Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Shortround6]

The Air war in desert covered almost 2 1/2 years from start to El Alamein, sometimes the Germans were ahead and sometimes (mostly) they were not. Granted the Germans arrived late and the Italians allowed the British a good deal of practice.

Blenheim's did day bombing and sometimes at long range. Wellingtons did long range night bombing. British had radar almost from the start and added to it quickly and extensively.
The Italians took quite a while to get it (if at all?) and the Germans didn't have much.
Both Blenheim and Wellingtons were used for ship convoy attack, often hundreds of miles at sea. The Italics or Germans had to use standing patrols as they didn't have any early warning. Wellingtons later attacked ships at night, The British had a few Wellingtons with radar to find the convoys and guide the attack planes. Not saying it worked all the time (or even most of the time) but the Germans had one staffel of night fighters in the whole med at one point.

The Med covered a huge area and even if the Germans had superiority in one area the British were attacking in a number of areas. The Luftwaffe could not stop the British in all areas.
The Germans mined the Suez a number of times, but not enough. They attacked British costal convoys near the Egytian coast, but a fraction of the times the British were attacking axis convoys near Greece and Crete. Both sides were bombing each other airfields in Egypt and Crete respectively. Then you have Malta, and then you have the Benghazi sweepstakes.
And the Axis convoys to Tunisia.

The British had better recon, they had ultra, they had better signals intercepts, Basically they could and did attack where the Axis was less likely to in force with their handful of superior pilots and and planes.
So most of the time the Germans were not controlling the air war but reacting to it.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Air war in desert covered almost 2 1/2 years from start to El Alamein, sometimes the Germans were ahead and sometimes (mostly) they were not. Granted the Germans arrived late and the Italians allowed the British a good deal of practice.

I would say that the Axis was clearly, obviously, ahead most of the time up to El Alamein and a few times even after that. They caused major problems for the Americans at Kasserine Pass.

Blenheim's did day bombing and sometimes at long range. Wellingtons did long range night bombing. British had radar almost from the start and added to it quickly and extensively.
The Italians took quite a while to get it (if at all?) and the Germans didn't have much.
Both Blenheim and Wellingtons were used for ship convoy attack, often hundreds of miles at sea. The Italics or Germans had to use standing patrols as they didn't have any early warning. Wellingtons later attacked ships at night, The British had a few Wellingtons with radar to find the convoys and guide the attack planes. Not saying it worked all the time (or even most of the time) but the Germans had one staffel of night fighters in the whole med at one point.

Attacks on shipping is one thing we can pinpoint pretty well. Ship losses are often fairly well documented and the records usually (not always) note what kind of attack did them in. I don't have hard data on this yet, though I have started collecting. So far it looks like the Wellingtons did get some ships though they were already taking fairly heavy losses in 1941. Blenheims don't seem to have been very effective. The small number of Beauforts seemed to do some damage, Beaufighters definitely did. Later B-25s and Bostons did too. But we will put a much finer point on all this a bit later. I think we can get totals by type (and also for subs etc.) with tonnage, and add it all up so the data is pretty clear.

The Med covered a huge area and even if the Germans had superiority in one area the British were attacking in a number of areas. The Luftwaffe could not stop the British in all areas.
The Germans mined the Suez a number of times, but not enough. They attacked British costal convoys near the Egytian coast, but a fraction of the times the British were attacking axis convoys near Greece and Crete. Both sides were bombing each other airfields in Egypt and Crete respectively. Then you have Malta, and then you have the Benghazi sweepstakes.

Again we can compare the losses in shipping, and the losses of aircraft from bombing airfields. Definitely quantifiable and I think the pattern is obvious. Obviously the most devastation of Allied shipping was to the Malta convoys, which were hit very hard.

And the Axis convoys to Tunisia.

The British had better recon, they had ultra, they had better signals intercepts, Basically they could and did attack where the Axis was less likely to in force with their handful of superior pilots and and planes.
So most of the time the Germans were not controlling the air war but reacting to it.

