Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The German Fliegerkorps X was moved out of Sicily in April 1941 to take part in the Invasion of Greece and get ready for the the invasion of Russia. Fliegerkorps X stayed and took part in Crete and then stayed and engaged in long range dueling with the DAF through 1942 and into 1943.
It is about 240 miles from Crete to Tobruk so just about all of the German raids in the eastern Med were from Fliegerkorps X. Including mining the Suez and torpedo attacks on the eastern convoys, etc. However the distance is too far for 109s even with drop tanks.

This is one of my original points that started this whole debate off...

Fliegerkorps X too often sat on their hands but then the command structure was one of the convoluted Italian/Med things and Fliegerkorps X was not in the chain of command of the Africa Korps. The Germans were not that good at moving commands around. It sometimes took around 8 weeks to move a Fliegerkorps from the Russian front to Italy and another 8 weeks to move it back.

There was a lot of problems of coordination between different military branches within the German armed forces and between the Germans and the Italians, the latter of which got pretty dangerous toward the end until it erupted into an actual break by the time of the Italian surrender. But they were growing mutually suspicious long before that.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Ok so before I post another batch of aircraft losses, lets dig into this excerpt MikeMeech posted from Robert Ehlers 2015 book "The Mediterranean Air War" way back in post 80.

I have copied a few excerpts, and organized them by subject.

Logistics and Supply interdiction:

"On 4 August Rommel appealed to Wilhelm Keitel for better convoy protection, prioritization and coordination..." "Neither Luftwaffe nor IAF and Italian Navy units were privy to the full shipping schedule, making reliable air cover impossible"

I would add to this, the lack of range of the Bf 109 and MC 202, and the relatively ineffectiveness of the Bf 110 as a day time fighter.

"Heavy raids stretched unloading times for ships to eight days or more, making them extremely vulnerable to damage or sinking. In comparison, the British were unloading 400,000 tons a month in Suez."
Another knock-on effect of long range air raids on the ports: longer reloading times. A virtuous cycle for the Allies, a disaster for the Axis.

"On 23 August, he warned again that fuel and antitank ammunition were critically short. Without immediate resupply, he could not attack. Weichold replied that heavy shipping losses had further delayed the delivery schedule."

"Fuel shortages, already severe, nearly prevented Axis troops from getting back to their start lines. Even when ships got through to deliver more, vehicles .... The Axis had received 4.2 consumption units of fuel and 43 tons of ammunition, but another 5.5 consumption units of fuel and 350 tons of ammunition went down with their ships."

"Attacks on Tobruk were so effective that seaborne convoys diverted to Nenghazi, 250 miles to the west, forcing trucks to drive an extra 500 miles roundtrip. USAAF Liberators attacked Benghazi without pause. No. 201 Group and a reviving Malta turned up the pressure even further. In April and May, while the Luftwaffe controlled the central Mediterranean, Axis convoys lost only 2.7 and 5.8 percent, respectively, of their tonnage during the passage to Libya. In June, losses shot up to 35 percent. The Axis did slightly better in July as the Luftwaffe made an unsuccessful attempt to reverse Malta's revival. In August, 35 percent of supplies did not reach Libya. In September the total was 30 percent. In October more than 50 percent, including most of the fuel, went to the bottom."

I'd say this is a pretty categorical support of what I've been saying about a pivot point in mid 1942, and drastic increase in losses of fuel and supplies for the Germans, directly attributable to Allied air attacks, although we still need to look at what percentage was due to submarines.

Tactical Air power - The devastating (and yes, decisive) effects of Allied air strikes leading up to Second El Alamein.

"On 30 August, the RAF attacked troop convoys and concentrations. "Heavy air raids commenced," the Afrika Korps war diary said, "directed mainly against 21st Panzer Division."

Hans von Luck noted laconically that "our own Messerscmitt fighters stood on the airfields with no fuel" as RAF aircraft savaged Axis forces. [Axis] Bombers managed one night of ineffective attacks. From there, the few Me 109s that got airborne were tied to close escort of ineffective and costly Stuka raids, with a handful engaging in the equally ineffective but still standard Frei Jagd ('free-hunting") tactic, with 902 operational WDAF aircraft facing 171 serviceable Luftwafffe planes, a 5.3:1 ratio"

I would say this ratio is wrong, because he forgot about the Italian RA here, including an on-books strength of 7 fighter groups, or about 210 deadly MC.202 fighters and about 80 bombers (including 20 Stukas). I don't however know the full serviceable strength of the Italians at this point. But it's more than zero that's for sure. We will see more about this when I post some more air combat and available forces data later. The Frei Jagd is the tactic I mentioned several times upthread of the German fighters prowling around at altitude looking for Allied fighters to pick off. I.e. rather than getting in there and mixing it up with the bomber escorts, which they didn't like doing (as you'll note below from a Luftwaffe pilot in his own words).

