Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Thumpalumpacus]

There are cases where it's not really that clear because losses were possibly attributable to a variety of causes so you can't untangle it, and cases where it's obvious what happened from the data, and you can. There are for example cases where attacks were stopped or defenses were overcome immediately after an air strike.

Sometimes it's not really that mysterious.

View attachment 701850

Anecdotes aren't evidence. Nicholas Alkemade fell 18,000' out of a Lancaster and lived to tell about it, but that didn't stop the Brits from issuing 'chutes all the same.

So how many pics like this do you have to support your contention?

 

[Shortround6]

Title of thread
"Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?"

First post

" My premise is that the Luftwaffe, having dominated the skies for most of mid 1941 through mid 1942 (and contributed greatly to Axis victories in that period), started having some trouble with the British air forces in mid 1942 and that the British had acquired some abilities (through improving kit and tactics) that the Luftwaffe did not have. And that this, in turn, led to the downfall of the Luftwaffe in North Africa and the increasing efficacy of the DAF as a factor in the ground battles, followed swiftly by the demise of the Afrika Korps."

Picture of a Tiger tank in crater does not show any relation to "improving kit and tactics" of the DAF. There were no Tiger tanks anywhere near El Alamein

The British had steady improvement in "kit and tactics" in DAF during good part of the year.
They also had an improvement in supply, more air craft, more fuel, more bombs
The Ground troops also had improvements in "kit and supply".
More and/or better tanks.
Tanks that could fire HE.
More artillery.
More or better AT guns.
More Artillery Ammo. More guns without more ammo doesn't mean much.

MikeMeech's post of the book pages clearly does show an improvement in the DAF's efforts and effectiveness and the decline in the Luftwaffe's efforts and effectiveness.
Some is due to tactics on both sides, a lot is due to numbers and supply.
Getting 4-5 new squadrons of fighters (or reequipping some squadrons) with a slightly newer fighter was not going to make much difference when you are talking a supply difference of over 2 to 1.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Assuming we get that far, I will get into the hour by hour ground combat records for Second El Alamein.

Those reports would be of interest, why were they not used before the making the claims about the Priests or even knowing how many were present? I do not know what others conclude, for me it is a warning to treat all your claims as verify before accepting.

I already posted, upthread, the precise dates when the unit of which Bobby Gibbes was commander, 3 RAAF, received it's P-40Fs, and this includes serial numbers of the aircraft. Go back and look, and then if you like check these serial numbers because there is an audit trail so to speak. After November 1942 3 RAAF was flying primarily Kittyhawk II / P-40F, which they continued to use into 1944.

To "the rest of the squadron stayed with mark I" I failed to add "until re-equipped…", since I only had in mind the kill claim in October. Then comes I gave where to find the full details, the 3 squadron PDF is about 1.9Gb for the time period in question.

By early 1942 the Hurricane I and II, Tomahawk IIB and Kittyhawk I and Ia were taking unacceptable losses.

The upgrades in fighter performance were obviously needed. However you claim bombing caused 3 to 5 times the casualties to the Luftwaffe, leaving 15 to 25% for in air including AA losses, if this is correct then there is no great need for the Spitfire or better KIttyhawks, just the increased strength (either numbers or more sorties per aircraft or both) so enough fighters were available to punch the bombers through to the airfields, as the Luftwaffe losses in the air were a minority. To take this all the way the army becomes decisive in the air war, your tank on their runway is the ultimate air superiority, better than bombing. Bombing this effective would also see the shift that the Spitfire V had over France in 1942/43, in trouble in 1942 as it was the main target, doing better in 1943 as the bombers were the target.

Air 20/1929, Middle East operational flying hours , 11,950 in January 1942, 8,659 in February, 10,896 March, 11,384 in April, 12,680 in May, 19,209 in June, July report missing, 24,966 in August, 23,234 in September, 23,221 in October, 21,661 in November and 16,006 in a hard to read December report. No mention of B-17. Things to note are Wellingtons were around 4 to 4,500 hours January to May and over 6,000 hours in June, or a third or more of the effort. The report gives the number of airmen available but not the number of sorties to determine loss rates. June 1942 average for the month, 325 Hurricane, 162 Kittyhawk, 96 Spitfire and 64 Tomahawk pilots available, total 647 pilots, 9,427 hours. In August 420 Hurricane, 167 Kittyhawk, 494 (!??) Spitfire and 29 Tomahawk, total 1,110 pilots, 8,470 hours. Weekly casualty reports are in AIR 20/1881.

The "Lawyer" aspect comes in when you pour through a post trying to find some detail to pounce on and then turning the whole discussion into a referendum on that. My point didn't hinge on Kittyhawk III in July.

Actually I am not, rather going through and noting where your claims do not match the material I have, fewer mismatches, fewer comments.