I'm not so sure on the British having better recon. And who was controlling the air is one thing, how much they were able to do effectively with it is another. Both are worth verifying with data rather than opinions.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This magnificent guy was one major recon asset for the Allies over the Med, from Taranto through El Alamein and well beyond. Quite an asset, using a stripped down Martin Maryland.

Adrian Warburton - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

But the TacR missions from land seemed to get slaughtered at an appalling rate. I'll point that out in the next batch of data.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success. … The fact of British air superiority threw to the winds all the tactical rules which we had hitherto applied with such success. In every battle to come, the strength of the AngloAmerican air force was to be the deciding factor."
Erwin Rommel

... especially when you're out of gas, as Rommel was in 3Q 1942.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Something like half of his gas was in ships being sunk by Allied bombers by El Alamein

 

[Glider]

Generally speaking the one area the Luftwaffe failed in was stopping bombers. The fighters tended to concentrate of scoring kills and fighting the fighters were one for one they often had an advantage, but the bombers tended to get to attack.
If you look at that aspect then I would state that the Luftwaffe were less effective than the RAF who had a significant impact on the land campaign.

You are of course correct when you say that the Malta convoy's were a major part of the naval losses but when you consider what they had, and the opposition that was lined up against the convoys its a minor miracle that anything got through.

Another thought is why was Tobruk able to hold out for so long, in a situation where the Axis forces held every advantage.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Generally speaking the one area the Luftwaffe failed in was stopping bombers. The fighters tended to concentrate of scoring kills and fighting the fighters were one for one they often had an advantage, but the bombers tended to get to attack.

But the bombers, at least initially, weren't doing much damage on average. One of the changes the British made was by putting bombs on the fighters, and making them into a "poor man's stuka" so to speak. This improved the rate of bomb hits and targets strafed to pieces, especially at shorter ranges, but the fighter-bombers were even more vulnerable. And until they figured out how to solve their problem with 'top cover' as they called it, this system was a bit broken.

Once they did at least partly solve it, the DAF became much more lethal IMO.

If you look at that aspect then I would state that the Luftwaffe were less effective than the RAF who had a significant impact on the land campaign.

DAF definitely did have a significant impact on the land campaign. The question is when did this start becoming a really telling effect. You can read what Rommel said about second El Alamein. But he wasn't complaining in quite so bleak and bitter terms in 1941 or even earlier in 1942.

You are of course correct when you say that the Malta convoy's were a major part of the naval losses but when you consider what they had, and the opposition that was lined up against the convoys its a minor miracle that anything got through.

I agree with that, though improvements in land based air power - notably fighter range, helped with that somewhat.

Another thought is why was Tobruk able to hold out for so long, in a situation where the Axis forces held every advantage.

Worth looking into.

 

[pinehilljoe]

IMHO No. the Germans were outnumbered approximately 2-1 in both battles, in infantry, tanks and aircraft. The British had shorter supply lines. Aircraft helped but given the British had competent commanders in both battles aircraft did not play a decisive part. During Rommel's retreat aircraft helped deplete the Germans further.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Something like half of his gas was in ships being sunk by Allied bombers by El Alamein

Not to mention subs and the occasional flotilla sweep, all of which were -- wait for it -- based out of Malta.

So if you want a decisive action -- or inaction -- that might be a point of consideration. More decisive than introducing this or that Merlin-powered fighter, imo. Once the Axis decided against trying to take Malta, they put the DAK and the Italian forces as hostages to the battle in the central Med. Fighters without fuel are ground targets. Tanks without fuel are booty.

If you're losing half your fuel due to the operations based on, I dunno, an island in the middle of your supply lines, it might behoove you to maybe take the island. But I'm no general.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

On February 8, 3 of the 4 Hurricanes were shot down and strafed. The other 'shot down with pilot PoW'. The one Kittyhawk which crash landed had it's "tail shot away".

Checking the 3 squadron records, the report is AK665 received a damaged tail plane, landed 1350 on 8 February. It is next recorded on operations on 11 February, 0955. The 8 February mission was cover for 73 squadron, 4 other aircraft returned with engine trouble, 4 lost the formation and returned early, remainder attacked by 3 Bf109. Squadron records (3 squadron history sheets) at the Australian Archives, see around page 595.