"By 2 September nonstop raids on advancing German columns had caused heavy casualties. These consisted of twenty to thirty bombers with fighter escort and occurred almost hourly. Flak was often unable to engage effectively as a result of the near absence of searchlights and radar. There was one night-fighter Staffel of twelve aircraft., and one Freya radar unit at El Daba."

Night bombing seems to be more of a factor than I had realized on the tactical level, according to this narrative by Ehlers.

The Importance specifically of Fighters and especially escort fighters

"Rommel remarked, "Between ten and twelve o'clock we were bombed no less than six times by British aircraft.... Swarms of low-flying fighter bombers were coming back to the attack again and again, and my troops suffered tremendous casualties. Vast numbers of vehicles stood burning in the desert." He continued, "Our badly outnumbered fighters hurled themselves again and again toward the British bomber squadrons, but rarely succeeded in penetrating to their targets, for they were intercepted every time and engaged by the tremendously strong fighter escorts of the 'Party Rally' bomber squadrons."

"After Rommel called off the offensive on 3 September, strike aircraft harried the German withdrawal, making ten raids comprising 1u80 aircraft. Heavy night bombing followed. Vehicles, artillery, and antiaircraft positions suffered heavy damage. The most heavily hit units lost almost all of their vehicles."

I'd say this once again underscores the devastating, decisive impact of DAF air strikes. But it also highlights the importance of fighters. His comment about the trouble the Luftwaffe was having in attacking Allied bombers is echoed by a Luftwaffe pilot quoted in Shores Mediterranean Air War Volume 2. I put these quotes in blue to distinguish them from the other book:

Professor Doctor Ludwig Fransisket 1.Staffelkaptan 1./JG 277 up to Oct 1942:

"In the air we were superior to the British fighter aircraft (Hurricanes) particularly in 1941. The Curtiss Tomahawks and Kittyhawks were much better aircraft, but the Bf 109F had the better performance at high altitudes. over and above, our tactics seemed to be better than the British, but on the other hand the ever growing superiority in numbers of the RAF was the reason why JG 27 was from summer 1942 onwards more and more decimated and weakened."

So he dates the increasing problems from mid 1942, notes the Kittyhawk etc.

Ernst Düllberg Staffelkaptain in II.Gruppe JG 27, later Kommandeur III.Gruppe.

"The Bf109F and G were superior to the Hurricane and Curtiss P-40, and during the early months the inferiority of the Hurricane compensated for our lack of numbers. The Curtiss P-46* and Spitfire were equal to the Bf 109 in speed and rate of climb. The armament of the british types was designed for fighter versus fighter combats and was superior to ours in dogfights, but in our surprise attacks the bigger caliber guns proved more profitable.... My longest combat in Africa lasted 15 minutes and was over our own airfield with a Curtis P-46*. I managed to shoot it down when it broke away to return to base and I was able to cut it off. The pilot was unhurt and I was informed he was a New Zealand Captain, but when I arrived he was already taken away."

*The P-46 is what the Germans called P-40F and Kittyhawk II

Rudolf Sinner, technical officer II./JG 27 in 1942

"We only mete British bomber formations occasionally. If we were able to attack, they were nearly always covered by a strong British fighter formation, and the attack generally split up into individual attacks between fighters. The Curtiss P-40, although not as good an aircraft to hunt the Bf 109s in, was an excellent aircraft to fly close escort to bombers. It was very dangerous to attack a bomber formation escorted by the manueverable Curtis's, and without prospects."

"We did not fly many offensive missions with fighters, and for the British fighters it was relatively easy to attack our bombers with good chances of success.... the relatively small success of the British fighters against the Bf 109s is easily explained.... the British units always flew very low, and always in very senseless combat formations. This pleased us, but we were unable to understand it... from one mission to the next I was afraid the British must recognize the cause of their helplessness and change their formation to a looser one. But God be praaised my fears were groundless! I met my first fighter opponents flying correct tactical formations over Tunisia, and they were Americans. I believe the British tactics in Africa were wrong, they were based on numbers, 'flock' tactics, and as a last resort, defensive circles."

I think he is wrong about the formations, because the British changed their formations too. But the timing is the same time that the Americans showed up. Anyway, getting back to Rommel.

Rommel: "the paralyzing effect which air activity on such a scale had on motorized forces; above all, the serious damage which had been caused to our units by area bombing.... "British air superiority threw to the winds all the tactical rules which ... had hitherto applied with such success. There was no real answer to the enemy's air superiority, except a powerful air force of our own. In every battle to come, the strength of the Anglo-American air force was to be the deciding factor."

