 550 serviceable
325 German and 250 Italian vs Allies ~1,000 on Oct 9, 1942.

Says highest count of serviceable German aircraft was ~300

Mentions Axis airfields being hit hard, Allies decimating German CAS missions

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Some of the Stukas reputation in France came from the already mentioned Char B1 tanks and the Char 2C
View attachment 702641
Most of which (out of ten, how many photos?) were "knocked out" on trains (1 or more) that were stopped by Stukas.
Most of them were not destroyed by Stukas. The crews could not get them off the flat cars and most of the destroyed ones were burned, destroyed by their own crews. Not the story the Germans put out
The Char B1 had a few problems of it's own, poorly trained crews, a complicated steering system that had to used to aim the gun( 0 degrees of traverse) and more than a tendency to breakdown leading to collisions with building and trees (and photo ops). Yes it was very dangerous to German troops.
View attachment 702642
But like many of the big German tanks at the end of the war, many broke down and were destroyed by their own crews.
Signal magazine often had a different take on things

Well, cool pictures for sure (not even kidding, nice photos) but let's just say you have not covered the entirety of the armored battles in the Battle of France here. Maybe at some point we can really look at that, but I'll just say for now it wasn't limited to Stukas bombing trains.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

My numbers for Allied aircraft are not that high in Second El Alamein by the way, not that anyone cares. I show nominal Allied fighter strength in the battle in Oct 1942 area at:

• 128 x RAF P-40s (about 50 Kittyhawk Mk I, 16 Tomahawks, 32 x Kittyhawk Mk II, and about ~30 Kittyhawk Mk III)
• 128 x RAF Hurricanes (Mostly Mk IIc, with a few IIb and ~ 20 Mk I still flying)
• 32 x Hurricane II D
• 75 x USAAF P-40 F/L** (plus a few P-40K in the 57th Fighter Group)
• 48 x Spitfire Mk V (mostly VB with a few VC)

I do not know actual servicebility rates. The Hurricane IID are the ones with the big anti-tank guns which didn't work out so well.

Shores shows the following German strength, totaling 92 BF 109F, 12 Bf 109E, and 46 Bf 110. That is supposed to be actual on-hand strength.

• Stab / JG 27 -2 x Bf 109F-4
• I./JG 27 - 23 x Bf 109F-4
• II./JG 27 - 24 Bf 109F-4
• III./JG 27 - 24 Bf 109F-4
• JaboStaffel/JG 27 -12 Bf 109E
• III./JG 53 - 24 Bf 109E & F
• Jagdkommando/JG 27 - 3 Bf 109F (Crete)
• III./ZG 26 46 Bf 110C, D, E and F (Crete)
• 4.(H)/12 Bf 110E and Bf 109E-7 Jabo (number not listed)

III./JG 53 was transferring back to Sicily while two staffel of JG 77 were coming in during October, bringing mainly Bf 109G-2. By November JG.77 had brought in 81 more Bf 109s.

The Italians had 7 groups of Macchi MC 202 (210 in total, though not sure how many serviceable), 5 groups of Fiat CR 42 (used as fighter bombers), 1 group of Ju 87s, 1 group of Z 1007, and 2 groups of SM.79.

I think of the Italian bombers only the Stukas flew a couple of missions, I think the CR 42s flew one. The main significance of the Italians are the MC.202s.

 

[Snautzer01]

Most of which (out of ten, how many photos?) were "knocked out" on trains

I have seen an awful lot of pictures. Including France 1940. I have seen but a few on trains knocked out. A lot are just left were they stand ( lack of fuel and too far from own lines) or got some holes in them. Mind you, almost every german soldier seemed to have had a camera and stranded or destroyed chars were a favorite subject. It in not uncommen to see the same char in different poses as is for that matter airplanes that they found laying around.

 

[Buz101]

Interesting discussion here gents, however I do note some of the info about Kittyhawks may be in error.

Post #10 - Bomb loads - Kittyhawk I, II and III did not carry 1000lb bombs in 1942, their weapon of choice was mostly 250lbrs or 500lbrs. Kittyhawk II and III also carried 40lbrs. The pictures showing the 6 x 250lbrs set up etc were seen on the Kittyhawk IV in Italy. Tomahawks (5SAAF) carried no bombs at all.

Post #20/26 - Whilst the first K-1 came off the production line on the in May, but the actual production run of the K-1's started to come off the production line on the 24th Jun 42 - did not come into RAF Squadron service until 26th Sep, however most arrived into SQN service in Oct 42. At the start of the 2nd Battle of El Alamain 450, 112, 250 was fully equipped with Kittyhawk III's, 260 SQN was on Kittyhawk II's, 3 RAAF was flying Kittyhawk Is, with a single Kittyhawk III, but by the end of the battle were flying a mix of Kittyhawk I and Kittyhawk II's (the single III was off unit by this time), and both 2 and 4 SQN (SAAF) on Kittyhawk I. During El Alamain the 11 Squadrons equipped with P-40's were assigned were bomber escort, Armed Recce, Long ranged Strafing attacks and Fighter bomber operations. As to the P-40M, there's a mix up in the usage, the biggest user of the M model was the Russians, followed by the USAAF (not a couple, actually over 120 aircraft (over 1/6th the production run), served in CBI, CENTPAC and home based). The detail of Squadron strengths comes from DAF opsums July-Nov 1942 and is just lumped together to show that those Units had a mix of P-40's without breaking out who has what (its done by wing - hence it states Kittyhawk I/II/III)