To me it really doesn't matter who gets the credit for the fighter tactics and CAS / forward observer reforms.

Who did it matters in this sort of forum where the details can be explored. Not just the Desert Air Force did it, or one man did it shorthand generic history. The trouble for me is you assign credit for such things incorrectly then build on that. To exaggerate slightly take out the usual patrol activity and the desert war had "hours" of combat June 1940 to June 1942, little time to learn about combat. Throw in the growth pains as 8th Army expanded and the turnover of British generals and it is easy to see how mistakes could continue at that level. To create the doctrine required both arms, at Gazala it was clear there was still a gap between them. Things like using the twin engine bombers as battlefield strike were understandable given the lack of fighter bombers, but it meant hours of delays to get the bombers plus escort to a target.

The supply issues meant it was expensive to run large scale exercises even near Cairo because of the wear and tear, the tank and vehicle mileage limits. Britain had lots of supplies and underemployed forces who therefore needed exercises plus had the commanders who had been on the receiving end in France. The Lysander was around as an artillery observer pre war with a doctrine, and the use of fighter reconnaissance to make such work more survivable was underway in Britain in 1940/41, good use for the early P-40 shipped there, later the P-51. The references I have indicate the system the allies used in WWII was developed and tested in Britain then exported to North Africa, in June 1942 half the army had it, in July all did. The desert commanders already had a system based on the pre war ideas but proved and improved the one from Britain. Things like forward air controllers were a 1943 improvement, logically following on from the forward artillery observers idea. While it all seems logical now despite the reports units in Britain did not pick up on the changes done in the Mediterranean and had to learn after D-Day. Then with even more air resources they could increase the amount of support and decrease waiting times.

The RAF strength return for front line units on 1 July 1942 simply says Kittyhawk, establishment 178, strength 103, 68 serviceable, the 1 September return, establishment 112, strength 101 I, 11 II, 4 III., 1 October establishment 112, strength 57 I, 19 II, 59 III after receiving 1 I, 47 II and 67 III during the month, writing off 16 I, 2 II and 7 III. It will be interesting to see how many Hurricane I were being lost, there seems to be some still in the TAC/R units, but whether those units were doing operations is unknown.

My understanding is that the 'tentacle' system was more about spotting and relaying positions of enemy troops to ground forces. The forward observer system for calling in air strikes came later.

My point is I gave a date for the FCO use, since your "later" was earlier than the date I had.

Mediterranean Air War, page 401-403, lists the following US and heavy and medium bomber types in Theater for Oct 27 1942 (so i.e. before Torch and during 2nd Al Alamein)
(under "Air HQ, Egypt"):
US 1st Bombardment Group (Provisional)
9th Sqn B-17E
Halverson Sqn B-24D

Thanks for that, my quick check of the 9th Air Force figures for the desert had all heavy bomber figures under B-24, which vaguely did not seem right. Time to look at more specific references, Rust's The 9th Air Force in World War II. The B-17E unit that did a sort of world tour, the 9th squadron of the 7th Bomb Group, arrived from India on 28 June, they had 7 B-17, though on 19 July strength is given as 9, with 3 serviceable. And that is the entire mention of the unit. The USAAF combat squadrons has it in the Middle East from 2 July to 4 October, the returning to India. It also had some LB-30 and re-equipped with B-24 in 1942. The abbreviated histories of USAAF groups does not mention the Middle East deployment. If the squadron history is correct it was gone by 27 October, not sure about how many B-17 it had when departing. No losses mentioned in the B-17 list, https://384thbombgroup.com/_content/downloads/FORTLOG.pdf

The two USAAF squadrons were being serviced by 134 squadron RAF, nominally a single seat fighter unit, they are both reported present on 20 October by the RAF.

What I actually meant (again) is that these aircraft types alone were insufficient and could not have carried the day.

So with only Hurricanes and Blenheims the Air Force cannot carry the day and so the Air force is not "decisive"? In turn leading to the loss of 1st Alamein? You change your language and we can only go on what is written.

I'm sorry but you are all over the map again here and are making factual errors, I'll try to break it down point by point in a subsequent post.

The all over the map includes axis supply issues, problems and effects of air attacks.

Allow me to explain this. Since you are challenging everything I post in this discussion, and sometimes pretending I said things I didn't, it is a convenient short cut to refer to your own numbers to make my point. 50% losses of supplies are due to interdiction across the Med, according to your own numbers.

If I was challenging everything there would be a line by line reply. And I do not pretend. Your 50% figure applies to what period? I gave key monthly figures, to expand on that in the period June 1940 to December 1942 losses at sea hit 50% or more twice, November 1941 and December 1942. So where does your 50% figure come from? Or can it be interpreted as 50% of supplies that did not make it to the front were lost at sea, the other on land? Does any land total include the supplies the supply system needed? Metric tons.