I would say this again emphasizes the importance of the fighter. And changing tactics. Speaking of which, the book also shows Marshal Coningham had similar priorities:

"Coningham's Key Lessons:

1 Fighter governs the front.
2 Air Commander must h ave control of all air forces in forward areas.
3 Bombing by day in battle area involves permanent fighter escort
4 Within range of shore base fighters Stuka is dead
5 Necessity for continuous bombing by day and night
9 Fighters need speed and performance below 15,000 feet
10 Over-specialization of fighters to be discouraged
11 Need for larger proportion of fighters to bombers; say 4 to 6 fighters for one bomber.
12 In combined operations Army and air commanders must live together and see each other daily."

Stuka is dead within range of the shore based fighters. This was a revelation after 2nd El Alamein. I.e. German tactical bombing is suddenly hitting a wall.
Fighters. Air superiority. Fighter escorts. More fighters per bombers. You can see this from both sides.

So yeah it certainly wasn't down to one type. Spitfires mattered a lot. So did the "P-46" P-40s. So did flying in flights of four with two pairs of wingmen.

Up until mid 1942 the Germans were relying a lot on the kind of uneven victories they were winning in early 1942. They needed to have that edge, because yes they were often outnumbered (though not as heavily as they sometimes make out). Once the Allies reached near parity in air combats and made it harder for the Germans to play their game, suddenly the prospects for the Luftwaffe dimmed and with it, the Afrika Korps, while the DAF and 8th Army went in the other direction.

 

[33k in the air]

Speaking of tactical air power in North Africa, the following video from the WW2TV YouTube channel might be of interest:

Battleaxe to Lightfoot: The evolution of tactical air power in North Africa

 

[Shortround6]

Up until mid 1942 the Germans were relying a lot on the kind of uneven victories they were winning in early 1942. They needed to have that edge, because yes they were often outnumbered (though not as heavily as they sometimes make out). Once the Allies reached near parity in air combats and made it harder for the Germans to play their game, suddenly the prospects for the Luftwaffe dimmed and with it, the Afrika Korps, while the DAF and 8th Army went in the other direction.

Part of the British problem from Dec 1941 through June/July of 1942 was that a lot of their planned aircraft replacements were siphoned off to India and Burma/Australia. British did an excellent job of recovering, repairing and getting damaged aircraft back into service to keep numbers up. They had a number of trucks and crews that would strip every airframe they could from the airfields and take them back to rear areas to be repaired at central facilities instead of trying to piece things together at local airfields. However this took dedicated trucks, crews and fuel.
One of the problems the Germans had was that as good as JG 27 was, it couldn't be everywhere. And where it wasn't the the British were pounding the crap out of the German targets. Germans didn't have enough AA guns either.
The British took losses (in some cases due to bad tactics) but more often than not JG 27 could not stop the British from doing what they wanted to do, even if they shot down more British planes than the Germans lost. The Germans (and Italians) lost an awful lot of planes on the ground.
British had a number of radar units that were mobile and they shuffled them forward and back as the front lines shifted which gave them better warning as to German raids and cut way down on flying standing patrols over the front line troops or road convoys so that engine hours and fuel use was going into something more productive.

 

[BiffF15]

Part of the British problem from Dec 1941 through June/July of 1942 was that a lot of their planned aircraft replacements were siphoned off to India and Burma/Australia. British did an excellent job of recovering, repairing and getting damaged aircraft back into service to keep numbers up. They had a number of trucks and crews that would strip every airframe they could from the airfields and take them back to rear areas to be repaired at central facilities instead of trying to piece things together at local airfields. However this took dedicated trucks, crews and fuel.
One of the problems the Germans had was that as good as JG 27 was, it couldn't be everywhere. And where it wasn't the the British were pounding the crap out of the German targets. Germans didn't have enough AA guns either.
The British took losses (in some cases due to bad tactics) but more often than not JG 27 could not stop the British from doing what they wanted to do, even if they shot down more British planes than the Germans lost. The Germans (and Italians) lost an awful lot of planes on the ground.
British had a number of radar units that were mobile and they shuffled them forward and back as the front lines shifted which gave them better warning as to German raids and cut way down on flying standing patrols over the front line troops or road convoys so that engine hours and fuel use was going into something more productive.

From reading this thread I ask this: Was the Allied resupply of aircraft / parts / pilots so overwhelming that it almost didn't matter what JG27 did? Earlier we were counting kills, but reading Rommels synopsis, and what was posted as to logistical imbalances, that the end was almost a forgone conclusion from the get go. Shoot down five of my planes and I will replace them with 10 today, and 20 next month. However, I drop 5 of your planes and you may replace them but don't have enough of them to begin with even without bringing fuel into the discourse.

Of course this is only from an AirPower centric point of view (I know there was more to winning than that alone).