Shores has the Hurricane actually lost to Flak. He then has 2 crash landed and strafed, 1 crash landed and 1 damaged, you have upgraded that to 3 shot down and strafed, why? 1 Hurricane was lost that day, it had a different serial to the one provided in Shores, Hurricane Z5069 is both Hurricanes shot down and strafed, one as "AX-H The Glamour King" with Lt. Biden wounded by the strafing and again just as Z5069 with Lt. Biden safe. Which is it? Listed as lost twice in February 1942 by Shores it is reported in North West Africa in 1943 and finally SOC on 8 March 1944. Lt S A FINNEY (103700V) has an incident recorded on 8 February 1942, in Hurricane Z5336, which again lasted until 8 March 1944. Shores has them both destroyed in February 1942. Lt Stewart Alexander FINNEY (103700V) also appears against Hurricane Z5455 which lasted until 1 July 1943, and again in BD893 in a collision on 3 August 1942, the other Hurricane was repaired.

When it comes to damage taken anyone seen a good list of the Hurricanes and Spitfires damaged during the Battle of Britain but repaired by the squadrons, not just those sent to the maintenance system? Nice static situation, near to head office with all its administrative capacity, should be easy enough?

To spell it out to count damaged means deciding the list in the Shores book is based on equally complete lists of damaged aircraft on both sides, that these lists are published in full, not above a certain threshold decided by the authors nor edited down for say space reasons in the publishing process. It also means a definition of losses does not match the air force one.

You can use your own criteria as to what counts as loss. My feeling is that if the aircraft goes down (can no longer fly) or is destroyed on the ground, then it counts. You need some way to determine which side is winning the air war since that is the point under debate right now.

The criteria for winning depends on the circumstances. Even loss lists have uncertainties, as Shores regularly notes, add damaged and the uncertainties grow.

If you are going to use your own criteria then inevitably that means everyone is wasting their time. Consider the way disease will rip an army, therefore in the desert the obvious decisive unit was allied, the British mobile bath unit, the axis forces in Africa are known to have had a bigger disease problem. Definition of disease to support the decisive tag, case closed.

An example, The US Army in France lacked field craft knowledge, and had clothing problems. The result of the lack of clothing was a major rise in trench foot, 25% of US casualties in Italy in the 1943/44 winter. It was not widely realised that spending all day in damp shoes and socks in cool weather would cause trench foot. It is not until January 1945 that the Mediterranean Theatre report on trench foot makes it to the European theatre, and then only after a specific request. Meantime in the ETO Trench foot "accounted for 9.25% of all the casualties suffered on the Continent." Warnings had been given but the seriousness of the problem had been discounted by the units. The standard combat boot was not waterproof but much of the problem was lack of simple precautions. Trench foot, joined the VD, AWOL and court martial rates as a measure of unit discipline.

Forget the fancy weapons, invest more in the "decisive" mobile bath units.

If you try to go by what may or may not be repairable you end up in a much more complex kind of analysis, but a lot of the heavily damaged aircraft were not repaired for one reason or another. Some were cannibalized for parts, some destroyed in subsequent bombing or strafing, some left behind when they moved bases etc. etc. Some were eventually repaired of course but if it's put out of action for months I think that counts.

You have an aircraft that was repaired in around 2 days by the unit as a casualty. Once you count damaged you have to define how damaged, currently the definition is a mention in the Shores lists, with no definition of what aircraft are included in those lists or any idea of how complete they are. An example of the list versus air force records can be seen from the 8 February summary. The air forces are quite clear in their definitions, destroyed and damaged.

On 8 February 1942, the RAF lost 1 Hurricane and 4 Kittyhawks, according to its summary. On this day the Germans pulled off two bounces.