Cargo	All Cargo	All Cargo	dry cargo	Fuel	% all	Note
Month	sent	arrived	arrived	arrived	cargo lost	Note
May-42​	93188​	86439​	67858​	18581​	7.24​
Jun-42​	41519​	32327​	26759​	5568​	22.14​	1192 tons fuel lost.
Jul-42​	97794​	91491​	67590​	23901​	6.45​
Aug-42​	77134​	51655​	29152​	22503​	33.03​	41% loss of fuel.
Sep-42​	96903​	77526​	46465​	31061​	20.00​
Oct-42​	83695​	46698​	34390​	12308​	44.20​

So here at least we have defined one of the points of contention clearly: Were the two battles of El Alamein close, or something of a foregone conclusion?

Few battles are forgone conclusions, first Alamein required the allied command to remain disrupted for the axis to win, that did not happen, fresh troops arrived and in any case the axis forces lacked the supplies to go much further. As for second Alamein the axis win if the allies call off the attack but by this time the allies were well informed about the state of axis forces, they could keep going. A whole lot of things have to break for the axis in a situation where they have lost intelligence and essentially, if Ehler is correct need to land 4 times the fuel the army needs to supply it with fuel, 3 for supply system, 1 for army, that is not sustainable. The US supply histories covering the Red Ball and similar make it clear how much supply the supply system needed in that situation. There were a series of US truck convoy supply routes, Red Ball is just the best known.

On 10th September 1944 the Red Ball route is effectively doubled from St Lo to Soissons for the 1st Army and Sommesous for the 3rd Army. The southern route round trip is now 590 miles, the northern route even longer. On 20th September the road between Courville and Alencon, being used by the Red Ball Express, is in such a bad shape that further maintenance is impractical, an alternative route is chosen. The Red Ball express northern termination is moved to Hirson. The northern route round trip is now 696 miles. Tyre consumption was so bad all the trailers had to be taken out of service to keep the trucks going at the cost of supply lift.

Ok here is another point of contention: Did the Germans interdict Allied supply chains with any air strikes in North Africa? Do you mean for a specific time period?

You were the one who made the claim, you need to provide the evidence.

Repeat,

Does this mean the barrages in WWII were similarly ineffective, and is that except for SP 105mm guns? Given how good you rated them above? It had to be airstrikes?

Another opinion about being close battles, so Supercharge was the last roll of the dice at Second Alamein? Rommel and his under 30 operational Panzers was really close as of 3 July to shifting a dug in infantry division with more than divisional artillery in support? Or bypassing it with adequate supplies and force to press on? To run into fresh troops further back. Von Mellenthin, being a staff member at DAK HQ is completely mistaken on 4 July?

You would have to clarify a bit what you are actually asking for here.

The way advancing causes loss of combat power, in particular tanks, and the amount of supplies needed in the supply system, Rommel needed 8th Army to remain as confused as it was at Mersa Matruth, that did not happen, he definitely did not need Auchinleck making routine use of massed artillery, by the looks of things the biggest barrages yet done in the desert.

Am I correct in understanding that you are making the argument that the DAF was basically useless or irrelevant to the outcome of these two battles? Because I think that would be an outlier position.

I have already stated my views on the DAF, it was not decisive. Now sit down and figure out how you managed to get from not decisive to where you did.

In spite of this being an aviation forum and y'all being aviation buffs, clearly there are many people here who think that aviation played relatively little role in ground warfare.

I disagree 100%. I believe the Stuka specifically was actually pivotal, crucial to the success in Poland and especially France. It wasn't 'just' or even 'mostly' propaganda, if anything I believe it is a bit understated.

Actually what people are doing is pointing out you are overstating the case. Consider Tobruk in 1941, the Germans had months, air supremacy and Stukas, so they should have been able to systematically eliminate the AA guns, the artillery, the concrete bunkers then support the crushing attack into the much weakened defence as per your Malta plan. Rommel asked for and received a siege train. Poland was going to lose, it was heavily outnumbered, France had a very slow command system. The combined arms attacks made things easier for the Germans, as noted before the idea the Luftwaffe was decisive meant it tried the Battle of Britain, including one raid, target destroyed beliefs.

The bombs, rockets and artillery shells were not powerful enough, so a near miss was usually a miss if the troops were in even light field works.

A good example of airpower in support is the forcing of the Meuse, initially aided by the allied command refusing to believe the attack was coming, on troops who had not been properly trained by April 1940 standards. As the artillery could not deploy the crossing was supported by 900 bomber and 180 Stuka sorties for Guderian and 360 bomber and 90 Stuka for Rheinhardt along with 88mm guns and those of the troops, the plan was for 8 hours of attacks from 0800, they began at 1000. Other Luftwaffe forces were doing interdiction. The air attacks did little material damage, they undermined the morale of the defenders, they also hit a couple of German units. The German troops attacked at 1500. This was a clear target for the airmen, with a well defined bomb line, a series of planned attacks, not really making use of the liaison system, that came later.