 

[Shortround6]

From reading this thread I ask this: Was the Allied resupply of aircraft / parts / pilots so overwhelming that it almost didn't matter what JG27 did? Earlier we were counting kills, but reading Rommels synopsis, and what was posted as to logistical imbalances, that the end was almost a forgone conclusion from the get go. Shoot down five of my planes and I will replace them with 10 today, and 20 next month. However, I drop 5 of your planes and you may replace them but don't have enough of them to begin with even without bringing fuel into the discourse.

Sort of, the number totals (including bombers and recon planes) were often over 1000 per side (Germans and Italians together) but after just a few months (or weeks?) hundreds were lost or at least out of service. The Axis often had around a 50% serviceability rate. If you don't have spare parts or enough ground crewmen it doesn't matter if "Purple 6" is rated at less than 40% damaged or not when it lands, your crews can't fix planes that are 20% damaged.
The British were perfectly happy to make airfield raids one of their top priorities. To heck with the "Knights in the sky" crap. They were just as happy blowing the crap out of the airfields with 500lb bombs. Then attack the the supply routes, ship traffic, harbors, railroad if there was one, truck convoys on the road/s. supply dumps. Whatever it took to reduce the number of Axis aircraft in the sky when the ground troops actually were fighting each other. Then the tactical front line bombing and intercepting the enemy tactical bombers could start.
British fighters also intercepted (or tried) German bomber raids on rear areas. They weren't giving up and letting them do it.
The British had a much better C2 system and a much better intelligence system. They had their share of Army officers who wanted their own personal air force flying over their heads at all times but the British DAF leaders stopped that pretty quick. If they put the work into bombing airfields and supply routes then when the German aircraft showed up the British (with the aid of radar) could often meet them and stop them. The Dessert was harsh environment and engines lasted a much shorter time than in Europe. Flying routine patrols used up engines, fuel and exhausted pilots. Americans went through the same nonsense in operation Torch, each division commander wanted his own personnel air force flying top cover and ground attack just for his division. It was stopped or not put into place but the Americans did not have the C2 system that the British did, and did not have the number of radars to provide warnings, and did not have the repair organization.
Germans only had a few radars, and they weren't very mobile. Just like a lot of things, once Rommel started chasing a retreating British force he left a lot of things behind.

British problem was that any/most replacement aircraft had to come over the Takodari to Cairo air route

or stage through Malta or go around South Africa. Most of the big parts, fuel and ammo for the army went around as did all but VIP troops.
The Germans had their problems but the British had delivery times of weeks (well over a month)from when stuff was actually shipped (not promised) to when it got there.
The Germans did mine the Suez Canal the Red Sea on occasion but not very consistently.
The British were trying to maximize their air power effectiveness if every area when it was needed as it was needed.

Hope that helps.

 

[BiffF15]

Sort of, the number totals (including bombers and recon planes) were often over 1000 per side (Germans and Italians together) but after just a few months (or weeks?) hundreds were lost or at least out of service. The Axis often had around a 50% serviceability rate. If you don't have spare parts or enough ground crewmen it doesn't matter if "Purple 6" is rated at less than 40% damaged or not when it lands, your crews can't fix planes that are 20% damaged.
The British were perfectly happy to make airfield raids one of their top priorities. To heck with the "Knights in the sky" crap. They were just as happy blowing the crap out of the airfields with 500lb bombs. Then attack the the supply routes, ship traffic, harbors, railroad if there was one, truck convoys on the road/s. supply dumps. Whatever it took to reduce the number of Axis aircraft in the sky when the ground troops actually were fighting each other. Then the tactical front line bombing and intercepting the enemy tactical bombers could start.
British fighters also intercepted (or tried) German bomber raids on rear areas. They weren't giving up and letting them do it.
The British had a much better C2 system and a much better intelligence system. They had their share of Army officers who wanted their own personal air force flying over their heads at all times but the British DAF leaders stopped that pretty quick. If they put the work into bombing airfields and supply routes then when the German aircraft showed up the British (with the aid of radar) could often meet them and stop them. The Dessert was harsh environment and engines lasted a much shorter time than in Europe. Flying routine patrols used up engines, fuel and exhausted pilots. Americans went through the same nonsense in operation Torch, each division commander wanted his own personnel air force flying top cover and ground attack just for his division. It was stopped or not put into place but the Americans did not have the C2 system that the British did, and did not have the number of radars to provide warnings, and did not have the repair organization.
Germans only had a few radars, and they weren't very mobile. Just like a lot of things, once Rommel started chasing a retreating British force he left a lot of things behind.

