Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Shortround6]

Is it a major well supplied base or a remote outpost little more than a few tents and a lot full of trucks on a patch of desert. Was it bombed recently or is it relatively protected. Is it a new field they just took over or established or is it an old one with a lot of facilities. Is it way at the end of a long supply chain or closer to the port. Etc.

The British had a lot of auxiliary landing fields. This was standard routine for them. They would move the aircraft from rear area fields to forward fields during operations. They would also shuffle fields around keep the Germans guessing as to which fields they were actually using. Sometimes for the fighters planes would fly 3 sorties a day. Planes would often move back overnight to avoid night bombing. The British had a lot more trucks than the Germans and the DAF used them, hard. Damaged aircraft that could not fly out for repair were trucked out the same day, leaving nothing for the Germans to bomb.
British ground crews were often servicing DAF aircraft on captured airfields in a few hours. The 8th Army rarely outran the DAF ground crew and the DAF was able to maintain coverage over the advancing troops at just about all times. There were number of shops back near Cairo with extensive repair facilities and engine overhaul and propeller repair. The DAF often trucked planes back to shops rather than wait for parts at forward airfields. Kept them from being targets.
Didn't always work but the DAF didn't loose many planes on the ground to either air attack or being over run. Something could not be said for the Luftwaffe.

The DAF did have priority for trucks and truck fuel, they did not have to exist on scraps and left overs. A long retreat by Rommel could result in scores if not hundreds of damaged/unserviceable airframes captured by advancing 8th Army troops as the German ground crew had no way to move them.

 

[WARSPITER]

There wasn't a lot of trouble for Axis convoys going to and from North Africa until April 1941 when attacks of all types ramped up.

A lot of the lists of sinking I see on the net now only list shipping sunk at tonnages of 500 and above. There were a lot of lower tonnage
vessels used as well so records are hard to follow at times.

Naval vessels have to be included in this as well since Italian Destroyers and I think light cruisers were also tried as troop transports to
get across faster. Submarines also began to be used although they couldn't carry much but could at least evade the air attacks.

 

[Vincenzo]

of the 2272707 ton lost just 81850 were of under 500 tsl merchantmen
for the military ship the italian navy lost 334,757 standard tons of ships included auxiliary, in the statistic volume there is no information in what mission they were when sank and i've no time neither all the volumes for check on the text/history part
i can add the navy lost 46 ships/ss by guns, 73 by torpedo, 128 by bombs, 33 by mine, 100 unknown or various

 

[EwenS]

According to the information I have there were 27 Swordfish based on Malta and in a nine month period they accounted for 50,000 tons
per month average. August 1941 was the highest with 92,000 tons sunk.

How many tons sunk by submarines isn't relevant to this, especially since Italy lost over 2,500 vessels during the war.

What is your source for the "27 Swordfish" on Malta and at what point in time?

As far as I can see at no point between June 1940 and the end of 1942 did the numbers of Swordfish AND Albacores on the island, let alone Swordfish alone, come to that kind of a figure. In June 1939 there were only 11 Swordfish in reserve on Malta per the Admiralty and I doubt that that number increased at all given the demand elsewhere.

830 on formation in June 1940, began with 12 Swordfish and suffered heavy losses throughout the campaign despite replacement aircraft being flown in from Ark Royal on occasion.
Jan 1941 - 5
July 1941 - 6
Oct 1941 - 2 (only 1 arrived)

828 took 11 Albacores to Malta from Ark in Sept 1942. Replacements for them were flown in from Egypt when the front line was sufficiently far advanced to permit (a plan to fly in 6 replacements in March 1942 from Argus proved abortive).

But there were periods when both squadrons were down to a mere handful of aircraft during 1942.

So where does the figure of 27 come from?

 

[Vincenzo]

According to the information I have there were 27 Swordfish based on Malta and in a nine month period they accounted for 50,000 tons
per month average. August 1941 was the highest with 92,000 tons sunk.

How many tons sunk by submarines isn't relevant to this, especially since Italy lost over 2,500 vessels during the war.

In August '41 the lost of merchantman (all the italians and german flag in mediterranean) by aircraft were 28,565 and this obviously were not just from Malta based swordfish
the Navy ships lost by aircraft in the 2nd half of'41 were: 2 MTB and 1 small auxilary

 

[WARSPITER]

What is your source for the "27 Swordfish" on Malta and at what point in time?

As far as I can see at no point between June 1940 and the end of 1942 did the numbers of Swordfish AND Albacores on the island, let alone Swordfish alone, come to that kind of a figure. In June 1939 there were only 11 Swordfish in reserve on Malta per the Admiralty and I doubt that that number increased at all given the demand elsewhere.

830 on formation in June 1940, began with 12 Swordfish and suffered heavy losses throughout the campaign despite replacement aircraft being flown in from Ark Royal on occasion.
Jan 1941 - 5
July 1941 - 6
Oct 1941 - 2 (only 1 arrived)

828 took 11 Albacores to Malta from Ark in Sept 1942. Replacements for them were flown in from Egypt when the front line was sufficiently far advanced to permit (a plan to fly in 6 replacements in March 1942 from Argus proved abortive).

But there were periods when both squadrons were down to a mere handful of aircraft during 1942.

So where does the figure of 27 come from?

The 27 comes from several sources on the net.

Interestingly, I have been looking at different sources for losses as well.