Post #22 - One of the Major reasons for the uptick in losses between Tomahawk and Kittyhawk had a lot to do with change of mission and the numbers involved. There was only 5 Units using Tomahawks in late 1941, however by April 42 there had been an increase in Squadrons on the P-40 (5 Kittyhawk and 3 Tomahawk). Tomahawks didn't carry bombs at all and were assigned to Fighter Escort or Armed Recce, where the Kittyhawks performed a fair amount of Armed Recce and bombing sorties, which lead to increased losses to both fighters and AA (one SQN suffering very badly in Feb 42 and continued even after retraining - so much so that by May they had been converted back to Hurricanes). Quite often the escort element also carried bombs so when bounced all elements had issues.......this was later changed to escort being purely escort not attack as well

Post #38 - The 57th FG was fully equipped with P-40F, the K models did not appear in the 57th FG until late Nov 1942

Post #55 - The first SAAF SQN to receive P-40K's was 2 SQN - and they were not happy with them at all.......lots of Maintenance and engine issues (most second hand) all were K models (mix of long and short tailed), 5 SAAF on the other hand operated both K and M models when they re-equipped.

Post #59 - The aircraft that were re-engined with the V-1710-73's were still called Kittyhawk I.

Post #63 - 9th Oct - Roberts was flying FL898 not FR898 and 13th Oct - Taylor was in a Kittyhawk I not a Kittyhawk III

Post #67 - Of an interesting note 3 SQN managed to swap its Kittyhawk III's for Kittyhawk II's from 260 SQN in Dec 1942. 260 SQN had started to get Kittyhawk III's so rather than both squadrons flying a mix, the two CO's agreed to swap the 4 Kittyhawk III's that 3 SQN had for 4 Kittyhawk II's.

Post #87 - there's a whole file on the nastiness involved with the US trying to take aircraft in the UK national archives............ things were a bit ugly, to a point the US basically saying we want this, with a somewhat very British diplomatic reply that was basically saying "SOD OFF" As to strenghts a RAF/RAAF/SAAF P-40 units authorised strength was 16 I.E and 2 I.R, 5 SAAF being slightly stronger as the only unit using Tomahawks. USAAF Squadrons were 25 aircraft, with a total Group strength of 80 aircraft - basically the same as 4 1/2 RAF SQN's.

Post #108-110 - Of the losses mentioned by the AHOTMAF Vol. 2 - 4 aircraft were lost, SGT Curtiss was not in AK655, but AK665 which recovered to base, and was repaired quickly, later shot down on the 27th Feb 42 whilst being flown by Sgt. R.M Jennings. AK655 was a 450 SQN aircraft and was SOC after being taxied into by Hurricane BD920 om the 22nd Feb 42.

Post #144 - Alot of the British issue with Kittyhawks and spares came after PH when everything was frozen. Seeing it was taking about 2 Months to get aircraft to North Africa, this created quite a number of issues, with numbers of aircraft supposed to go to the RAF vs the numbers they were given. All P-40E's that had been assigned to British orders were taken back (yes the RAF was to have been given E models, not just Kittyhawk and Kittyhawk Ia's), and suddenly shipping wasn't available nor where the aircraft, this lasted a few months which caused further issues down the track for strengths

Post #197 - Don't forget that Tomahawks were also used for TACR in North Africa - 208 SQN and 40 SAAF both used them late in 1942

I hope that helps with some further understanding on the Tomahawk/Kittyhawks.........if anyone is looking for a particular day or aircraft let me know (only Tomahawks/Kittyhawk thou). Final noted on AHOTMAF, as Chris states its quite hard sometimes tracking losses, and Project 19 repairwork makes it even harder when aircraft that were struck off charge were basically full rebuild........there's a number of Missed data moments in the series, that can be filled in by various sources but that takes travel, time and money.

Buz

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Interesting discussion here gents, however I do note some of the info about Kittyhawks may be in error.

Post #20/26 - Whilst the first K-1 came off the production line on the in May, but the actual production run of the K-1's started to come off the production line on the 24th Jun 42 - did not come into RAF Squadron service until 26th Sep, however most arrived into SQN service in Oct 42.

What do you mean by "K-1" here? Kittyhawk I (P-40D equivalent) were flying with 3 RAAF and 112 RAF in January 1941.

At the start of the 2nd Battle of El Alamain 450, 112, 250 was fully equipped with Kittyhawk III's, 260 SQN was on Kittyhawk II's, 3 RAAF was flying Kittyhawk Is, with a single Kittyhawk III, but by the end of the battle were flying a mix of Kittyhawk I and Kittyhawk II's (the single III was off unit by this time), and both 2 and 4 SQN (SAAF) on Kittyhawk I. During El Alamain the 11 Squadrons equipped with P-40's were assigned were bomber escort, Armed Recce, Long ranged Strafing attacks and Fighter bomber operations. As to the P-40M, there's a mix up in the usage, the biggest user of the M model was the Russians, followed by the USAAF (not a couple, actually over 120 aircraft (over 1/6th the production run), served in CBI, CENTPAC and home based). The detail of Squadron strengths comes from DAF opsums July-Nov 1942 and is just lumped together to show that those Units had a mix of P-40's without breaking out who has what (its done by wing - hence it states Kittyhawk I/II/III)