British problem was that any/most replacement aircraft had to come over the Takodari to Cairo air route
View attachment 702438
or stage through Malta or go around South Africa. Most of the big parts, fuel and ammo for the army went around as did all but VIP troops.
The Germans had their problems but the British had delivery times of weeks (well over a month)from when stuff was actually shipped (not promised) to when it got there.
The Germans did mine the Suez Canal the Red Sea on occasion but not very consistently.
The British were trying to maximize their air power effectiveness if every area when it was needed as it was needed.

Hope that helps.

Thanks for the answer. It appears the water was rising (Allied forces) and there wasn't much that in the end could be done. The Germans from reading this thread, just didn't have their collective sh!t in one sock (Chain of Command, Logistics, CnC, Air Power, ETC.) The Allies appeared to be playing the long game, and the Germans were more, "we can do this if...).

The more things change, the more they remain the same. When near persistent air assets became available in the Middle East, the Army again went through the constant airpower mentality. With a combo of manned and unmanned they pretty much have it now. They feel blind (understandably so) without constant intel streaming in. I've been a part of this system in a low threat environment and it's a great thing to have. However, Ukraine is a different beast altogether (High Threat).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

From reading this thread I ask this: Was the Allied resupply of aircraft / parts / pilots so overwhelming that it almost didn't matter what JG27 did? Earlier we were counting kills, but reading Rommels synopsis, and what was posted as to logistical imbalances, that the end was almost a forgone conclusion from the get go. Shoot down five of my planes and I will replace them with 10 today, and 20 next month. However, I drop 5 of your planes and you may replace them but don't have enough of them to begin with even without bringing fuel into the discourse.

Of course this is only from an AirPower centric point of view (I know there was more to winning than that alone).

No, that wasn't the case and there were several times where the Allies were struggling. It often gets portrayed as quantity over quality but it's much more complex than that. Quantity alone would not have done it. The Allies couldn't afford 3-1 and 4-1 losses, and eventually they made corrections and fixed that. There were shorter term improvements several times earlier but the one in mid 1942 seems to have been irreversible.

Part of the problem was the Allies were really struggling with fighter tactics I'll post a bit more on that later. But one aspect was Arthur Conningham's process of trying to figure out how to get his close air support working properly, at one point he was having pilots fly at 6,000 feet, not in pairs, and literally told them to ignore attacks from above. That was causing major problems.

And as I've pointed out a bunch of times, the supply problems the Axis had was largely to do with vastly improved strategy, tactics, and aircraft being used by the Allies. Sinking his supply ships.

 

[WARSPITER]

And as I've pointed out a bunch of times, the supply problems the Axis had was largely to do with vastly improved strategy, tactics, and aircraft being used by the Allies. Sinking his supply ships.

Nice to see the Swordfish getting a mention.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Swordfish did get a few...

 

[EwenS]

Sort of, the number totals (including bombers and recon planes) were often over 1000 per side (Germans and Italians together) but after just a few months (or weeks?) hundreds were lost or at least out of service. The Axis often had around a 50% serviceability rate. If you don't have spare parts or enough ground crewmen it doesn't matter if "Purple 6" is rated at less than 40% damaged or not when it lands, your crews can't fix planes that are 20% damaged.
The British were perfectly happy to make airfield raids one of their top priorities. To heck with the "Knights in the sky" crap. They were just as happy blowing the crap out of the airfields with 500lb bombs. Then attack the the supply routes, ship traffic, harbors, railroad if there was one, truck convoys on the road/s. supply dumps. Whatever it took to reduce the number of Axis aircraft in the sky when the ground troops actually were fighting each other. Then the tactical front line bombing and intercepting the enemy tactical bombers could start.
British fighters also intercepted (or tried) German bomber raids on rear areas. They weren't giving up and letting them do it.
The British had a much better C2 system and a much better intelligence system. They had their share of Army officers who wanted their own personal air force flying over their heads at all times but the British DAF leaders stopped that pretty quick. If they put the work into bombing airfields and supply routes then when the German aircraft showed up the British (with the aid of radar) could often meet them and stop them. The Dessert was harsh environment and engines lasted a much shorter time than in Europe. Flying routine patrols used up engines, fuel and exhausted pilots. Americans went through the same nonsense in operation Torch, each division commander wanted his own personnel air force flying top cover and ground attack just for his division. It was stopped or not put into place but the Americans did not have the C2 system that the British did, and did not have the number of radars to provide warnings, and did not have the repair organization.
Germans only had a few radars, and they weren't very mobile. Just like a lot of things, once Rommel started chasing a retreating British force he left a lot of things behind.

British problem was that any/most replacement aircraft had to come over the Takodari to Cairo air route
View attachment 702438
or stage through Malta or go around South Africa. Most of the big parts, fuel and ammo for the army went around as did all but VIP troops.
The Germans had their problems but the British had delivery times of weeks (well over a month)from when stuff was actually shipped (not promised) to when it got there.
The Germans did mine the Suez Canal the Red Sea on occasion but not very consistently.
The British were trying to maximize their air power effectiveness if every area when it was needed as it was needed.