Axis merchant shipping losses go from 1,200,000 tons to 4,000,000 tons with
the number of vessels lost at around 900 right through to 3800.

Each of these have around four amounts.

What I posted earlier may be right and may be wrong but that means anything else posted could easily be the same. This
makes it hard to work out the impact of operations from Malta leading up to the Alamein battles.

Apart from all that the Swordfish was an ugly duckling but it still did well and no, I'm not interested in providing any sources for that
except me.

 

[EwenS]

The 27 comes from several sources on the net.

Care to name / link them so we can check their veracity / accuracy?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Yes you seem to be having a problem with part of this discussion. In order to quantify the data, you have to have pretty simple criteria and be consistent about it. To me, 'shot down' = 'can't fly any more after being attacked'. To keep it simple. So long as you use the same criteria for both sides, I believe it's valid. It's not like I'm only counting crash landed planes on the Allied side. On that Feb 8 date the Allies didn't even make any claims IIRC.

I'm also not trying to second guess Shores here, and I'm not trying to follow the audit trail of every crash-landed aircraft.

Good to know I am still the problem. Which means everyone has to put up with your interpretation and description of the Shores Et. Al.'s interpretation and description of losses and what to include in a book, not a statistical survey. It also means there can be no easy comparison to the official air force figures.

So on 8 February 1942 Shores has 2 Hurricanes strafed to destruction, the air force says they survived, Shores has a Kittyhawk "tail shot away", the squadron says it landed with tail damage and flew again 3 days later. How does an aircraft make that clean a landing with no tail? At its core the loss list in Shores should be very good, that is the lost and heavily damaged aircraft, given all air forces generated documents on these and the checking that has gone on. If you are going to include lightly damaged aircraft then welcome to garbage in. Like most people I have problems with garbage in approaches. Since no axis losses are included on 8 February is the conclusion all 8 allied pilots that attacked completely missed? At the very least an explanation of the differences on 8 February is needed, and it does not need you adding a third strafing victim.

Adding aircraft that are repaired doesn't introduce any errors if you are just counting aircraft that were shot down.

Assuming the definition in the book is consistent of course and for both sides with similar levels of data and after the 8 February 1942 data check that is doubtful.

Really? Fighter cover wasn't annihilated on several of the days I already listed? You are calling me a liar here basically. Maybe we need to plunge deeper into some of those 'bad days'.

From Message 120 "But the Axis was still able to blunt Allied air attacks and prevent the Allies from doing the effective longer ranged strikes. Even when the bombers weren't shot down they often had to eject their bombs and run for home when their fighter cover was annihilated."

Provide the proof, not the accusation, the number so we can all see what often and annihilated are defined as.

The shipping loss figures clearly vary between sources and they have the additional problem if someone is trying to define if the ship was on the African run. However none of the figures support the Swordfish 50,000 tons per month story.

Casualties, Killed, Wounded, Missing, Allied 1,750, German 1,859, Italian 1,051, 38 Panzers, 11 Italian tanks, 67 British tanks. Barrie Pitt, Crucible of War, looking at other sources they are around the same. Add 395 or so trucks.

Rommel's opinion is not the last word, but it's certainly a data point. The key thing is I think you will find people on both sides who share his opinion on the role of Air Power in El Alamein, but I'll get deeper into that too.

I know, then again look at how exaggerated the Germans though the level of air attack was. Plus the amount of allied artillery fire and the raids on Axis supply lines by ground troops.

The rules of engagement as the Germans thought they were as of early July 1942. Allied command was slow, the faster the battle could be fought the more likely an axis win. German armour could move at night, or at least in pre dawn and post dusk, and would have supply come to them during the night, Allied armour would not move unless it was daylight and would retire towards supply before dark. This meant the Germans were on the move first and tended to stay on the battlefield, where they would use visual signals during the night to stay in touch, normally without attracting attention from the enemy. Allied armour would normally fight without (much) support and could be relied to move towards axis armour. Allied infantry and artillery prepared positions were tough and best bypassed but the positions were not normally mutually supportive and allied command was too slow to send support, so a strong assault with the Luftwaffe acting as heavy artillery could be expected to eliminate the position at the cost of time and operations becoming more static for a time. Allied airpower on the battlefield was a manageable problem.

August update, Allied artillery was now operating in numbers rather than individual units, allied combined arms doctrine was still poor, allied ability to put together divisional or larger attacks still poor. Allied battlefield airpower was more of a problem. An attack hooking round the southern end of the line would work if once again the allied armour could be defeated heavily enough to create holes in the defences and/or an exposed flank causing the battle to turn mobile. The allied southern front was patrolled rather than defended by 7th Armoured division

Sun and moon set and rise GMT, at London, which is 5130 N 0, adjust as appropriate for Alamein roughly 3050N 2900E. Full moon was on 26 August.

30-Aug-42 Sunrise 0509, Moon set 1002, Sunset 1852, Moon rise 2101
31-Aug-42 Sunrise 0510, Moon set 1109, Sunset 1849, Moon rise 2128
1-Sep-42 Sunrise 0512, Moon set 1212, Sunset 1847, Moon rise 2159
2-Sep-42 Sunrise 0513, Moon set 1313, Sunset 1845, Moon rise 2233 (third quarter moon)
3-Sep-42 Sunrise 0515, Moon set 1409, Sunset 1843, Moon rise 2312
4-Sep-42 Sunrise 0517, Moon set 1501, Sunset 1841, Moon rise 2357

It seems Rommel's fundamental plan was having the Allied armour attack the axis positions, not the axis punch through the defences, at least not until the Allied armour was largely disposed of.