Post #22 - One of the Major reasons for the uptick in losses between Tomahawk and Kittyhawk had a lot to do with change of mission and the numbers involved. There was only 5 Units using Tomahawks in late 1941, however by April 42 there had been an increase in Squadrons on the P-40 (5 Kittyhawk and 3 Tomahawk). Tomahawks didn't carry bombs at all and were assigned to Fighter Escort or Armed Recce, where the Kittyhawks performed a fair amount of Armed Recce and bombing sorties, which lead to increased losses to both fighters and AA (one SQN suffering very badly in Feb 42 and continued even after retraining - so much so that by May they had been converted back to Hurricanes). Quite often the escort element also carried bombs so when bounced all elements had issues.......this was later changed to escort being purely escort not attack as well

Post #38 - The 57th FG was fully equipped with P-40F, the K models did not appear in the 57th FG until late Nov 1942

Post #55 - The first SAAF SQN to receive P-40K's was 2 SQN - and they were not happy with them at all.......lots of Maintenance and engine issues (most second hand) all were K models (mix of long and short tailed), 5 SAAF on the other hand operated both K and M models when they re-equipped.

Post #59 - The aircraft that were re-engined with the V-1710-73's were still called Kittyhawk I.

I never said any different- I said with the V-1710-73 they were equivalent to a P-40K in terms of power though not in some other respects (stability and improved guns)

Post #63 - 9th Oct - Roberts was flying FL898 not FR898 and 13th Oct - Taylor was in a Kittyhawk I not a Kittyhawk III

Post #67 - Of an interesting note 3 SQN managed to swap its Kittyhawk III's for Kittyhawk II's from 260 SQN in Dec 1942. 260 SQN had started to get Kittyhawk III's so rather than both squadrons flying a mix, the two CO's agreed to swap the 4 Kittyhawk III's that 3 SQN had for 4 Kittyhawk II's.

I know that 260 RAF ended up going back to Kittyhawk II after a brief period with the IIIs, their losses went up so they got back on the II until they switched to Mustangs in 1944.

Post #87 - there's a whole file on the nastiness involved with the US trying to take aircraft in the UK national archives............ things were a bit ugly, to a point the US basically saying we want this, with a somewhat very British diplomatic reply that was basically saying "SOD OFF" As to strenghts a RAF/RAAF/SAAF P-40 units authorised strength was 16 I.E and 2 I.R, 5 SAAF being slightly stronger as the only unit using Tomahawks. USAAF Squadrons were 25 aircraft, with a total Group strength of 80 aircraft - basically the same as 4 1/2 RAF SQN's.

I know there was some residual anger about the P-40F / L - for a long time there were many books stating that the British didn't get any of them. They had been asking for merlin engined P-40s for a long time and when they became available, were originally planning to equip 4 squadrons, but were only able to acquire enough for two squadrons. There was a shortage of P-40F which were in high demand for a little while but the reason was basically because Packard switched over their American production to making the 60 series type Merlins for the Mustang.

However due to the licensing contract they still made Merlin XX for British aircraft, including Hurricanes, many of which seem to have never left Canada. It might have been better to make a few more P-40F as they were still being used in the Med through Anzio, and remained in use in the Pacific and CBI even longer.

Post #108-110 - Of the losses mentioned by the AHOTMAF Vol. 2 - 4 aircraft were lost, SGT Curtiss was not in AK655, but AK665 which recovered to base, and was repaired quickly, later shot down on the 27th Feb 42 whilst being flown by Sgt. R.M Jennings. AK655 was a 450 SQN aircraft and was SOC after being taxied into by Hurricane BD920 om the 22nd Feb 42.

Post #144 - Alot of the British issue with Kittyhawks and spares came after PH when everything was frozen. Seeing it was taking about 2 Months to get aircraft to North Africa, this created quite a number of issues, with numbers of aircraft supposed to go to the RAF vs the numbers they were given. All P-40E's that had been assigned to British orders were taken back (yes the RAF was to have been given E models, not just Kittyhawk and Kittyhawk Ia's), and suddenly shipping wasn't available nor where the aircraft, this lasted a few months which caused further issues down the track for strengths

Post #197 - Don't forget that Tomahawks were also used for TACR in North Africa - 208 SQN and 40 SAAF both used them late in 1942

I hope that helps with some further understanding on the Tomahawk/Kittyhawks.........if anyone is looking for a particular day or aircraft let me know (only Tomahawks/Kittyhawk thou). Final noted on AHOTMAF, as Chris states its quite hard sometimes tracking losses, and Project 19 repairwork makes it even harder when aircraft that were struck off charge were basically full rebuild........there's a number of Missed data moments in the series, that can be filled in by various sources but that takes travel, time and money.

Buz

Seems like you know your P-40s pretty well, I'll take your word for the rest of this.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

By the way, do you know any details about a difference in the wing guns and / or ammunition storage in the P-40K which improved the rate of stoppages / gun jams?

Apparently one of the reasons some pilots like the Tomahawk better than the Kittyhawk early on was that the Tomahawk had a manual charging handle inside the cockpit, allowing the pilot to at least attempt to recharge the two heavy machineguns if there had been a stoppage. The Kittyhawks were supposed to have an electric charging option on the wing guns but it doesn't seem to have worked or not well anyway, at least at first.