The lack of axis air strikes in the retreating 8th Army after Gazala is widely noted, a time when the ground units were at their most vulnerable, an air force should not have missed this opportunity, which shows how the axis air power in North Africa was concentrated in staying just over or behind the front line. Not surprising given the numbers and supply available. Something that was also happening in the USSR and France. Wiliamson Murray has a later example from the Eastern Front of Leutnant Elmar Boersch from 3./KG4, he survived the war with 311 combat missions to his credit. First 25 missions 8 August to 6 September 1943, no more than 10 minutes per mission over enemy territory. Next 25 missions, 7 to 22 September 2 missions lasted more than 10 minutes over enemy territory, one was 15 minutes, the other 2 hours. In the next 50 missions 3 lasted more than 10 minutes over enemy territory. In his second 100 missions 32 lasted over 10 minutes but many of these were weather reconnaissance over the Black Sea or transport missions to the Crimea. So at a maximum of 5 minutes in and 5 minutes out he was usually bombing maybe 15 miles behind enemy lines.

The axis air force in the desert surged in May/June 1942, its fighters in a situation similar to that of France in 1941, plenty of targets, generally superior equipment, tactics and training plus often no need to engage unless the situation was favourable, in France in 1941 that translated to a 3 to 1 or better loss ratio. To do this it largely stayed over friendly territory, any domination had a limited scope, space wise. As a guide consider how many axis fighter pilots were being made prisoner.

The important thing IMO is to compare like with like. Same criteria for Axis as for the Allies. And either way, I don't believe the ratios will change.

Fine, please contact Christopher Shores and obtain from him certification the published loss and damage lists are complete to about the same degree for both sides. And have a chat to him about the differences between sources for the 8 February losses.

Even when the bombers weren't shot down they often had to eject their bombs and run for home when their fighter cover was annihilated.

So what is the definition of often? Say as a percentage of sorties, you must have the figures to make the claim.

Something like half of his gas was in ships being sunk by Allied bombers by El Alamein

As has been said before. No, both in terms of absolute losses and even more so by cause. Why is it even when you have the correct figures they are not used?

 

[Shortround6]

The DAF was decisive in all the battles in North Africa. From beginning to end.

About the only time as a whole the Luftwaffe was dominate was from Dec/Jan 1941 to June/July of 1942.

Decisive, Dominant and Battle winning are not the same things.

Local superiority, like attacks on British convoys, is one thing.
Being able to dominate or show superiority over the entire theater is another.

The British use of the fighter bomber was hardly a poor mans Stuka but an evolving technique of getting multiple uses out of one aircraft on the same flight/sortie.
It took a while. It also took new radios, a new radio net work, trained coordinators and training for the army.
. Sounds ridiculous to modern ears but in 1940 the "bomb line" (distance the bombers were supposed to drop the bombs from friendly troops) was 40 miles. In 1940 and parts of 1941 some entire divisions didn't know where they were (on both sides) which makes it a little hard to call in air strikes. Rommel used to get "lost" for over a day at time. Staff officers were trying to chase him down with Storch. If his staff can't reach him by radio how does Rommel call for any air strikes? Or tell his own pilots not to bomb him?

Fighter bombers could do armed recon. At least radio back to tell what they were seeing. They could either bomb things from the pre flight planning or be redirected (they were NOT doing cab rank at this time), They could also, fuel allowing, be redirected to 2nd targets to strafe as everybody got more experience. AND they could be used for air superiority (disrupt enemy ground attacks) not just defend themselves on the way back.


It also took a while for close support to evolve, it took a lot more than a few directives.
1940 fighters had radios, they got HF radios, in 1942 they were getting VHF radios. The range got shorter, especially at low altitudes, but there were a lot more radios on the ground for the fighters to talk to and to relay information though.