This is sort of a synthesis from some reports on the Alam Halfa battle, built around the New Zealand Official History. About a week before the battle the allied air force starts the new tactic of bombing DAK positions at night, casualties are caused but the main effect is to deprive the troops of a good night's rest. A planted map incorrectly detailing the terrain and allied minefields in the south has made its way to DAK but it seems the axis never entered the incorrectly marked terrain in strength at least.

On 27 August Rommel sets the attack date as 29 August, the original plan allowed 5 days to concentrate, and it required a 24 hour delay to 30 August to complete, a tanker arrived on 30 August, the Luftwaffe began a fuel airlift. New Zealand official history, about Alam Halfa supply, "Nehring records how the Luftwaffe lifted some 400 cubic metres of fuel but delivered less than 100 at the front, the balance being consumed on the journey" or 3 units to move 1, which sounds right for air delivery, road delivery wold be less. This appears to be for transferring fuel from the rear to the front in Africa. While the Jerrican had many virtues its weight was an addition burden and so fuel cost to move, the can was about a quarter of the total filled weight when used for fuel.

On 30 August the axis formations moved into their final positions, fuel for 100 miles for tanks, 150 miles for other vehicles. The attack started at 2200 starting with heavy shelling of the first allied minefield area, all movement was planned to be complete by 0530, forming a front line 15 miles long facing north, threatening the allied rear. Axis attacks on allied airfields late on 30 August did little damage. Allied night reconnaissance picked up the movement and by 0300 air attacks began, lasting until dawn. The minefields were thicker than expected, units failed to navigate correctly. Air attacks caused most delay in the march, 21st Panzer reporting 18 attacks, and the terrain slowed things down as well, while the time required for forcing back the 7th Armoured division patrols delayed the minefield clearances. Allied artillery kept firing during the night.

As of 0500 31 August there were narrow gaps in the minefields but they were bottlenecks, vehicles had bogged or broken down and some had been damaged by allied shelling or bombs. As of 0900 21st panzer was finally leaving the minefields, but Littorio was further behind. As Rommel expected the initial British plan was to use their infantry and artillery to defend. The dust storm arrived at 1130, imposing a delay that meant it was 1400 before 15th Panzer began moving, while Littorio caught up to 21st Panzer but in the divisional assembly area, imposing another hour's delay. Allied air attacks were continual, as was the shelling. The New Zealand division reporting firing over 12,000 rounds by darkness 31 August, while the division AA units claimed 3 Ju87 and 3 Bf109 shot down, two pilots taken prisoner.

The axis attack was recast as a shorter hook, to clear the ridge line to their north, after destroying some allied tanks creating an apparent hole the panzer divisions moved towards the ridge and into the anti tank line, retiring when allied armour was spotted heading towards the line at speed. The allied armour stopped at the front line. Throughout the night allied air and artillery attacks continued.

1 September the axis position was roughly where it was planned to be a day earlier. Allied armour was apparently dispersed and could be dealt with in sequence. The supply routes were becoming better. However the reconnaissance group "was scarcely battle-worthy. In the approach march its vehicles had suffered severely from ground and air action, mines, and mechanical trouble. In its laager overnight near Samaket Gaballa, it had been caught in the light of Air Force flares and pattern bombed. Now about a third of its vehicles was completely destroyed or in need of repair and it had a large number of casualties to be evacuated to the rear." While 15th Panzer could attack, 21st needed fuel which took until mid afternoon to arrive, but the early attack stopped at a false crest and destroyed some allied armour that broke cover. The inexperienced British 8th Armoured Brigade moved to join the 22nd but had one regiment run out of fuel almost immediately, at 0830 it hit the German gun line, mostly ex USSR 76.2mm ones, decided they were 88mm and halted in order to call in support to withdraw. A heavy axis air attack managed to disrupt the HQs of 13 corps, 10th Armoured and 44th Infantry Division, resulting in 8th Armoured retiring east instead of into the defences. The situation on the ground in the area hardly changed all day, 15th Panzer between the two British armoured brigades. Allied artillery continued to fire "Two prisoners of 90 Light Division who were gathered in by a 23 Battalion patrol just after dark told a story of a hard day. Two parties, of about thirty-six men altogether, had set off that morning from the vicinity of Dier el Munassib with orders to advance to the north-east. Under heavy artillery fire the men had halted until they were joined by six tanks. The tanks then led off again but, after one had been knocked out, the rest retired, leaving the infantry under fire in the open. By evening all but three of the men were casualties."

Evening 1 September DAK down to around 90 running panzers and was largely where it started the day. New Zealand history: "On the night of 1–2 September, with the enemy's situation well reconnoitred during daylight, the Air Force stepped up its bombing programme. For the first time in the desert war, a 4000 lb bomb was dropped on the enemy columns, and among the thuds and rumbles of gunfire and bombing, the detonation of this one bomb was clearly heard by the New Zealanders in their box some miles to the north. The support and supply vehicles of the Axis troops, no longer strung out along the line of march as on the previous night but laagered in closer concentration around unit headquarters, felt the weight of the air assault severely. Their records, previously complaining of the moral effect rather than of material damage, now listed men, guns, and vehicles as casualties. Apart from this bombing, a comparatively small amount of Axis air activity, and the customary artillery harassing fire, this night passed with no minor incidents recorded."