 

[Vincenzo]

K-1 it's a P-40K of the 1 block like how are used now for the F-16C-60, for the 60 block

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Ah ok gotcha

 

[Buz101]

Will_Bill_Kelso (love that User tag)

As per Vincrenzo's answer for the K-1's. Originally they were just P-40K-CU, because they were to have been replaced by the P-60 (as per Curtiss Factory records). As we know this didn't happen, and when the K-5/K-10/K-15's were ordered, they became K-1's (as per the data blocks on the aircraft).

IRT the the change of designation for the re-engined Kittyhawk I's, this was in reply to Shortround6 (post #59) who stated "Something of note is that the US Army gave the British 47 modified Allison V-1710-73 engines with a unique oil line from a breather cap to the and special adapter to the oil pump drive for installation on RAF P-40E and E-1 aircraft which would turn them into ersatz P-40Ks. This was done on Aug 11th 1942. I have no idea if they relabelled them". It was just pointing out to him that they did not change.

Interestingly the V-1710-73 was fitted to a number of the last batch E-1's being built (sorry don't know the exact number as my V-1710 database isn't presently mature enough - it needs more data), along with about the last 500 E-1's also having the fin fillet ala the K-1/5 models.

P-40 shipping to the Middle East - this is a saga in itself without adding the P-40F issues. This actually started in Jun 1941, when the shipping of the first aircraft was delayed, the shipping of this type didn't start until Aug 41. Overall the RAF planned more squadrons that were actually reequipped, and before PH the RAF had also planned to reequip 30, 33 and 274 (all Hurricane units). On the 4th April 42 Tedder noted in correspondence with the Air Ministry that he was expecting 55 aircraft in Feb, 54 aircraft in Mar and 34 in Apr, where as only 31 were noted at sea with 12 of these part of his Feb batch, so the Mar delivery's had only just been started to be sent. By Jul 1942 it was noted in correspondence that most Squadrons were at 50% strength and that they had only received 18 New aircraft for that Month.

The saga of the P-40F's started in Jul 1942, when the US basically wanted the British to had over the F models so they would only have one type within the 57th FG (at that time they had 80 P-40F within the Group, plus 12 P-40F and 60 P-40K assigned as replacements - although yet to ship (basically a whole Group of attrition replacements for a Group that was yet to even enter the theater - yet they had issues when the British said 1 Spare engine per 4 aircraft wasn't enough in a desert environment). In the end they just took what they wanted anyhow, which became even more of an issue when the 79th were sent to the Middle East, as they still ended up using the K model anyhow.

To the P-40F/L - there was plenty of F and L models, however (in my view) the USAAF wasn't too keen on sharing them........... out of over 2000 F/L models they only allowed 250 to be sent via Lend-lease (discounting the accidental one), and even then the British didn't get all 250 (some L models were diverted to the French and show no SQN useage for the RAF - only 3 SQN RAAF had L models). IIRC the USAAF had basically 6 Groups equipped with F/L models, so 480 aircraft between the groups (at full strength), leaving 1270 odd aircraft as spares (and training), that's a lot of attrition replacements.

As to the Gun's - I don't know of any real changes to the gun set up between the Kittyhawk I, Kittyhawk Ia, Kittyhawk II's or the Kittyhawk III's, the parts manuals for both the Kittyhawk Ia and the Kittyhawk III both show every similar parts with some smaller changes with adapter plates etc, nor can I find much in the way of gun jamming incidents. I've looked through the combat reports from 3 SQN and 3 SQN ORB, the diary of an LAC Armourer for the same unit, as well 450 SQN records, 112 SQN, 250 SQN and 260 SQN. The only place I can note that gives the impression of issues with the guns is from around early May 1942, where 250 SQN has a few cases of gun stoppages (one when SQNLDR Judd had 5 of his guns fail). Only other mention of guns apart from standard maintenance and belting is that the armourer states that "sand plays havoc with both guns and engines". Maybe the gun jamming being an issue is in the eyes on one Pilot or one Unit, or during a period a particular SQN had just changed from Tomahawks to Kittyhawks and hadn't worked out their idiosyncrasies (or best may to protect the guns or best way to service them)??? certainly the records don't indicate significant issues.

As to knowing my P-40's, I've been research this type for 30 years so I would hope I know enough to be dangerous (only type I research) and at last count I have 15,000 plus archives files from around the world on the aircraft, Pilots log book copies, operation records, Combat reports, the odd photo or 20 etc , but there's always stuff you don't know, so discussions like this are awesome in pointing you in new directions to look for data

Buz

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

You are definitely still struggling with this mate. Shores lists these aircraft as 'crash landed' and I already explained, maybe five times in this thread, why I personally (not Shores) included crash landed as criteria to count as a 'loss' in answering the question "who was dominating the air war".

No I am not struggling, I am watching how the Shores loss list is too important to deal with its flaws.

As to how an aircraft can have the tail shot away and be repairable, I don't know for sure but my guess would be that the cloth covering of the tail surfaces (rudder and / or elevators) were shot away or burned, as easily happened, but that the pilot was still able to land because he was still getting some control surface response from whatever was left. But a crash landing usually means an uncontrolled or forced landing, either because the aircraft lost power or the pilot lost control, or for example the landing gear would not go down (maybe because hydraulics were damaged). So varying degrees of damage are typically the result.

Thanks for a clear example of what is going on, the squadron says tail damage, Shores ups that to tail shot off, you now try and come up with a definition of how an aircraft can land with its tail shot off, the Shores list is that important. While the list includes lightly damaged it is problematical. So what is the Shores definition of landed at base after damage, versus crash landed? A record that says the aircraft took more damage when landing?