World War I showed attacking front line positions was costly for the air force and struggled to inflict losses on the troops, if it was done in good co-ordination with an attack it helped overall, but was swapping higher air force casualties for lower ground force ones. Even in WWI if the enemy was forced to move air power could inflict high casualties, like the artillery really, catch the enemy in the open. Once they stopped the value of an air strike, like an artillery bombardment, rapidly faded as an aid to attackers, unless you had massed heavy bombers. It was hard enough for the army to do artillery and infantry attacks, aircraft were harder to time correctly.

The RAF/British Army Close Support organization was changing as experience was gained. CAS depends on the communication system and knowledge of where friendly and enemy troops are. Diagrams from Vic Flinthams 'Close Call' Volume I (first and last diagram) and AP 3235 'Air Support' (middle two) show this over a period of time:

Nice diagrams, if I read things correctly in 1940 division HQ was aware but then had to ask permission of higher air headquarters, interesting if the formations in the field were really in direct communication with Air Force HQ, but then again the force was 2 divisions and the RAF available was similarly sized. In September 1941 brigades are now listening and can talk to the aircraft, but authority to order aircraft is at Corps level in the army, no mention of the hand off to the air force. In November Corps has to hand off to another HQ which is only linked to it, not the aircraft reporting system.

Alamein there is none or only one link between the aircraft and the authority to allocate strikes. Another diagram expands this, which shows the brigade/division/corps links. Everyone is informed at the same time, everyone can have a say if they feel it is required. Other corps HQ can also listen in at least.

Hi
Ehler's book ('The Mediterranean Air War'), pages 236-241, has this reference the lead up to 2nd battle of El Alamein:

Thanks for that. What is reference 66? That is a rear services fuel consumption higher than I thought it would be.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Hi
Ehler's book ('The Mediterranean Air War'), pages 236-241, has this reference the lead up to 2nd battle of El Alamein:
View attachment 701875
View attachment 701876
View attachment 701877
Mike

I think this pretty well makes my point. I'll make a post highlighting a couple of specific areas later.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Title of thread
"Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?"

First post

" My premise is that the Luftwaffe, having dominated the skies for most of mid 1941 through mid 1942 (and contributed greatly to Axis victories in that period), started having some trouble with the British air forces in mid 1942 and that the British had acquired some abilities (through improving kit and tactics) that the Luftwaffe did not have. And that this, in turn, led to the downfall of the Luftwaffe in North Africa and the increasing efficacy of the DAF as a factor in the ground battles, followed swiftly by the demise of the Afrika Korps."

Picture of a Tiger tank in crater does not show any relation to "improving kit and tactics" of the DAF. There were no Tiger tanks anywhere near El Alamein

I never pretended it did, that was a reference to air power vs tanks in general and when you can tell the difference between when artillery or an air strike did the damage.

I've been taking you on the level so far but this is a disingenuous comment.

The British had steady improvement in "kit and tactics" in DAF during good part of the year.
They also had an improvement in supply, more air craft, more fuel, more bombs
The Ground troops also had improvements in "kit and supply".
More and/or better tanks.
Tanks that could fire HE.
More artillery.
More or better AT guns.
More Artillery Ammo. More guns without more ammo doesn't mean much.

MikeMeech's post of the book pages clearly does show an improvement in the DAF's efforts and effectiveness and the decline in the Luftwaffe's efforts and effectiveness.

Yes it does indeed

Some is due to tactics on both sides, a lot is due to numbers and supply.

It had to do with reasons I stated. As Coningham himself noted and Rommel dismally observed, the fighters were key. You can see this in the Allied losses leading up to mid 1942. The Germans were winning lopsided victories in the air, and then that started to go away.

Getting 4-5 new squadrons of fighters (or reequipping some squadrons) with a slightly newer fighter was not going to make much difference when you are talking a supply difference of over 2 to 1.

What it did was change the ratio of losses to an acceptable level, because earlier in the year the Luftwaffe was winning at a rate of much more than 2 to 1.

The Axis supply situation, as I think the article posted above makes abundantly clear, was made at least twice as bad precisely due to Allied air strikes.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Anecdotes aren't evidence. Nicholas Alkemade fell 18,000' out of a Lancaster and lived to tell about it, but that didn't stop the Brits from issuing 'chutes all the same.

So how many pics like this do you have to support your contention?

I never said it did or it was, my only point was that contrary to what was said upthread, it's not really that hard to find photos of M4 with their 12.7mm machine gun. I know from a big stack of books on armored combat in WW2 that they used the .50 cal because it's mentioned constantly in battle reports and personal accounts by the troops. The Germans also mention it..