By morning of 2 September nothing much had changed the axis had dug in and men were reluctant to move fuel given the mostly air attacks they were under, that afternoon part of 7th armoured division caught a supply convoy of 300 trucks, destroying 57 and scattering the rest, with the result the axis front line forces were down to 1 issue of fuel, good for 100 km on good terrain, probably half of that in their current situation.

The axis began to fall back. "By the middle of the morning the field guns of 10 Armoured and 44 Divisions were falling silent as few targets remained within range. The armoured division then took some of its batteries from their dug-in positions and set them up further to the south. By midday a thick dust-storm was raging, hindering observation both from the ground and the air. Several New Zealand artillery observation officers took advantage of the dust to settle themselves in better vantage points overlooking the line of the depressions on the south of the box and, when the dust began to settle about two o'clock, reported a wealth of targets as numerous enemy columns, also taking advantage of the low visibility, were moving to their positions for the withdrawal. On orders from Eighth Army for maximum harassing fire, all British guns within range maintained constant fire until dusk, several batteries expending over 1000 rounds each during the afternoon and evening."

On 2/3 September 'the British guns, on Montgomery's instructions, harassed the enemy constantly throughout the hours of darkness, while seventy-two sorties were flown by the Air Force between dusk and dawn. Two 4000 lb bombs were dropped this night, both causing large fires to show that they had found targets of some kind. According to the German records, 300 aircraft dropped 2400 bombs and caused such damage to transport that some units were nearly immobilised."

3 September DAK had about 120 tanks operational. The Allied attack on the night of 3/4 was helped by 90 minutes of bombing starting 2030. It provided a guide for the attackers, but the operation was overall a failure, a local counter attack was effective. The allied artillery and airpower seem to have done little damage to axis forces on 3 September.

"the Desert Air Force, which was beginning to feel the strain of the heavy bombing programme, to lay on a two-hour raid on the concentration of vehicles observed at dusk in Munassib. This raid, on the evening of the 4th, was the last major air effort of the battle."

CHAPTER 11 — Summary of the Battle | NZETC Page 176 starts a summary of allied air operations. Total truck losses are put at 395, the New Zealand history says 400.

 

[Shortround6]

The Swordfish was a thing of beauty and joy to all who beheld it.


Good thing we are typing on the internet so you can't see my face.
That was not typed with anything close to a stragiht face

 

[Shortround6]

My main focus here is on the relevance of the Desert Air Force vs. the Luftwaffe. My premise is that the Luftwaffe, having dominated the skies for most of mid 1941 through mid 1942 (and contributed greatly to Axis victories in that period), started having some trouble with the British air forces in mid 1942 and that the British had acquired some abilities (through improving kit and tactics) that the Luftwaffe did not have.

A lot things were changing slowly and other things were changing fast. A lot of things overlapped and came together in the months leading up to 2nd El Alamein.

From Wiki:
"On 3 September 1939, RAF Middle East Command—under Air Chief Marshal Sir William Mitchell, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East—comprised four separate commands: for Egypt (designated Middle East), RAF Iraq, Mediterranean at Malta, and RAF Aden (No. 8, No. 203, and No. 94 Squadrons).[2] Mitchell handed over to Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore in early May 1940. When Italy declared war in June 1940, Longmore had just 29 squadrons numbering less than 300 aircraft in the four commands detailed above."

It was under Longmore that the four commands were joined into one to provide greater flexibility. Longmore could pretty much on his own, transfer units form one area to another to where the greatest threat was or where they would be the most useful. Tedder had been assigned to the Mid east to get him out of the way in Britain where he had run afoul of Lord Beaverbrook and he became Longmore's 2nd in command.
The Mid East had become sort of a dumping ground for commanders that Churchill and his friends didn't like. And when some of these commanders insisted they needed more equipment/supplies they were labeled defeatist and/or complainers.

Wiki again:

"On 10 June 1940, RAF bomber squadrons in AHQ Egypt—under the direction of No. 202 Group RAF—totalled five squadrons of Bristol Blenheims, one of Vickers Valentias and one of Bristol Bombays. "
In Egypt for you could add No. 33, No. 80, and No. 112 Squadrons with Gloster Gladiators, No. 208 Squadron RAF with Westland Lysanders.

The Commanders in Egypt dealt with both the Italian East Africa campaign and the Advance into Libya and then in 1941 Rommel and the results of the Greek expedition (and Malta).
Longmore was relieved in May of 1941 and Tedder was not the 1st choice. He had been 2nd in Command but the 1st choice, Air Vice-Marshal O T Boyd Previously in charge of Balloon Command (cannot make this stuff up) was captured when his aircraft came down in Sicily instead of Malta. Tedder took over by default and by the time London could come up with anybody else they realized that Tedder and crew were doing a good job (even if they complained a lot) and they left him there. 1941 also saw the Irag and Iran uprisings and the need to occupy French Syria and the rather feeble attempt by Germany to aid the Arab insurrectionists (a few Me 110s and He 111s). Which still didn't raise many (any?) alarm bells in London that just maybe the Mid East wasn't a backwater front and could get by with bottom of the barrel scrapings.
Tedder and crew were doing a lot of innovating in tactics, operations, maintenance, repair, training, communications and integration of command and control. Tedder's HQ was the same as the army HQ, sub commands were in the Army sub command HQs, They learned what each others problems were and what they could do to solve each others problems, they also learned what each force could and could not do. It also made issuing orders and sharing intelligence much easier. Army and Air commanders got recon photos at the same time.