With a working rear area system the allied air forces had the option to reduce the workload on the unit maintenance people by removing a damaged aircraft from a combat unit and replacing it with a reserve, something the axis dd not have.

Your surprise and doubt on learning that Allied pilots sometimes made multiple claims on a day when the Axis didn't take any losses is also nothing new. Many people including myself were surprised by this when this data first became available many years ago, but all of the similar comparisons which have now been done have shown this (on both sides).

Actually I asked did you believe all 8 allied pilots totally missed on 8 February 1942, but thanks for yet again making me the problem. I have known the RAF was over claiming big time for quite a few years, the black smoke emitted when axis aircraft pushed the throttle wide open one reason. The British Intelligence history covers how Ultra enabled the true losses to be calculated and the claims system to be tightened. In response to my query you have told us if Shores records no damage to axis aircraft, there was no damage, even slight. You believe the axis records are that good and Shores has them all and for that matter the allied ones, and they are all in the book. No lightly damaged axis aircraft to compare with the Kittyhawk tail shot off, back in under 3 days. Eliminate the lightly damaged, that will give a better comparison.

Based on that interview with this Canadian historian Mike Bechthold, the guy who seems to have actually done the most to actually reorganize what became the DAF or WDAF is a 60 victory WW 1 ace named Raymond Collishaw. Tedder hated him and was finally able to replace him with Coningham in July 1941. Collishaw is credited with creating the framework of what eventually became the close air support system often credited to Tedder. Tedder was the overall leader.

The allied ground support doctrine ended up being a good thing, lots of people want their contribution noted and we have a Canadian historian highlighting the Canadian input. The "hated him" reminds me of Hitler's Mediterranean Gamble by Douglas Porch, every commander gets a character assessment with plenty of negatives, which makes me less charitable when it comes to overlooking claims in the book like the Germans had Tigers and Panthers in North Africa.

What happened in a nutshell seems to be that there was a power struggle between the ground army Generals and the Air Force commanders, with London (and sometimes Churchill himself) stepping in to lean on one side or the other. As a result, the British Air Force in North Africa (I'm just going to use DAF for short from now on even though I know it isn't always accurate)... the DAF kept alternating clumsily between defensive and offensive roles.

There was not a lot of ground offensive to support. What is the definition of defensive and offensive in this case?

Specifically, the DAF seesawed between the 'air umbrella' of fighter protection and standby bombers that the Army generals wanted, with the increasingly cunning ongoing experiment in close air support and long range logistics interdiction that the Air Force was figuring out.

During 1941 the Desert Air Force was rather struggling to do interdiction, the lack of suitable aircraft plus the need to base the longer range stuff mostly around the Nile Delta thanks to supply issues. After all Tobruk was friendly at the time. Similarly the needs of Ethiopia, Greece, Syria, Iran and Iraq made it hard to allocated aircraft for the desert fighting for extended periods, and again there were the supply issues when that did happen.

Both sides caused dreadful mistakes - putting the DAF on the "umbrella" mission almost got the Army annihilated during Operation Battleaxe, and switching back to CAS (thanks to a directive to "Concentrate on ground strafing" in Jun 1941) is what saved the retreating army from total annihilation. In Sept 1941 Churchill broke the tie personally by issuing an order to all the ground forces and air force commanders "No more defensive air umbrella".

As read this suggest the army should have stayed passive and let the air force win it. What reports of the ground combat have you read?

12 May Tiger convoy via the Mediterranean delivers 238 tanks and 43 Hurricanes. Churchill has personally decided to take the risk rather than send the ships via the Cape of Good Hope. Operation Brevity 15 and 16 May, around a division level attack, prodded by an Ultra intercept that described the axis position as weak, only success is capture of Halfaya Pass. 27 May Germans retake Halfaya pass and better fortify it.

Battleaxe began on 15 June, ended on 17 June. Corps level action except both divisions involved were under strength, corps HQ located 5 hours drive behind the lines in order to be near a good airfield and to stay in touch with RAF HQ which was even further back. This is the battle where the Matilda met the 88mm, the limits of the 2 pounder as a tank gun against the Germans became clear, the reliability of the new Crusader tanks shown to be poor. The new tanks enabled 7th Armoured division to actually have tanks again for the first time in four months, but many personnel had been transferred in the months of idleness. It took until 9 June for all the tanks to arrive. There were 4 regiments of tanks, 2 with Matildas, 1 of these was attached to the infantry. Most of those tanks were lost in the first attack. End of attempt to take Halfaya Pass. A lack of radios meant there was only one per tank troop. Hitting a succession of anti tank lines meant British armour was down to around half strength by the end of the day, most knocked out tanks left in German hands. Few Axis tanks had been hit.

Next day it was the turn of 15th Panzer to take on an infantry/artillery/anti tank line and bounce with heavy losses, while 5th light reduced 7th Armoured Brigade to 9 tanks as of dawn on the 19th, which resulted in 15th Panzer joining 5th Light for the final push on the morning of the 19th. This worked quite well except the allied infantry commander had understood the situation well enough to ensure the force had an escape route. Wavell arrived and discovered two things, this had been a two division operation, corps was too far back to effectively command and Hindustani speaking divisional commanders gave good radio security. The allied force retreat was well underway before corps was aware of it. With a strong tank and artillery force blocking the German attacks. The allied troops escaped, but losses were 122 killed, 588 wounded, 259 missing, 64 Matildas, 27 cruiser tanks and 4 guns. The ground war accounts indicate neither air force was a problem at any time. On the 18th 5th Light effectively rolled through the British armour in the field, its HE firing tanks effective in suppressing the 25 pounders, and its superior firepower effective against the British tanks.