 

[Shortround6]

The RAF strength return for front line units on 1 July 1942 simply says Kittyhawk, establishment 178, strength 103, 68 serviceable, the 1 September return, establishment 112, strength 101 I, 11 II, 4 III., 1 October establishment 112, strength 57 I, 19 II, 59 III after receiving 1 I, 47 II and 67 III during the month, writing off 16 I, 2 II and 7 III.

As I understand this, could be wrong.

July 1st.................................103 Kittyhawks (1 and 1A) something as establishment drop from 178 to 112, but actual strength only dropped two planes, change in paper strength or wrong word?
Sept 1st ............................... 101 Kittyhawk Is, 11 Kittyhawk IIs (P-40Fs), 4 Kittyhawk IIIs (P-40Ks)
Oct 1st ...................................57 Kittyhawk Is, 19 Kittyhawk IIs (P-40Fs), 59 Kittyhawk IIIs (P-40Ks)

Overall strength changed very little in the RAF? US contingent was getting larger.
Bulk of the P-40Fs are with the US 57th fighter group. The 57th fighter group was loaded onto the Ranger on July 1st 1942. The planes were flown off on July 19th to Accra and then on to the cross Africa trip to Egypt. Got there in time for the 2nd Battle of El Alamein. Some of the 57th aircraft had been "borrowed" from British production to make up numbers. 57th aircraft showed a mix of camouflage and fin flashes early in the campaign after arrival.
P-40Ks had better performance down low than the P-40Es without using emergency boost. The two planes were very close together using emergency boost. Difference in both military power and emergency boost disappeared at around 11,500-13,000ft depending on speed and climb.

Not seeing a big difference in the numbers or capability of the Kittyhawk contingent of the DAF except the increase in numbers of the 57th fighter group,

57th fighter group website.

57th Fighter Group

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

As I understand this, could be wrong.

July 1st.................................103 Kittyhawks (1 and 1A) something as establishment drop from 178 to 112, but actual strength only dropped two planes, change in paper strength or wrong word?
Sept 1st ............................... 101 Kittyhawk Is, 11 Kittyhawk IIs (P-40Fs), 4 Kittyhawk IIIs (P-40Ks)
Oct 1st ...................................57 Kittyhawk Is, 19 Kittyhawk IIs (P-40Fs), 59 Kittyhawk IIIs (P-40Ks)

Overall strength changed very little in the RAF? US contingent was getting larger.
Bulk of the P-40Fs are with the US 57th fighter group. The 57th fighter group was loaded onto the Ranger on July 1st 1942. The planes were flown off on July 19th to Accra and then on to the cross Africa trip to Egypt. Got there in time for the 2nd Battle of El Alamein. Some of the 57th aircraft had been "borrowed" from British production to make up numbers. 57th aircraft showed a mix of camouflage and fin flashes early in the campaign after arrival.
P-40Ks had better performance down low than the P-40Es without using emergency boost. The two planes were very close together using emergency boost. Difference in both military power and emergency boost disappeared at around 11,500-13,000ft depending on speed and climb.

Not seeing a big difference in the numbers or capability of the Kittyhawk contingent of the DAF except the increase in numbers of the 57th fighter group,

57th fighter group website.

57th Fighter Group

At the factory is one thing, in the field is another.

The difference between the Kittyhawk I and the Kittyhawk III comes down to three things, and none of them are actually the boost ratings. They were not using factory boost settings since Spring of 1942, and the boost rating was up to the individual crew chief and pilot. Some used the automatic boost control on the K some did not. The Aussies in particular had already been overboosting to probably dangerous levels for several months by El Alamein and used their own chosen boost settings. Some of them still were after the compromise 60" Hg WEP setting had been agreed to with Allison and the US War Dept.

The difference with the P-40K was 1) that the V-1710-73 engine was strengthened (crank shaft and crank case IIRC, and I think bearings) so it could handle the higher boost settings better, and 2) the aircraft either had a tail fin (early P-40K) or a lengthened fuselage (later P-40K and all subsequent models) so as to make it more stable at the higher boost / RPM, and 3) there was a change made to the ammunition storage or guns (I can't remember the details precisely) which reduced the number of stoppages / jams.

Add to the confusion the fact that some Kittyhawk I and Ia (P-40D and E) were being re-engined with V-1710-73s as these became available, and the lines are blurred a bit more.

One of the problems with all the Allied fighters in the Western Desert, Hurricane, Spitfire, Tomahawk and Kittyhawk, was that their guns jammed a lot in fighting. This was also true in the Pacific. During a turning fight where the pilot was pulling G, it was not a matter of "if" but "when" guns would start 'packing up' as the Aussies put it. This did not go away with the P-40K and F but it improved a lot. They were also more stable (making it safer to engage in high speed escape maneuvers) and the higher boost settings could be used a lot more safely. The P-4K was just a more effective version of the E, probably by a significant margin.