By Oct 1942 the WDAF (not counting the eastern regions ) had over 38 squadrons/flights available for 2nd El Alamein.

Don't underestimate this learning curve, The US in Tunisia had to learn some of it. Made easier by Tedder. More US units learned in Italy.
Tedder was called back to London and took part in revamping the Tactical Air Force for Normandy. Tedder was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander at SHAEF beneath General Eisenhower. However it seems he ran afoul of Montgomery and his supporters and was shuffled off to the Soviet Union to talk them into making a greater effort during/after the battle of the Bulge.

 

[EwenS]

The British had a lot of auxiliary landing fields. This was standard routine for them. They would move the aircraft from rear area fields to forward fields during operations. They would also shuffle fields around keep the Germans guessing as to which fields they were actually using. Sometimes for the fighters planes would fly 3 sorties a day. Planes would often move back overnight to avoid night bombing. The British had a lot more trucks than the Germans and the DAF used them, hard. Damaged aircraft that could not fly out for repair were trucked out the same day, leaving nothing for the Germans to bomb.
British ground crews were often servicing DAF aircraft on captured airfields in a few hours. The 8th Army rarely outran the DAF ground crew and the DAF was able to maintain coverage over the advancing troops at just about all times. There were number of shops back near Cairo with extensive repair facilities and engine overhaul and propeller repair. The DAF often trucked planes back to shops rather than wait for parts at forward airfields. Kept them from being targets.
Didn't always work but the DAF didn't loose many planes on the ground to either air attack or being over run. Something could not be said for the Luftwaffe.

The DAF did have priority for trucks and truck fuel, they did not have to exist on scraps and left overs. A long retreat by Rommel could result in scores if not hundreds of damaged/unserviceable airframes captured by advancing 8th Army troops as the German ground crew had no way to move them.

On the subject of airfields in Egypt it should be remembered that Egypt was NOT a British colony. It was independent but with a very heavy British influence. The relationship between the two nations was governed by the Anglo Egyptian Treaty of 1936. That allowed Britain to place 10,000 troops and 400 pilots, plus ancillary personnel and civilian support staff, in the "Suez Canal Zone", numbers that could be increased in time of war. The "Zone" was not a closely defined strip of land as the name suggests. It was a right to base British forces "in the vicinity of the Canal" in places defined in by the Treaty. These broadly were placed between the Canal and the Nile River. From the Treaty:-

So in 1939 there were only 5 quasi-permanent air bases in Egypt plus a number of Landing Grounds, all in the Canal Zone. There were 3 more bases in Palestine, 1 in Aden, 2 in Malta (including the seaplane base at Kalafrana), one in Kenya and 1 at Khartoum in Sudan. Only 2 had hard surfaced runways.

As for the development of the 5 airfields themselves:-

"Owing to the lack of good-quality local sand and aggregate, it was decided as a matter of policy that runways would not be concrete. Moreover, neither plant nor labour was available and the type of construction was foreign to the country, so it was decided, since time was an overriding factor, to employ bituminous carpets in which sand aggregates coated with bitumen were used. These were laid five inches thick, hand tamped, and then rolled. Given the hard sand base, these runways stood up even under four-engined aircraft throughout the waar until B-17s and B-24s with higher US tyre pressures of 85lb psi ... versus the British 45lb psi...came in, so pre-coated aggregate overlay had to be added."

25 more airfields were built in the Canal Zone between 1940 & 1943. There was a general lack of machinery so extending construction times, but labour was cheap.
"Bases of Air Strategy Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-1945" by Robert Higham

Building Landing Grounds was a relatively easy task. Just find a suitably large piece of hard sand and move in. That kind of surface was adequate for most of the aircraft types operated in 1941/42. Anything else had to be based back in the Canal Zone e.g. the Wellingtons (although sometimes they did stage through forward Landing Grounds). The size of that patch however grew as larger new types came along.

While what you note about British use of Landing Grounds is true, it should be noted that both sides used those same patches of hard sand as the battle ebbed & flowed across the desert. And both sides booby trapped them before they left.

 

[Vincenzo]

landing zone were common italian had 125 landing strip in Libya in 1940, and 21 with higher classification

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Good to know I am still the problem. Which means everyone has to put up with your interpretation and description of the Shores Et. Al.'s interpretation and description of losses and what to include in a book, not a statistical survey. It also means there can be no easy comparison to the official air force figures.

So on 8 February 1942 Shores has 2 Hurricanes strafed to destruction, the air force says they survived, Shores has a Kittyhawk "tail shot away", the squadron says it landed with tail damage and flew again 3 days later. How does an aircraft make that clean a landing with no tail? At its core the loss list in Shores should be very good, that is the lost and heavily damaged aircraft, given all air forces generated documents on these and the checking that has gone on. If you are going to include lightly damaged aircraft then welcome to garbage in. Like most people I have problems with garbage in approaches. Since no axis losses are included on 8 February is the conclusion all 8 allied pilots that attacked completely missed? At the very least an explanation of the differences on 8 February is needed, and it does not need you adding a third strafing victim.