So the claim is those machine guns in the fighters prevented the German massed panzer attack, not the timely concentration of artillery and tanks in good positions guarding the escape route. I assume the video uses the Corps Commander's thank you message which is full of praise and credit, with the implication keep the air umbrella up.

After this came Crusader, a true army level fight, with more than twice the troops to command and that meant finding experienced corps and army commanders and staffs, with a couple of days of a weak divisional attack and 3 days of a weak corps attack as the sum of local combat knowledge to go on. What could possibly go wrong?

The pre war idea of an air umbrella was actually achieved in 1944 in both Italy and France.

Unfortunately they used Hurricanes for a lot of the Tac Recon. I have no idea of the reasoning.
The first several hundred Tomahawks in Britain were given cameras and used for Rec Recon in early 1941.

Maybe part of the British aircraft Hierarchy? Not good enough to be fighter? do Tac Recon.
Not good enough for Europe? go to the mid-east. Not good enough for the mid-east? Go to the Far East (Buffaloes).

It took a lot of pleading to get even one PR Spitfire. They knew they were taking losses. But the idea of not having photos bothered them even more.

A lot of the early Tomahawks were not suitable for combat, so you need to remove them.

Spitfire IV was for strategic reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance was nominally for the Lysander units, but it was appreciated quite early that was not going to happen, for example 3 RAAF arrived in 1940 as an army co-operation unit. Tactical reconnaissance units began equipping with fighters, later some were modified to take reconnaissance cameras. The first shipments of Hurricane mark II to Takoradi were in July 1941. Even the Tiger Convoy Hurricanes were mark I.

The Baltimore and Boston versions used in the desert had about the same defensive armament as the Blenheim, with hand held machine guns against the dorsal turret of the Blenheim. They were about 40 mph faster, shorter ranged and could carry double the bomb load. The first Baltimores arrived in November 1941, first operational hours in May 1942, total of 312 arrivals to end September 1942. A total of 111 Bostons arrived in the Middle East September to December 1941, first operational hours in February but the numbers involved meant it played a bit part until September 1942. There were 76 Marylands imported in 1941, plus a few from Britain, again faster but weak defensive armament. Apart from the pre and early war shipments Britain sent 1,583 Blenheims to the Middle East August 1940 to end October 1942.

Hurricanes, exports to the Middle East totalled 2,414 June 1940 to October 1942, plus others via Malta. Spitfires, exports of 299 February to October 1942 but 161 of those September/October and the figures seem to include some PR but exclude the reallocation of some, about 48, originally meant for Australia. 28 Tomahawks were also sent from Britain. Tomahawk imports 516 February to September 1941. Kittyhawk imports to Middle East 878 November 1941 to October 1942.

Beaufighters, 16 exports to the Mediterranean (Malta) in April 1941, then 446 to the Middle East June 1941 to October 1942. Wellingtons 1,018 May 1940 to October 1942. As both these types could fly out there is a chance some exports are missed.

Since they have been mentioned, apart from the pre and early war shipments, 54 Lysanders sent to the Middle East June 1940 to February 1941, another 2 in September and 3 in November 1941, and 8 more July to December 1942. Halifax exports, 1 in December 1941, 2 in June 1942, 30 in July and 5 in October. Britain also sent 3 B-24 it had received to the Middle East in the first half of 1942, and 4 arrived from the US in January 1942. The B-24 are included to show the limitations of the import/export figures, aircraft that moved as part of units are NOT counted, these moves were the major supplier of Liberators to the Middle East in 1942, plus also a few Halifaxes. The air components of numbers 159 and 160 squadrons with B-24 arrived in the Middle East in May 1942 en route to India but stayed, using things like the ground crew only 147 squadron for support. Effectively in January 1943 their remaining personnel and those 147 squadron were merged to form 178 squadron.

To around Alamein there were around 4 Blenheims to 1 Baltimore/Boston and 3 Hurricanes to 2 of any other single engine fighter.

I know there was some residual anger about the P-40F / L - for a long time there were many books stating that the British didn't get any of them. They had been asking for merlin engined P-40s for a long time and when they became available, were originally planning to equip 4 squadrons, but were only able to acquire enough for two squadrons. There was a shortage of P-40F which were in high demand for a little while but the reason was basically because Packard switched over their American production to making the 60 series type Merlins for the Mustang.

However due to the licensing contract they still made Merlin XX for British aircraft, including Hurricanes, many of which seem to have never left Canada. It might have been better to make a few more P-40F as they were still being used in the Med through Anzio, and remained in use in the Pacific and CBI even longer.

The Hurricane engines sent to Canada were Merlin XX family, designated Merlin 28 and 29. There were 480 Merlin 29 originally meant for what ended up as the 400 RCAF order Hurricanes designated mark XII, but 150 of the Hurricanes were exported to Britain and the Canadians kept all the Merlin 29, using the spares to upgrade survivors of the 30 Mark I transferred to the RCAF in early 1942 and the 50 Sea Hurricanes meant as the North American pool for the Merchant Ship Fighter Unit after the unit disbanded. The Rolls Royce Heritage Trust reports 144 Merlin 28 in 1942 and another 141 in 1943 were imported into Canada for Hurricanes, all these engines were sent to Britain either attached to a Hurricane airframe or stand alone. Upon arrival apart from a few test flights the engines were used for Lancasters. The Hurricanes tested in Britain have mark III noted on their aircraft cards. The Hurricane X is used in some RAF documents for a Canadian built mark I (Merlin III) but there was no official mark X, while the mark XI never existed, persistent reports of these marks using US Merlins are wrong.