But the biggest difference to the air superiority situation was the P-40F and L, which equipped one RAF squadron (260 Sqn) at El Alamein plus the the 57th FG units, and then ultimately 2 RAF squadrons (260 RAF and 3 RAAF), 5 full US Fighter Groups (57th, 33rd, 325th, 324th, and 79th), the first Tuskegee squadron (99th FS) and a Free French squadron were equpped with the Merlin-engined P-40's.

Whatever you want to assign as the reasons though, it's clear from the data that Allied air losses went down from mid 1942, while Axis losses went up.

It's also worth noting, if you check Shores, in October 1942 DAF P-40 pilots made claims on 25 different days (53.5 claims total - 32 of these by Kittyhawk II or III). Spitfire pilots made claims on 15 days (35.5 claims total). Hurricane pilots made claims on 4 days (12 claims). So unless the rate of overclaiming varied a great deal by aircraft type, the P-40s were still carrying the weight of the fighter combat at this point, though there would be a lot of new machines in 1943 (more and better Spitfires, plus P-38s, and eventually P-47s).

 

[Shortround6]

But the biggest difference to the air superiority situation was the P-40F and L, which equipped one RAF squadron (260 Sqn) at El Alamein plus the the 57th FG units, and then ultimately 2 RAF squadrons (260 RAF and 3 RAAF), 5 full US Fighter Groups (57th, 33rd, 325th, 324th, and 79th), the first Tuskegee squadron (99th FS) and a Free French squadron were equpped with the Merlin-engined P-40's.

The L didn't exist at the factory until Jan 1943.
You are quite right, quite a few squadrons and groups used the Merlin powered P-40s, but only about 4-5 (?) a the time of 2nd Alamein, how many were using them in Feb March is not relevant to the discussion. Americans had 3 squadrons, the British had enough for 1 squadron a few extras on Oct 1s.
How many did they have on Oct 23rd? complete squadrons or mixed Squadrons?

Things were changing quickly, 2nd Al Alamein was near the beginning of the change, it wasn't a result of the change to P-40F&L and K&Ms.

 

[WARSPITER]

As with any combined arms endeavour no one element at Alamein was decisive in itself.

There were many decisive actions which involved air, ground, or artillery units but each one is not a battle
winner unless combined with the others.

Artillery played a very important role, especially the versatility of the 25lber. Axis higher ups were concerned that the British
forces had some kind of large calibre auto loading cannon - this was the 25lber.

The Polish invented mine detector was used at Alamein and allowed sappers to get through the minefields in half the time
normally expected. Again something the Axis troops were not expecting as well as saving a lot of troops lives.

Dogged actions such as the defence of the Snipe outpost with mainly 6lber AT supported at times by tanks and air but for the most
part reliant on the men on the ground. The successful action accounted for over fifty armoured vehicles including 32 tanks, most of which were
German from what I have read. The commander - Victor Turner, received the Victoria Cross for his leadership and you don't get them
for nothing.

Pre battle training and logistics were (and always are) a major factor.

The combination of these meant the Axis forces were constantly reacting and were not able to fight on their terms which in the end ground
them down to the point of no return.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The L didn't exist at the factory until Jan 1943.
You are quite right, quite a few squadrons and groups used the Merlin powered P-40s, but only about 4-5 (?) a the time of 2nd Alamein, how many were using them in Feb March is not relevant to the discussion. Americans had 3 squadrons, the British had enough for 1 squadron a few extras on Oct 1s.
How many did they have on Oct 23rd? complete squadrons or mixed Squadrons?

Things were changing quickly, 2nd Al Alamein was near the beginning of the change, it wasn't a result of the change to P-40F&L and K&Ms.

Well I've been kind of waiting to get into the numbers, but I think you'll see that they were changing a lot and these newer planes had a lot to do with it.

I'm going to speak in broad strokes here, always a bit dangerous, but I'm going to plunge into the details later in the thread to backup my point (and probably put a more precise number on this). Right now I'm not trying to convince you I'm right, I'm just going to lay out the argument I'm making.

From roughly the second quarter of 1941 when the Luftwaffe arrived in some force (with Bf 109s) the British air forces started suffering high and disproportionate casualties. This disrupted offensive operations as well as defensive. Roughly third quarter of 1941 the Tomahawk started making a small difference but this was rather quickly offset by the arrival of the Bf109F-4 and increasing numbers of MC 202 which everyone seems dismissive of but caused major problems for the Allies. What I mean by this is (very roughly) they were losing aircraft at a rate of very roughly speaking something like 5-10 Allied for 1 or 2 Axis, sometimes worse than that. I'll post some examples later to put a harder number on it. But it was extreme. Some of this is offset by the fact that the Axis was basically letting their fighter units attack DAF fighters in the optimal conditions, which didn't always have the most tactical significance, but the key factor here is that Allied bombers were also being lost at a rate that meant they couldn't be used that effectively. Luftwaffe tactical bombers were also playing more of a role in the ground fighting, while DAF was relatively ineffective.