You are definitely still struggling with this mate. Shores lists these aircraft as 'crash landed' and I already explained, maybe five times in this thread, why I personally (not Shores) included crash landed as criteria to count as a 'loss' in answering the question "who was dominating the air war". Which by the way is painfully obvious.

As to how an aircraft can have the tail shot away and be repairable, I don't know for sure but my guess would be that the cloth covering of the tail surfaces (rudder and / or elevators) were shot away or burned, as easily happened, but that the pilot was still able to land because he was still getting some control surface response from whatever was left. But a crash landing usually means an uncontrolled or forced landing, either because the aircraft lost power or the pilot lost control, or for example the landing gear would not go down (maybe because hydraulics were damaged). So varying degrees of damage are typically the result.

Assuming the definition in the book is consistent of course and for both sides with similar levels of data and after the 8 February 1942 data check that is doubtful.

I chose Shores because his Mediterranean Air War series (and also his 'Bloody Shambles' series on the Far East) are:

1) Widely regarded as highly accurate in terms of data
2) Frequently used in many discussion threads on this very website, and
3) Seem to be respected by both sides of many discussions on here.
4) The best single source on loss data for this Theater.

Shores' work is a known quantity. I do not think he is free of errors but he is the best source we have on actual losses (as distinct from claims) on both sides. Your surprise and doubt on learning that Allied pilots sometimes made multiple claims on a day when the Axis didn't take any losses is also nothing new. Many people including myself were surprised by this when this data first became available many years ago, but all of the similar comparisons which have now been done have shown this (on both sides).

 

[Shortround6]

as criteria to count as a 'loss' in answering the question "who was dominating the air war". Which by the way is painfully obvious.

Who was dominating the air war is who was able to more missions.
Who was completing the most recon missions (intelligence).
Who was stopping the most recon missions (denying intelligence)
Who was completing the most supply interdiction missions (affecting their enemies supply)
Who was attacking the air fields the most (restricting enemy number of sorties).

Some of this gets a little complicated. Not all ground was the same, If you can force your opponent to retreat from good (solid ground) air fields to areas with known soft ground in rainy seasons his sortie rate automatically goes down. If this was worth your own losses in the bombing sorties to achieve this may be subject to question. Forcing enemy aircraft to fly further to reach the front lines means more fuel used per sortie.

Probably some stuff I over looked.

Dominating the air was lot more complicated that daily shoot down tallies.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

A lot things were changing slowly and other things were changing fast. A lot of things overlapped and came together in the months leading up to 2nd El Alamein.

From Wiki:
"On 3 September 1939, RAF Middle East Command—under Air Chief Marshal Sir William Mitchell, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East—comprised four separate commands: for Egypt (designated Middle East), RAF Iraq, Mediterranean at Malta, and RAF Aden (No. 8, No. 203, and No. 94 Squadrons).[2] Mitchell handed over to Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore in early May 1940. When Italy declared war in June 1940, Longmore had just 29 squadrons numbering less than 300 aircraft in the four commands detailed above."

It was under Longmore that the four commands were joined into one to provide greater flexibility. Longmore could pretty much on his own, transfer units form one area to another to where the greatest threat was or where they would be the most useful. Tedder had been assigned to the Mid east to get him out of the way in Britain where he had run afoul of Lord Beaverbrook and he became Longmore's 2nd in command.
The Mid East had become sort of a dumping ground for commanders that Churchill and his friends didn't like. And when some of these commanders insisted they needed more equipment/supplies they were labeled defeatist and/or complainers.

Wiki again:

"On 10 June 1940, RAF bomber squadrons in AHQ Egypt—under the direction of No. 202 Group RAF—totalled five squadrons of Bristol Blenheims, one of Vickers Valentias and one of Bristol Bombays. "
In Egypt for you could add No. 33, No. 80, and No. 112 Squadrons with Gloster Gladiators, No. 208 Squadron RAF with Westland Lysanders.

The Commanders in Egypt dealt with both the Italian East Africa campaign and the Advance into Libya and then in 1941 Rommel and the results of the Greek expedition (and Malta).
Longmore was relieved in May of 1941 and Tedder was not the 1st choice. He had been 2nd in Command but the 1st choice, Air Vice-Marshal O T Boyd Previously in charge of Balloon Command (cannot make this stuff up) was captured when his aircraft came down in Sicily instead of Malta. Tedder took over by default and by the time London could come up with anybody else they realized that Tedder and crew were doing a good job (even if they complained a lot) and they left him there. 1941 also saw the Irag and Iran uprisings and the need to occupy French Syria and the rather feeble attempt by Germany to aid the Arab insurrectionists (a few Me 110s and He 111s). Which still didn't raise many (any?) alarm bells in London that just maybe the Mid East wasn't a backwater front and could get by with bottom of the barrel scrapings.
Tedder and crew were doing a lot of innovating in tactics, operations, maintenance, repair, training, communications and integration of command and control. Tedder's HQ was the same as the army HQ, sub commands were in the Army sub command HQs, They learned what each others problems were and what they could do to solve each others problems, they also learned what each force could and could not do. It also made issuing orders and sharing intelligence much easier. Army and Air commanders got recon photos at the same time.

By Oct 1942 the WDAF (not counting the eastern regions ) had over 38 squadrons/flights available for 2nd El Alamein.