According to the British reporting what the Americans did, Merlin 28 were the first Merlins built by Packard, production of 5,200 to February 1943. The Merlin 29 were built during 1942. Production switched to the Merlin 38 in March 1943 and to a lesser extent also the Merlin 31 in April. March 1943 the final month any single stage Merlins were built for the US, total 2,813 built. P-4F production January 1942 to January 1943, P-40L January to April 1943, total 2,011 Merlin engine P-40.

According to the British they received 418 engineless mark I Hurricane airframes, 447 engineless mark II airframes and 234 mark II with engines from Canada, another 8 mark I and 11 mark II were lost en route, total 1,118 out of 1,451 built. In addition the mark I pattern aircraft sent to Canada pre war returned, officially making imports 419 engineless mark I airframes.

K-1 it's a P-40K of the 1 block like how are used now for the F-16C-60, for the 60 block

Not quite correct as I understand it, and now I get to find out if it is correct. The P-40E-1 was the export version of the P-40E, the P-40K-1 was the export version of the P-40K, produced under Defence Aid contacts, production and designations predate the introduction of block numbers into P-40 production, but by the time the P-40K models ordered under the USAAF contract began production block numbers were in use and they became the P-40K-5. DA-3 for 600 P-40K-1 and AC-22714 for 1,400 P-40 accepted as 700 P-40K and 700 P-40L, contracts signed on the same date.

The first 699 P-40F production starting from January 1942 were just that, there were no P-40F-1, P-40F-5 starting in August 1942, the same month as the first P-40K-5 were accepted. The P-40K-1 production finished in August 1942 except for 1 in September, 600 built. The first batches of P-40L, M and N all were block 1.

Interestingly the V-1710-73 was fitted to a number of the last batch E-1's being built (sorry don't know the exact number as my V-1710 database isn't presently mature enough - it needs more data), along with about the last 500 E-1's also having the fin fillet ala the K-1/5 models.

Looking at the engine serial numbers in the final P-40E-1 most are 42-35xxx, but a few have 42-160xxx, including the final 11. While the P-40K-1 early engine serials are 42-85xxx.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Will_Bill_Kelso (love that User tag)

As per Vincrenzo's answer for the K-1's. Originally they were just P-40K-CU, because they were to have been replaced by the P-60 (as per Curtiss Factory records). As we know this didn't happen, and when the K-5/K-10/K-15's were ordered, they became K-1's (as per the data blocks on the aircraft).

IRT the the change of designation for the re-engined Kittyhawk I's, this was in reply to Shortround6 (post #59) who stated "Something of note is that the US Army gave the British 47 modified Allison V-1710-73 engines with a unique oil line from a breather cap to the and special adapter to the oil pump drive for installation on RAF P-40E and E-1 aircraft which would turn them into ersatz P-40Ks. This was done on Aug 11th 1942. I have no idea if they relabelled them". It was just pointing out to him that they did not change.

Interestingly the V-1710-73 was fitted to a number of the last batch E-1's being built (sorry don't know the exact number as my V-1710 database isn't presently mature enough - it needs more data), along with about the last 500 E-1's also having the fin fillet ala the K-1/5 models.

P-40 shipping to the Middle East - this is a saga in itself without adding the P-40F issues. This actually started in Jun 1941, when the shipping of the first aircraft was delayed, the shipping of this type didn't start until Aug 41. Overall the RAF planned more squadrons that were actually reequipped, and before PH the RAF had also planned to reequip 30, 33 and 274 (all Hurricane units). On the 4th April 42 Tedder noted in correspondence with the Air Ministry that he was expecting 55 aircraft in Feb, 54 aircraft in Mar and 34 in Apr, where as only 31 were noted at sea with 12 of these part of his Feb batch, so the Mar delivery's had only just been started to be sent. By Jul 1942 it was noted in correspondence that most Squadrons were at 50% strength and that they had only received 18 New aircraft for that Month.

The saga of the P-40F's started in Jul 1942, when the US basically wanted the British to had over the F models so they would only have one type within the 57th FG (at that time they had 80 P-40F within the Group, plus 12 P-40F and 60 P-40K assigned as replacements - although yet to ship (basically a whole Group of attrition replacements for a Group that was yet to even enter the theater - yet they had issues when the British said 1 Spare engine per 4 aircraft wasn't enough in a desert environment). In the end they just took what they wanted anyhow, which became even more of an issue when the 79th were sent to the Middle East, as they still ended up using the K model anyhow.

To the P-40F/L - there was plenty of F and L models, however (in my view) the USAAF wasn't too keen on sharing them........... out of over 2000 F/L models they only allowed 250 to be sent via Lend-lease (discounting the accidental one), and even then the British didn't get all 250 (some L models were diverted to the French and show no SQN useage for the RAF - only 3 SQN RAAF had L models). IIRC the USAAF had basically 6 Groups equipped with F/L models, so 480 aircraft between the groups (at full strength), leaving 1270 odd aircraft as spares (and training), that's a lot of attrition replacements.