Hope that helps.

Fuel didn't need to go around the Cape of Good Hope.

There was a refinery at Haifa in Palestine plus another at Tripoli in Syria (modern day Lebanon, which was captured in April 1941 when Britain invaded Syria). Both were supplied by overland pipelines from the oilfields in northern Iraq. The pipeline to Tripoli had IIRC been shut off from June 1940 to prevent supplies reaching the Germans via Vichy France.

Most important was the huge refinery at Abadan (IIRC, the largest in the world pre WW2) in the Persian Gulf which was capable of producing aircraft fuel from pre-war days. There was also another smaller one in Bahrein that had opened in 1936 and was expanded in 1937 and 1940. It was heavily upgraded and expanded in WW2 with US assistance but wasn't producing 100 octane fuel until 1945.

It was these refineries that were supplying much of the fuel for the campaigns in the Mediterranean and CBI theatres during WW2.

 

[EwenS]

Nice to see the Swordfish getting a mention.

There were more Albacores than Swordfish operating in Malta & Egypt in this period.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

You are struggling with basic concepts. It's really not that complicated.

Good to know I am the problem again. It is really not that complicated from my end. You appear to only have access to the Shores Et. Al. book to figure out losses. Therefore that list must be used and considered correct. Even enhanced. The gap between what the book says and the air force records say was lost 8 February is ignored. Not used an example of verifying what the references are reporting.

So a simple explanation. As Shores points out a number of times tracking down total losses has problems at times. I add these problems are essentially the same for aircraft damaged badly enough to require removal from the unit, in both cases paperwork tends to be generated, aircraft movement cards updated. Adding aircraft that were repaired in unit throws open a major source of errors. You are now reliant on the individual unit records, what the person doing the reporting thought important, those people change and they can be told to change what to report. If you have seen examples of the reports you would know they cover a wide variety of styles and information. Then whether the Shores book reports all it finds.

All the above assumes the RAF, RA and Luftwaffe had compatible systems for reporting losses and damaged aircraft, as well as the usually very bad assumption the axis air force records for the time are as complete as the allied ones. And you want to include as losses an aircraft that was damaged but flew again in under 3 days, with the possibility it did not fly on day 2 because it was not needed that day. Include repaired in unit aircraft and the list is most probably worthless unless those losses are separated out. As another point, did either axis air force have rear area repair depots, the number of abandoned aircraft suggests not, so every axis repair was a by unit one? In the desert war the British Army tended to have lots of equipment captured by the axis, but the air force very little, the axis was the other way around.

Getting into what the ultimate fate of a plane which was shot down or crash landed ultimately was can become a huge and open-ended endeavor, and you will find that you can't always determine what happened to a given aircraft. If you try to do this for say, an entire year of air combat you are going to be spending weeks figuring it out. There can also be a fine line between shot down and crash landed. Crash landed doesn't necessarily mean at the friendly base, for example, or that the aircraft was recovered. Sometimes it was, sometimes it wasn't.

On the basis of the above all loss lists are a waste of time. Instead I read it as Shores list, end of story, if the book says crash landed it equals loss.

You seem to have access to the data, if you want to make your own list and only count aircraft listed as shot down, or shot down + MiA + FTR, by all means feel free to do so, and post it as an alternative to mine. I'd be interested to see the numbers. I do not think the ratios will be any different. I stated what my criteria were at the outset, and I used consistent criteria. I think that is the most effective way to use the data based on the discussion at hand.

The spreadsheet I posted has such data by month for the Allies. Thanks for the interest. The file I am working from also has non combat losses. Your criteria is mentioned in Shores, less those with a couple of key words, you have zero idea of what the Shores criteria are or how complete that data is. To use every entry in Shores means you are comfortable all aircraft damaged enough not to fly again for 2 to 3 days (and maybe available earlier than that) are recorded for all units on both sides.

You made a claim about fighter cover being annihilated often and failed to back it up. You are struggling with basic concepts, like having evidence to back the claims.

List of Italian shipping lost 1940-43

Nice list, seems to have been drawn from the post war allied studies, which have 465 Italian ships of over 500 GRT listed by name and even more German. HMA if you can go through all the pages has allied submarine attacks.

the relatively ineffectiveness of the Bf 110 as a day time fighter.

The Bf110 versus the Beaufighter was not that uneven.

In April and May, while the Luftwaffe controlled the central Mediterranean, Axis convoys lost only 2.7 and 5.8 percent, respectively, of their tonnage during the passage to Libya. In June, losses shot up to 35 percent. The Axis did slightly better in July as the Luftwaffe made an unsuccessful attempt to reverse Malta's revival. In August, 35 percent of supplies did not reach Libya. In September the total was 30 percent. In October more than 50 percent, including most of the fuel, went to the bottom."