Don't underestimate this learning curve, The US in Tunisia had to learn some of it. Made easier by Tedder. More US units learned in Italy.
Tedder was called back to London and took part in revamping the Tactical Air Force for Normandy. Tedder was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander at SHAEF beneath General Eisenhower. However it seems he ran afoul of Montgomery and his supporters and was shuffled off to the Soviet Union to talk them into making a greater effort during/after the battle of the Bulge.

It's much more complex with Tedder and the other British air force leadership in North Africa. I watched the video with the interview posted upthread by 33k in the air and learned a bit especially about the goings on in 1941.

Based on that interview with this Canadian historian Mike Bechthold, the guy who seems to have actually done the most to actually reorganize what became the DAF or WDAF is a 60 victory WW 1 ace named Raymond Collishaw. Tedder hated him and was finally able to replace him with Coningham in July 1941. Collishaw is credited with creating the framework of what eventually became the close air support system often credited to Tedder. Tedder was the overall leader.

What happened in a nutshell seems to be that there was a power struggle between the ground army Generals and the Air Force commanders, with London (and sometimes Churchill himself) stepping in to lean on one side or the other. As a result, the British Air Force in North Africa (I'm just going to use DAF for short from now on even though I know it isn't always accurate)... the DAF kept alternating clumsily between defensive and offensive roles.

Specifically, the DAF seesawed between the 'air umbrella' of fighter protection and standby bombers that the Army generals wanted, with the increasingly cunning ongoing experiment in close air support and long range logistics interdiction that the Air Force was figuring out.

Both sides caused dreadful mistakes - putting the DAF on the "umbrella" mission almost got the Army annihilated during Operation Battleaxe, and switching back to CAS (thanks to a directive to "Concentrate on ground strafing" in Jun 1941) is what saved the retreating army from total annihilation. In Sept 1941 Churchill broke the tie personally by issuing an order to all the ground forces and air force commanders "No more defensive air umbrella".

But when Tedder wanted to push the ground support strategy, he was often too heavy handed. He gave orders on at least two occasions that fighter pilots had to fly below 6000 ft and to explicitly ignore attacks from above. This helps explain some of the insane formations that the Germans were often amazed and delighted by, and helped them cause such painful
damage to the DAF. I.e. it was more than just the finger four thing.

Reading about all this helps me understand how the DAF seemed to radically change "personalities" several times in 1941. There were periods earlier in the year when they were doing quite well. There were a few later in the year too. But then it goes back to seeming catastrophic results. This is largely due to the continuing experiments being made and the gradual refinement of policies, with some of the biggest and most successful changes coming in the second half of 1942, but there was still some confusion and mistakes being made on the policy side.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Who was dominating the air war is who was able to more missions.

I would say success rate in the missions is also a major factor. For example:

Who was completing the most recon missions (intelligence).

...how many TacR missions by the RAF ended up shot down? You can see that in Shores data clearly. If you got assigned to one of those TacR flights, get your affairs in order and write a letter home to the wife. Longer range recon however started out pretty good and got better. You had guys like Warburton and relatively fast aircraft like the Maryland early on, later also
Baltimores and B-24s, B-17s, Wellingtons for night time, Beaufighters etc. But the day time TacR seemed to be a big problem for the Allies.

Who was stopping the most recon missions (denying intelligence)

See above

Who was completing the most supply interdiction missions (affecting their enemies supply)

This is something that definitely changed a lot over time. I think we are still figuring out the numbers just in the shipping (which is the easier part) and nobody seems to agree.

Who was attacking the air fields the most (restricting enemy number of sorties).

Not just most but most effectively. This is something you can see in Shores data dramatically changing. If I ever get to post the rest of the 1942 data you'll see it clearly, even more so in 1943.

Some of this gets a little complicated. Not all ground was the same, If you can force your opponent to retreat from good (solid ground) air fields to areas with known soft ground in rainy seasons his sortie rate automatically goes down. If this was worth your own losses in the bombing sorties to achieve this may be subject to question. Forcing enemy aircraft to fly further to reach the front lines means more fuel used per sortie.

Probably some stuff I over looked.

Dominating the air was lot more complicated that daily shoot down tallies.

It is, I agree, but losing 25% or even 50% or more in a single mission from one of your handful of effective fighter squadrons is a problem, IMO. That was not something the DAF could sustain.

 

[Shortround6]

But the day time TacR seemed to be a big problem for the Allies.

Unfortunately they used Hurricanes for a lot of the Tac Recon.
I have no idea of the reasoning.
The first several hundred Tomahawks in Britain were given cameras and used for Rec Recon in early 1941.

Maybe part of the British aircraft Hierarchy? Not good enough to be fighter? do Tac Recon.
Not good enough for Europe? go to the mid-east. Not good enough for the mid-east? Go to the Far East (Buffaloes).

It took a lot of pleading to get even one PR Spitfire. They knew they were taking losses. But the idea of not having photos bothered them even more.
There were times they scheduled recon flights to preserve Ultra. Sent out a recon plane to intercept/report a convoy so they could attack it with bombers without the Axis wondering how they found it. Once the convoy saw the recon plane they had an answer handed to them.