As to the Gun's - I don't know of any real changes to the gun set up between the Kittyhawk I, Kittyhawk Ia, Kittyhawk II's or the Kittyhawk III's, the parts manuals for both the Kittyhawk Ia and the Kittyhawk III both show every similar parts with some smaller changes with adapter plates etc, nor can I find much in the way of gun jamming incidents. I've looked through the combat reports from 3 SQN and 3 SQN ORB, the diary of an LAC Armourer for the same unit, as well 450 SQN records, 112 SQN, 250 SQN and 260 SQN. The only place I can note that gives the impression of issues with the guns is from around early May 1942, where 250 SQN has a few cases of gun stoppages (one when SQNLDR Judd had 5 of his guns fail). Only other mention of guns apart from standard maintenance and belting is that the armourer states that "sand plays havoc with both guns and engines". Maybe the gun jamming being an issue is in the eyes on one Pilot or one Unit, or during a period a particular SQN had just changed from Tomahawks to Kittyhawks and hadn't worked out their idiosyncrasies (or best may to protect the guns or best way to service them)??? certainly the records don't indicate significant issues.

As to knowing my P-40's, I've been research this type for 30 years so I would hope I know enough to be dangerous (only type I research) and at last count I have 15,000 plus archives files from around the world on the aircraft, Pilots log book copies, operation records, Combat reports, the odd photo or 20 etc , but there's always stuff you don't know, so discussions like this are awesome in pointing you in new directions to look for data

Buz

Thanks good stuff. 79th seems to have gotten P-40F/L somewhere because that's what they were mostly flying when they became operational. I have their squadron history and a bunch of photos.

I'll provide some data on the gun jamming (and the improvement) later, I was hoping you had it so I wouldn't have to dig it up.

At the peak there was 5 US fighter groups plus 99th FS (16 squadrons) fully equipped with the F/L in the Middle East, most taking fairly heavy losses, and they had at least 1 FG in the Pacific for a while too. And of course 260 RAF and 3 RAAF. So I'd say they did end up needing all of the aircraft that they could get. Wearing out of engines also seems to have happened pretty fast in the Middle East. I have read something about the RAF figuring out some kind of system to get compatible Merlin XX parts into service as they were short on spares.

 

[Shortround6]

I certainly appreciate your posts.

I don't have the British/American agreements for Merlin production and initial agreements were not the same as production and production was not the same as deliveries.

The US was originally supposed to get 3000 single stage Merlin out of the 1st 9,000 made. I am not sure they got all of them and the need for spare engines (which the US did not allocate enough for) means that the production numbers for US Merlins will come up short of the Merlin engined P-40s.
It took Packard until some time in March of 1943 to complete the initial 9000 engines. That would be the Merlin 28s (?) and the V-1650-1 combined?
Packard built 615 engines in March so when they made the switch or switches was probably very early.
The switch to the engines for the P-51 is something of a smoke screen or even a Furphy.
Packard never built more than 850 engines in one month in 1942 and early 1943. However by May of 1943 they were building over 1000 single stage Merlins a month.
I don't know when the follow up orders for engines were placed. Obviously well before the 1st contract ran out.
In 1944 Packard built over 7,000 single stage Merlins for the British or about 100 less single stage engines than they did in 1942. In 1944 they built almost 15,800 2 stage engines.
Yes they were having trouble getting the two stage engines built but that seems to have a problem with plant expansion.
From Sept through Dec 1943 Packard never built less that 1200 single stage engines and never less than 450 two stage engines in one month.
Basically Packard production doubled from March of 1943 to Sept of 1943.

Whatever the British were using single stage Merlin engines for seems to have been more important to the Allied war effort than building a few hundred more P-40Ls.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Whatever the British were using single stage Merlin engines for seems to have been more important to the Allied war effort than building a few hundred more P-40Ls.

Right that was the policy, though it's questionable that was actually the case. I gather they made those engines for Hurricanes, Mosquitos and Lancasters, but that many of those stayed in Canada and some were re-engined in the UK. It's been a while since I read about it. But I know they produced an extra 700 P-40F or L airframes which they didn't have the V-1650s / Merlin 28 available for and they ended up being re-engined with Allisons, relabled P-40R (for 're-engined'?) and used stateside for training. Those 700 fighters probably could have equipped 2 or 3 Hurricane groups in the Middle East / Italy or the equivalent of Us or Australian P-40E or M units in the South Pacific or Burma. Or if the shipping arrangements were possible send them to India instead of those Mohawk units.

Specifically for the Middle East, I'd say in most of 1943 they could have definitely used a few hundred more P-40Ls, by the end of the year P-47s are starting to become available which are ultimately better, and then P-51s which are definitely much better. The British were still using Kittyhawk IV in some of those old DAF units I think until 1945 and an F/L type might have better (maybe not since they were using them so much as fighter bombers).

 

[Shortround6]

I have read something about the RAF figuring out some kind of system to get compatible Merlin XX parts into service as they were short on spares.

British gave the US about 600 used Merlin XX engines to break down for spare parts.

Some P-40F/Ls were re-engined with Allisons. However this was done in the US in training commands. At least the ones there are records of. What happened overseas is not recorded in the aircraft history cards.
At least 51 P-40Fs were converted to P-40R-1-CUs and at least 49 P-40Ls of various block numbers were called P-40R-2-CUs.
The first known order to do such work is dated Feb 2 1944.