Trying to sort through all the changes in technique and tactics and supply (and repair) which were ongoing and the introduction of new aircraft types is hard.
The 109F was major change. It did mark a change in the Lufftwaffe's fortunes. But then the Luftwaffe wasn't changing a lot of other things.
The Beaufighter influenced things all out of proportion to it's numbers. Not because they used it to fight 109s but because it allowed British bombers to hit convoys out to sea, disrupt the Axis convoy escorts (109s didn't have the range and they didn't have enough of them) and on the flip side. Beaufighters could protect British costal convoys from German or Italian (rarely) bombers.
The Med was a war of supply. No food and in many places, no water plus all the stuff like ammo, fuel, oil, parts. etc. The side that won was the side that could deny it's enemy supply while preserving it's own.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Checking the 3 squadron records, the report is AK665 received a damaged tail plane, landed 1350 on 8 February. It is next recorded on operations on 11 February, 0955. The 8 February mission was cover for 73 squadron, 4 other aircraft returned with engine trouble, 4 lost the formation and returned early, remainder attacked by 3 Bf109. Squadron records (3 squadron history sheets) at the Australian Archives, see around page 595.


As has been said before. No, both in terms of absolute losses and even more so by cause. Why is it even when you have the correct figures they are not used?

You are struggling with basic concepts. It's really not that complicated.

We have a lot of data which is somewhat mixed up. To make any sense of it, you just have to decide what you want to count. What matters vis a vis what you want to know? Normally, for air combat what I want to know and count, is who got shot down, period. From the point of view of the pilot doing the shooting and the pilot in the aircraft getting shot, shot down means can't fly any more because of something the enemy did. That includes crash landings, FTR, MiA, and shot down.

Because in previous posts people have continuously brought up logistics and planes destroyed on the ground by bombing, I also included that for my last count. And for similar reasons, losses to flak and accidents (trouble with logistics contributes to accidents, flak is also part of the air war). In other kinds of comparisons (like fighter vs. fighter) I would not count losses to flak, though you can't always be sure what shot down a plane (often what is recorded is a guess, or sometimes obfuscation, and for example the Italians rarely give any detail as to why an aircraft was lost).

Getting into what the ultimate fate of a plane which was shot down or crash landed ultimately was can become a huge and open-ended endeavor, and you will find that you can't always determine what happened to a given aircraft. If you try to do this for say, an entire year of air combat you are going to be spending weeks figuring it out. There can also be a fine line between shot down and crash landed. Crash landed doesn't necessarily mean at the friendly base, for example, or that the aircraft was recovered. Sometimes it was, sometimes it wasn't.

You seem to have access to the data, if you want to make your own list and only count aircraft listed as shot down, or shot down + MiA + FTR, by all means feel free to do so, and post it as an alternative to mine. I'd be interested to see the numbers. I do not think the ratios will be any different. I stated what my criteria were at the outset, and I used consistent criteria. I think that is the most effective way to use the data based on the discussion at hand.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The DAF was decisive in all the battles in North Africa. From beginning to end.

About the only time as a whole the Luftwaffe was dominate was from Dec/Jan 1941 to June/July of 1942.

Decisive, Dominant and Battle winning are not the same things.

Local superiority, like attacks on British convoys, is one thing.
Being able to dominate or show superiority over the entire theater is another.

I agree with that, for the most part.

The British use of the fighter bomber was hardly a poor mans Stuka but an evolving technique of getting multiple uses out of one aircraft on the same flight/sortie.
It took a while. It also took new radios, a new radio net work, trained coordinators and training for the army.

What I mean is that the fighter bomber had a level of accuracy that, while not as high as the Stuka, was probably an order of magnitude better than the standard level bombers when it came to hitting things like tanks, AT guns, artillery etc.

. Sounds ridiculous to modern ears but in 1940 the "bomb line" (distance the bombers were supposed to drop the bombs from friendly troops) was 40 miles. In 1940 and parts of 1941 some entire divisions didn't know where they were (on both sides) which makes it a little hard to call in air strikes. Rommel used to get "lost" for over a day at time. Staff officers were trying to chase him down with Storch. If his staff can't reach him by radio how does Rommel call for any air strikes? Or tell his own pilots not to bomb him?

Fighter bombers could do armed recon. At least radio back to tell what they were seeing. They could either bomb things from the pre flight planning or be redirected (they were NOT doing cab rank at this time), They could also, fuel allowing, be redirected to 2nd targets to strafe as everybody got more experience. AND they could be used for air superiority (disrupt enemy ground attacks) not just defend themselves on the way back.

Yes they can and they did.