Bragadin notes different figures, April to October 1942, 0.78%, 7.24%, 22.14%, 6.45%, 33.03%, 20%, 44.2%. Remembering of course ships were lost sailing both ways.

"I'd say this is a pretty categorical support of what I've been saying about a pivot point in mid 1942, and drastic increase in losses of fuel and supplies for the Germans, directly attributable to Allied air attacks, although we still need to look at what percentage was due to submarines."

According to Australian Archives AWM66 109. Percentage of loss on African Convoy routes due to naval action April to October 1942, 100.00, 100.00, 27.28, 25.72, 51.42, 31.76, 37.02, 25.26, which of course can be calculated from the spreadsheet already given, but not used.

"After Rommel called off the offensive on 3 September, strike aircraft harried the German withdrawal, making ten raids comprising 1u80 aircraft. Heavy night bombing followed. Vehicles, artillery, and antiaircraft positions suffered heavy damage. The most heavily hit units lost almost all of their vehicles."

I'd say this once again underscores the devastating, decisive impact of DAF air strikes.

So how many vehicles and how many units qualify for most heavily hit?

The night raids on DAK position started over a week before Rommel's last attack, inflicting few casualties but made sure sleep was hard to get.

On night/day one of the attack DAK discovered the British minefields were thicker than expected, as a result their gaps took until the morning. Seems some of the gaps remained under artillery even machine gun fire. A morning dust storm provided relief, but the terrain had a lot more soft sand than expected, British Armour was not engaged until nearly dusk, which meant DAK saw the British anti tank gun line far too late. Unlike previous battles allied artillery kept shelling all night. Night air raids particularly hurt the reconnaissance battalions on the eastern flank. The few lanes through the minefields were under armoured car and occasional artillery fire besides being too small to start with and obvious targets for attacking aircraft. The next day and night were the same as the previous one, continual artillery shelling and air raids, DAK moving and probing attacks. Then day three came news a supply convoy of 300 vehicles ran into part of 7th Armoured Division, losing 57 trucks and the rest scattered. DAK was down to 1 petrol issue, good for 100 km over good going, maybe half that on soft sand. There does not seem to have been many losses during the withdrawal. Casualties, Killed, Wounded, Missing, Allied 1,750, German 1,859, Italian 1,051, 38 Panzers, 11 Italian tanks, 67 British tanks.

In short the night air raids, in conjunction with night artillery fire, reduced the chance for DAK to rest and inflicted losses, most Panzers were lost to ground fire, day raids did not stop combat formation movement or inflict heavy casualties, the allied ground units and air force operated effectively against the axis tactical supply system though again the effect of air seems to be less mobility, rather than large casualties.

Before the attack the DAK health report noted widespread jaundice, commonplace trachoma and amoebic dysentery, those devastating, decisive mobile bath units did it again.

Rommel would not be the first general to decide most of his defeat was due to enemy airpower, not the opposing general, one who had laid down a plan that was followed and who stayed in control of the situation. For devastating and decisive the losses to airpower need to be split from those inflicted by the ground forces, plus dealing with the way DAK kept moving until it hit resistance on the ground, not in the air.

 

[Shortround6]

Fuel didn't need to go around the Cape of Good Hope.

You are correct, sorry.

 

[Shortround6]

I am about 3/4 of the way through Ehler's book ('The Mediterranean Air War') (start of the Invasion of Sicily).

It is good but there are a few things don't make sense (at least to me) and a few spots where he got the aircraft wrong (Stripped Hurricane's shot down a Ju 86P? maybe earlier than the Spitfires did it?)

It does seem to cover the basic principles fairly well, I hesitate to call it tactics as he does not go into aircraft formations like "fingers four" or how/why actual interceptions were done. Things are much more on the operational level.

What is amazing is there seems to be a huge disconnect between planes "lost" and planes claimed shot down in combat. As in hundreds of planes disappearing from the ready lists in just a few weeks time in periods of heavy action. This does not seem to line up with Shores where the losses seem to be a few per day or handfuls.
Operational losses or mechanical failures?
There are times where the Luftwaffe was reporting around 50% of available aircraft were operational.
British had 3rd catagory. Available in the next 14 days.

Maybe I am just bad a math but reported combat losses (especially if you are verifying them) don't seem to match the number of available aircraft. The number of available aircraft seems to be very low, something was happening to the planes. and counting just combat losses doesn't seem to a good way of figuring out which side is "winning". Not very satisfying but what do we do? The Germans were doing good if they had 60% serviceability at times, the British were closer to 70% or a few times over that. That can make a big difference with each side having around 1000 planes. It also means that many of the unserviceable planes were not a result of combat damage or very slight combat damage.
There is a bit of accounting trickery when counting the losses I will get into another time (on the British side).