Roughly Mid 1942 saw the changes in policy to proper fighter formations, the first Spitfires, and increased boost ratings for the Kittyhawks. Third quarter of 1942 saw the first Kittyhawk IIs arriving and the first US P-40F. More US bomber types (Baltimores, Bostons and pretty soon B-25s and B-24s) were arriving, increasing long range strike effectiveness. Kittyhawk IIs were the best escorts for these. Heavy fighter escort, as both Coningham and Rommel noted in the excerpts posted above, was key to success in daylight bombing missions (some of the longer range strikes were done at night). More longer range strikes and fighter attacks were targeting Axis shipping (which brings us back to the whole Malta issue).

By Second El Alamein, the small number of Kittyhawk II / and US P-40F and III available were enabling the longer range daytime strikes with much reduced bomber losses. Spitfires and later model Kittyhawks were helping win air superiority over the battlefield. Very roughly speaking, the rate of losses in air combat dropped from something like 5-1 to more like 1.5-1. That was a ratio that the Allies could endure. During October 1942 the Axis lost 81 aircraft (62 shot down, 19 crash landed), of which most were fighters (41 were Bf 109s, and 19 were MC 202s). The Allies lost 90, of which only 6 bombers.

In October the later model P-40s were making the lions share of the claims against Axis aircraft, followed closely by Spitfire Vs. So I would point this out to show that the new types (with the new tactics) did make a difference.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm going to speak in broad strokes here, always a bit dangerous, but I'm going to plunge into the details later in the thread to backup my point (and probably put a more precise number on this). Right now I'm not trying to convince you I'm right, I'm just going to lay out the argument I'm making.

Nobody is arguing that the DAF didn't do a lot great things and contribute a lot to the success of the NA campaign.
What is being argued is WHEN, and it is your title and opening post.
Before/during 1st El Alamein (July 1942) and 2nd Alamein (Oct 23-Nov 11th 1942).
Anything that happened after Nov 11th doesn't count for this discussion so be careful with the brush strokes.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Nobody is arguing that the DAF didn't do a lot great things and contribute a lot to the success of the NA campaign.
What is being argued is WHEN, and it is your title and opening post.
Before/during 1st El Alamein (July 1942) and 2nd Alamein (Oct 23-Nov 11th 1942).
Anything that happened after Nov 11th doesn't count for this discussion so be careful with the brush strokes.

yes I think this was already telling in first, and especially second El Alamein.

The presence of the Spitfires was a big deal in the first battle. The Spit V, burdened by tropical kit, arguably wasn't quite as good as a 109F-4 or the later G-2, and probably also a bit inferior to the MC 202, but they could go toe to toe with them at altitude. This largely negated the big advantage the Germans had in which they could basically pick their fights and quite often attack unsuspecting Allied squadrons by surprise, thus contributing to the uneven loss rates. The Spitfire evened that out quite a bit, at least at the shorter ranges.

When the Kittyhawk IIs started showing up a bit later, this same capability was increased over the short range and extended out to the medium range escort missions, and a bit longer ranged fighter-bomber strikes. This is about the same time the attacks on the Axis air bases started to ramp up. The Kittyhawk IIIs made the low level fighter bombers more dangerous to attack so the Axis fighters started taking losses there too.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The whole point is that the Luftwaffe, and for a while the Regia Aeronautica too, were enjoying a long period of marked, you might say grotesquely uneven outcomes in air combat. British and Commonwealth pilots were dying at rather awful rates, machines were being chewed up as soon as they arrived, and the DAF was relatively ineffective. This in turn, IMO, contributed to the highly uneven outcomes in the land battles. Axis were winning against numerical odds and by a wide margin.

This is the only way the Axis could continue to win, because the Allies had the numbers and better (and less vulnerable) supply chain.

Many factors came together and this shifted rather swiftly in mid 1942. DAF started becoming much more effective, the huge imbalance in losses of aircraft and aircrew which had been so much in favor of the Axis now shifted much closer toward parity. The DAF gained new capabilities at interdiction. The Axis failed to neutralize Malta. All that meant doom, and the results changed accordingly on the ground as well.

I do think the changes in ground forces, and ground force organization also mattered. I am not arguing that those were irrelevant (I listed several factors on the ground as key back where this argument branched off) but the impact of the air forces was 'decisive', IMO, and you can read that pretty clearly in the excerpts MikeMeech posted.

 

[glennasher]

I suspect that the SAS raiding Luftwaffe airfields contributed a lot to the decline of the GAF during this time, too.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I never said it did or it was, my only point was that contrary to what was said upthread, it's not really that hard to find photos of M4 with their 12.7mm machine gun. I know from a big stack of books on armored combat in WW2 that they used the .50 cal because it's mentioned constantly in battle reports and personal accounts by the troops. The Germans also mention it..