See above

Germans and Italians were operating blind a lot more often than the British.
British tried with both special Hurricanes and Spitfires to stop Ju 86Rs let alone other recon aircraft.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Another big factor is bombing effectiveness. That is the real advantage of the Stuka early on, one which the Germans relied on heavily (we never got to the point of discussing the tank battles in France for example but it's worth looking at, Russia too). But the Stuka was an old design and eventually became unable to bring the same kinds of results in land battles. This was a gradual decline probably culminating at Second El Alamain. The closing of that door was a major problem for the Axis. The Ju 88 gave some similar results a few times (including at Kasserine Pass in 1943), but by late 1941 it was becoming 'painful' to use in land battles, often taking heavy losses when deployed beyond the range of fighter escort.

By contrast, in the early days of the Desert war, Blenheims and Lysanders were not extremely effective in ground attack. Wellingtons had some useful capabilities but were just too slow and vulnerable to operate in daylight raids in the tactical or operational role.

The problem with the Blenheim was two fold - it was too vulnerable to fighters (even with an escort), and it wasn't that effective as a bomber. Small bomb load and not very accurate. Both Lysander and Blenheim also quite vulnerable to ground fire.

Newer planes like Maryland, Boston, Baltimore were faster, and largely due to that had a better survival rate, but they couldn't outrun a Bf 109 and still required an escort. The limited range of the Hurricane meant that in the early days these newer types had to stay away from the better defended targets, except at short range. Kittyhawk extended this range somewhat, but policies like flying at 6,000 feet in strange formations without wingmen, made them excessively vulnerable.

Fighter bombers gave the DAF a much more effective tool for the shorter range battlefield attacks. But with a bomb on it, fighter range is reduced. But this is what I mean by 'poor man's stuka'. A fighter bomber may not have the hit percentage that the Stuka has, but it's better at strafing and can engage fighters on pretty equal terms once it drops it's bombs.

The later B-25, B-26 and B-24 gave some enhanced capabilities, bigger bomb loads (especially useful in attacking Axis airfields, as you can see very clearly in Shores data), more defensive guns, but these still also needed an escort if they were flying near Axis airbases (and keep in mind, MC 202s could shoot these planes down too).

The Spitfire gave the DAF relative parity in fighter combat at close range, helping them at least contest air superiority closer to the Allied air bases. The Kittyhawk II / P-40F / Warhawk added to that capability and also gave it to them at longer ranges for escort missions. This in turn made it possible to extend the reach of the existing bombers, particularly Baltimore and later the B-25 and B-26, to attack more distant but still defended targets.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Unfortunately they used Hurricanes for a lot of the Tac Recon.
I have no idea of the reasoning.
The first several hundred Tomahawks in Britain were given cameras and used for Rec Recon in early 1941.

Yeah I don't know why, but it seems ill-suited

Maybe part of the British aircraft Hierarchy? Not good enough to be fighter? do Tac Recon.
Not good enough for Europe? go to the mid-east. Not good enough for the mid-east? Go to the Far East (Buffaloes).

There was some of that for sure, both in terms of people and kit. Fortunately they underestimated some of both people and kit who turned out better than expected.

It took a lot of pleading to get even one PR Spitfire. They knew they were taking losses. But the idea of not having photos bothered them even more.

They got some Spit Mk IV some time in 1942, but those took pretty heavy losses too. So did the recon P-38s when those arrived in 1943 (yes this would be post second El Alamein). They could have used some of those recon Mustangs the British liked so much.

There were times they scheduled recon flights to preserve Ultra. Sent out a recon plane to intercept/report a convoy so they could attack it with bombers without the Axis wondering how they found it. Once the convoy saw the recon plane they had an answer handed to them.

Germans and Italians were operating blind a lot more often than the British.
British tried with both special Hurricanes and Spitfires to stop Ju 86Rs let alone other recon aircraft.

Well the Germans and Italians had one big advantage at least for short range. The Ju 86R posed a brief crisis for the Allies, but they did solve that problem. A bigger and more challenging problem was that the Axis could fly Bf 109 or MC 202 over Allied lines at altitude, and these could usually outrun any Allied fighter especially at altitude. They weren't invulnerable because you did often have to fly lower to get a good look at the goods, but much less likely to get caught than a Hurricane.

 

[Shortround6]

The Stuka's reputation was always a bit over blown in land battles.
If you are bombing tanks you are area bombing. You can fit several tanks in space of one Cruiser turret.
Same with dug in guns. A miss of several dozen yds from a gun pit may not destroy the gun (the crew may deaf forever) but a crew either laying on gun pit 'floor' or in separate slit trenches may live. In desert the ground was often rock not sand. Guns were often dispersed instead of clustered. shallow personal trenches were still common.
Scoring an identical hit on a Destroyer at sea might well sink it or at least cripple it. Cruisers are actually sizable targets.
A bombed Artillery battery is going to be disrupted. and out of action for while. Total destruction is rare.

Same with the tank formation. The formation is disrupted and sometimes not capable of either offensive or defensive action for some time, (a few hours or longer). A lot depends on actual human casualties and replacements of crew and soft vehicles.

A bigger and more challenging problem was that the Axis could fly Bf 109 or MC 202 over Allied lines at altitude, and these could usually outrun any Allied fighter especially at altitude.

and this was dependent on time. The 109Fs didn't show up until almost 1942?
MC 202s in North Africa also show up late. Months after they start showing up in Malta, and with typical Axis supply, they are often grounded due to lack of parts.
The Axis did fly recon missions, but when you only 1/2 to 1/4 the number you are not going to get good results and if you are using 109Fs and MC 202s you are not going very deep.
The Poor Hurricane pilots sometimes used drop tanks.