 

[Ovod]

There were more Albacores than Swordfish operating in Malta & Egypt in this period.

Also the many RAF bombers used in the anti-shipping role in the theatre, Beauforts, Beaufighters etc.
Would the Swordfish have been removed from torpedo role by the time of the first Battle of El Alamein, or did that just apply to carrier based aircraft?

 

[Vincenzo]

Merchant losses to Libya april to october '42, go and back/employed
in metric ton

April: 1297/190240, 4219/128242
May: 10008/177307, 2384/177071
June: 15666/88064, -/48739
July: 6339/181424, -/100635
August: 37201/138196, 13361/120682
September: 22041/130658, -/69608
October: 40354/155368, 1055/93047

 

[WARSPITER]

There were more Albacores than Swordfish operating in Malta & Egypt in this period.

Yes. My reference to the Swordfish was way before Alamein but has an impact due to the nine month period where they
accounted for the average of 50,000 tons sunk per month. This flowed on as there were far less ships available to transport
anything and the tonnage lost included vehicles for transporting supplies by land.

Axis supplies were precarious well before Alamein due to these losses.

For example, Italian merchant shipping in 1941 had a tonnage loss of 617986 gross tons from vessels over 500 tons. The Swordfish
contingent based on Malta was responsible for at least 450,000 tons. Those ships and what they carried were lost which is the flow on
into 1942. To that can be added the damage done to naval combat vessels.

The Swordfish is one the most 'decisive' aircraft of the North African campaigns.

 

[Ovod]

Yes. My reference to the Swordfish was way before Alamein but has an impact due to the nine month period where they
accounted for the average of 50,000 tons sunk per month. This flowed on as there were far less ships available to transport
anything and the tonnage lost included vehicles for transporting supplies by land.

Axis supplies were precarious well before Alamein due to these losses.

For example, Italian merchant shipping in 1941 had a tonnage loss of 617986 gross tons from vessels over 500 tons. The Swordfish
contingent based on Malta was responsible for at least 450,000 tons. Those ships and what they carried were lost which is the flow on
into 1942. To that can be added the damage done to naval combat vessels.

The Swordfish is one the most 'decisive' aircraft of the North African campaigns.

The Fairey Swordfish did not sink 50,000 tons of shipping in the Mediterranean in any month - 50,000 tons would probably be the average total amount of shipping sunk per by all means. RN and RAF aircraft were probably only responsible for a minority of Italian and German shipping losses during the war.

Biggest killer of Axis shipping in Europe in WW2 (in the Mediterranean at least) - RN submarine fleet.

 

[EwenS]

Part of the British problem from Dec 1941 through June/July of 1942 was that a lot of their planned aircraft replacements were siphoned off to India and Burma/Australia. British did an excellent job of recovering, repairing and getting damaged aircraft back into service to keep numbers up. They had a number of trucks and crews that would strip every airframe they could from the airfields and take them back to rear areas to be repaired at central facilities instead of trying to piece things together at local airfields. However this took dedicated trucks, crews and fuel.

You need to be careful with that analysis because plans kept changing and Britain had responsibilities extending far beyond Egypt/Libya which was what the DAF were involved with.

In late 1941 the RAF dispatched 2 Hurricane Wings, 7 squadrons to the "Middle East". But only one Wing, 3 squadrons was originally destined for the Western Desert. En route those units were diverted to Gibraltar where the aircraft and pilots of most of two squadrons were put aboard Ark Royal and sent to Malta instead. The rest would have followed had Ark not been lost. Instead they went to Takoradi and then got diverted to the Far East.

The second Wing was actually destined for Iraq and a secret plan to prepare to occupy/defend the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus should the Germans have broken through or Russia collapsed. It was never planned that they should join the DAF. By one means or another these all ended up in the Far East instead of Iraq.

Only two Hurricane squadrons left the "Middle East" for the Far East in early 1942. One (30) came from DAF but the other was taken from the forces in Iraq/Palestine (261).

And it wasn't all one way traffic. Some units intended for the Far East were waylaid en route for periods of time. For example, in early 1942 it was decided to send 2 Beaufort squadrons to the Far East (replacements for 36 & 100 that were supposed to get Beauforts from Australian production). Ground crews left by sea but the aircraft flew out via Gibraltar, Malta and Egypt. A detachment of 22 squadron operated from Malta for a short period in March/April. The whole of 217 squadron was held at Malta from 10 June to 25 Aug 1942 to add to the offensive during the Operation Hapoon & Pedestal convoy operations to add to the strike capability on the island. The surviving aircrew minus their aircraft then moved on east.