It also took a while for close support to evolve, it took a lot more than a few directives.
1940 fighters had radios, they got HF radios, in 1942 they were getting VHF radios. The range got shorter, especially at low altitudes, but there were a lot more radios on the ground for the fighters to talk to and to relay information though.

Yes I knew a change of radios was another key factor, though it gets a bit complex with the various aircraft types. Also aircraft radios and ones used on the ground didn't necessarily use the same frequency. One factor mentioned by Allied pilots was that one of the new types (I think American made VHF maybe?) had some preset buttons you could tune in beforehand, like the ones in a car with an AM radio back in the day. This made switching frequency like from flight to squadron to home base much easier. According to Bobby Gibbes some guys died fiddling with their radios while not hearing urgent warnings to their squadron mates. Guys that were doing artillery spotting or CAS sometimes had a second radio in the plane, apparently.

Trying to sort through all the changes in technique and tactics and supply (and repair) which were ongoing and the introduction of new aircraft types is hard.
The 109F was major change. It did mark a change in the Lufftwaffe's fortunes. But then the Luftwaffe wasn't changing a lot of other things.
The Beaufighter influenced things all out of proportion to it's numbers. Not because they used it to fight 109s but because it allowed British bombers to hit convoys out to sea, disrupt the Axis convoy escorts (109s didn't have the range and they didn't have enough of them) and on the flip side. Beaufighters could protect British costal convoys from German or Italian (rarely) bombers.

I don't disagree with that, I think the Beaufighter was quite important though they sometimes took rather heavy losses. They didn't often fight 109s but they were often dueling with Bf 110s and Ju 88s.

The Med was a war of supply. No food and in many places, no water plus all the stuff like ammo, fuel, oil, parts. etc. The side that won was the side that could deny it's enemy supply while preserving it's own.

Logistics was a big part of it, so was the tactical battle. I think it's helpful to examine each aspect in a somewhat distinct manner, then put it back together in a coherent whole.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Not to mention subs and the occasional flotilla sweep, all of which were -- wait for it -- based out of Malta.

So if you want a decisive action -- or inaction -- that might be a point of consideration. More decisive than introducing this or that Merlin-powered fighter, imo. Once the Axis decided against trying to take Malta, they put the DAK and the Italian forces as hostages to the battle in the central Med. Fighters without fuel are ground targets. Tanks without fuel are booty.

If you're losing half your fuel due to the operations based on, I dunno, an island in the middle of your supply lines, it might behoove you to maybe take the island. But I'm no general.

I'm not really sure what your point is here, I did state the importance of Malta in fact I'll circle back to the 'could the Axis have taken Malta' thread eventually, right now this one is taking up too much time and energy for that. But a couple of points:

1) It's not such a vague mystery as to what killed Axis and Allied supply ships. Quite often it's documented and we can get this data and add up the numbers. For example I think it can be determined how many were lost to submarines or surface fleets and how many to aircraft.
2) Malta was a major problem for the Axis but many of the attacks were coming from planes based in North Africa, and some from Carriers.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

IMHO No. the Germans were outnumbered approximately 2-1 in both battles, in infantry, tanks and aircraft. The British had shorter supply lines. Aircraft helped but given the British had competent commanders in both battles aircraft did not play a decisive part. During Rommel's retreat aircraft helped deplete the Germans further.

Rommel won battles where he was outnumbered on tanks 2-1, and in his own description of Second El Alamein, he really focuses on the Allied aircraft more than anything else. He does talk about his supply problems too.

 

[Shortround6]

Or was it some combination of two or more of these factors. My main focus here is on the relevance of the Desert Air Force vs. the Luftwaffe. My premise is that the Luftwaffe, having dominated the skies for most of mid 1941 through mid 1942 (and contributed greatly to Axis victories in that period), started having some trouble with the British air forces in mid 1942 and that the British had acquired some abilities (through improving kit and tactics) that the Luftwaffe did not have. And that this, in turn, led to the downfall of the Luftwaffe in North Africa and the increasing efficacy of the DAF as a factor in the ground battles, followed swiftly by the demise of the Afrika Korps.