I was talking about the multiplicity of influences on the war in the desert, and when you wrote that you have a hard time untangling them, I asked how you could claim air power decisive without being able to untangle the furball.

I'm having a hard time seeing how your picture of an upside-down tank answers that question.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I was talking about the multiplicity of influences on the war in the desert, and when you wrote that you have a hard time untangling them, I asked how you could claim air power decisive without being able to untangle the furball.

My point is simply that sometimes it isn't a ''furball". Not all battles are the same either in terms of what happened or how much we know about them. Sometimes it's unclear who did what in a battle, sometimes it's very clear...

I'm having a hard time seeing how your picture of an upside-down tank answers that question.

...like when you see a bomb crater and an upside down tank. But I just meant that as an analogy.

Anyway, the time for debating this in the abstract is over. To keep going on like that there has to be some baseline of mutual respect which frankly I'm not feeling in some of these posts lately. Which is fair enough, you don't know me from Adam.

And more importantly, we don't need to look at it in the abstract or broad strokes any more. I wanted my points to be clear, and also what the actual points of some of the other people raising objections really were (this is not always clear with some people). Now we can start looking at the data and some good data has already been posted to this thread. I probably can't get into it today, but tomorrow I'll start focusing on a few specific points. Probably something like:

Interdiction of Axis maritime supplies by Allied air strikes, and how much direct impact that had on fuel, food and ammunition for the German and Italian armed forces.
(and how much was due to air vs compared to say, the submarines)
Indirect impact of the same (such as having to move to a different port 150 miles away).
Destruction of Axis supplies on the roads and in depots. In numbers of vehicles, tons of supplies etc.
Neutralization of the threat of Axis air strikes. (how many Axis air strikes were launched? How much damage did they do to Allied ground forces?)
Numbers of Axis aircraft destroyed by bombing their airfields (we have the data on this, down to serial numbers of individual aircraft at least for the Germans).

Then if and when we can digest that, maybe we can get into:

Destruction of Axis armored vehicles by DAF air strikes (numbers of tanks, SP guns, trucks etc.).
Destruction of Axis artillery and anti-tank guns (especially the 88s mm AT guns) and the direct ramifications of that on the ongoing battle.
Morale effect of Allied air strikes (on both sides).
Whether or not any Axis columns were halted by air strikes.
Whether or not any Allied columns were able to continue thanks to air strikes. All supported by...
...commentary by ground forces on the Axis side
...commentary by ground forces on the Allied side
...commentary by pilots on both sides
...commentary by commanders on both sides.
Statistics of lost vehicles, kit, people etc. as closely verified by hard data as possible.

And more....

 

[BiffF15]

Wild Bill,

There have been some "humorous" comments made on here, however disregard them. In face to face communication not everyone has the same threshold of what is considered okay versus over the line. In forum dialogue it's even harder because so much of what one interprets depends on you the reader, not the writer.

On the airpower as decisive I think it might help if you that word, along with adequate, good, great, etc., were all given a definition and value so that in the end it doesn't finish with everyone agreeing to disagree (probable outcome). By value it gives weight in a numeric term, but then one needs to determine a "passing / winning" grade...

I'm watching, and it's like a good tennis match with my views changing with every hit. Keep it up.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

My point is simply that sometimes it isn't a ''furball". Not all battles are the same either in terms of what happened or how much we know about them. Sometimes it's unclear who did what in a battle, sometimes it's very clear...

That might have been an unfortunate word-choice on my part at an aviation forum. I'm saying that if you can't say you can really unwind the different threads that play into a battle or campaign, how is it possible to even define what is or is not decisive?

Anyway, the time for debating this in the abstract is over. To keep going on like that there has to be some baseline of mutual respect which frankly I'm not feeling in some of these posts lately. Which is fair enough, you don't know me from Adam.

Just so you know, I dig so much of what you do, even if we don't always agree. If you feel I've been disrespectful you have my apologies, because even in disagreement I strive to be respectful; and if I've failed here I will own it. I've got a lot of respect for you and if I've failed to convey it call me out. You make me think and that's a good thing.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

On the airpower as decisive I think it might help if you that word, along with adequate, good, great, etc., were all given a definition and value so that in the end it doesn't finish with everyone agreeing to disagree (probable outcome). By value it gives weight in a numeric term, but then one needs to determine a "passing / winning" grade...

Right, this is not a black-or-white thing. Airpower clearly played a big role, on both sides, and the influence of airpower on each side evolved as the war progressed. Decisive? I'm not sure. Important? Of course.

More decisive than airpower was the Axis refusal to take Malta, if such were possible. It's very hard to run when you've got a stone in your shoe, but that's what they tried.