It is not easy isolated the different factors.
I have no information on 1st El Alamein but at 2nd El Alamein British artillery was firing 10 times the number of shells that the Germans were, it some locations around 20 times the number of shells. The DAF dropped a lot more bombs than the Luftwaffe Including using B-24s.

Now was it the use of Warhawks as fighter bombers that made difference or were there a bunch of factors?

British had much superior intelligence though out. They KNEW when Rommel was going to make his move at 2nd Al Alamein and British waited until 4 days before to really step up the bombing in the forward areas. They had been hitting the supply points further to the rear before that.
A favorite tactic of the DAF was to use Albacores to drop flares so the night bombers (Mostly Wellingtons) were actually bombing by the light of flares. Not daylight but a whole lot better than what the RAF was doing over Germany in 1942.

 

[EwenS]

List of Italian shipping lost 1940-43

Axis merchants lost on the North Africa Route – 1941-1943

Background In the appendix of the USMM Official History The most helpful Lorenzo Colombo, owner of the excellent Con la pelle appesa a un chiodo blog has taken time during the lockdown to type…

rommelsriposte.com

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm not really sure what your point is here, I did state the importance of Malta in fact I'll circle back to the 'could the Axis have taken Malta' thread eventually, right now this one is taking up too much time and energy for that. But a couple of points:

My point is stated plainly in the post you quoted: "So if you want a decisive action -- or inaction -- that might be a point of consideration."

1) It's not such a vague mystery as to what killed Axis and Allied supply ships. Quite often it's documented and we can get this data and add up the numbers. For example I think it can be determined how many were lost to submarines or surface fleets and how many to aircraft.

... not to mention how cargo ships arrived safely due to Malta's airpower being written down by Fliegerkorps X and RA strikes, which is admittedly airpower. But what that indicates to me is that the air war had an ebb and flow to it, which undercuts the argument that it was decisive, to me.

It was important, don't get me wrong. I just think the issue under discussion is a bit more nuanced than you seem to think. That's okay, we're allowed to have differing opinions. The forum would be pretty boring otherwise, no?

2) Malta was a major problem for the Axis but many of the attacks were coming from planes based in North Africa, and some from Carriers.

True, but disregarding a massive air and naval base sitting directly astride one's supply-lines strikes me as a decisive blunder.

 

[Shortround6]

Rommel won battles where he was outnumbered on tanks 2-1, and in his own description of Second El Alamein, he really focuses on the Allied aircraft more than anything else. He does talk about his supply problems too.

Rommel was very good at somethings. At other things he was not so good. Some of his supply problems were of his own making. Some were built into the supply system, which was convoluted and ran through the Italian chain of command and they often sent what they wanted to send, not what Rommel wanted, and then a fair amount of it ended up on seabed.
The Luftwaffe didn't have enough planes in NA most of the time and they couldn't keep enough of them serviceable. British recovery and repair was head and shoulders ( to be honest well above knee deep) above the German efforts.
Rommel was also very good at taking the available AA guns forward to the battle and leaving the ports to fend for themselves, likewise moving the 109s forward but then he often had only one fighter group. But when you leave you sea ports and hundreds of miles of road nearly naked to air attack who's fault is it if you have supply problems?

 

[Shortround6]

The German Fliegerkorps X was moved out of Sicily in April 1941 to take part in the Invasion of Greece and get ready for the the invasion of Russia. Fliegerkorps X stayed and took part in Crete and then stayed and engaged in long range dueling with the DAF through 1942 and into 1943.
It is about 240 miles from Crete to Tobruk so just about all of the German raids in the eastern Med were from Fliegerkorps X. Including mining the Suez and torpedo attacks on the eastern convoys, etc. However the distance is too far for 109s even with drop tanks.
Fliegerkorps X too often sat on their hands but then the command structure was one of the convoluted Italian/Med things and Fliegerkorps X was not in the chain of command of the Africa Korps. The Germans were not that good at moving commands around. It sometimes took around 8 weeks to move a Fliegerkorps from the Russian front to Italy and another 8 weeks to move it back.